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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, the first international 
tribunal to try individuals for international crimes, the role of victims of international 
crimes in international criminal proceedings has been limited to that of witnesses. The 
ad hoc international tribunals – the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) did not change this position. As such, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first international criminal tribunal to provide 
for the rights of victims to participate in their own right in criminal proceedings. 
Similarly, it is the first such tribunal to provide for the right to reparations.  
This thesis focuses on the right of victims to participation and to reparations 
under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It argues that the ICC 
offers an opportunity for the entrenchment of the concerns of victims in the 
international criminal process. However, it suggests that this depends on what 
framework of justice the Court adopts. The thesis further argues that previous 
international criminal tribunals – the IMT at Nuremberg and the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals (ICTY, ICTR and SCSL) – operated on retributive and utilitarian 
theories of criminal justice that are exclusionary of and inimical to specific concerns of 
victims of international crimes. The largely retributive and utilitarian objects driving 
these systems limited victims to a peripheral status in the process and failed to address 
fully the harm occasioned to victims.  
This thesis suggests that the ICC should adopt a restorative justice paradigm in 
order to give full effect to the rights of victims while protecting the rights of 
defendants and meeting the law enforcement functions of the Court. The thesis 
reviewed the relevant texts – the Rome Statute, its Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
and other instruments – and demonstrated the fact that the ICC framework provides a 
basis for such a restorative justice paradigm. In order to suggest a trajectory for the 
operationalisation of the ICC victims’ rights regime underpinned by principles of 
restorative justice, the thesis attempts a systematic review of the rights of victims in 
criminal law processes in select domestic criminal justice systems, international human 
rights tribunals and other international courts. At the same time, the thesis reviews the 
implementation of reparations in various contexts and made suggestions as to how the 
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ICC and the Victim Trust Fund (VTF) should proceed in this regard within the 
relevant legal and institutional framework. 
In relation to the right to participate, the thesis concludes that Article 68(3) of 
the Rome Statute – the general provision on the subject – strikes the right balance 
between the right of victims to participate, defence rights to an expeditious trial and 
the law enforcement function of the Prosecutor. However, the scope of victim 
participation at various stages of the proceedings will depend on, among others, the 
paradigm of justice adopted by the Court and, in view of the Prosecutor’s seemingly 
knee-jerk opposition to victim participation, the attitude adopted by the Court itself to 
this new right of victims to participate. The thesis reviewed relevant texts and 
concluded that the Rome Statute’s victims’ rights regime presupposes a restorative 
model of justice – understood as values and principles rather than ‘practices’ and 
‘methods’ as applied in some national criminal justice systems. Restorative justice 
contemplates a central role for victims of crime in relevant proceedings. Henceforth, 
the rights of defendants must not only be weighed against the concerns of the 
Prosecutor but also the right of victims to participate. 
The thesis concluded further that the tests established for victims’ participation 
– appropriateness, the requirement for their personal interests to be affected and the 
rights of defendants – present serious challenges in view of the fact that ICC crimes for 
the most part will involve mass atrocity. The number of victims who may eventually 
participate in particular proceedings is thus very small. The thesis notes that while the 
provision for legal representation of victims alleviates some of the difficulties 
associated with participation by a varied mix of victims in complex proceedings, it 
may be considered as diminishing the impact of direct participation. While the scope 
and modes of victim participation will vary at various phases of proceedings, current 
jurisprudence at the ICC shows that the Court seems to favour a broad presumption of 
victim participation. Since full realisation by victims of the right to participate will 
depend on the role that the Court will play, it is crucial that the right paradigm of 
justice is adopted. 
With respect to the right to reparations, the thesis notes that this is perhaps the 
greatest innovation in the Rome Statute. The study found that the Rome Statute 
establishes two ‘focal points’ for purposes of reparations – the Court and the Victim 
Trust Fund (VTF) – in close relationship with each other. Drawing from the 
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experience of national criminal justice systems, the thesis acknowledged the practical 
difficulties involved in vesting a criminal court with a reparation function will pose 
particular challenges for the Court. These include the need to protect the right of a 
defendant to a speedy trial, the presumption of innocence and to conduct efficient 
proceedings. Having reviewed the texts and relevant jurisprudence, the study 
concluded that various mechanisms, including various permissive rules and the 
creation of the VTF make it possible to address some of the difficulties associated with 
the right to reparations in the ICC. 
The thesis further noted that while a reading of the relevant provisions 
establishes the possibility of the Court and VTF instituting independent reparations 
schemes, it is imperative that the two collaborate in order to give full effect to that 
function. In any case, while Regulation 56 of the Court’s Regulations provides for the 
possibility of considering reparations issues during the main trial, the fact that a 
reparation order against an accused is dependent on finding of guilt of the accused, it 
necessarily means that a definitive finding on reparation has to come after that. 
Further, the thesis concluded that in context of mass atrocities and the possibility that 
numerous victims may prove the requisite links to a case to obtain reparations, holding 
joint proceedings would complicate and burden the trial. However, the thesis endorsed 
the initial view of the Court that evidence concerning reparations could, at least in part 
– where appropriate, and in the interest of efficiency and victims – be considered 
during the trial. 
The thesis further concluded that the VTF, which presents greater flexibility 
than the Court in terms of standards of proof, the requirement for criminal liability and 
various other mechanisms should be allowed a more prominent role in the processing 
of reparations. A survey of various mass reparation schemes – Holocaust reparations, 
South African TRC, the Rwandan Gacaca model and the United Nations 
Compensation Commission (UNCC), as well as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a 
particular mass tort litigation mechanism – offer some useful lessons on a range of 
challenging reparation related questions. 
The study concluded that while the Rome Statute offers an important 
opportunity for victims in terms of reparations, various challenges including shortage 
of funds and the large number of victims requires that situation countries – those states 
under investigation by the ICC and from which victims are drawn – cannot abandon 
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their primary responsibility of providing appropriate remedies for victims. The ICC is 
not, and cannot be a panacea for the concerns of victims of international crimes. 
 
.
 v 
 
DECLARATIONS 
 
I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. I further declare that this 
dissertation has never before been submitted for any degree or examination in any 
university. 
GODFREY M MUSILA 
 
Sign:       Dated: 
This thesis has been submitted with our permission as university supervisors. 
PROF VINCENT O NMEHIELLE 
 
Sign:       Dated: 
PROF THEUNIS ROUX 
 
Sign:       Dated: 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors Prof Theunis Roux, 
Prof Vincent O Nmehielle and Dr Mia Swart for their guidance, insight and support 
during the writing of this thesis. I am equally beholden to the South African Institute 
for Advanced Constitutional Public, Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC) 
and its Director Prof Theunis Roux for financial support that made this project 
possible. I am thankful for the moral and intellectual support of colleagues at SAIFAC 
and Wits including Solomon Ayele Dersso, George Mukundi, and Mmatsie Mooki. 
Sincere gratitude goes to my one-time students and friends James Fowkes and Abigail 
Marcus for reading with a keen eye through some of my drafts. A special thanks goes 
to my fiancée Sosina for her support and for all the formatting work. To my siblings; 
Martin, Edwin, Jovan, Nancy, Carolyne and Lilian for their enduring love and support 
over the years. 
 vii 
DEDICATION 
 
To my parents Angelina (deceased) and John Musila, who encouraged my early steps 
on this academic journey. 
 viii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AC     Appeals Chamber 
AfCHPR   African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
AFRC    Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
ASP    Assembly of States Parties 
ATCA    Alien Torts Claims Act (USA) 
CAT    Convention Against Torture 
CDF    Civil Defence Forces 
CEC    Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers 
CPS    Crown Prosecution Service 
CRT    Claim Resolution Tribunal  
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECHR    European Court on Human Rights 
FVWPA   Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act 
HRC    Human Rights Committee 
IACHtHR    Inter American Court of Human Rights 
ICC     International Criminal Court 
ICCPR    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICEP    Independent Committee of Eminent Persons  
ICJ    International Court of Justice 
ICL    International Criminal Law 
ICTR    International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 
IHL    International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL    International Human Right Law 
ILC    International Law Commission 
IMT    International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) 
IMTFE   International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NOVA    National Organization for Victim Association 
OTP    Office of the Prosecutor 
OPCV    Office of Public Counsel for Victims 
PCIJ    Permanent Court of International Justice 
PIL    Public International Law  
PTC     Pre-Trial Chamber 
RJ     Restorative Justice 
RPE     Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
RRC    Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation 
RUF    Revolutionary United Front 
SCSL    Special Court for Sierra Leone 
TC     Trial Chamber 
TRC     Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
TVPA    Torture Victim Protection Act 
UN    United Nations  
UNCC    United Nations Compensation Commission 
UNGA    United Nations General Assembly 
 ix 
UNSC    United Nations Security Council 
US    United States 
VCA    Victim of Crime Act 
VPRS    Victims Participation and Reparation Section 
VRM    Victim Rights Movement 
VTF    Victim Trust Fund 
VWU     Victims and Witnesses Unit 
WWI    World War I 
WWII     World War II 
 
 x 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................... i 
DECLARATIONS.......................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...........................................................................................vi 
DEDICATION..............................................................................................................vii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................ x 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................. 5 
THE NEW PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW.............................. 5 
1.1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 5 
1.2. Theoretical Underpinnings of ICL........................................................................ 8 
1.3. Rethinking International Criminal Law.............................................................. 11 
1.4. Understanding Restorative Justice...................................................................... 13 
1.5. Restorative Justice as the Framework for the ICC.............................................. 18 
1.6. Justification for the Formulation of Restorative Justice Adopted in the Work .. 24 
1.7. Rights and Concerns of Victims: A General Outline.......................................... 27 
1.8.1 The Right to Participate in Proceedings........................................................ 29 
1.8.2 The Right to Reparations .............................................................................. 31 
1.8.3 Right to Protection ........................................................................................ 31 
CHAPTER TWO .......................................................................................................... 34 
FROM NUREMBERG TO SIERRA LEONE: ............................................................ 34 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW ............................................................................................................................. 34 
2.1. Introduction: International Responses to International Crimes .......................... 34 
2.2. Squandered Opportunities: Versailles, Sevres and Lausanne............................. 35 
2.3. The International Criminal Tribunal Experiment ............................................... 37 
2.4.1 The International Military Tribunals: Nuremberg and Tokyo...................... 38 
2.4.2 The Nuremberg Precedent and Retributive Justice in ICL ........................... 39 
2.4. Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: ICTY and ICTR............................... 41 
2.4.1  The Ad Hoc Tribunals and Victims: The Forgotten Parties? ...................... 43 
2.5. Beyond Rwanda: New Responses to International Crimes ................................ 47 
2.5.1 The Special Court for Sierra Leone .............................................................. 50 
2.5.2 The Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission......................... 52 
2.5.2.1 Participation, Truth and Reconciliation ..................................................... 53 
2.5.2.2 Reparations, Restoration and Reconciliation............................................. 54 
2.5.2.3 Lessons From Sierra Leone ....................................................................... 56 
CHAPTER THREE ...................................................................................................... 59 
VICTIMS IN THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK:.............................. 59 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
TRIBUNALS ................................................................................................................ 59 
3.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................... 59 
3.2 The State Responsibility Framework................................................................... 59 
3.2.1 The International Court of Justice................................................................. 62 
3.3 Reliance on International Human Rights Law by the ICC .................................. 66 
3.4 Victims and Human Rights Oversight Bodies ..................................................... 68 
 xi 
3.4.1 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) ............................................................. 68 
3.5 Regional Human Rights Bodies........................................................................... 70 
3.5.1 The Inter-American Court............................................................................. 70 
3.5.1.1 Duty to Investigate and the Right to Truth ............................................ 71 
3.5.1.2 Right to an Effective Prosecution .......................................................... 72 
3.5.1.3 Right to Access and Participation .......................................................... 73 
3.5.1.4 Reparations ............................................................................................ 75 
3.5.2 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ........................................... 82 
3.5.2.1 Right to Prosecution.................................................................................. 84 
3.5.2.2 Access and Participation in the Criminal Process.................................. 85 
3.5.2.3 Reparations ............................................................................................ 87 
3.5.3 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ........................... 89 
3.5.4 Relevance of Human Rights Case Law ........................................................ 91 
CHAPTER FOUR......................................................................................................... 93 
VICTIMS IN SELECT DOMESTIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS ................... 93 
4.1 ICC Sources of Law and National Criminal Law................................................ 93 
4.2 The Victim Rights Movement and National Experiences ................................... 95 
4.3 United States of America: Law Reforms Relating to Victim Participation and 
Restitution ..................................................................................................................... 96 
4.3.1 Judicial Interpretation and the Constitutional Amendment Debate.............. 99 
4.3.2 US and the ICC Victims’ Rights Regime ................................................... 101 
4.4 United Kingdom and Common Law Jurisdictions............................................. 102 
4.4.1 The Right to Participate and Related Rights............................................... 104 
4.4.2 Compensation and Reparations................................................................... 106 
4.4.3 Relevance of the United Kingdom Experience........................................... 107 
4.5 Civil Law Tradition: France and Continental Europe........................................ 108 
4.5.1 The Right to File a Complaint .................................................................... 109 
4.5.2 The Right to Initiate a Prosecution ............................................................. 110 
4.5.3 The Right to Participate in Criminal Proceedings ...................................... 111 
4.5.4 The Right to Restitution and Compensation............................................... 112 
4.5.5 The Right to Be Informed ........................................................................... 117 
4.6 National Courts and the Question of Complementarity..................................... 119 
4.7 Locating Domestic Law and Practice in the ICC............................................... 121 
CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................ 123 
OPERATIONALISING THE VICTIMS’ REGIME: THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE 
IN PROCEEDINGS.................................................................................................... 123 
5.1 Legal Framework of Participation ..................................................................... 123 
5.2 Prosecutor, Defendants and Victims: A Three-Legged Stool?.......................... 125 
5.2.1 Prosecutor and Law Enforcement: Trumping Other Interests? ...................... 126 
5.2.2 Re-Examining Fair Trial ................................................................................. 127 
5.2.3 ‘The Interests of Justice’ ................................................................................. 129 
5.3 Participation and Legal Representation ............................................................. 131 
5.3.1 The Ad Hoc Tribunals and National Jurisdictions...................................... 131 
5.3.2 ICC Representation Framework ................................................................. 133 
5.3.3 Some Thoughts on the Challenges of Representation ................................ 134 
5.4 FORMS OF VICTIM PARTICIPATION: PRE-TRIAL PHASE ..................... 137 
5.4.1 Basis for the Right to Participate ................................................................ 137 
5.4.2 Role of PTC in Pre-Trial Proceedings ........................................................ 141 
5.4.3 Forms of Participation at the Investigation Stage ....................................... 143 
 xii 
5.4.3.1 Measures Protective of Persons and Evidence..................................... 144 
5.4.3.2 Specific Proceedings Under Art 68(3) ................................................. 145 
5.4.3.3 Authorisation of an Investigation Proprio Motu by Prosecutor........... 145 
5.4.3.4 Confirmation: To Investigate or Not?.................................................. 147 
5.4.3.5 Charging, Confirmation of Charges and Prosecutorial Discretion ...... 148 
5.4.4 International Tribunals................................................................................ 152 
5.4.5 National Experiences .................................................................................. 153 
5.5 TRIAL PHASE .................................................................................................. 154 
5.5.1 Victims and the Trial: What Expectations? ................................................ 154 
5.5.2 Trial and Victims in National Systems ....................................................... 154 
5.5.3 Victims in the ICC Trial Framework .......................................................... 155 
5.5.4 Admission of Guilt and Plea Agreements................................................... 156 
5.5.4.1 Plea Agreements at ICTR and ICTY ................................................... 156 
5.5.4.2 Plea Bargaining in National Jurisdictions............................................ 157 
5.5.4.3 Plea Agreements in the ICC: A Possibility? ........................................ 158 
5.5.5 Modes of Participation at the Trial Proper.................................................. 160 
5.5.5.1 Trial, Defendants’ Rights and Role of Trial Chamber......................... 163 
5.5.5.2 Beyond the Trial: Appeals and Other Proceedings.............................. 167 
CHAPTER SIX........................................................................................................... 170 
OPERATIONALISING THE VICTIMS’ REGIME II: REPARATIONS................. 170 
6.1 Introduction: The ICC Reparations Framework ................................................ 170 
6.2 Reparations as Restorative Justice: Why Reparations in the ICC?.................... 172 
6.3 Reparations: Definitions and Forms .................................................................. 179 
6.4 Implementing Reparations: Issues, Concerns and Challenges .......................... 183 
6.4.1 Criminal and ‘Civil Liability’ Proceedings: To Separate or Not? .............. 183 
6.4.2 The Court and/or the Fund: Independence or Interdependence? ................ 186 
6.4.3 Links Between Two Rights: Participation and Reparations ....................... 189 
6.4.4 Assessing Reparations: Some Specific Issues ............................................ 191 
6.4.4.1 The Concept of Harm: Damage, Loss, or Injury ................................. 191 
6.4.4.2 Assessing Harm: Proposed Principles ................................................. 195 
6.4.4.3 Causation, Standard of Proof and Related Issues ................................ 197 
6.5 Design and Implementation of Mass Reparations Mechanisms ........................ 200 
6.5.1 Holocaust Reparations Programmes ........................................................... 201 
6.5.1.1 Structures and Mandates ...................................................................... 203 
6.5.1.2 Principles, Trends and Lessons............................................................ 205 
6.5.2 South African TRC Model.......................................................................... 209 
6.5.2.1 Structures and Mandates ...................................................................... 211 
6.5.2.2 Principles, Trends and Approaches...................................................... 212 
6.5.3 Rwanda and Gacaca Reparations Model .................................................... 218 
6.5.3.1 Structures and Mandates ...................................................................... 218 
6.5.3.2 Principles, Trends and Lessons............................................................ 220 
6.5.4 UN Compensation Commission: The Case of Iraq-Kuwait ....................... 221 
6.5.5 United States’ Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA)......................................... 223 
6.5.5.1 Available But Inappropriate: The Limits of Litigation........................ 227 
CHAPTER SEVEN .................................................................................................... 229 
CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................... 229 
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................... 242 
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The search by victims of serious atrocities – in particular genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity – for effective remedies has been one punctuated by 
disappointment. While the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT) and Tokyo created a precedent that perpetrators of such atrocities 
would henceforth be liable to face justice, no mechanism existed to address specific 
concerns of victims. Victims played little role other than that of witness (for those 
selected). Reparation for harm suffered by victims was alien to international criminal 
justice processes. The suffering of victims, even when in large numbers, such as those 
victims of the World War II and the Rwandan genocide, was hardly acknowledged, or 
received mere lip service from those concerned. The criminal tribunals established by 
the UN in the early 1990s – the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – did little to change the position of victims in 
international criminal justice for the better. 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is 
empowered to try individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
changes drastically, at least formally, the position of victims. While reinforcing the 
right to protection as practised by previous international criminal tribunals, the Rome 
Statute establishing the Court provides for the right of victims to participate at all 
stages of the Court’s proceedings and to reparations.1 This study focuses on these two 
aspects of victims’ rights – participation and reparations – and argues that the inclusion 
of these rights suggests a transformation of a hitherto retributive model of international 
criminal justice as practised by previous international tribunals to a restorative justice 
one. It argues that a restorative justice paradigm is the best way of giving full effect to 
these victims’ rights. 
While it may be argued that the ICC offers an opportunity for the entrenchment 
of the concerns of victims in the international criminal process, a number of questions 
to which the thesis attempts a response are raised. Firstly, does the new victims’ rights 
regime constituted by the right to participation and reparations as well as several other 
                                                
1  Arts 68 (3) and 75 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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concepts in the Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE) such 
as ‘in the interests of justice’ presuppose a restorative justice paradigm? If so, what is 
the scope of this concept in view of both normative and institutional limitations since 
the ICC is primarily a criminal court? In view of the defendant’s right to fair trial and 
the Prosecutor has a law enforcement function to perform, how should the rights of 
victims, in particular the right to participate, be read? In view of other interests that are 
traditionally protected in the criminal process (prosecutor and defence), does the new 
regime proffer a real change for victims of crimes, or will it in effect end up as merely 
superficial recognition? What is the role of the Court in developing content of victims’ 
rights and giving effect to them in view of the named competing interests? In view of 
the novelty of the ICC victims’ rights regime, what is the relevance of jurisprudence 
on related matters from national, human rights and other international bodies?  
In responding the central question as to whether the new victims’ rights bring 
to an end the marginalisation of victims from criminal process at international level, in 
particular the ICC, the thesis suggests that the outcome depends on what framework of 
justice the Court adopts. The Court can either use the traditional retributive model 
operated by similar tribunals or the restorative model proposed by the study. The thesis 
argues that previous international criminal tribunals operated on theories of criminal 
justice exclusionary of and inimical to specific concerns of victims of crimes. The 
largely retributive and utilitarian objects driving these systems limited victims to a 
peripheral status in the process and failed to address fully the harm occasioned to 
victims. In view of the objectives of the ICC discussed in detail in the next chapter, the 
thesis makes a case for the adoption of a restorative justice paradigm in the 
implementation of the victims’ rights regime. 
With many of the elements relating to the right to participation and reparations 
untested – these being innovations of the Rome statute – this study joins the nascent 
body of scholarship on the subject with a view to contributing to ongoing debates and 
perspectives on what trajectory should be charted for the new victims’ regime. To 
achieve this goal, the thesis reviews the practice and jurisprudence of past international 
criminal tribunals; select national criminal justice systems and human rights tribunals. 
It does this in order to trace the development of the law relating to the victim in 
criminal processes to ascertain the rights of victims within the context of international 
criminal law (ICL), in particular rights relating to reparation and participation. Further, 
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it aims to establish what the Rome Statute provides in this regard and; ultimately to 
suggest how some of these issues should be interpreted in light of principles of 
restorative justice identified. 
The study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one sets out the broad conceptual 
framework for the entire study. It introduces the concept of restorative justice and 
other key concepts, and identifies and briefly outlines the relevant issues of concern to 
victims set out in the Rome Statute. It outlines the main thrust of the thesis. It argues 
that the Rome Statute has changed the status of victims of international crimes in 
international criminal law and justice, but a restorative justice paradigm must be 
adopted by the Court to give this regime full effect. Noting that the notion of 
restorative justice is amenable to multiple interpretations under different disciplines, 
the chapter conceives restorative justice as limited to principles and values related to 
participation and full restoration of the effects of crime. It then argues that there is a 
normative basis for a restorative justice paradigm in the ICC. This chapter suggests 
that while the Rome Statute seems to endorse a victim-sensitive regime, the actual 
gains by victims will depend on how these provisions are interpreted and the 
framework of justice that underpins this process. In this regard, a strong restorative 
template for this process is proposed from the start in order to afford victims 
substantive justice and to give the full effect to victims’ rights. 
Chapter two provides context in international criminal law and justice for 
discussions on the ICC by revisiting the history of international war crimes tribunals 
from the aborted post WWI proposals to the ad hoc tribunals leading up to the 
establishment of the ICC. The chapter highlights the role of realpolitik in influencing 
the ‘exclusion’ of victims by previous international criminal tribunals beginning from 
Nuremberg. Thereafter, chapter three reviews generally the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the main international human rights tribunals 
and identifies principles relating to victims that may be of relevance to the ICC regime. 
It explores how the state-centric framework within which the main courts operate, in 
particular the ICJ, may limit the full exercise of any recognised rights of victims. 
Additionally it examines in some detail the jurisprudence of international human rights 
oversight bodies relating to victims of crimes namely the Human Rights Committee, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court on Human Rights and 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. In so doing, it aims to 
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establish to what extent the rights to participate in criminal proceedings and to 
reparations have been recognised by respective systems and whether such 
jurisprudence may be relevant in the interpretation of the ICC victims’ rights. In view 
of the broad spectrum of rights over which these human rights tribunals adjudicate, the 
focus of this chapter is on human rights violations that may amount to international 
crimes. 
Chapter four examines for the same reasons the victim rights movement and 
specific developments in the rights of victims in select national criminal justice 
systems. In chapter five, specific aspects of the right to participate at various stages of 
the ICC proceedings are discussed with respect to each stage of proceedings. It 
examines the participation framework to establish whether victims of crime are 
accorded the status the third party at the ICC and what tangible achievements they may 
attain in the process. Further, their relationship to the ‘established’ parties – prosecutor 
and defence – is scrutinised. The role of the Court in the application of participation 
criteria at all stages of proceedings is also examined. 
Chapter six discusses in detail the right to reparations in the Rome Statute. It 
outlines the two focal points to reparations – the Court and the Victim Trust Fund 
(VTF). Seeking to inform the implementation of this framework within the context of 
mass and systematic crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction, it discusses select 
past mass reparations programmes from varying contexts namely Holocaust 
reparations, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the 
Rwandan Gacaca system, the United Nations Claims Commission (UNCC) and the 
United States Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). From these experiences, the chapter 
highlights the challenges facing the ICC but also makes suggestions on how some of 
the reparations issues in the Rome Statute should be dealt with in the context of 
Articles 75 and 79 mandates of the Court and the Victims Trust Fund (VTF) 
respectively. Chapter seven consists of findings and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE NEW PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
International criminal law (ICL), like municipal criminal law and practice, has until 
the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) focused on 
the liability of perpetrators and relegated the interests of victims of international 
crimes to a secondary position. This reflects the view that criminal conduct should be 
considered first as a wrong against the entire society and that remedial measures focus 
on disrupted societal order. At the international level, measures taken by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) to punish those responsible for international crimes 
such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide have been conceived 
primarily – perhaps solely – as a means of restoring international peace and security.1  
As argued in the next chapter, the creation of the International Military 
Tribunal Nuremberg Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal) and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo (Tokyo Tribunal),2 the first of their kind in 1945 
was similarly justified.3 It is argued that justifying these steps in terms of ‘international 
peace and security’ considerations is not problematic in itself. In any case, the United 
Nations (UN) Charter, which vests the core function of maintaining international peace 
and security in the UNSC, demands such justification.4 The problem, it is argued, is 
that the assumption that such action seems impliedly to take – that punishment of 
perpetrators alone will restore peace in embattled societies – is flawed, and arises from 
                                                
1  When deciding to establish these tribunals has consistently justified the action by justified on 
the basis that their commission threatens international peace and security. United Nations 
Charter Chapter VII; Resolutions establishing ICTR, ICTY, IMT Charters; Tadic v Prosecutor 
IT-94-1-T; Akayesu v Prosecutor IT-94-6-T Jurisdiction decisions support this view. 
2  Charter of the International Military Tribunal For the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal) approved by 
the supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur on 19th January 1946 as 
amended by order of Supreme Commander, general Headquarters, APO 500, 26th April 1946. 
3  International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg established by Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) annexed to the London Agreement of 8th August 1945 
between the United States, France, United Kingdom (and Northern Ireland) and the Soviet 
Union. 
4  Art 39-42 Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See also Tadic v Prosecutor IT-94-1-T (ICTY) 
Appeals Chamber decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction’ 
paras 14-40; D Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security 
(1999); generally DM Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council (1998). 
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a narrow conception of what constitutes ‘international peace and security’. As argued 
at some length in the next chapter, realpolitik coupled with this narrowly 
circumscribed concept of ‘international peace and security’ explains the fringe position 
previously allocated to victims in UN tribunals. As this thesis shows in ensuing 
chapters, the concerns of victims including the recognition of their suffering and 
restitution to them has been, and for the most part still is, an incidental issue, both at 
the domestic and international plane.  
The Allied Powers had jointly articulated the view that the threat posed to the 
international order by expansionist Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan must attract 
international condemnation and retribution.5 The Nuremberg Tribunal’s mandate was 
to prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes 
against peace.6 While World War II typically noted for the staggering numbers of 
civilian casualties and millions of survivors affected by it, victims’ concerns were 
hardly articulated at the trials.7 In fact, the focus of the trials was to punish major war 
criminals rather than address specific victims’ concerns in their own right.8 
Consequently, victims mostly featured as a statistic to depict the horror of the war and 
thus served to aggravate the blame attributable to those indicted.  
After Nuremberg and Tokyo, the tribunals created by the UN Security Council 
have all been justified by considerations of international peace and security.9 The 
                                                
5  See notably the Moscow Declaration of 30th October 1943 signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and 
Stalin reprinted in 470 from 38 AJIL (Supp. 1944). See also R Bierzanek, ‘War Crimes: 
History and Definition’ in MC Bassiouni, & VP Nanda, A Treatise on International Criminal 
Law (1973) 559-586 573 detailing various declarations affirming that no war criminal would 
go unpunished. 
6  These are contained in the Nuremberg Principles adopted by the UN General Assembly. See 
Gen Assembly resolution UN GA Res 95/1 of 11th December 1946. 
7  The total estimated human loss of life caused by World War II was roughly 62 million people, 
of whom 37 million were civilians. See Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, accessible at 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties> (accessed on 10th January 2006). 
While this source may raise questions, the author uses this figure only to show the magnitude 
of civilian casualties. 
8  Art 2 Statute of the IMT (Nuremberg Charter); Art 2 Tokyo Charter. 
9  Following the adoption of the Nuremberg Principles by the International Law Commission 
(ILC) on request by the UN General Assembly, codification efforts aimed at compiling a draft 
international criminal code focused only on crimes with a political element and which 
concerned the maintenance of international peace and security. See LS Sunga, The Emerging 
System of International Criminal Law Developments in Codification and Implementation 
(1997) 4-5. See also General Assembly Resolution 177 (II) of 21 Nov 1947. 
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Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),10 the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)11 and that of the special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) clearly articulate that the imperative to try ‘those who bear 
the highest responsibility’ for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is in 
the interest of international peace and security.12 In their approach, which as the next 
chapter shows excludes victims, they fail to comprehend fully the dynamics within 
post conflict societies including the concerns of victims. The next chapter 
demonstrates how the normative framework of the ad hoc criminal tribunals and their 
subsequent practices reflect the fringe position accorded to victims. Victims’ interests 
are only addressed within the general objective of maintaining international peace and 
security, within which, perhaps, their rights will not be violated again.13 It is suggested 
that whereas this approach rightly assumes that the absence of peace and security 
creates an environment in which more crimes against victims are committed, it blinds 
itself to the fact that there are specific victims’ concerns that need attention because of 
direct or indirect victimization of individuals.14  
This chapter establishes the theoretical framework for the entire study. It 
introduces the concept of restorative justice generally and discusses the substantive 
basis for such framework in the Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(ICC RPE). It introduces the argument that the inclusion of victims’ rights to 
participation and to reparations in the Rome Statute and ICC RPE presupposes a 
different paradigm of justice from the retributive one as practised by previous 
international tribunals. 
 
                                                
10  UN Security Council Resolutions 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 on the establishment of the 
ICTR and resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 on the establishment of the ICTY.  
11  Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 on the establishment of the ICTY also the recent SC 
resolution 1593 (2005) referring Darfur for investigation by the ICC. 
12  The Security Council has always, in establishing international criminal tribunals, expressed that 
it is acting within its mandate under chapter VII of the United Nations charter (UN Charter). 
Tadic v Prosecutor IT-94-1-T (ICTY) Appeals Chamber decision on the defence motion for 
interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction’ para 14-40. 
13  See subsequent sections articulating the extent to which the prosecutions address victims’ 
rights per se. R Aldana-Pindell, ´In vindication of justiciable victims’ rights to truth and justice 
for state-sponsored crimes’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l Law 1399-1501. 
14  Violation of a right gives rise to an imperative to remedy the wrong. Even at the level of state 
responsibility, an internationally wrongful act attributable to a state gives rise to an 
international responsibility of that state to supply reparations, irrespective of the restoration of 
peace. See article 1 ILC Articles on State Responsibility. See also Case Concerning the 
Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction) 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 9, at 21. 
 8 
 
 
1.2. Theoretical Underpinnings of ICL 
 
This thesis departs from the position that ICL, like municipal criminal law, has been 
founded on a paradigm of justice that focuses on the perpetrator, both as a target of 
criminal sanction and beneficiary of due process guarantees. Additionally, emphasis 
placed on the main function of criminal sanction in the restoration of societal order and 
protection of broad communal interests (international peace and security in the case of 
ICL) has led to the relegation of the victim of crime to a peripheral role in proceedings 
before international criminal tribunals. 
A study of domestic criminal systems that have influenced the content and 
processes of ICL as well as international criminal tribunals as discussed in chapter 
three and four bears this out. These systems seem to be influenced largely by 
retributive and utilitarian theories of justice.15 In general, these two theories of justice 
not only justify certain responses to crime, but also explain the function of ensuing 
responses. Despite minor variations and some doubts as to their exact content, 
retributive justice theories are in general characterised by their emphasis on the link 
between punishment and moral wrongdoing.16 In terms of these theories, punishment is 
seen as just desert for wrongdoing. In these theories therefore, the focus seems entirely 
directed at the morally reprehensible conduct of the accused. Retributive justice 
systems strive for proportional punishments and consistent treatment of offenders.17 
Pursuit of these goals has a consequence that these systems ‘often adhere to the ideas 
of state punishment and fair procedures for the accused.’18  
As noted already, retributive justice is largely unaccommodating to victims of 
crime. However, some commentators have argued that punishment of an offender not 
                                                
15  See M Heikkila, International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime: A study of the status 
of victims before international criminal tribunals and factors affecting this status (2004) 21-33; 
H Strang Revenge or repair: Victims and Restorative Justice (2002) 4-6. 
16  Ibid, 25; CL Ten Crime, guilt and punishment: a philosophical introduction (1987) 38 cited in 
Heikkila (n 16 above) 25; generally T Kuhner ‘The status of victims in the enforcement of 
international criminal law’ (2004) 6 Oregon Rev IL 9. 
17  J Dignan & M Cavadino ‘Towards a framework for conceptualising and evaluating models of 
criminal justice from a victim’s perspective’ (1996) 4 International Review of Victimology 153-
182 155; Heikkila (n 16 above) 26. 
18  Heikkila (n 16 above), 26.  
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only constitutes an expression of ‘solidarity with the victim’ but also annuls the 
appearance of an offender’s superiority, thereby affirming the victim’s ‘real value’.19 
For these reasons, it is argued that restorative justice is not incompatible with 
punishment, the main feature of retributive justice.20 The conception of restorative 
justice advocated in this thesis does not, as in the earliest articulations of the concept, 
seek to replace prosecutions with restitution.21 However, it is understood that the idea 
of trying perpetrators has its limits, and that ‘affirmation of victims’ real value’ is as 
far as retributive justice goes in addressing victims’ concerns. Victims rarely feature in 
retributive justice discourse. Reference to victims seems to be restricted to the 
assessment of wrongfulness for purposes of apportioning punishment. Apart from the 
mental state of the offender, wrongfulness of conduct also depends on the impact of 
the wrong on the victim. In this regard, the seriousness of the crime informs the 
punishment meted out.22 Since the principal aim of retributive justice is to establish 
whether the accused person has committed a crime – and to mete out proportional 
punishment if the answer is in the affirmative – once punishment is assessed, the 
debate ends there.23 It is the offender’s guilt – not the victim’s suffering – that is at 
issue. The view that victims’ subjective experiences should not therefore affect the 
outcome of the trial requires that the prosecutor – rather than victims – take charge of 
                                                
19  Ibid, 26-7; GP Fletcher With justice for some: victims’ rights in criminal trials (1995) 203; J 
Hampton ‘A new theory of retribution’ in RG Frey & CW Morris (eds) Liability and 
responsibility: Essays in law and morals (1991) 402. 
20  L Zedner ‘Reparation and retribution: are they reconcilable?’(1994) Modern LR 57 suggests 
that restorative justice is compatible with retributive justice and that it contains some 
retributive content, but it [RJ] offers something more. See also S Wilson ‘The myth of 
restorative justice: Truth, reconciliation and the ethics of amnesty’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 531. 
21  Randy Barnett, perhaps the earliest exponent of restorative justice in the 1970s conceived 
restorative justice as substitution of criminal Court proceedings with restitution. See RE 
Barnett ‘Restitution: a new paradigm of restitutive justice’ (1977) Vol 86 Issue 4 Ethics 279-
301. Barnett’s ‘theory’ of restorative justice has been criticised for: not distinguishing clearly 
crimes and torts; and not acknowledging that crime has broader societal implications. See 
Heikkila (n 16 above) 37; R Pilon ‘Criminal remedies: restitution, punishment or both?’ (1978) 
Vol 88 Issue 4 Ethics 348-357; Dignan & Cavadino (n 17 above) 165. 
22  However, Barnett (n 21 above) 284 notes rightly that there is never a simple rational 
connection between a term of imprisonment and harm caused to the victim. This is even more 
accurate in the case of international crimes, which infer numerous victims. Heikkila (n 16 
above) 26 argues that for ‘crimes of international concern’, it appears that the perpetrator’s 
mental state has been accorded greater significance in determination of wrongfulness since it is 
impossible to fashion punishment that would fit the suffering of victims. See s 6.5.4.1 Chapter 
6 on assessment of harm. 
23  See Heikkila (n 16 above) 27. 
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the prosecution and that the prosecution be ‘depersonalised’.24 This explains the 
relegation of victims to a passive, witness role in the criminal process.  
Utilitarian justice theories emphasise the ‘good consequences that punishment 
produces’, not the wrongfulness of impugned conduct.25 Criminal prosecution and 
punishment are seen as serving societal interests. Reduction of crime appears as a 
central goal of utilitarian theories of justice and is pursued through deterrence, reform 
and incapacitation.26 The problem with utilitarian theories, from the point of view of 
victims, is that it focuses on societal interests and the offender and tends to overlook 
victims, especially when their interests are at odds with the former.27 There are many 
examples in the context of mass atrocities. The opting by some countries for total or 
qualified impunity for international crimes characterised by amnesty laws has in the 
past been explained by the need to establish peace and stability after violent conflict. 
In some of these cases discussed in Chapter six of this thesis, one finds that factors not 
necessarily linked to victims’ concerns have been deployed to determine outcomes of 
relevant processes at the expense of victims.  
Punishment seems to be the common and main feature of most criminal justice 
systems, in particular the two outlined. For this reason, the tendency is to regard 
criminal justice systems as invariably retributive.28 This view has been criticised on 
account of the fact that it seems to hold that a particular justice system can be 
explained by one single theory of justice. The critique rightly holds that no one system 
is based on a ‘unitary set of coherent values and purposes’.29  
It is argued that irrespective of the rationale for punishment in either case – 
retributive or utilitarian theories – both systems are understood to have, as the main 
focus, either societal interests and/or the offender, to the exclusion of the victims of 
                                                
24  W Cragg The practice of punishment: towards a theory of restorative justice (1992) 19 has 
however argued that the emphasis on impartiality is one of the strengths of retributive justice, 
depersonalisation of the criminal process … ‘blinds justice to the crime’s victim as well as to 
the personal characteristics of the offender’. See also Heikkila (n 16 above) 28. 
25  Heikkila, 29. 
26  Ten (n 16 above) 7; Heikkila, 29; Cragg (n 24 above), 30-31. 
27  Heikkila, 31; GP Fletcher With justice for some: victims’ rights in criminal trials (1995) 192-3  
28  Heikkila, 24; A Von Hirsch Censure and sanctions (1993) 14. 
29  RA Duff Trials and Punishment (1986) 5; Heikkila, 24. Even the use of ‘retributive’ has been 
criticised by commentators who emphasise that modern criminal justice systems are 
underpinned by a hybrid of philosophies of justice. See C Barton ‘Empowerment and 
retribution in criminal justice’ in H Strang & J Braithwaite (eds) Restorative Justice: 
Philosophy of practice (2000) 55-57; DW Van Ness & KH Strong, Restoring Justice 2nd ed 
(2002) 44. 
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crime. For the purposes of this thesis, all references to retributive justice are reflective 
of this understanding. While it may be argued that the utilitarian concept of justice 
addresses the concerns of victims in as far as the latter are subsumed in those of the 
general public, this is not accurate. It is suggested that the interests and concerns of 
victims are fairly specific, and do not always converge with those of the society as 
pursued by prosecutors through the system. Societal interests seem, in the main, to be 
broad concerns of peace and public order. 
 
1.3. Rethinking International Criminal Law 
 
The generally prevailing view of international criminal law is that it is preoccupied 
with the punishment of international crimes. Definitions by numerous commentators 
and approaches by previous international tribunals bear this out. As a branch of public 
international law (PIL), international criminal law (ICL) is concerned with the 
prohibition and processes of punishment of international crimes. Cassese observes that 
it is the body of international rules that proscribe international crimes and require 
states to prosecute and punish at least some of those crimes and regulates international 
proceedings related to this.30  
Authors seem united in the above view. What seems a point of disagreement is 
whether ‘international criminal law’ is a unified body of law.  Some consider the term 
inaccurate in as far as it is suggestive of a distinct, coherent branch of PIL. Sunga for 
instance suggests that ‘norms of international criminal law form neither a coherent nor 
integrated system’ and that ‘currently established mechanisms do not provide a 
panacea to correct this situation.’31  
ICL is a relatively new branch of PIL, having developed through various 
institutions since Nuremberg, and is not yet a coherent, self-sufficient system. As a 
developing body of law, ‘its substantive, as well as procedural elements continue to 
                                                
30  A Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003) 15. See also MC Bassiouni & VP Nanda, A 
Treatise on International Criminal Law (1973); I Bantekas & S Nash, International Criminal 
Law (2003); G Schwarenberger ‘The problem of an international criminal law’ in J Dugard & 
C van den Wyngeart, (eds) International Criminal Law and Procedure (1996) 3-37 on the ‘six 
meanings of ICL’. 
31  See LS Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law Developments in 
Codification and Implementation (1997) 2-8 who traces the development of ICL since 
Nuremberg; Cassese (n 30 above) 16-19. 
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evolve through complex processes’. 32 However, there seems to be agreement that the 
ICC has changed, or perhaps more accurately, will change this, insofar as it 
streamlines and develops further this body of law hitherto marked by ad hoc 
arrangements.33  
While the apparent exclusion of the ‘national element’ in the definition of ICL 
has raised some questions in view of the important role municipal law plays in ICL,34 
the more important question, it is suggested, relates to the changes introduced by the 
Rome Statute in two respects. The first is the participatory rights granted to victims, 
which as argued here in certain respects elevate the victim to the status of a unique 
party – a party sui generis in the ICC proceedings.35 The second relates to the right to 
reparations accorded to victims in what is essentially a criminal court. It is suggested 
that the introduction of these two aspects must bring about fundamental changes to the 
conception of international criminal law irrespective of its core function. Accordingly, 
the traditional definition of ICL will no longer accurately reflect the actual scope of the 
discipline.  
At the implementation level, it is argued that what is important is for this 
process to reflect the new objectives of ICL as contained in the Rome Statute, which is 
not only to punish perpetrators but also to deliver justice to victims. It is proposed that 
the new conception of international criminal justice must be restorative in character. 
As suggested in the following sections, the new victims’ regime incorporates at a 
theoretical level basic principles of restorative justice. Consequently, these principles 
should underpin the interpretation of victim-specific provisions in the Rome Statute 
and Rules (ICC RPE). It is argued that the objectives of the Court and the victims’ 
regime establish a basis for restorative justice as the predominant paradigm that should 
                                                
32  Cassese (n 30 above) 16; Sunga (n 30 above) 7. 
33  On the possible role of the Rome Statute and its interplay with domestic systems, see generally 
D Shelton (ed) International Crimes, Peace and Human Rights: The Role of the International 
Criminal Court (2000); W Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 2nd ed 
(2004) 24-25; Prosecutor v Furundzija (Case No. IT-95-17/IT), Judgement, 10 December 
1998, para 227; Prosecutor v Kristic (Case No. IT-98-33-T) Judgement, 2 August 2001, para 
541. 
34  See Cassese (n 30 above) 1-2 suggesting that a contemporary conception of ICL should include 
various fundamental questions relating to the role played by national Courts in ICL on account 
that: they have contributed enormously to development of ICL; international tribunals take into 
account domestic case law; that the ICC is complementary to domestic Courts and that 
international tribunals rely on state cooperation for effective implementation of their mandates. 
35  See art 68(3) Rome Statute and various Rules of the ICC RPE discussed in chapter six.  
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guide the ICC in its work. Taking a cue from the victim rights movement in which 
activists urged a redefinition of crime and thus criminal law to reflect a ‘deserved’ 
place for victims, this thesis argues that the new model of ICL must inform new ways 
in international criminal justice.36  
 
1.4. Understanding Restorative Justice 
 
The term ‘restorative justice’ does not lend itself to easy definition. More often that 
not, particular definitions adopted reflect the disparate disciplines and groups of people 
in this field.37 Lamenting the lack of precision in definition, Coben and Harley observe 
that restorative justice may be considered an umbrella term for a spectrum of practices 
used in association with the criminal justice system, but more generally, to describe 
approaches to dispute resolution in disparate settings such as neighbourhoods, schools, 
and workplaces.38 Other commentators prefer, because of these difficulties, ‘to 
articulate basic principles and their implication for implementation’ rather than attempt 
rigid definition.39 Kurki notes that restorative justice is based on values that promote 
repairing harm, healing, and rebuilding relations among victims, the offenders, and the 
communities. It has participation and empowerment as its goals.40 On occasion, 
restorative justice is used interchangeably with transformational or transitional justice 
to describe the work of truth and reconciliation commissions and such bodies.41 In this 
context, it appears that the use of restorative justice reflects the desire to deploy 
                                                
36  See CJN Eisnaugle ‘An international "truth commission": utilizing restorative justice as an 
alternative to retribution’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt J of Transnational Law 209-241 213. On the 
victim rights movement, see chapter four. 
37  Eisnaugle, 211; L Kurki ‘Restorative and Community Justice in the United States’ (2000) 27 
Crime & Just. 235-302 237 (comparing restorative justice to community justice). 
38   J Coben & P Harley ‘International conversations about restorative justice, mediation and the 
practice of law’ (2004) 25 Hamline J. Pub L & Policy 235-234 239. 
39  H Mika & H Zehr ‘A restorative justice framework for community justice practice’ in K 
McEvoy & T Newburn Criminology, conflict resolution and restorative justice at (2003) 135-
152 138. 
40  L Kurki (n 37 above) 235. See H Mika & H Zehr, (above) 140 notes that engagement is one of 
the foundational principles of restorative justice. He notes that ‘in RJ, the primary parties 
affected by crime – victims, offenders and community – are treated as key stakeholders … and 
are thus offered significant roles in the justice process’. 
41  J Coben & P Harley (n 38 above) 240. Even more loosely, and perhaps in a manner not 
particularly relevant to this study, restorative justice has been employed in association with 
‘community justice’. See for instance A Lanni ‘The future of community justice’ (2005) 40 
Harvard Civ Rgts-Civ Lib LR 359. Others draw a sharp distinction, for instance L Kurki 
‘Restorative and Community Justice in the United States’ (2000) 27 Crime & Just. 235. 
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mechanisms inclusive of victims. In general, these mechanisms depart from the 
strictures and narrow focus of ‘traditional’ formal criminal justice systems that in 
general limit themselves to a retributive approach to crime.42  
In the African context, the term ‘restorative justice’ has been used to describe 
the African legal tradition consisting of a set of values and practices that emphasise 
mediation of truth, acknowledgement of wrongdoing, forgiveness and reconciliation 
rather than retribution.43 The contemporary use of ‘restorative justice’ refers to a set of 
mechanisms operating outside or on the fringes of the formal justice system widely 
regarded as ‘Western’ in its origins.44 In recent times, the relevance of traditional 
African justice mechanisms to the establishment of accountability for international 
crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity has been debated.45 In the case 
of Uganda, one of the four African situations currently under investigation by the ICC, 
these mechanisms have been proposed as a possible response to crimes committed in 
Northern Uganda. The Juba Peace Agreement provides for the deployment of 
traditional justice mechanisms as practised by various ethnic groups in Northern 
Uganda: Mat Oput (Acholi); Culo Kwor (Langi and Acholi); Tonu Ci Koka (Madi); 
Kayo Cuk (Langi); and Ailuc (Iteso) to deal with some of the crimes.46 In these 
communities, as elsewhere in Africa,47 conflict resolution mechanisms focus on 
                                                
42  See H Mika & H Zehr (n 39 above) 138 noting that restorative justice ‘constitutes a bold 
response to the conventional and punitive justice reflexes of contemporary societies’. 
43  See generally DW Nabudere, ‘Comprehensive research report on restorative justice and 
international humanitarian law’ The Marcus-Garvey Pan-Afrikan Institute (June 2008) 
discussing restorative justice in different African contexts (on file with author). 
44   See R Gargarella, P Domingo and T Roux (eds) 'Courts and Social Transformation: An 
Institutional Voice for the Poor?' (2006). They discuss the use of traditional justice 
mechanisms in a number of African contexts to plug the shortcomings of formal systems in 
place ultimately enhancing access to justice for rural and illiterate populations. 
45  L Hovil and JR Quinn, ‘Peace first, justice later: traditional justice in Northern Uganda’ 
Refugee Law Project Working Paper No 17 (2005). Accessible through 
<http:/www.refugeelawproject.org> (Accessed 19 September 2009); L Keller, ‘Achieving 
Peace With Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice 
Mechanisms’ (2008) 23 (2) Connecticut J. of Int’l Law 209-279. 
46     Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of  
Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, June 29, 2007 (Juba, Sudan). For a 
discussion of these mechanisms, see L Hovil and J Quin (n 45 above) 12-15. 
47  Several other post conflict African countries including Mozambique and Sierra Leone have 
deployed traditional justice mechanisms, formally or informally. See CB Thomson, ‘Beyond 
civil society: child soldiers as citizens in Mozambique’ (1999) 26 (80) Review of African 
Political Economy 191-206; J Schafer ‘Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: 
De-Socialization or Re-Socialization? (2001) 100 (399) African Affairs, 215-237. See also in 
the case of Uganda and Sierra Leone, Susan McKay ‘Reconstructing Fragile Lives: Girls' 
Social Reintegration in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone’ Gender and Development, (2004) 
 15 
victims' needs and the reintegration of the ‘accused’ back into society. Broad based 
participation processes encompass rehabilitation, reconciliation, compensation, and 
restoration. The dominant approaches in many of these communities emphasise 
contextual factors, allowing focus on the root causes of the conflict.48 
Within latter day (Western) formal criminal justice systems, restorative justice 
is said to consist of ‘a wide-ranging movement’ whose proponents seek ‘to transform 
the systems that are in place to deal with interpersonal and intergroup conflict.’49 Many 
commentators like Eisnaugle consider crime as a conflict, interpersonal in character. 
This has been regarded as the ‘basic premise’ of restorative justice.50 As practised at 
the national level, restorative justice consists, on the one hand, of various 
‘mechanisms’, ‘processes’, ‘methods’, or ‘practices’ and, on the other hand, of a set of 
values and principles that underlie these institutions.51 As such, restorative justice is 
not bereft of philosophical or teleological underpinnings.52 Cunnen agrees with the 
identification of restorative justice and reparations for human rights abuses as both 
practices and a set of values.53 In the same vein, Coben & Harley conceive restorative 
justice beyond specific practices to include ‘a set of principles, and even a 
                                                                                                                                        
12 (3), 19-30. Post-Genocide Rwanda provides another example where a traditional justice 
mechanism Gacaca has been employed to deal with mass atrocity and victimisation. For more 
on Gacaca, see chapter six in this study. 
48  L Hovil and J Quin (n 45 above) 11; L Keller (n 45 above) 212. 
49  Eisnaugle (n 36 above), 211 quoting P Hutchison & H Wray, What Is Restorative Justice?, 
New World Outlook, July/Aug (1999) 4. In some jurisdictions where the concept is recognized, 
restorative approaches are increasingly used in conflicts that do not disclose a crime, including 
problems in schools (bullying, truancy); workplaces (labour disputes, sexual harassment); and 
within families (child welfare, family violence). See in this regard MS Umbreit, RB. Coates, 
Betty Vos, Community Peacemaking Project: Responding to Hate Crimes, Hate Incidents, 
Intolerance and Violence through Restorative Justice Dialogue (2002) (using five community 
cases to examine a range of types of hate crimes, types of communities and uses of dialogue), 
available at <http://0-ssw.che.umn.edu.innopac.up.ac.za:80/rjp/Resources/Resource.htm> 
(accessed on 25 November 2005). 
50  Eisnaugle, ibid. 
51  Howard Zehr, the earliest exponent of perhaps the most influential school of restorative justice 
– victim-offender reparation – places emphasis on reconciliation and the empowerment of 
victims and offenders through mediation and private negotiations. See H Zehr Retributive 
justice, restorative justice (1985); H Zehr Changing lenses (1990); H Mika & H Zehr (n 39 
above) 135-152. 
52  See L Walgrave ‘Restorative justice in comparison’ in J Winteryk & L Cao Lessons from 
international/Comparative/Criminology/Criminal Justice (2004) 125-137 125 (2004) considers 
an outcome based approach, rather than the inclusive deliberative process element as ‘the key 
characteristic of restorative justice’. 
53  C Cunnen ‘Reparations and restorative justice: responding to gross violations of human rights’ 
in H Strang & J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Civil Society (2001) 83-98 93; See also J 
Braithwaite & H Strang ‘Introduction: Restorative Justice and Civil Society’ in H Strang & J 
Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Civil Society (2001). 
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philosophical approach to life’.54 Similarly, Eisnaugle adverts to ‘a set of values and 
ideals that define a just reaction to the commission of a crime and the crime 
committer.’55  
From the literature,56 some of the identifiable principles or values that underpin 
restorative justice include healing and making amends,57 reconciliation,58 guarantees 
against repetition of crime(s) and restoration of or repairing harm caused to victims. 
This may entail ‘offering some form of recompense involving where possible 
restitution, compensation and reparation. As a process, restorative justice ‘brings[s] 
together those affected to establish truth and provide a framework for reconciliation.’59 
Conceived as such, the three most commonly used practices are victim offender 
mediation,60 noted for its advantages within the criminal setting;61 family group 
conferencing,62 and circles.63 Additionally, and perhaps of more relevance to this 
thesis, the offering of restitution, the writing of letters of apology, community service, 
and the use of victim impact panels or community reparation boards are considered as 
restorative justice practices.64  
For the purposes of this study, the term restorative justice is used in a selective 
and rather nuanced manner. As the discussion above demonstrates, because of the 
multiplicity of contexts in which restorative justice has been used, one may be prone to 
                                                
54  Coben & Harley (n 38 above) 240. 
55  Eisnaugle, (n 36 above) 211. 
56  Mika & Zehr, (n 39 above) 141-147; Braithwaite & Strang in Strang & Braithwaite (n 53 
above); Cunnen (n 53 above), 88-95; Zehr, 1985 (n 51 above), 184-85; Zehr, 1990 (n 51 above) 
200-203. 
57  See Braithwaite & Strang in Heather Strang & John Braithwaite (n 53 above) 55. 
58  Cunnen (n 53 above) 88; Zehr 1985, (n 51 above) 184-85; Zehr 1990 (n 51 above) 200-203. 
59  Cunnen, Ibid. 
60  On mediation as a social process of conflict resolution, see generally RAB Bush & JP. Folger, 
The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition 
(1994); CW Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, 2nd ed 
(1996). 
61   One advantage of victim-offender mediation is that it offers offenders a chance to initiate 
voluntary reparation to their victims, which reparation is not limited to financial payments but 
may include an apology and explanation of how the offence came about, as well as work for 
the victim, work for a community cause chosen by the victim, or a specific undertaking (e.g. to 
attend a counselling course) See Coben & Harley (n 38 above) 241; TF Marshall, ‘Restorative 
Justice: An Overview’, A report by the UK Home Office Research Development and Statistics 
Directorate (1998) 14. 
62  The number of participants is expanded in family group conferencing to include the offender's 
family, the victim's family or supporters and community contacts of the offender (such as a 
teacher, neighbour, employer) who are interested in offering support or help. 
63  This is a larger group, expanded to include community members. See Coben & Harley (n 38 
above) 241. 
64  Coben & Harley (n 38 above) 240. 
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confuse in what respect it is employed. Apart from clarity of demarcation, delineation 
is further necessitated by the fact that the term has largely been deployed in reform 
debates at national level and hardly in international law, much less in ICL.65 This is not 
to indicate that the principles of restorative justice are new to public international law. 
Some commentators have located principles of restorative justice squarely in the 
debate on the law of state responsibility regarding reparations for human rights 
violations. Brownlie notes that ‘restorative justice’ is a broad term that encompasses a 
variety of measures that may be required of a defendant state including, but not limited 
to, restitution, compensation, apology, and prosecution of responsible persons and 
guarantees of non-repetition.66  
The affirmation of restorative justice principles in PIL notwithstanding, the 
potential links between restorative justice and human rights violations is not well 
explored, a fact attested to by the dearth of literature on the subject.67 The comment by 
Van Ness makes some useful, though incomplete reference to the possible links 
between restorative justice and criminal law standards.68 It is useful, if only for the 
reason that it clarifies a bit more the possible parameters of restorative justice. Van 
Ness has argued that both restorative justice theory and international criminal 
standards exhort states to certain basic conduct. These include the requirements that: 
states balance the interests of victims, offenders and the public; victims and offenders 
must have access to formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, 
that states undertake comprehensive action in regard to crime prevention; governments 
provide impartial, formal judicial mechanisms for victims and offenders; and that there 
                                                
65  Recent debates within the context of ICL relate to how truth and reconciliation commissions 
can be used alongside mixed international tribunals such as the Special Court in Sierra Leone 
as a response to international crimes. See for instance W Schabas ‘Conjoined Twins of justice? 
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court’ 2 (2004) J of 
International Criminal Justice 1082-1099. See references to RJ by judges of the ICTY in their 
recommendations to the UN Security Council in their report ‘Victims compensation and 
participation’ of 13 Sep 2000 available at <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p528-e.htm> 
(accessed on 20 Sep 2005). 
66  I Brownlie, Public International Law (1998) 460; see also J Crawford The International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Texts and Commentaries on art 
31; D Bodansky, JR Crook & D Shelton ‘Righting wrongs: reparations in the articles on state 
responsibility’ (2002) 96 American JIL 833; M du Plessis ‘Reparations and International Law: 
How are Reparations to be Determined (Past Wrong or Current Effects), Against Whom, and 
What Form Should They Take?’ (2003) 22 Windsor YB of Access to Justice 41. 
67  See D Shelton Remedies in international law (2003) 9; Cunnen (n 53 above) 83. 
68  Cunnen (n 53 above) 84. 
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must be help for the community reintegration of victims and offenders.69 Various 
provisions in the Rome Statute relating to victims, the rights of defendants and the role 
of states parties as discussed in chapter five and six seem to embody these principles.  
As evident in the discussion in chapter four, the perceived shortcomings of the 
retributive approach to crime informed the victim rights movement both in the United 
States and in Europe. At the national level, the victims’ rights movement argued for 
reforms of the criminal justice systems because of its perceived failure to address the 
concerns of victims of crime.70 Protagonists advocated for an approach that would 
constructively address the interests of the state to fight crime as well as the concerns of 
victims.71 Measures such as restitution, reparations, participation and rehabilitation 
were identified as being integral to such an approach.72  
 
1.5. Restorative Justice as the Framework for the ICC 
 
Until now, restorative justice has been a somewhat stigmatised term in ICL discourse. 
Perhaps for this reason, ICL-specific literature seems to eschew the term almost 
entirely. One can attribute this to at least two causes. First, given that the main focus of 
international criminal tribunals, at least until the ICC, has been the prosecution of the 
most serious perpetrators of international crimes issues related to victims have not 
been central to the practice of these tribunals and discourse around such practice.73 
Secondly the ‘baggage’ restorative justice carries, in particular the often cumbersome 
‘procedures’, ‘methods’ or ‘practices’ associated with it at the national level, could 
explain hesitancy to import the terminology into international criminal justice 
                                                
69  Van Ness & Strong (n 29 above) quoted in Cunnen (n 53 above) 84. See chapter four. 
70  H Zehr The Little Book of Restorative Justice (2002) quoted in LN Henderson, ‘The Wrongs of 
victims’ rights’ (1985) 37 Stanford LR 937-1021 1007 has observed that: ‘[r]estorative justice 
holds that criminal behaviour is primarily a violation of one individual by another. When a 
crime is committed, it is the victim who is harmed, not the state. Instead of the offender owing 
a debt to society, which must be ‘paid back’ by the offender being subjected to some form of 
state imposed punishment, the offender owes a specific debt to the victim – which can only be 
repaid by making good the damage caused.’ 
71  Ibid. See also J Gittler, ‘Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview 
of Issues and Problems’ 11 Pepperdine LR 117, (1984) 121-125; H Strang Revenge: Victims 
and Restorative Justice (2002) 44. 
72  See A Morris & G Maxwell, Restorative Justice for Juveniles (2000); D Roche, Accountability 
in Restorative Justice (2003) 3 who states that four values are contained in restorative justice: 
personalism, reparation, participation and reintegration. 
73   See generally chapter three and 4 of this thesis. 
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context.74 Even at the national level, there is a tendency to relegate restorative justice 
practices to the fringes of the ‘mainstream’ criminal justice system and to regard such 
approaches as supplementary, rather than integral, to the system.75 Hesitancy to 
integrate such mechanisms may well be justified. A criminal law framework must be 
such that certainty, efficiency and expedition are assured.  
At the international level, in particular in ICL, the few references to restorative 
justice by judges,76 commentators, and practitioners in this field reflect the inaccurate 
tendency to equate ‘restorative justice’ with ‘reparations’.77 Even when used in relation 
to accountability for crimes of an international character, the tendency is to consign 
restorative justice’s application to the limited sphere of transitional justice as practised 
in truth commissions (TRC) and related institutions.78 The few references to restorative 
justice in general ICL literature are in the main curt and tend towards vague and 
imprecise formulations such as ‘victim-oriented justice’, ‘victim-centred justice’ and 
the like.79 It is argued that whatever meaning is intended by these descriptions, a 
‘victim-centred’ or ‘victim-oriented’ approach said to be envisaged by recent 
                                                
74     See P Roberts ‘Restoration and retribution in international criminal justice: an exploratory 
analysis’ in A Von Hirsh, J Roberts & A Buttons (eds) Restorative justice and Criminal justice: 
Competing or reconcilable paradigms? (2003) 115, 223. 
75  Literature on restorative justice approaches tends to focus on these fringe justice mechanisms. 
76 However, the judges of the ICTR and ICTY have, in a previous report, recognised the broad 
ambit of restorative justice. They have noted that restorative justice encompasses inter alia 
allowing victims to participate in proceedings and by providing compensation to them for their 
injuries. See ICTR/ICTY ‘Victims compensation and participation’ ICTR and ICTY Judges’ 
Report of 13 Sep 2000 to UN Security Council available at 
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p528-e.htm> (accessed on 20 Sep 2005). 
77  See C Muttukumaru ‘Reparations to victims’ in RS Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court: 
The making of the Rome Statute (1999) 262-270 263-4 discussing debates relating to the 
provision on reparations by delegations at the Preparatory Committee. Views by delegations in 
support of including article 73 (art 75 in the final text) seem to reflect an understanding of 
‘reparations’ as ‘restorative justice’. Muttukumaru, at 264 remarks with respect to changing 
views on the reparations provision at the ICC Prep Com that it was … ‘increasingly realised that 
victims not only had an interest in prosecution of offenders but also had an interest in restorative 
justice, whether in the form of compensation or restitution or some other form.’ See Chapter 6. 
78  Recent debates within the context of ICL relate to how truth and reconciliation commissions can 
be used alongside mixed international tribunals such as the Special Court in Sierra Leone as a 
response to international crimes. See for instance W Schabas (n 65 above) 1082-1099. 
79  See for instance WA Schabas (n 33 above) 172 referring to a ‘victim-oriented’; D Donat-Cattin 
‘article 68’ in Otto Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International criminal 
Court: observers’ notes, article by article 869; Muttukumaru (n 77 above) 264 (mentioning 
without elaboration restorative justice in the context of Prep COM discussions on art 73, later art 
75 of the Rome Statute. 
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developments in ICL, must be restorative in character.80 Further, this thesis does not 
disavow the broader interests of the international community that may be pursued 
through the punishment of perpetrators of international crimes. As argued already, a 
formulation that equates restorative justice to reparations is problematic in the sense 
that it considers crime as a purely interpersonal issue that does not implicate broader 
societal interests. This thesis argues that victims have specific interests and concerns 
that have to be protected within the criminal justice system and reparation is but one of 
them. 
If the analysis of the use of restorative justice in the municipal context above is 
correct, the emerging view in mainstream ICL equating restorative justice to 
reparations is entirely inaccurate in as far as it excludes other core elements of the 
concept. It is argued that ‘reparations’, itself a composite term,81 is but one of the 
elements constitutive of restorative justice or a restorative justice approach. This view 
underpins the approach adopted in the instant study. At least one other element must 
be deemed constitutive of restorative justice (or a restorative justice approach), namely 
participation by victims. The right, or in some cases the opportunity for victims of a 
particular crime to participate in related proceedings is central to a restorative approach 
as outlined. It is argued that a proper view of restorative justice is reflected in the array 
of ‘modes’ of reparations that may be ordered by the Court, as outlined in chapter six. 
As argued in that chapter, there is scope for other means such as apology and 
rehabilitation, beyond the ‘traditional’ compensation and restitution. This reflects the 
broad ambit of restorative justice as a concept.  
It is the argument of this thesis that the Rome Statute and its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE) provide a firm basis for a restorative justice 
paradigm. For reasons outlined immediately below, it is argued that restorative justice 
provides the best understanding of how all the provisions of the Rome Statute fit 
together. First, the objectives of the ICC require a restorative justice approach by 
relevant actors in the ICC. These were formulated within the global context in which 
concern for victims at national and international planes had progressively increased 
                                                
80  Y Buruma ‘Doubts on the upsurge of the victim’s role in criminal law’ in H Kaptein & M 
Kaptein (eds) Crime, Victims and Justice: Essays on Principles and Practice (2004) 1-15 
distinguishes ‘victim-oriented’ or ‘victim-centred’ approach from restorative justice.  
81   See section on terminology in Chapter five of this study. 
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since Nuremberg, in particular after the Rwanda and former Yugoslavia tribunals.82 
The ICC’s core objective is to contribute to the fight against impunity by prosecuting 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes. But the Court 
has a wider goal – to provide justice for victims by ordering measures geared towards 
full repair of harm suffered by them.83 More broadly, the Court is tasked in its 
functions with truth-searching as one of its main objectives – truth relating to 
responsibility for crimes, victimisation and establishing the historical record.84  It is 
suggested that the thinking reflected in these objectives must inform the intended 
outlook of the new Court and of ICL in general.  
The preparatory talks relating to the new victims regime, and the right to 
reparations in particular reflect that states intended such an approach for the ICC. 
Muttukumaru notes that ‘it was increasingly realised that victims not only had an 
interest in prosecution of offenders but also had an interest in restorative justice, 
whether in the form of compensation or restitution or some other form.’85 Further, the 
realisation that reparations could foster reconciliation and restoration of individuals 
and society in general convinced states to embrace what is evidently a broader concept 
of justice.  
Secondly, apart from these objectives, the provision for an extensive 
participatory framework and the right to reparations discussed in detail in chapters 5 
and 6 respectively are themselves not only an elaborate exposition of these objectives, 
but also reflect elements of restorative justice as outlined.  
                                                
82  See for United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power, 1985 (GA/RES/40/34); Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for victims of Violations of International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (Bassiouni Report); Council of Europe 
Recommendation on the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure 
(Recommendation (85/11); European Union Framework Decision on the Standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings, 2001 (2001/220/jHA); Commonwealth Guidelines on Treatment of 
Victims at 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Shared_ASP_Files/UploadedFiles/%7B99410136-47A1-
478F-B549-DB753CF8B20B%7D_Victims%20of%20Crime.pdf> (Accessed on 12 August 
2005) 
83  Situation in the DRC in the case of Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Decision on victims’ 
participation No ICC-01/04-01/06 (Jan 18 2008) [Hereinafter DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber 
I Decision].  
84  David Donat-Cattin in Triffterer (n 79 above) 873. 
85  C Muttukumaru (n 77 above) 264. 
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Thirdly, a series of other mechanisms and frameworks entailed in certain 
concepts in the Statute such as ‘interests of justice’,86 fair trial87 and fairness,88 provide 
additional normative imperatives to adopt a restorative justice approach. They also 
provide the framework to give effect to such an approach. These concepts are 
discussed in detail in the context of specific functions of the Registry, the Office of 
Prosecutor (OTP) and Chambers of the Court – Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber and 
Appeals Chamber in chapters 5 and 6.  
Fourthly, it is suggested that Article 21 of the Statute – the sources of law 
provision –equips the Court with the requisite tool to enrich the interpretation of the 
Statute in general and the victims’ regime in particular. It is submitted that in view of 
the novelty of the ICC victims’ regime and the paucity of relevant jurisprudence from 
international criminal tribunals, it is imperative that the Court draws from municipal 
and other international tribunals when relevant. As discussed later in chapters 3 and 4 
of this study, both spheres have, albeit in varying degrees, endorsed a restorative 
justice approach when dealing with victims’ rights. The discussion in these two 
chapters discloses that the Court has already begun to refer to international and 
municipal jurisprudence, although its ‘pick-and-choose approach’ is unsystematic and 
does not appear rationalised. In our view, restorative justice proffers a theoretical 
framework for understanding Article 21 insofar as it relates to the analysis of victims 
as well as defendants’ rights. This will enable the Court to fulfil its other general 
function of developing and streamlining international criminal law. This approach is 
adopted throughout this thesis. 
                                                
86  The term ‘interests of justice’ is mentioned in several contexts in the Statute and Rules. These 
are in relation to: the criteria for commencement or otherwise of an investigation; assignment 
of legal assistance to suspects during investigation; the appointment of counsel during 
confirmation hearing where the accused has fled or cannot be found; proceedings on admission 
of guilt, where TC considers it necessary for normal procedures of evidence to be followed; 
privileged information; restrictions on disclosure of confidential information by the prosecutor; 
the seat of ICC proceedings; and the possibility of joint and separate trials. 
87  See JL D’Ambrosio ‘Memorandum for the Office of the Prosecutor International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda: Courtroom technology: A Comparative Analysis of its Application, Due 
Process and Public Policy Issues for Victims and the Accused’ available at 
<http://www.nesl.edu/center/wcmemos/2002/dambrosio.pdf> at 7; C Chinkin, Amicus Curiae 
Brief on protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, (1996) 7 Crim LF 179, 202. See 
chapter Six. 
88  A fair process must be one that balances the interests of the defendants, victims and those of 
the international society to deal decisively with impunity. 
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It is suggested that Article 21 of the Statute supports an interpretation inclusive 
of a restorative justice paradigm. This interpretation is can be supported in two ways. 
First, as it relates to reference by the Court to national law and practice, it provides in 
its relevant part that this can be done as long as ‘those principles are not inconsistent 
with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and 
standards.’89 Secondly, the Statute requires that ‘application and interpretation of law 
pursuant to Article 21 ‘must be consistent with internationally recognized human 
rights.’90 As advanced further in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, it is submitted that 
developments in the rights of victims of crime at national and international levels are 
such that these two provisions must be interpreted as not only inclusive of a restorative 
justice approach but as demanding such an approach by various actors, including the 
ICC in terms of its Statute. The thesis argues that the inclusion of the rights of 
participation and reparations for victims as well as other guarantees in the Statute 
supports this view. 91  
For purposes of this thesis, a particular understanding of restorative justice is 
adopted and applied throughout. Because of institutional and practical constraints, 
restorative justice as understood in some national systems – in terms of practices and 
principles – cannot apply wholesale to the ICC. This thesis therefore adopts a 
conception of restorative justice limited to constitutive principles and values. These 
values and principles are, from a victim’s standpoint, intended to enhance the role of 
victims in criminal justice and envisage a system that responds adequately to the 
demands of justice by and for victims.  
Apart from a limited number of practices mentioned in the last instance – 
restitution and apology considered further in chapter six, this thesis adopts a view of 
restorative justice as a set of values, some of which are mentioned above, rather than 
strict practices or methods of approaching criminal justice. To clarify therefore for the 
purpose of this thesis, by restorative justice is meant a conception of justice that takes 
into account the interests, as far as possible, of all parties in an international criminal 
prosecution. These include the international community (substituting the state at the 
                                                
89  Art 21 (1) (c ) Rome Statute. 
90  Art 21 (3) Rome Statute. 
91  See I Caracciolo ‘Applicable law’ on article 21 Rome Statute in F Lattanzi & WA Schabas 
(eds) Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, vol I (1999). 
 24 
national level) seeking ends achievable through the punishment of perpetrators of 
international crimes; defendants with fair trial guarantees; and victims whose right to 
participate, and to reparations is protected. It is suggested that such an approach would 
steer ICL away from the current model premised on a paradigm of retribution.  
 
1.6. Justification for the Formulation of Restorative Justice Adopted in the 
Work 
 
For clarity, restorative justice entails to the extent possible, the following principles 
and approaches to crime by the ICC: restorative justice is a set of principles, values 
and ideals that define a just reaction to the commission of a crime. These principles 
include healing and making amends; establishment of truth and reconciliation; 
guarantee against repetition of crime(s); restoration or repairing harm that may entail 
some form of recompense including restitution, compensation and reparation. The 
conceptual framework for restorative justice adopted above is justifiable on a number 
of grounds.  
First, as a criminal Court established by treaty, the ICC is subject to strict 
institutional arrangements and is thus not amenable to ad hoc, fluid and flexible 
formulations such as traditional restorative justice practices demand. It is not 
conceivable that practices such as mediation, circles and conferencing could be given 
effect within the framework of a supranational forum adjudicating ICL. Even at the 
national level, the said practices seem to operate at the fringes of the mainstream 
criminal justice system.92 Additionally, the fact that the seat of the ICC is 
geographically removed from likely concentrations of victims does not offer good 
prospects for these practices if instituted.93 Yet, as disclosed in the discussion in 
chapter four certain principles of restorative justice have been effortlessly incorporated 
into the criminal justice system.  
Secondly, if for our purposes we adopt a meaning of restorative justice 
inclusive of practices or methods, a difficulty arises relating to who should participate 
                                                
92  See H Strang & L Sherman ‘Repairing the harm: victims and restorative justice’ 2003 Utah LR 
15-42 15. 
93  The possibility of a ‘circuit’ ICC does not necessarily eliminate obstacles of mounting any of 
the restorative justice methods. 
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in view of the proposition central to restorative justice that crime should be seen as an 
interpersonal conflict between the perpetrator and victim. Given that the state is in 
many instances responsible for gross human rights violations, a difficulty arises in 
considering the state as a party to the conflict, especially in identifying proper 
participants in practices such as mediation and circles.94 A similar problem does not 
arise with respect to prosecutions seen as a distinct category, because ICL asserts 
individual criminal responsibility for ICC crimes.95  
Thirdly, the nature of ICC crimes and the peremptory obligations they impose 
favour the conception of restorative justice as a set of principles. The duty in 
international law to prosecute ICC crimes is mandatory. Variously referred to as ‘gross 
human rights violations’ and ‘grave breaches’ of humanitarian law most of these 
crimes give rise to an obligation erga omnes. They oblige states, among other things, 
to prosecute and to provide effective redress to victims.96 In light of this, the adoption 
of approaches that oust or render prosecution impossible would not comport with 
international law.97 In fact, a restorative approach is inherently compatible with the 
imperative to prosecute serious crimes. Indeed, one of the values of restorative justice 
is the guarantee against repetition, which may be achieved through deterrent effects of 
criminal sanction.98  
                                                
94  See Cunnen (n 53 above) 84 on the possible inadequacies that arise from the view of crime as a 
conflict between two parties especially where the perpetrator is the state, which is common for 
gross human rights violations. 
95  See art 25 Rome Statute; generally E Van Sliedregt The criminal responsibility of individuals 
for violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003); AM Danner ‘Guilty associations: 
joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility, and the development of international 
criminal law’ (2005) California LR 75. 
96  See MC Bassiouni International Criminal Law Vol I Crimes (1999) 44-46 on meaning of 
obligation erga omnes; generally ID Seiderman, Hierarchy in International Law (2001). 
97  See generally ID Seiderman, above; B Chigara Amnesty in International Law: the Legality 
under International Law of National Amnesty Laws (2002) (on the inapplicability of amnesty to 
this order of international crimes) generally N Roht-Arriaza (ed) Impunity and Human Rights 
in International Law and Practice (1995); D Orentlicher ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to 
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’ (1990) 100 Yale LJ 25 37; R Aldana-
Pindell, supra note 4 on the obligation to prosecute at least the most serious crimes. 
98  Some form of guarantee against repetition is a key value in the restorative justice literature. See 
Cunnen (n 53 above) 93. See also Muttukumaru (n 77 above) documenting discussions on the 
right to reparations. States at the Prep Com seemed to agree and to emphasise that non-
repetition must be guaranteed by the ICC but differed on how this could be achieved. Most 
states seemed to emphasise that the deterrent effects of punishment, and not necessarily 
reparations was sufficient to provide guarantees to non-repetition. See L Zedner (n 20 above) 
57 suggests that restorative justtice is compatible with retributive justice and that restorative 
justice contains some retributive content, but it restorative justice offers something more. 
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In her article focusing on discourse as the fundamental principle of latter-day 
theories and models of justice, Hudson forcefully demonstrates that institutionalisation 
of restorative justice has the potential of restricting or distorting it [restorative justice], 
in particular the discursive and ‘deliberative’ principles that define it.99 It is argued 
here that the limited conception of restorative justice adopted in this study as informed 
by conceptual and practical considerations seems to vindicate Hudson’s observation, 
although she does not expressly contemplate the ICC but speaks to general theories 
and modes of justice. However, it is opined that while institutionalised restorative 
justice must necessarily conform to the limits imposed by the relevant institution – 
especially when restorative justice in its ‘raw’ or primary conception is seen as fitting 
outside the mainstream criminal justice system – the fundamental principles embodied 
in it remain intact. For instance, the fact that the broad and generally unrestricted 
participatory role of victims and perpetrators may be substantively and procedurally 
limited in the ICC does not mean that the right to participate is entirely precluded. 
Chapter five of this study argues, on a reading of the relevant provisions, that the ICC 
presumes a wide participatory role for victims.  
Hudson suggests, without substantiation, that despite the distortions likely to 
arise from institutionalisation, ‘other futures are possible’ for restorative justice. In 
their discussion of principles of restorative justice, Mika and Zehr make important 
observations on the applicability of restorative justice principles at domestic level. 
First, they note that it is unlikely that restorative justice practice will incorporate all the 
elements. In their view, it is equally difficult to distinguish ‘the critical mass of these 
elements’ in order to distinguish retributive and restorative justice practice.100 
Secondly, they note that the principles are not static, and that their dynamism allow for 
response to changing needs, changing relationships and cultural values.101 It is 
suggested that the Rome Statute circumscribes the bounds within which the principles 
can be applied in line with the objects of the ICC. Thirdly, they warn that the 
restorative justice lexicon and language conventions sometimes become ‘barriers to 
shared meanings and understanding’. They cite definitional problems – of words such 
                                                
99  B Hudson ‘The Institutionalisation of Restorative Justice: justice and ethics of discourse’ in E 
van der Spuy, S Parmentier & A Dissel (eds) Restorative Justice: Politics, policies and 
prospects (2007) 56-72 56. 
100  H Mika and H Zehr (n 39 above) 141. 
101  Ibid. 
 27 
as ‘community’, ‘victim’ as well as ‘restoration’ – and sometimes an aversion to use 
words such as ‘victim’ as particular concerns. Once again, it is suggested that the 
provisions of the Rome Statute provide a template for the judges to shape a restorative 
justice approach. The novelty of restorative justice, both as term and concept, acts as a 
barrier to the required incorporation of a restorative justice approach in the ICC 
process. It is argued generally, and in relation to particular aspects of the ICC’s victims 
regime in subsequent chapters of this study, that what is imperative is for the Court to 
constructively, within its structures and procedures, give effect to a restorative justice 
approach unsaddled by the cumbersome ‘practices’ and ‘methods’ usually associated 
with it where it is practised.  
 
1.7. Rights and Concerns of Victims: A General Outline 
 
Although both were defined by their advocacy and assistance for victims, the victim 
rights movement in the United States and that in Europe took two distinct trajectories. 
While the former focused on victim rights, the latter dedicated its efforts to a less 
confrontational course – that of victim support.102 The movement in the US, which 
from the start pursued a legislative agenda identified various concerns of crime victims 
in the municipal criminal justice system. These included the right to restitution 
(compensation), participation at the sentencing stage, assistance in participating in the 
criminal justice system and protection from intimidation by the defence, accused 
persons or their agents.103 We return to these case studies in some detail in chapter 
four.  
The Rome Statute and the ICC RPE provide for an extensive catalogue of 
rights and concerns of victims that for the most part reflect, but also go beyond the 
victim rights movement in various municipal jurisdictions. While the very adoption of 
the Statute affirms the now settled standard that it is the right of victims of human 
rights violations to see the perpetrators of at least the most egregious crimes 
                                                
102  For more on the global ‘victim movement’, see H Strang, Repair or Revenge (2002) 26-34 
103  CS Goddu ‘Victim’s “rights” or fair trial wronged’ 41 Buffalo LR 245-272 at 245. See also JH 
Stark & HW Goldstein The rights of crime victims ACLU Handbook (1985) 3-4. 
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prosecuted,104 it recognizes that from a victim’s standpoint, reparations including 
rehabilitation must be integral responses to such crimes. Also important to the process 
must be the effective participation by victims in the process, facilitated by adequate 
protections in this regard.  
The modalities by which the views and concerns of victims are to be articulated 
before the ICC are inscribed in the RPE,105 while the foundational principle is enacted 
in Article 68(3) of the Statute thus: 
 [w]here the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and 
concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be 
appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented 
by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
 
In chapter five and six, the thesis considers these concerns, analysing relevant 
provisions in the Statute and ICC RPE together with existing jurisprudence in order to 
properly locate the victim in the ICC in line with the restorative justice paradigm. In 
addition, provisions relating to reparations will be analysed in the same context.  
The implementation of this new regime, in order to give victims a voice in 
proceedings, demands a delicate balance considering that the core mission of the ICC, 
like other international criminal tribunals discussed in chapter two, is to prosecute 
perpetrators under guarantees of fairness. Elizabeth Guigou’s comment captures this 
aptly.106 It also identifies a theme that runs through the discussion of specific 
provisions of the victims’ participatory regime – the need to balance these concerns in 
                                                
104  The obligation to prosecute serious human rights violations (international crimes) is well 
established in international law. See generally N Melanczuk (ed.) (1997) Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law (7th ed.) [1997]; T Meron, International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law as Custom (1992); N Roht-Arriaza, (ed.) Impunity and Human Rights in 
International Law and Practice (1995); Ben Chigara, Amnesty in International Law: the 
Legality under International Law of National Amnesty Laws (2002); R Aldana-Pindell (n 13 
above) 1438. 
105  Section III Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC (emphasis mine). 
106  Elizabeth Guigou, French Minister for Justice noted at the Paris Seminar on Access of Victims 
to the International Criminal Court: Such is the magnitude of our mission: to put the individual 
back at the heart of international criminal justice system, by giving it the means to accord the 
victims their rightful place. A noble task, but one whose difficulty is readily appreciable by all. 
Since the aim is to allow the victims, concretely, to become parties to the international criminal 
proceedings, without undermining the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court, 
without diverting it from its task of law enforcement. Quoted in E Haslam ‘Victim participation 
at the International Criminal Court: A triumph of hope over experience?’ in D MacGoldrick, P 
Row & E Donnely (eds) The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy 
Issues’315-334 316. 
 29 
specific circumstances against other considerations whether of a legal or operational 
character, including the Court’s law enforcement functions and guarantees afforded to 
suspected perpetrators. The rights of victims in the Rome Statute are briefly outlined 
below. 
 
1.8.1 The Right to Participate in Proceedings 
 
The Rome Statute has been praised for revolutionizing the international law of 
victims.107 Some early commentators regard as ‘landmark’108 provisions that facilitate 
victim participation in the Court and cast them beyond their traditional role as 
witnesses, in which role commentators allege objectification.109 While this 
accomplishment is new at the international level, the reform agenda for greater 
integration of victims of crime orchestrated by the victim’s rights movement in a 
number of national jurisdictions had achieved a modicum of success in this regard.110 
The victim’s rights movement in the United States focused its efforts to enhance 
victims’ participation in the criminal process on their role at the sentencing stage, 
notably by making a statement in open Court.111 According to Henderson, this 
approach appears to be ironical because one would expect that the most politically 
visible activity in the movement should focus on the beginning, rather than the end of 
the criminal process.112 The argument for a right to restitution equally incorporated a 
right of the victim to participate in its determination, typically at the sentencing 
stage.113  
It IS odd that this was the trajectory of the reform agenda with regard to 
participation. It is possible for one to speculate that perhaps it was because of the 
                                                
107  Ibid, 315; SA Fernandez de Gurmendi, ‘Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ 
in Lee Roy S Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court: Elements of crimes and Rules of 
Procedure (2001) 235 255. 
108  G Bitti & K Friman, ‘Participation of victims in proceedings’ in Lee (n 71 above) 456. 
109  See E Haslam, (n 106 above) 17; MB Dembour & E Haslam ‘Silencing hearings? Victim-
witnesses at war crimes trials’ (2004) 15 European JIL 151 that chronicles the woes of victims 
in a specific case before the ICTY The Prosecutor v Radislav Kristic (2nd August 2001), Case 
No IT-98-33-T, but reveals problems previously encountered by victims before international 
criminal tribunals. 
110  Modest advancement was made both at federal and state level, with various states adopting 
what were dubbed ‘Victims Bill of Rights’. See Henderson (n 70 above) and chapter three. 
111  Ibid, 986. 
112  Ibid. 
113  Ibid, 1007. 
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impact that victim statements would have had on the outcome of the trial. Henderson 
seems to take this view in her attempt to explain the justification for victim 
participation at this stage through a number of theories including deterrence, 
incapacitation, retribution, ‘fairness’, ‘due process’ and ‘recognition’ noting that it was 
largely intended to influence the outcome of the trial by obtaining a finding 
‘favourable’ to the victim. It is argued that if justice is entailed, not just in the outcome 
of a trial, but also in the process, the framework that permits broader participation in 
the entire process at the ICC must necessarily be a better one. Admittedly, tribute to 
the ICC is ‘founded upon a widespread assumption that victims either do or can 
benefit from participation in the international criminal proceedings.’114 Chapter five 
outlines in detail the right to participation.  
For the purposes of this thesis, participation is not limited to the sentencing 
stage of the trial. It covers a range of ‘roles’ by victims in the procedure, from the start 
to the end, by which the victim’s visibility in and centrality to the process is enhanced. 
This includes the right to be appropriately consulted and to information at various 
stages in the trial process.115 Indeed, as seen in chapter five the Rome Statute expands 
the ambit of issues related to participation by victims in the process of the ICC from 
the investigation phase to the determination of reparations (assuming that this is done 
after the trial).  
The basic principle that governs participation by victims in the process is 
established under Article 68(3) of the Statute, as complemented by various other 
substantive provisions in the Statute, and the RPE which set out the modalities of 
participation at all stages of the ICC proceedings.116 This means that victims will, 
subject to Article 68(3), participate at the pre-trial, trial and sentencing stages, 
including determination of reparations. Chapter five assesses the possible scope of this 
participatory role and exposes the challenges that victims and other players are likely 
to face in the process. 
 
                                                
114  E Haslam (n 106 above) 315. 
115  See W Pizzi & W Perron ‘Crime victims in German Courtrooms: a comparative perspective on 
American problems’ (1996) 32 Stanford JIL 37. 
116  Art 89 Section III RPE. 
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1.8.2 The Right to Reparations 
 
Restitution as a right of victims of crime has been central to the claims of the victim 
rights movement. Its centrality is acknowledged by many commentators who concur 
that restitution is perhaps the most important concern for victims of crime anywhere.117 
It is no surprise, perhaps, that the provision for reparations under Article 75 of the 
Rome Statute, read together with the provision for a Victims Fund in Article 79, have 
attracted the loudest plaudits in the ICC victims’ regime.118 As a matter of introduction, 
Article 75, in its relevant parts requires the Court to ‘establish principles relating to 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation and …. [to] determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and 
injury to, or in respect of, victims.’ This provision implicates a host of pertinent legal 
issues as well as questions relating mostly to its implementation to which the study 
returns in chapter six.  
 
1.8.3 Right to Protection 
 
The right to protection arises naturally from the participation of witnesses in the 
criminal process. The rights relates to the protection of witnesses in the criminal 
process, as well as providing safeguards for victims against ‘re-traumatisation’ by 
virtue of their role in the process. Although one may expect that this right should be 
afforded to a victim who testifies in the prosecution, circumstances may arise where 
‘non-witness’ victims require protection, especially where there is a backlash directed 
at a class of victims. The ICC’s victims and witness protection framework builds on 
the protection practice at the ad hoc international tribunals which has for the most part 
been considered wanting.119  
                                                
117  Henderson (n 13 above) 1007 observes that ‘While many propositions advanced on the behalf 
of past victims may be of marginal concern to them, compensation for injuries can be of central 
importance. If crime victims have ‘rights,’ the right to recover from the wrongdoer is the most 
tenable individually based right’. 
118  See E Haslam (n 106 above) 74 ; WA Schabas (n 33 above) 174; D Donat-Cattin (n 79 above); 
Muttukumaru (n 77 above) 263; V Nainar ‘Giving victims a voice in the International Criminal 
Court’ (1999) UN Chronicle Issue 4 accessed at <http://www.iccwomen.org/sources/article.-
unchronicle.htm> . 
119  See for instance for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, G Sluiter ‘The ICTR and 
the protection of witnesses’ (2005) 3 J Intl Crim Just 962-975. 
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The Rome Statute establishes the general standard that all organs of the Court 
must respond appropriately to protect the privacy, dignity, physical and psychological 
well-being and the security of victims and witnesses, especially when the crimes 
involve sexual or gender violence, while fully respecting the rights of the accused.120 
To coordinate these functions, a Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) is established in 
the Registry of the Court, to provide ‘protective measures and security arrangements, 
counselling and other appropriate assistance’ for witnesses and victims including those 
victims ‘who appear before the Court and others who are at risk on account of 
testimony’.121 In its decision rendered on 18 January 2008, Trial Chamber I (TC I) has 
clarified the notion ‘victims appearing before the Court’ noting that victims at risk may 
be entitled to some measure of protection as soon as their completed application to 
participate (in a situation or a case)122 has been received by the Court.123 In the 
Chamber’s view, the process of ‘appearing before the Court’ is not dependent on either 
an application to participate having accepted or the victim physically attending.124 An 
Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), which will provide support and 
assistance to victims and victims’ legal representatives, has been established.125 It has a 
role to play in ensuring effective victim participation in the proceedings. 
It is notable that witness protection is perhaps the only concern of victims that 
has hitherto received considerable attention in international criminal law, at least since 
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, which have overseen some interesting 
developments in this regard.126 Despite this, it is argued that its application remains 
deficient, perhaps because the attribution of such rights to victims essentially 
constitutes a counter claim to the assertion by accused perpetrators of traditional fair 
                                                
120  Art 68 (1) Rome Statute and Rules 87 & 88 RPE. 
121  Arts 43(6) and 68 (4) Rome Statute; Rules 16-19 ICC RPE. 
122  ‘Situation’ means the overall factual context over which the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction 
and from which individual cases may be developed. ‘Situation’, used in contradistinction to 
‘case’ may cover an entire country (as in the case of CAR, DRC and Uganda) or a particular 
time period or geographical space (Côte d’Ivoire and Darfur). Cases against specific 
individulas are drawn from the situation. 
123  Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v Thomas Dylo Lubanga, 
‘Decision on victims’ participation’ of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 137. 
124  Ibid. 
125   On 19 September 2005. Regulations 114-117 Regulations of the Registry of the ICC. See the 
ICC Newsletter, November 2005 at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/newsletter/index_21.html>. 
126  See Sluiter (n 119 above) 962 noting that protection of witnesses occupies a prominent place in 
10 years of practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
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trial guarantees. That witness protection undercuts the rights of accused persons is a 
vehement assertion of some commentators. Among these, the accused’s rights to a 
public trial and adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence are cited.127 It 
becomes imperative that the international tribunal balances these competing claims. 
This study does not discuss the right to protection beyond this brief introduction, 
except insofar as it relates to the right to participation and reparations and the relevant 
functions of the VWU and the OPCV. 
                                                
127  Ibid, 972 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FROM NUREMBERG TO SIERRA LEONE: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
2.1. Introduction: International Responses to International Crimes 
 
Gross human rights violations have been, and continue to be, perpetrated in the course 
of numerous armed conflicts witnessed in recent times as well as in peacetime. While 
it might have been expected that the extent, seriousness and recurrence of atrocities 
committed would have elicited universal condemnation and triggered swift preventive 
and deterrent action from states in light of the purposes of the United Nations, the 
reality seems to have been the reverse.1  
The international community has often reacted with indifference to even the most 
egregious atrocities.2 In the face of state interest therefore, commitments to the ideal of 
human rights have been at best, rhetorical. Indeed, while in the modern era the 
Security Council is mandated to deal with threats to, and breaches of international 
peace and security,3 it has mostly been inconsistent in its responses.4 Since the need to 
establish a permanent international criminal tribunal was identified, several factors 
intervened to delay its realisation.5 In particular, the role of realpolitik in impeding 
                                                
1  See art 1 (1) and 1 (3) Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) which enact for two of the 
purposes of the UN: the maintenance of international peace and security; and the achievement 
of international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, 
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms. 
2  A Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003) 4 noting that states tend to respond only when 
their own interests are at stake. 
3  See Chapter VII UN Charter. The nexus between ‘international peace and security’ and 
initiatives by the Security Council to respond judicially to international crimes has been 
articulated by the ad hoc Tribunals in two landmark decisions: Tadic v Prosecutor IT-94-1-T 
(ICTY) and Akayesu v Prosecutor Case No. ICTR-94-T. 
4  This inconsistency applies both to judicial and non-judicial responses. Notable examples of 
such conflicts include Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chechnya. 
5  For a historical account of various initiatives see MC Bassiouni, ‘Historical Survey: 1919-
1998’ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Statute of the International Criminal Court: a documentary history 
(1998); LS Wexler ‘The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal’ 
(1996) 29 Cornel Int’l L.J. 665; BB Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward 
World Peace-A Documentary history and Analysis (1980); MC Bassiouni, ‘From Versailles to 
Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal 
Court’ (1997)10 Harvard HRJ 11; C Warbrick, The United Nations System: A Place for 
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these efforts, and in shaping any responses to the atrocities when this happened, has 
been lamented.6 Even when various ad hoc tribunals and investigative commissions 
were established, their administration has been subordinated to realpolitik.7 Seen in 
this context, prosecution of international crimes, let alone a genuine attempt to address 
victims’ concerns could not have been a faultless undertaking. The adoption of the 
Rome Statute, which, as argued above, incorporates a new paradigm of international 
justice is per se a revolutionary feat.8 
To put the new regime in historical perspective, this chapter reviews the practice of 
post World War II tribunals – the military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo as well 
as the United Nations ad hoc criminal tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). It establishes that the 
international criminal justice system as constituted by these tribunals has been based 
on a paradigm of retribution driven mainly by a narrow understanding of the concept 
of ‘interests of international peace and security’, which, as noted in the previous 
chapter, has served as the justification for establishing these institutions. This chapter 
demonstrates that while there has been a progressive development in the norms 
relating to persons accused of international crimes as in other aspects of international 
criminal law (ICL), issues relating to victims have rarely arisen in ICL discourse and 
processes.  
 
2.2. Squandered Opportunities: Versailles, Sevres and Lausanne 
 
Attempts to conduct war crimes trials through an international war crimes tribunal 
after World War I were unsuccessful.9 Although such a tribunal was envisaged in the 
                                                                                                                                        
Criminal Courts?, (1995) 5 Translational L and Contemp. Probs 237; LS Sadat ‘The new 
International Criminal Court: an uneasy revolution’ (2000) Georgetown LJ.  
6  On realpolitik and international criminal justice, see generally JG Bass Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance: The Politics of war Crimes Tribunals (2000) (Bass, 2000); J Maogoto, War Crimes 
and Realpolitik: International Justice from World War I into the 21st Century (2004). 
7  See MC Bassiouni, ‘International Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions’ (n 5 above) 31-86 
31. 
8  NS Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: 
Justice for the new Millennium 2nd ed (2000) 1. 
9  On World War I war crimes and prosecutions see Bierzanek, R ‘War Crimes: History and 
Definition’ in MC Bassiouni & VP Nanda A Treatise on International Criminal Law (1973) 
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Treaty of Versailles10 on the recommendation of the investigative Commission on 
Responsibilities established by the Allied Powers,11 it did not come to fruition after 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was to face trial together with other German war criminals 
escaped into exile and was granted sanctuary in the Netherlands.12 A similar tribunal to 
try suspected Turkish war criminals13 did not materialize after the subsequent adoption 
of the Treaty of Lausanne, which ignored Turkish atrocities hence establishing a de 
facto blanket amnesty.14 In the German case, the Allied Powers in the end consented to 
the trial of indicted German criminals by the German Supreme Court at Leipzig, after 
German authorities opposed their extradition on grounds that the German public would 
revolt.15 These proceedings proved to be a sham.16  
The failure by the Allied Powers to punish World War I war criminals was not 
attributable so much to the strength of opposing ‘national sentiment’ and the inability 
of the Powers to insist on compliance as to the novelty of the idea that war criminals 
could be called to account in an international tribunal. The failure to conduct these 
trials at all in an international forum and the mostly resigned attitude of the Allied 
Powers to the Leipzig parody of justice eliminated any chance that the concerns of 
victims from Allied territories could be raised.17 In fact, it is unlikely that victims’ 
concerns would have featured at all, as the treaties envisaged only trial of major war 
criminals. Although the decision to stage trials was partly in acknowledgement of the 
suffering of people in the territories, especially Armenians at the hands of the Turkish 
                                                                                                                                        
559-586; V Morris, & MP Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Vol 1 
(1998) 2-3. 
10  Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 28 June 1919 Arts 
227-230. 
11  See Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 
Enforcement of Penalties, Conference of Paris 1919 reprinted in V Morris & MP Scharf, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Vol 2 (1998) 419-469. 
12  Morris & Scharf, (n 9 above) 2. 
13  See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, 10 August 1920, Arts 226-230, 
reprinted in 15 American JIL 179 (Supp. 1921). 
14  Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, 24 July 1923, 28 LNTS 11, reprinted 
in 18 American JIL 1 (Supp. 1924). See Bassiouni & Nanda, (n 2 above). 
15  R Bierzanek, (n 2 above) 566. 
16  Out of more than 800 indicted, only 14 were tried resulting in only one conviction, with a 
nominal prison sentence. R Bierzanek, (n 2 above) 568. 
17  Ibid, 567 illustrating the attitude of the Allied Powers and their dithering views on the basis and 
conduct of war crimes trials by a ‘High Tribunal’. See in particular, the views of Japan and 
United States. 
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government,18 it is not entirely speculative to argue that nothing would have come out 
of this recognition that the relevant crimes concerned people, a fact that should have 
necessitated attention both within and without any possible criminal process. It appears 
that a great idea (that of staging prosecutions in possible judicial recognition of 
victims) became victim to its own novelty, and the hesitation of major players to act 
and implement it. 
 
2.3. The International Criminal Tribunal Experiment 
 
After the debacle of World War I war crimes trials, the consistent desire of the Allies 
to punish World War II criminals may have blurred their perspective regarding 
concerns of victims, which under the circumstances were considered incidental to the 
main thrust of what became the ‘Nuremberg project’. The experience of WWI showed 
that the road to the establishment of an international criminal justice system would not 
be an easy one. It took the horror of World War II to jolt the ‘Great Powers’ to take 
unprecedented action to punish German and Japanese war criminals. The atrocious 
conduct of war by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan caused states to abandon their 
demure inhibitions about the feasibility of an international war crimes tribunal that had 
marred post World War I initiatives. 19 As early as 1942, while the war was in full 
swing, the Allies and the occupied European states had repeatedly declared their 
unwavering resolve to rewrite history by staging both national and international trials 
of war criminals at the end of the war.20 This was later to influence the approach of the 
Allies and the processes of the two tribunals.  
 
                                                
18  See Treaty of Sevres making reference to the atrocities against Armenians which have since 
come to be acknowledged as a genocide, a term that did not form part of rights discourse at the 
time of the massacres. 
19  Pella has written in this regard that:  
 ‘[i]t was not until World War II and its lessons that the rulers of states finally decided to cast 
off the old armor of prejudice which had led them to declare any international penal justice 
system impossible as the idea of repressing acts committed by states as well as by individuals 
endangering directly or indirectly the supreme legal good i.e, peace was often regarded as the 
manifestation of a dangerous revolutionary sentiment.’ See V Pella La Guerre-Crime et les 
Criminels de Guerre (1946) 16 quoted in R Bierzanek (n 2 above), 571. 
20  See notably the Moscow Declaration of 30th October 1943 signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and 
Stalin reprinted in Morris & Scharf (n 9 above) 470 from 38 American JIL (Supp. 1944) See 
also R Bierzanek, (n 2 above) 573 detailing various declarations affirming that no war criminal 
would go unpunished. 
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2.4.1 The International Military Tribunals: Nuremberg and Tokyo  
 
The solemn declarations by various states concretised in the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT),21 in terms of the Nuremberg 
Charter concluded by the London Agreement22 on recommendations by the 
Preparatory Commission on War Crimes.23 Soon thereafter, the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo tribunal) was promulgated by proclamation of the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Far East.24 While the IMT was 
mandated to try war criminals of the European Axis for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and crimes against peace,25 which offences were deemed not to be limited to 
a particular geographical location, the Tokyo tribunal had a similar mandate with 
relation to members of the Japanese high command.26 Since the tribunals could not 
possibly prosecute all war criminals, the London Agreement had reserved the right of 
various states to try other war criminals whose crimes were limited to their respective 
territories.27 It was under this mandate that various countries staged trials related to the 
war.28 Of the 26 people indicted at Nuremberg, 22 were convicted and sentenced to 
death, and four were acquitted.29  
 
                                                
21  On the Nuremberg Tribunal see generally MC Bassiouni ‘The Nuremberg Legacy’ in 
Bassiouni Vol III (Enforcement) 217-390; T Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A 
Personal Memoir (1992); T Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age: Essays(1998); 
Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary-General, The Charter and the Judgment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal: History and Analysis UN Doc. A CN 4/5 (1949). 
22  Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) annexed to the London 
Agreement of 8th August 1945 between the United States, France, United Kingdom (and 
Northern Ireland) and the Soviet Union. 
23  United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes established in on 20th October 
1943. 
24  Charter of the International Military Tribunal For the Far East approved by the supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur on 19th January 1946 as amended by 
order of Supreme Commander, general Headquarters, APO 500, 26th April 1946. 
25  Art 6 Nuremberg Charter. 
26  Art 5 Charter of IMTFE. 
27  Art 4 London Agreement. Trials of war related criminals were conducted in many countries 
including France, Israel, Australia and UK. See for instance Order No 10 promulgated by the 
Control Council of Germany that sanctioned trials in German Courts. For an account on 
national war crimes trials, see Jordan J Paust et al International Criminal Law: Cases and 
materials (2000) 633-637. 
28  Domestic prosecution of international crimes, infra section 3.7. 
29  See ‘the Nuremberg Judgment’ in GK McDonald & O Swaak-Goldman (eds) Substantive and 
Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and 
National Courts Vol II Part 2 Documents and Cases (2000) 629-749. 
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2.4.2 The Nuremberg Precedent and Retributive Justice in ICL 
 
From the mandates of the two tribunals, it can be deduced that the intention of the 
Allies was never to address the concerns of war victims beyond what the trial of key 
perpetrators could offer. As evidenced from the conduct of the Nuremberg trials 
themselves, prosecutors were mostly preoccupied with a concept of international peace 
and security, understood within the confines of the punitive and deterrent functions of 
criminal law. Bert Roling, a former judge at the Tokyo tribunal, has written that ‘the 
European pursuit of peace coupled with the deep indignation with German criminality 
led to the Nuremberg trial and that [all] the counts justified a charge of crimes against 
peace.’30 Although the Nuremberg Charter established competence over three crimes, 
the indictment against major German criminals concentrated on aggressive war.31 In 
justifying US entry into the war, the American Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Justice 
Robert Jackson had remarked thus, underscoring the charge of crimes against peace: 
 “… [t]herefore, our view is that this is not merely a case showing that these Nazi-Hitlerite 
people failed to be gentlemen in war; it is a matter of their having designed an illegal attack on 
international peace, which to our mind is a criminal offence by all common law tests, at least 
and the other atrocities were all preparatory to it or done in execution of it ….”32  
 
The prosecution therefore adopted an approach that subordinated crimes committed 
against people – war crimes and crimes against humanity – to the ultimate 
international crime: crimes against peace, which was projected as a violation of a 
universal standard accepted by all nations. Consequently, even when a specific group 
of victims was identifiable, as in the case of the Jews, no particular orders could be, 
and were actually ever made, as the expressed aim of any international proceeding was 
to mete out retributive justice.33 A reading of all pre-Nuremberg declarations by 
various governments discussed above reiterates this position. Revealingly, neither the 
                                                
30  BVA Roling ‘The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials in Retrospect’ in MC Bassiouni & VP Nanda 
A Treatise on International Criminal Law (1973) 590-608 593. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Report of RH Jackson, 384 quoted in B Roling, (n 30 above) 593. 
33  See Joint Declaration of 17th December 1942 by the governments of United Kingdom, United 
States and the Soviet Union in which the expressed their resolve to ensure that war criminals 
responsible for crimes against persons of the Jewish race would not escape retribution. A 
proposal to include a specific provision charging perpetrators for crimes against Jews in the 
IMT Charter was nevertheless abandoned, although even this would have been limited to 
criminal sanction. 
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Nuremberg Charter nor the IMTFE Charter makes express mention of victims. The 
only provision in the Nuremberg Charter relevant directly to victims, but which did not 
import criminal sanction related to looted property. It provided that ‘in addition to any 
punishment imposed by it, the tribunal shall have the right to deprive the convicted 
person of any stolen property and order its delivery to the Control Council for 
Germany’.34 This provision, which was not included in the IMTFE Charter, was never 
invoked at the trial.35 
It is opined that even though the term ‘human rights’ did not form part of rights 
discourse in the pre-WW II period, victims’ concerns, which had a basis in the natural 
law notion of ‘natural rights’, should have found greater expression in the processes of 
the tribunals.36 Indicted war criminals had faired better. The Charters of both tribunals 
did incorporate a catalogue of fair trial guarantees, which, even though limited in 
scope, protected those accused by the standards of the time.37 These formed the basis 
of the jurisprudential development in relation to the rights of those accused of crimes 
later encapsulated in major human rights instruments,38 and the Rome Statute itself.39 
As a powerful antecedent to the latter-day international criminal tribunals, and indeed 
as the seed of international criminal law, the ‘Nuremberg precedent’ laid the 
foundation for the current paradigm in ICL, which focuses on perpetrators by affording 
them greater protections while regarding victims as an incidental concern whose rights 
should be subordinated to those of perpetrators.40 There is no doubt that the IMT at 
Nuremberg laid the foundation for contemporary ICL.41 
                                                
34  Art 28 Nuremberg Charter. 
35  The IMT had dealt with the issue of property, but within the context of war crimes. See 
Nuremberg Judgment in MacDonald and Goldman supra note 30 at 671-673. 
36  The UN Charter inaugurated the term ‘human rights’ in international law discourse. See such 
references in prmbl, arts 1, 13 and 55 UN Charter. P Alston & HJ Steiner, International Human 
Rights in Context; Law, Policy, Morals 2nd ed (2000) 138-158. 
37  Art 16 IMT Charter Statute included the requirements that defendant had a right to have a 
detailed indictment in a language they understood furnished to them within reasonable time 
before commencement of trial; the right to proceedings in a language they understood best; the 
right to conduct their own defence before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel and 
the right through himself or through his Counsel to present evidence at the trial in support of 
his defence and to cross-examine any witness called by the prosecution. See also art 9 Tokyo 
Charter. 
38  See arts 10, 7, 11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N Doc 
A/810 at 71 (1948) and art 14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
1966, 999 UNTS 171, 6 ILM 368. 
39  See art 67 Rome Statute and chapters 6 and 7. 
40  Despite its less illustrious image, the Tokyo tribunal joined the Nuremberg tribunal in 
affirming the resolve that no person guilty of heinous crimes, irrespective of position of 
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2.4. Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: ICTY and ICTR 
 
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
by Security Council resolution pursuant to its Chapter VII powers42 constituted the first 
time since Nuremberg that the international community had responded forcefully to 
atrocities by establishing a tribunal to try and punish alleged perpetrators.43 This 
accomplishment was followed a year later by the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on similar terms.44   
Fifty years later, the Nuremberg affirmation of ‘never again!’ had rung hollow 
as the World watched the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda descend into violence that 
left over a million people dead. While in the former Yugoslavia the government of the 
Republic of Serbia implemented an ethnic cleansing policy against ethnic Albanians, 
Bosnians and Muslims and ethnic Croats,45 in Rwanda, the ethnic Hutu dominated 
government set out to exterminate the ethnic minority Tutsi and ‘moderate’ Hutus in a 
complex political conflict.46 For the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbian 
                                                                                                                                        
authority, would enjoy impunity. The Nuremberg judgment has been celebrated for its 
contribution in crystallizing and clarifying principles of international law. See in this regard R 
Bierzanek (n 2 above) 577.  
41  The Nuremberg Principles were adopted by the UN General Assembly. See Gen Assembly 
resolution UN GA Res 95/1 of 11th December 1946. See generally MC Bassiouni (n 21 above) 
on ‘the Nuremberg Precedent’. 
42  See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993) presented 3 may 1993 (s/25704) Para 18-30 explaining the legal basis for the 
establishment of the international tribunal. 
43  See SC res 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 on the establishment of the ICTY. On the establishment 
and legislative history of the ICTY, see MC Bassiouni & P Manikas The Law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1996) 199-236. 
44  See S.C. Res. 935 and S.C. Res. 955, (1994). On the legislative history of the ICTR, see 
generally Morris & Scharf (n 9 above).  
45  For the background and account of the Balkan civil war see MC Bassiouni & P Manikas (n 43 
above) 1-62 and The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II, 
‘Opinion and judgment’ in 7 May 1997 paras 53. 
46  The atrocities of the Rwandan genocide and responses of the international community are well 
documented. See Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T) paras 78-111. See also A 
Des, Alison; Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (1999); P Gourevitch, We 
Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow we Will Be Killed with Our Families (1998); R Dallaire, 
Shake hands with the devil; The failure of humanity in Rwanda (2003) (Dallaire, 2003); G 
Prunier The Rwanda Crisis: History of the Genocide (1995); L Melvern, A People Betrayed: 
The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (2000); M Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The 
United Nations and Rwanda (2002); Samantha Power A Problem from Hell: America and the 
Age of Genocide (2002); S Feil, How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda 
(1998). 
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expansionist aspirations by the Republic of Serbia to a ‘greater Serbia’ fuelled the 
conflict47 during which widespread violations of international humanitarian law were 
witnessed, including, according to reports, ‘mass forcible expulsion and deportation of 
civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention centres, deliberate attacks 
on non-combatants, hospitals and ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and 
medical supplies to the civilian population, and wanton devastation and destruction of 
property’.48 Based on evidence of atrocities in both Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia, the Security Council decided to establish an international tribunal for each 
country as recommended by UN Commission of Experts.49 
The tribunals have the competence to establish the individual criminal 
responsibility50 of persons considered to have committed ‘serious violations of 
international humanitarian law’ in the territory of the former Yugoslavia from January 
199151 and in the territory of Rwanda from 1 January to 31 December 1994.52 As such, 
the reach of both tribunals is limited in both scope and purpose. Materially, they have 
the same jurisdiction over genocide53 and crimes against humanity.54 Additionally, 
while the ICTY’s jurisdiction extends to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 applicable to international armed conflicts55 and violations of the laws or customs 
                                                
47  See Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic IT-94-1-T (n 45 above) para.54. 
48  See Report of Secretary General, Ibid at 6 reflecting the views of the Commission of Experts 
established by the Secretary-General on request by Security Council (res 780 of 6 October 
1992) that provided evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
49  See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts submitted by letter dated 9 February 1993 to 
the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General (S/25274) and SC res 808 
(1993). For Rwanda, see Report of Commission of Experts and accompanying letter dated 1 
October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994). 
50  Art 6 ICTR Statute. 
51  Art 1 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal established for the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY Statute) originally published as annex to the 
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808 
(1993) (U.N. Doc. S/25704) and adopted pursuant to SC res 827 (25 May 1993) and 
subsequently amended by UNSC resolutions 1166, 1329, 1411, 1431, 1481. 
52  Art 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Such violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 
and 31 December 1994 (ICTR Statute). 
53  Art 4 ICTY Statute and art 2 ICTR Statute. 
54  Art 5 ICTY Statute and art 3 ICTR Statute. 
55  Art 2 ICTY Statute. 
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of war (war crimes),56 that of the ICTR incorporates violations of Article 3 Common to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva 
Conventions57 both applicable to an internal armed conflict. Whilst the ICTY is an 
‘open-ended’ tribunal, its end time not being defined,58 the ICTR is temporally limited. 
Its competence extends only to relevant crimes committed between 31 January 1994 
and 31 December of the same year.59 
 
2.4.1  The Ad Hoc Tribunals and Victims: The Forgotten Parties? 
 
In terms of the founding instruments, the ICTR and ICTY were established ‘for the 
sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian 
law.’60 The tribunals, like Nuremberg adopted a retributive approach to justice 
characterised by punishment of perpetrators.61 The mandates of the tribunals constitute 
the main reason explaining the role of victims before these tribunals.62 They do not 
provide for the possibility for victims to claim reparations either from perpetrators or 
otherwise.63 However, the Rules leave open the possibility for victims to obtain 
compensation under national legislation or some other appropriate forum after a 
conviction at the tribunal.64 Further, the statutes of both tribunals addressed the 
question of restitution of stolen property to be ordered as part of final sentence.65 
                                                
56  Art 3 ICTY Statute. 
57  Art 4 ICTR Statute. 
58  It has jurisdiction over atrocities committed between 1st Jan 1991 and a time that will be 
decided by the Security Council resolution. 
59  Art 1 ICTR Statute. 
60  UN SC Res 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993; UN SC Res 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994. 
61  GJ Mekjian & MC Varughese ‘Hearing the victim’s voice: analysis of victims’ advocate 
participation in the trial proceeding of the international criminal Court’ (2005) XVII N 1 Pace 
Univ School of LJ 1-46 13 alluding to ‘the punitive nature of the tribunals’. 
62  Morris & Scharf have observed that the mandate of the ICTY indicates the intention of the 
UNSC to exclude the possibility of compensation before the tribunals. See V Morris & MP 
Scharf An insider’s guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(1995) at 167, 286-87; V Morris & MP Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Vol 1 (1998). 
63 See generally, JRWD Jones The practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (1998); A Rydberg ‘victims in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia’ in H Kaptein & M Malsch - crime victims and justice: essays on 
principles and justice, 126-140 131; Mekjian & Varughese (n 61 above) 13. 
64 Rule 106B ICTY RPE; Rule 106 ICTR RPE; UNSC Res 827 and 955 noted that ‘the work of the 
International Tribunal shall be carried out without prejudice to the right of victims to seek, 
through appropriate means, compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of 
international humanitarian law”. See ICTR/ICTY ‘Victims compensation and participation’ 
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The statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the two tribunals do not 
contain any provisions relating to victims’ participation in the proceedings. As such, 
their participation is restricted – for those who get called either by the prosecutor, 
defence or the tribunal on its own initiative – to that of witnesses.66 Despite the 
convergence of legal traditions in the procedure of the tribunals, they seem to have 
adopted an adversarial procedure in this respect, which is characteristic of common 
law systems in which the role of the victim in criminal procedure is restricted to that of 
witness.67 The fact that victim-witnesses are open to charges of contempt if they don’t 
tell the truth coupled with the fact that they do not have a right to be kept informed of 
the progress of proceedings68 has led some to conclude that ‘war crimes trials 
effectively silence, rather than hear victims.’69 
Typical of retributive models of justice, the interests of victims are supposed to 
be represented by the prosecutor. However, the prosecutor is hardly the appropriate 
person to look out for victims’ interests as these do not always converge with those of 
the prosecutor. The exclusionary manner in which plea bargaining procedure has been 
conducted before the tribunals attests to the fact that irrespective of independent 
victims’ concerns, the prosecutor has been driven largely by the need to dispose off 
cases as efficiently as possible in pursuance of the tribunals’ prosecutorial mandate.70 
The Statutes and Rules of both tribunals made it a priority to safeguard the 
right of accused to a fair and expeditious trial.71 The tribunals have emphasised 
                                                                                                                                        
ICTR and ICTY Judges’ Report of 13 Sep 2000 to UN Security Council available at 
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p528-e.htm> (accessed on 20 Sep 2005); T Kuhner ‘The 
status of victims in the enforcement of international criminal law’ (2004) 6 Oregon Rev IL 95. 
65 Arts 23(2) ICTR and art 24(3) ICTY Statute both under ‘penalties’ provide that in addition to 
imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by 
criminal conduct to their rightful owner.provide for restitution of property or proceeds acquired 
by criminal conduct. See also Rule 105 ICTR RPE; Rule 105 ICTY RPE; ICTY Judges 
Compensation Report, 7. 
66  Rule 98 ICTY RPE; Rules 54 and 98 ICTR RPE. 
67  Mekjian & Varughese (n 61 above) 13. See also chapter three. 
68  Rule 90 ICTY RPE; Rule 77 ICTR RPE; generally, JE Ackerman & E O’Sullivan Practice and 
procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2000) 436-43. 
69  MB Dembour & E Haslam ‘Silencing hearings? Victim-witnesses at war crimes trials’ (2004) 
15 European JIL 151; Mekjian & Varughese, 13.  See also E Stover The Witnesses who has 
documented the experiences of victims from the former Yugoslavia in relation to the ICTY. 
70  Art 15 ICTR Statute; art 16 ICTY Statute. On plea bargaining practice of the tribunals see A 
Tieger & M Shin ‘Plea agreements in the ICTY’ (2005) 3 J of International Criminal Justice 
666-679 and chapter four of this thesis. 
71  Art 21(4) ICTY Statute; art 19(1) ICTR Statute. 
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compliance with these defence rights.72 Victims have largely been left out, save in 
cases where victim protection schemes have been instituted as required by the 
founding law and rules of the tribunals.73 For the case of Rwanda, one major concern 
of victims has been that while in the opinion of genocide survivors those facing trial 
for genocide ‘live like kings and queens’, little is done to alleviate the suffering of 
survivors who struggle to deal with the effects of victimisation. Because of its 
perceived detachment from victims, many people in Rwanda, including the Rwandan 
government have considered the ICTR as a wasteful parody of justice.74 While there 
have been complementary national processes in Rwanda that may be considered more 
responsive to victims such as Gacaca tribunals, the ICTR has been a failure in this 
regard. The modest achievements of Gacaca discussed in chapter six demonstrate the 
usefulness of such indigenous justice mechanisms in addressing intricate problems of 
justice by complementing formal processes of ICL and in particular, attending to the 
some of victims’ concerns.75  
Without doubt, the tribunals have made invaluable contribution since their 
establishment. Apart from playing a central role in establishing accountability for 
atrocities committed in the respective territories thus paving the way for a measure of 
peace, reconciliation and reconstruction after violent conflicts, they have also 
contributed to the development of the jurisprudence of international criminal law.76 
Morris & Scharf77 observe with respect to the ICTR that its establishment constitutes 
one of the most important milestones in the history of international criminal law, 
                                                
72  See for instance Prosecutor v Barayagwiza, ICTR-97-29-T Decision on Defence Counsel 
Motion to Withdraw, Concurring and Separate Opinion of Judge Gunawardana, 2 November 
2000; Prosecutor v Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion 
Concerning Assignment of Counsel 4 April 2003; Mekjian & Varughese (n 61 above) 13. 
73  See art 20 and 22 ICTY Statute and Rules 69, 75, 79 and 89 Rule of Procedure and Evidence of 
the ICTY and Art ICTR Statute. 
74  For Rwanda’s initial objections to the ICTR see MH Morris, ‘The trials of concurrent 
jurisdiction: the case of Rwanda’ (1997) 7 Duke J. Comp. and Int'l L 349 355-358. 
75  On Gacaca and victims see M Goldstein-Bolocan ‘Rwandan Gacaca: an experiment in 
transitional justice (2005) J of Dispute Resolution 355 363. 
76  For the contribution of the ad hoc tribunals see PL Magnarella, ‘Expanding the frontiers of 
humanitarian law: the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda’ (1994) 9 Florida JIL 421; T 
Meron ‘War Crimes in Yugoslavia and Development of International Law’ (1994) 88 
American JIL 78; generally T Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age: Essays (1998); KC 
Moghalu ‘International humanitarian law from Nuremberg to Rome: the weighty precedents of 
the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda’ (2002) 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 273; P Akhavan 
‘the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda: the politics and pragmatics of punishment’ 
(1996) 90 American JIL 501. 
77  Morris & Scharf (n 9 above) 1. 
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especially when viewed in its historical context that takes into account the difficulties 
encountered in efforts to create other ad hoc international criminal tribunals and in the 
protracted process that culminated in the Permanent International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  
While the work of the tribunals is laudable in terms of institutional and 
jurisprudential developments, based on the narrow focus of their mandates, similar 
sentiments do not hold with respect to the rights of victims of the atrocities for which 
they were created to address. It is no surprise that they have so far focused only on 
establishing the criminal responsibility of suspected perpetrators. Even in this function, 
they have been handicapped due to their limited mandates, as well as practical 
considerations that have necessitated that they act selectively in prosecuting only a few 
people who bear the greatest responsibility.78  
Both tribunals provide for measures protective of witnesses and victims who 
act in that capacity. These fairly standard measures include in camera hearings, closed 
sessions, expunging identifying information from the public records of the tribunals 
and testimony through image (or voice) altering devices. However, these measures, 
aimed at protecting the privacy and safety of victims and witnesses may only operate 
subject to the rights of the accused.79 The ICTY seems to have made some strides in 
advancing the rights of victims in one major respect. In the most significant case on 
the subject, the trial Chamber found in favour of affording further protective measures 
for victims and witnesses effectively sanctions anonymous testimony in appropriate 
cases.80 Applauded by proponents of victims’ rights and vehemently criticized by those 
who consider it an infringement on fair trial guarantees, this decision is but a modest 
advancement of victims’ rights.81 It most importantly serves to highlight the tensions 
                                                
78  On the policy of indictment of the ICTY, see A Rydberg ‘victims in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’ in H Kaptein & M Malsch - crime victims and justice: 
essays on principles and justice, 126 128-131. 
79  Rules 75 and 79 ICTR RPE; Rules 75 and 79 ICTY RPE. See generally C DeFrancia, ‘Due 
Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters’ (2001) 87 Virginia LR 1381 
80  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-T (Trial Chamber, ICTY, Aug 10 1995 Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses). The tribunals 
allowed anonymous testimony owing to ‘exceptional circumstances’ and because serious 
concerns about victim safety warranted such a move. 
81  See later decisions that seem to deviate from The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir 
Talic - Case No. IT-99-36-PT (Trial Chamber II, ICTY, July 3, 2000); Prosecutor v Blaskic, 
Case No. IT-95-14-PT, (Trial Chamber I, ICTY, Mar. 2, 2000); C DeFrancia (n 79 above) 
1420; C Chinkin, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief On Protective Measures For Victims And Witnesses’ 
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between the rights of victims and those of perpetrators the ICC has to address in 
operationalizing the new norms relating to victims. It is noteworthy that the Rome 
Statute endorses anonymous testimony.82 The jurisprudence of the tribunals in this 
regard is therefore relevant for the ICC’s interpretative mission.  
In outlining ways in which the plight of victims can be dealt with, it is 
imperative to think beyond the judicial process. The Rwandan experience and the 
belated response by the UN to the crisis has demonstrated that while it is important to 
develop an international criminal process sensitive to victims, the effectiveness of 
complementary mechanisms of preventive intervention should be taken more 
seriously. Considering the limits of law in addressing large-scale human rights 
disasters, Smith83 argues rightly that although the ICC is but one facet of international 
justice, its existence may diminish the possibilities for humanitarian intervention to 
prevent atrocities. His call for a parallel development and strengthening of existing 
political frameworks for intervention to balance the pursuit of international justice 
captures, within the context of victims rights, the multifaceted approach advocated for 
in this thesis. 
 
2.5. Beyond Rwanda: New Responses to International Crimes 
 
Rather than opt for fully fledged international tribunals as in Rwanda or Yugoslavia, 
the Security Council has in its recent judicial responses to atrocities chosen to establish 
or encourage the establishment of what have come to be known as ‘special’, ‘hybrid’ 
or ‘mixed’ tribunals.84 In the case of Sierra Leone, the United Nations Special Court 
                                                                                                                                        
(1996) 7 Crim Law Forum 179, 202; D Lusty, ‘Anonymous Accusers: An Historical & 
Comparative Analysis of Secret Witnesses in Criminal Trials’ (2002) 24 Sydney LR 361, 424.  
82  Rule 74(7) (b), 76, 81 and 82 ICC RPE; Art 72 Rome Statute. See T Ingadottir, F Ngendahayo 
& PV Sellers, ‘The International Criminal Court: The Victims and Witnesses Unit (Article 43.6 
of the Rome Statute) A Discussion Paper,’ 25 (March 2000); JL D’Ambrosio ‘Memorandum 
for the Office of the Prosecutor International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Courtroom 
technology: A Comparative Analysis of its Application, Due Process and Public Policy Issues 
for Victims and the Accused’ available at 
<http://www.nesl.edu/center/wcmemos/2002/dambrosio.pdf> 31-32 (accessed on 12 March 
2007). 
83   TW Smith, ‘Moral Hazard and Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Court and the 
Limits of Legality’ International Politics Volume 39, No 2 (2002) 175-192. 
84  S Linton ‘New approaches to international justice in East Timor and Cambodia’ IRRC No 845 
(2002), 93; H Strohmeyer, ‘Collapse and reconstruction of a judicial system: The United 
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’ (2001) 98 American JIL 46. 
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for Sierra Leone was established. For East Timor (Timor L’Est), the Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes have been charged with the prosecution of members of the Indonesian 
army and pro-Indonesian Timorese militia responsible for the atrocities associated 
with the 1999 UN-organised referendum that resulted in East Timor’s independence.85 
More recently, the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers (CEC) were created to 
prosecute crimes associated with the brutal Khmer Rouge regime in that country.86 
These latter-day approaches are based on an expedient combination of international 
and domestic elements in their composition, structure and material scope of 
jurisdiction. It is notable however that this is perhaps a more accurate description of 
the case of Cambodia than Sierra Leone, which for practical purposes may be regarded 
a ‘mixed’ tribunal in name only. Commenting on character of the Special Court, the 
Appeals Chamber of the SCSL has on several occasions reiterated that the SCSL is an 
international court. In one such decision, the Appeals Chamber noted that the Special 
Court ‘is an international tribunal exercising its jurisdiction in an entirely international 
sphere and not within the system of the national courts of Sierra Leone’.87 
                                                
85  On East Timor, Summary of the report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts 
to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste at 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/timor/2005/0715report.pdf> (accessed on 
29th September 2005); United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Regulation 
2000/15; Amnesty International’s open letter to all members of the Security Council dated 15th 
July 2005 at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGASA570032005> (accessed on 24th 
September 2005); generally S Linton & C Reiger ‘The evolving jurisprudence and practice of 
East Timor’s Special Panels for Serious crimes on admission of guilt, duress and superior 
orders’ in H Fischer and A McDonald (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
(2001) 167-212; S Linton, ‘Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in 
international justice’ 12 Crim LF (2001), 185; S Linton ‘rising from the Ashes: The creation of 
a viable criminal justice system in East Timor’ (2001) 25 Melbourne Univ LR 2001. 
86  On Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers (CEC), see Report of the Group of Experts for 
Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 52/135 at 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cambodia-1999.html> (accessed on 25th September 2005); 
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government Of Cambodia Concerning 
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law Of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea of 6 June 2003 entered into force 29 April 2005, UN Doc. 
A/RES57/228B (Annex) available at 
<http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/Agreement%20between%20UN%20and%20RGC.pdf> 
(accessed 20 June 2006); D Boyle ‘The right of victims-participation, representation, 
protection, reparation’ 4 (2006) J of International Criminal Justice, 307-313; ‘An Introduction 
to The Khmer Rouge Trials’ report produced by the Secretariat of the Royal Government Task 
Force, Office of the Council of Ministers, Kingdom of Cambodia at 
<http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/introduction_eng/index.htm> (accessed on 25th 
September 2005). 
87  See Prosecution v. Kallon et al., SCSL-2004-15-AR72 (E), Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Appeals Chamber, Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, 13 March 2004, para 
80. See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-I, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Decision 
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While promotion of ‘ownership’ of processes of accountability in places like 
Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia may have justified the choice of ‘mixed’ 
tribunals, lessons have been learnt from Rwanda and Yugoslavia that the international 
criminal tribunal option is not only expensive but also logistically onerous, often 
requiring pooling of massive resources. This move is therefore partly informed by 
practical reasons. Rather than establish an entirely new institution to which donor 
countries are increasingly reluctant to commit resources, it has been considered 
desirable to tap into existing local infrastructures and to buttress them with 
internationally solicited resources and personnel who in turn bequeath international 
legitimacy to such structures. 
Although recent responses by the UNSC to atrocities demonstrate its 
preference for institutions demanding limited international input, it does not 
necessarily indicate a definite pattern of responses to similar situations in future. 
Obviously, each set of circumstances has its own politics that informs the response of 
the international community. As the recent response to the Darfur crisis demonstrates, 
while the route of a hybrid mechanism was available, proposals for a Rwanda-style 
tribunal seem to have been made by the US in order to forestall calls for ICC 
intervention, a move that may be interpreted as lending US legitimacy to an institution 
it has shunned.88 Since 2005, the situation has been under ICC investigation after 
UNSC referral.89 This may indicate that with the ICC in place, the need to make 
recourse to the more politicised and selective UNSC responses to international crimes 
may have been obviated. However, it is notable that the Rome Statute recognizes and 
endorses UNSC charter mandate in relation to international peace and security. It 
preserves the UNSC’s option to refer a situation in which international crimes may 
                                                                                                                                        
on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004, para 57; and Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and 
Allieu Kondewa, SCSL-2004-14-A, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Final 
Appeal Judgement, 28 May 2008, para 561 in which the Appeals Chamber reemphasised that it 
is ‘an international court with responsibility to protect and promote the norms and values of the 
international community, expressed not only as part of customary international law but also, in 
several international instruments. 
88  See Human Rights Watch letter dated 21st January 2005 to Dr Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary 
of State urging support for a referral of Darfur to the ICC at 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/21/sudan10090.htm> and statement of Mrs. Patterson 
(US Rep SC) after adoption of SC res 1593 (2005). 
89  See Security Council res 1593 (2005) referring Darfur to Prosecutor of the ICC adopted by 
Vote of 11 in Favour To None Against, with 4 Abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United 
States). 
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have been committed to the ICC,90 or to request that the Prosecutor of the ICC suspend 
an inquiry or prosecution of a particular situation or case.91  
 
2.5.1 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), is a hybrid tribunal established by 
agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone92 to try and 
punish persons ‘who bear the greatest responsibility’ for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, breaches of international humanitarian law and violations of select Sierra 
Leonean laws committed during the civil war in that country.93 While the option to 
establish a Rwanda-style tribunal was open to the Security Council, a ‘Special Court’ 
staffed by international judges appointed by the Secretary General, as well as Sierra 
Leonean judges was chosen.94 The decision to create a Special Court was informed 
partly by concerns over the costs of running a fully-fledged international tribunal in 
view of waning interest in the enterprise and the need to promote ownership of the 
process.95  
Apart from its composition, the SCSL differs from the ICTY and ICTR in 
several notable respects. Unlike these two tribunals, which were established by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII powers, the SCSL is a treaty-based Court 
established by agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone. This denies it powers to 
assert primacy over national Courts of third states or to order the surrender of a suspect 
                                                
90  Art 13(b) Rome Statute. 
91  Art 16 Rome Statute. 
92  See Annex to Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, 4 October 2000, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915. 
93  See S.C. Res. 1315 (2000), 14 August 2000; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 4 October 2000, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915. 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. On the SCSL generally see C Schocken ‘The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations’ 20 Berkeley JIL 436. 
94  The Special Court has two Trial Chambers, each with two judges appointed by the Secretary-
General and one judge appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone; and a five-member 
Appeals Chamber with three judges appointed by the Secretary-General and two judges 
appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Secretary-General appoints the Chief 
Prosecutor and Registrar. The Deputy Prosecutor is appointed by Sierra Leone in consultation 
with the United Nations. See arts 12-16 Statute SCSL. 
95  See Report of the Secretary-General, (n 91 above) paras 57-63. See D Wippman ‘The 
International Criminal Court’ in C Reus-Smit (ed) The Politics of International Law 
(2004)151-188 at 152 noting that to some extent, the Rome treaty was motivated by a desire to 
solve collective action problems and to reduce the transaction costs inherent in establishment of 
ad hoc tribunals. 
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located in any third state.96 Like the ICTR and ICTY in their respective countries, it 
nevertheless has primacy over domestic prosecutions in Sierra Leone.97  
The other difference relates to subject matter jurisdiction. While that of the 
ICTY and ICTR relates to violations of international humanitarian law, the Special 
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction extends, in addition to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity,98 to certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law, including abuse of a 
girl under 14 years of age, abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, and setting fire to 
dwelling-houses or public buildings.99 Despite these differences, the SCSL is to be 
guided by the decisions of the appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR,100 and to apply 
the Rules of Procedure of the ICTR, though the judges can, in case of lacunae in the 
source rules, amend or adopt additional rules.101  
The Special Court's temporal jurisdiction runs from 30 November 1996 to a 
date to be decided by a subsequent agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone. The 
commencement date was justified by the need to limit the burden on the Court given 
that the war had begun in 1991.102 In 2003, the SCSL indicted 13 individuals although 
two indictments were subsequently withdrawn after the death of Foday Sankoh the 
RUF leader and Sam Bockarie, RUF member. The third, Samuel Hinga Norman, 
alleged leader of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) died in custody on 22 February 2007 
before judgment. The trials of three former leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) and of two members of the CDF have been completed, including 
appeals. Testimony has ended in the trial of three former Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) leaders and judgement of the trial section was expected in late 2008. Charles 
Taylor, the former President of Liberia is facing trial before SCSL judges sitting in 
The Hague.103 Johnny Paul Koroma, former AFRC chairman remains at large. 
                                                
96  This explains why the demands for the surrender of Charles Taylor by Nigeria to the SCSL 
were limited to diplomatic requests and not an assertion of the Court’s powers. See art 8 (1) 
ICTR Statute and art ICTY Statute. With regard to ICTR, see Morris (N 74 above 1997), 362-
374. 
97  Art 8(2) Statute SCSL. 
98  Art 2 Statute SCSL.  
99  Art 5 Statute SCSL. 
100  Art 20 (3) Statute SCSL. 
101  Art 14 Statute SCSL. 
102   See Report of Secretary General (n 93 above) para 26-27. 
103  Those indicted include: five alleged leaders of the former Revolutionary United Front; three 
alleged leaders of the former Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and three alleged leaders of 
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2.5.2 The Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Sierra Leone TRC), 
envisaged in the Lomé Peace Agreement (Lome Accord)104 was established by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000.105 The Lomé Accord foresaw the TRC’s role as a 
one of the structures ‘for national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace.’106 The 
objectives of the TRC were formulated in terms of the Lomé Accord as distilled into 
the TRC Act 2000. The first objective was, to create an impartial historical record of 
violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the 
armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the 
signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement. Secondly, to address impunity, to respond to 
the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a 
repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.107 The TRC was also required, among 
other things, to recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of 
human rights violations.108  
Juxtaposing the Special Court and the TRC, the TRC saw its role as driven by 
‘largely restorative and healing objectives’ while the SCSL has ‘largely punitive and 
retributive aims’.109 Despite this difference in focus of functions, the TRC recognized 
that there was convergence in the objectives of the two bodies.110 On one of its main 
objectives -– fostering reconciliation – the TRC took the view that ‘reconciliation’ 
evolves from a notion of restorative justice, which ‘focuses on restoring relations, as 
                                                                                                                                        
the former Civil Defence Forces and Charles Taylor. See <http://www.sc-sl.org> (accessed on 
10 June 2008). 
104  Lomé Peace Agreement signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone in Lomé on 7 July 1999. 
105  On the mandate of the TRC see Art XXVI Lomé Peace Agreement Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Act 2000; Final SL TRC Report, Vol 1 Chapter One, paras 1-12. 
106  Art VI (2) (ix) Lomé Agreement. 
107  Art 6(1) Sierra Leone TRC Act; Art XXVI (1) Lomé Agreement. 
108  Art XXVI (2) Lomé Agreement. 
109  Final TRC Report, Vol II Chapter 1, para 71. 
110  The TRC noted that the institutions ‘seek truth about a conflict, although in different forms; 
both attempt to assign responsibilities for atrocities; both work with similar bodies of law; both 
are aimed at establishing peace and preventing future conflict.’ Final TRC Report, Vol II 
Chapter 1, para 71. See also S Berewa, ‘Addressing Impunity using divergent Approaches: The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court’ in UNAMSIL, Truth and 
Reconciliation in Sierra Leone a Compilation of Articles on the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Freetown (2001) 55. 
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far as possible, between victims and perpetrators and between perpetrators and the 
communities to which they belong.’111 The TRC considered a broad range of measures 
such as accountability, acknowledgment, truth telling and reparations as central to 
achieving reconciliation at the national, community and individual levels.112 
 
2.5.2.1 Participation, Truth and Reconciliation 
 
In view of the multiplicity of elements facilitative of reconciliation, the TRC is, 
because of its flexible procedures and broad mandate, perhaps better suited in this 
regard than the Special Court.113 Although the Special Court also has a truth-finding 
role, the truth it establishes – judicial truth – is for the most part limited to the criminal 
responsibility of the accused. This version of truth is further diminished by the Court’s 
mandate restricted to criminal responsibility of perpetrators ‘who bear the greatest 
responsibility’. As such, the TRC was perhaps better suited for a broader inquiry into 
the causes, nature and circumstances of the conflict.114  
The TRC, considering the establishment of the historical record as a key 
component in its functions invested much effort to these ends.115 The TRC took the 
view that establishing ‘social truth’ was crucial and therefore saw its role as facilitating 
dialogue and interaction between parties to the conflict, and the various components of 
civil society, state institutions and constituencies such as women, youth and children, 
in order that they might come together for debate and exchange.116 In its view, the TRC 
provided an avenue to establish ‘healing and restorative truth’ achievable through 
acknowledgement by perpetrators and offering apology to victims.117  
The broad participatory process and a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
the conflict has been said to enable ‘collective catharsis’ and creates a conducive 
                                                
111  Ibid, para 74. 
112  Ibid. 
113  The Lomé Peace Agreement declared that one of the purposes of the TRC was to ‘get a clear 
picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation’. See Memorandum 
of Objects and Reasons attached to the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000. 
114  Final Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereinafter Sierra 
Leone TRC Report), Volume 1: Chapter 3, Para 11. 
115  See Final SC TRC Report, Vol 1, Chapter 3. 
116  Ibid, paras 27. 
117  Ibi, paras 28-29. 
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environment for reconciliation.118 In its report, the TRC established a firm link between 
truth, reparation and reconciliation. It noted that reparations without truth telling could 
be perceived by victims as an attempt to buy their silence. Conversely, truth telling 
without reparations is problematic, in the sense that it ‘could conceivably be perceived 
by the victims to be an incomplete process in which they have revealed their pain and 
suffering without any mechanism being put in place to deal with the consequences of 
the pain.’ Similarly, reparations without truth telling could be perceived by the 
beneficiaries as an attempt to buy their silence. 119 It rightly concluded that restorative 
justice requires not only truth, but reparations, which enhances the reconciliation 
process. 
 
2.5.2.2 Reparations, Restoration and Reconciliation 
 
The TRC was mandated to make recommendations with specific objectives in mind: to 
help prevent repetition of the violations or abuses suffered, respond to the needs of the 
victims and to promote healing and reconciliation.120 When the TRC concluded its 
work, it issued a detailed report of its findings and set out recommendations for a 
reparations programme.121 On eligibility for reparations, the TRC took a broad view of 
the harm – injury, loss or damage – required. It seemed to suggest that anyone who 
had suffered human rights violations should benefit from reparations. It identified five 
broad categories of victims that should receive reparations based on their degree of 
vulnerability: war wounded; amputees; victims of sexual abuse; children, who had 
suffered psychological or physical harm, had been forcibly conscripted or lost a parent; 
and war widows.122 Through consultation with victims and service providers, the TRC 
recommended that a reparations programme should focus on mental and physical 
healthcare, education, skills training, micro credit as well as community and symbolic 
reparations.123 
                                                
118  Ibid, para 12. 
119  Final SC TRC Report, Vol 1, Chapter 3, para 33. 
120  Section 15(2) of the TRC Act; Vol 2 Chapter 1, para 80. 
121  Final Sierra Leone TRC Report, Vol II Chapter 4 Reparations pp 227-270. 
122  Ibid, Vol 2 Chapter 1 para 84. 
123  Ibid, para 85. 
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As regards the determination of individual reparations, the TRC proposed that 
the needs of the victim could be used to determine reparations.124 In its recognition of 
the fact that circumscribing so broadly the group of eligible victims would create 
practical and resource problems, the TRC cautioned that each of the categories of 
beneficiaries it proposed ‘should be carefully defined to fit specific parameters and 
conditions’.125 It is suggested that the proposal by the TRC may still yield many 
victims in respect of whom resources may not be available for individualised 
reparations. In view of resource constraints, a stricter criterion of ‘seriousness’ and a 
narrower demarcation of ‘indirect victims’ may be necessary to limit the number of 
victims in this category.  
In recognition of the government’s primary responsibility for reparations,126 the 
TRC recommended that the National Commission on Social Action (NaCSA) be 
established to coordinate and implement the reparations programme and to administer 
the Special Fund for War Victims proposed. The NaCSA was to be assisted by an 
advisory committee.127 In response, the government issued a White Paper a year later 
in 2005 before finally approving NaCSA. It also appointed a reparations task force.128 
However, the TRC’s recommendation that NaCSA starts work on implementing the 
most urgent reparations within 6 months was not effected. Further, despite continuing 
calls from civil society, the implementation of the reparations programe has not begun, 
some three years later.129  
The Lomé Agreement had proposed a Special Fund for War Victims to be 
established by the government with the support of the international community for the 
rehabilitation of war victims. 130 Unfortunately, the fund had not been established as at 
the end of 2008. Many organisations have called on the government to act in order to 
                                                
124  Ibid, para 80. 
125  Ibid, para 84. 
126  Ibid, para 81 making reference to Sierra Leone’s responsibility under international law and 
Sierra Leonean Constitution 1991 on redress for violation of fundamental human rights. 
127  Ibid, para 87. 
128  Amnesty International Sierra Leone: Getting reparations right for survivors of sexual violence, 
report of 1 Nov 2007 available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR51/005/2007/en/AFR510052007en.html> 
[hereinafter Amnesty Reparations Report, 2007], 13. 
129  Ibid, 13. 
130  Article XXIX Lomé Agreement. 
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provide much needed assistance to victims.131 It has been suggested that failure to 
implement this important aspect of the Lomé Accord and related TRC 
recommendations is not due to lack of funds or commitment by international partners, 
but to a misplaced government policy, belated and inappropriate responses to TRC 
recommendations.132 However, this is entirely accurate. In a poor country emerging 
from long years of conflict such as Sierra Leone, prioritisation of service delivery, and 
other more pressing concerns naturally capture the attention of a new government at 
the expense of victims. The case of post-Apartheid South Africa, a far more 
economically endowed country than Sierra Leone, amply demonstrates that 
availability of funds to a government does not always ensure that appropriate 
reparations programmes will be instituted.133 Priorities may lie elsewhere. 
 
2.5.2.3 Lessons From Sierra Leone 
 
The case of Sierra Leone – where a Special Court operated alongside a TRC – 
furnishes a number of lessons for the ICC or mechanisms associated with it that may 
be established to deal with international crimes. First, Sierra Leone demonstrates the 
unsuitability of criminal tribunals, in particular those based on a retributive paradigm, 
to deal satisfactorily with the concerns of victims that require their participation as 
well as reparation. It must however be acknowledged that the utility of a criminal 
tribunal is by its nature limited. 
Secondly, the case of Sierra Leone demonstrates that recourse to ‘hybrid 
tribunals’ can facilitate the deployment of domestic options for restorative justice 
mechanisms hand in hand with pursuit of criminal justice often emphasised by 
international players. The mere possibility that a ‘national law component’ and 
presence of host state judges in the composition of the Special Court may help steer 
these tribunals in a direction favourable, if not conducive to the interest of victims.   
Thirdly, unlike the ICTR and ICTY both of which operate from a second 
country, the fact that the ‘mixed’ tribunals – like the SCSL – are located in countries 
                                                
131  Amnesty Reparations Report  (n 128 above) 14. 
132  A UN official has stated that ' When the war ended, NGOs and the UN made it known to the 
government that we were prepared to fund or provide services for reparations. The government 
never asked. It sent the wrong message’. See Ibid, 1. 
133  See chapter six. 
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ravaged by conflict enhances access by victims to proceedings as observers or 
witnesses. Perhaps more importantly, in countries where impunity has been the order 
of the day, the trial of perpetrators within their communities may be crucial in the 
development of a new narrative of the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
Fourthly, the operation of the TRC side by side with the Special Court has 
permitted the Sierra Leonean government an option for restorative justice through the 
TRC in a post conflict society in dire need of truth, reconciliation and 
reconstruction.134 It is true that the Sierra Leonean TRC’s options were limited 
statutorily and in terms of resources as far as ordering reparations is concerned. 
However, to the extent that it provided a less adversarial forum, which permitted 
victims, including special categories such as children, a friendlier environment for 
expression, it must be considered more suited for these specific victims’ concerns.135 
All in all, the case of Sierra Leone underscores the fact that the search for mechanisms 
responsive to the concerns and interests of victims of international crimes may be an 
elusive one and that this enterprise necessarily requires the deployment of a range of 
judicial and non-judicial approaches.  
Beyond the criminal tribunals, the search by victims of international crimes for 
responsive avenues of redress has always been a continuing one. They have been 
confronted by the challenge of a bifurcated international criminal justice system – 
divided between ‘the international’ and ‘the national’ and also internally divided, as 
evidenced by the multiplicity of tribunals that may present alternative, but not 
necessarily appropriate avenues for victims. Since Nuremberg, parallel developments 
in general international law, discussed at some length in the next chapter, have seen 
the emergence of various norms – those requiring states to prosecute at least the most 
                                                
134  See generally W Schabas ‘Conjoined Twins of Justice? The Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court’ (2004) 2 J of International Criminal Justice 
1082-1099. 
135  See Report compiled by N Mann & B Theuermann for UNICEF National Forum for Human 
Rights UNAMSIL/Human Rights ‘Children and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
Sierra Leone: Recommendations for policies and procedures for addressing and involving 
children in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ 
<http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/SierraLeone-RCReport.pdf. > (Accessed on 15th September 
2005); Schabas, 1090; DM Amann ‘Calling children to account: the proposal for a Juvenile 
Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ 29 Pepperdine Univ. LR (2001) 167; Report of 
the TRC dedicated a considerable amount of space to the question of child soldiers. See chapter 
six of thesis. 
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serious crimes and victim-specific ones obliging states to adopt mechanisms that 
respond appropriately to victims’ concerns. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
VICTIMS IN THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK: 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
TRIBUNALS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter looked at developments in the various ad hoc tribunals on which 
the ICC might draw in developing its victims' rights regime. This chapter conducts a 
similar survey of developments in the case law of international tribunals. It reviews 
jurisprudence relevant to victims within the state responsibility framework and 
explores victims’ rights under the main human rights treaties. The chapter argues that 
although human rights treaties – both universal and regional – make no specific 
reference to victims of crime, respective treaty oversight bodies have progressively 
interpreted certain key provisions as including key entitlements for victims of human 
rights violations, the most serious of which amount to crimes under international law. 
In particular, the chapter identifies these rights and various principles relating to core 
victims’ entitlements – the right to participate in proceedings related to establishing 
accountability for serious human rights violations and the right to reparations. Quite 
apart from the possibility that victims of such atrocities can espouse alternative claims 
before these human rights tribunals,1 the jurisprudence elaborated by them can 
illuminate the interpretation of the ICC victims’ regime.  
 
3.2  The State Responsibility Framework  
 
Classical international law had established a framework of responsibility based on 
states as the principal actors, who were thus the only parties with standing to espouse 
claims before international tribunals. Under this model, state responsibility may be 
                                                
1  The Rome Statute provides only for individual responsibility – criminal and civil. State 
responsibility is thus excluded. However, since victims’ recourse to the ICC does not prejudice 
their rights under national or international law terms of article 75 (6) of the Rome Statute, 
victims may still obtain remedies for human rights violations that constitute such crimes before 
various human rights tribunals through their petition/communications procedures. 
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incurred directly by way of injury to another state through the actions of the agents or 
organs of the offending state, or indirectly through injury to the person or property of 
another state’s nationals.2 This conception of international state responsibility entails 
that injury to an individual that is attributable to a state other than that of which he or 
she is a national can only be espoused internationally by the state of nationality, in 
exercise of its right to diplomatic protection.3 While contemporary international law 
has yielded in the sphere of human rights, and permitted individuals to bring petitions 
directly against states before international human rights tribunals, as discussed below, 
the state-centric nature of international law is still an evident reality.4 
While victims whose injury is attributable to another state can and have had 
recourse through their nationality state before international tribunals and sometimes 
through negotiated inter-state monetary awards, the state responsibility model is ill-
suited to addressing victims’ concerns. Shelton rightly argues that this framework is 
inadequate because ‘it derives from inter-state cases between juridically equal parties, 
where diplomatic concerns and broader issues of cooperation or conflict affect the 
results.’5 While at a fundamental level injury to a national is considered as injury to the 
state of nationality in this framework,6 the relationship between relevant states and the 
politics of diplomacy involved have often been an impediment to the articulation of 
general victims’ concerns, when these are raised at all. Rosenne has wondered why in 
such cases, although the individual is the object of proceedings, he is not ‘granted any 
                                                
2  J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 3rd ed (2005) 270. 
3  See ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Annexed to 
GA Res. 56/83, (12 December 2001); C Bassiouni ‘International recognition of victims’ rights’ 
Human Rights LR 6:2 (2006) 203 -279 at 211-212; Liechtenstein v Paraguay (Notteboohm 
Case); Jennings & Watts (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law 9th ed (1992) 846. 
4  D Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law (1999) 55. See also generally on 
various aspects of state responsibility MC Bassiouni ‘Combating impunity for international 
crimes (2000) 71 Univ of Colorado LR 409; MC Bassiouni ‘Searching for Justice in the world 
of realpolitik’ (2000) 12 Pace Int’l L.R 213; R Lillich International Law of State 
Responsibility: Injury to aliens (1989); Carbonneau ‘The convergence of the international law 
of state responsibility for injury to aliens and international human rights law’ 99 Vanderbilt JIL 
(1984) 
5  Shelton, (n 4 above) 2. 
6  Jennings & Watts (n 3 above) 846; Vattel Les Droits des gens, principes de la loi naturelle 
appliqué a la conduite des affaires des nations souverains (1773) 289 cited in MC Bassiouni 
‘International recognition of victims’ rights’ Human Rights LR6:2 (2006) 203-279; Mavromatis 
Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v U.K), 1924 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 2, 13. 
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opportunity to make known to the Court, in his own way, his own views on the 
questions of fact and questions of law involved’.7  
In any case, only few of the cases before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) and its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), disclose 
any victim-related issues, under disparate branches of international law.8 For their part, 
decisions of varied arbitral tribunals9 as well as international claims commissions, (like 
most ICJ cases brought on behalf individuals), deal mostly with restitution of property 
and are thus of limited relevance to victims of crime.10 It is noteworthy however that 
the recent United Nations Claims Commission relating to Iraq’s international 
responsibility arising out of its invasion of Kuwait proffers some principles relating to 
the assessment of harm for purposes of quantifying reparations discussed in chapter six 
of this thesis.11 These principles have relevance for the ICC in view of the fact that 
                                                
7  S Rosenne ‘Reflections on the position of the individual in inter-state litigation in the 
International Court of Justice’ in Pieter Sanders (ed) International arbitration Liber amicorum 
for Martin Domke (1967) 240-251 241. 
8  For a discussion of the human rights jurisprudence of the PCIJ and ICJ to date, see SRS Bedi 
The development of human rights law by the judges of the International Court of Justice 
(2007); R Goy La Court Internationale de Justice et les Droits de l’homme (2002). Among the 
most notable cases include: Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States); 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Case (Belgium v Spain) ICJ Reports 1970, para 
33-4; Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Hetzegovina v Serbia) ICJ Decision (Merits) 2007. Available 
at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4> 
(Accessed on 15 May 2007). 
9  On the Permanent Court of Arbitration which has presided in over 30 cases including the Iran-
US Arbitration see P Sands, R Mackenzie & Y Shany Manual on international Courts and 
tribunals (1999) 23-38; A M Stuyt Survey of Internatinal Arbitrations (1972) 1794-1970; HJ 
Schlochaur ‘The Permanent Court of Arbitration’ (1981) in R Benhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of 
public international law (1981) 157; BE Shifman ‘The revitalisation of the permanent Court of 
arbitration’ (1995) 23 International J of Legal Information 284. 
10  International law of state responsibility relating to injury to aliens, because of the nature of 
claims with which it is predominantly concerned (property claims, and only to a limited extent 
non wealth claims), proffers even less guidance with respect to victims of international crimes, 
save to reiterate Chorzow in affirming that state practice in this area of law indicates that there 
exists a rule of customary international law requiring equitable compensation for breach of an 
international obligation, in this case, expropriation or injury to private interests and the person 
of foreign nationals. A brief study of various lump-sum payments, as well as awards by claims 
commissions aptly illustrate this point. See various authors, and in particular RB Lillich, 
‘International Claims: their settlement by lump sum agreements’ in in Pieter Sanders (ed) 
International arbitration Liber amicorum for Martin DomkeI (1967) 143-156; Richard Lillich 
International Law of State Responsibility: Injury to aliens (1989); Carbonneau ‘The 
convergence of the international law of state responsibility for injury to aliens and international 
human rights law’ (1984) 99 Vanderbilt J. Intl law. 
11  See JR Crook, ‘Current Development: the United Nations Compensation Commission - A New 
Structure to Enforce State Responsibility’, (1993) 87 American JIL 144 and Chapter 6 of this 
thesis. 
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other than property claims, the UNCC also dealt with claims related to human rights 
and humanitarian law violations – murder, torture and illegal detention.  
It is understandable that cases brought by states before the ICJ, even when on 
behalf of their citizens, would hardly raise the actual issues of importance to victims. 
Revealingly, only a handful of cases before the ICJ have involved specific allegations 
of state responsibility for international crimes – genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.12 In the main, the case law of these tribunals, especially with respect 
to violations against individuals, is dedicated to the exposition of general principles. 
Additionally, given that these cases have not been specifically brought to address 
victims’ issues, such inquiry into principles as turns out to be relevant to victims has 
been mainly en passant, and aimed at facilitating findings on more central, unrelated 
issues of the case. 
 
3.2.1 The International Court of Justice 
 
Like its predecessor the PCIJ, the ICJ was established as one of the principal organs of 
the UN13 and the main judicial organ,14 and has two key functions: settlement of 
disputes between states and the rendering of advisory opinions when requested by the 
Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA).15 The ICJ now has 
elaborated a substantial corpus of jurisprudence, relating both to contentious cases as 
well as advisory opinions.16   
A survey of the case law reveals that of the more than 60 cases so far decided 
by the ICJ, only a handful address, directly or indirectly, concerns of victims of human 
rights violations (and international crimes). Invariably, the majority of cases at the 
                                                
12  Case relating to Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v Uganda) ICJ 
Decision (Merits) 2005. Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf> 
(accessed on 10 May 2007); Bosnia and Hetzegovina v Serbia (n 8 above); and Case 
concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) ICJ Decision (Jurisdiction) 2008. Available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&k=73&case=118&code=cry&p3=4> (Accessed on 11 January 
2009). 
13  Article 7 UN Charter. 
14  Article 92 UN Charter ; art 1 ICJ Statute. 
15  See S Rosenne The World Court: What it is and how it works 4th Ed (1989) 27-; Terry D Gill 
Rosenne’s World Court - What it is and how it works 6th ed (2003). 
16  As at January 2007, the ICJ has rendered judgement with regard to 60 contentious matters as 
well as 5 advisory opinions. See Bedi (n 8 above) 3. 
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PCIJ17 as well as the ICJ18 not only address interstate disputes, but also issues unrelated 
to injury to individuals, outside the context of crime or human rights violations. For 
these two reasons, the relevance of the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and ICJ is limited to 
general principles of international law that may form the background against which, 
the Rome Statute, and the victim’s regime in particular will be elaborated. While some 
principles relating to reparations may be gleaned from this body of law, it seems of 
little and perhaps no utility with regard to victims’ rights to participation in the 
criminal process.  
Two cases, one decided by the PCIJ and the other by an arbitral tribunal, stand 
out for their articulation of specific issues relating to reparations. The Case 
Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Chorzów Factory case) is considered the 
authoritative statement of the basic principle of state responsibility, and by extension 
responsibility incurred for breach of any international obligation. The PCIJ stated that: 
[i]t is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation 
to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement 
of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the 
convention itself. 19 
 
Additionally, the reiteration by the PCIJ in the same case that ‘it is a general principle 
of international law, and indeed even a general conception of law, that any breach of 
an engagement involves a responsibility to make reparation’,20 while elaborated in the 
context of inter-state relations, equally applies to non-state relations. It establishes a 
customary obligation in respect of which states are required to ensure that injury to 
                                                
17  According to Gray, about one third of the cases at the PCIJ involved a claim for damages. 
However, they deal with issues unrelated to individuals, in particular loss of property. See CD 
Gray Judicial remedies in international law (1990) 77.  
18  Recent cases at the ICJ in which reparations are requested include LaGrand (Germany v U.S.); 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada); Armed Activities on the Territory of the  Congo 
(Congo v Uganda; Congo v Rwanda; Congo v Burundi); Land and Maritime Boundary 
Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria); Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 
(Pakistan v India); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the  Crime of Genocide  
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (n 8 above); Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988  
(Iran v U.S.); Gab!íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia); and Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Congo v Belgium). (all available at  <http://www.icj-cij.org>. 
19  Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction) 1927 PCIJ  (ser. 
A) No. 9, at 21. This principle has been reaffirmed in a number of other cases. See for instance, 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 
ICJ REP. 174, para. 184. 
20  Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Claim for Indemnity) (1928). 
PCIJ ser A, No. 17, 4 at 29; D Shelton ‘Righting wrongs: reparations in the articles on state 
responsibility’ 96 American J of Int’l Law 933-856 836. 
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individuals attracts a remedy from whoever is responsible.21 In terms of Chorzów, 
international law would require that victims of international crimes – genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity – should have the injury suffered appropriately 
repaired. It is argued that the victims’ regime in the ICC, while it excludes state 
responsibility for these crimes, is part of an array of mechanisms intended to achieve 
such reparation, especially in cases where national systems do not offer real options.   
In its oft-quoted pronouncement, the PCIJ spoke authoritatively with respect to 
the obligation imported by an international delict: 
 The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act . . . is that reparation 
must, so far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. 
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value 
which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained 
which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it—such are the 
principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary 
to international law.22 
 
As discussed in more detail in chapter six, but also as revealed by the jurisprudence of 
human rights tribunals in this chapter, this statement speaks to the appropriateness of 
reparative measures, and is thus of relevance to the scope and nature of reparations to 
be ordered by the ICC with respect to victims of crime.23 The Lusitania Arbitral 
Decision24 outlined the criteria applicable when determining the quantum of 
reparations payable to a victim’s next of kin. Part of this decision has been cited with 
approval in at least one case decided by the Inter-American Court for Human Rights.25 
A few other cases articulate less significant issues. For instance, the ICJ 
considered orbiter in the Barcelona Traction Case26 the normative status of the 
prohibitions against genocide and basic human rights guarantees relating to 
discrimination and slavery, noting that they imported obligations erga omnes owed by 
                                                
21  See N Roht-Arriaza, (ed) Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice 
(1995) 17 noting that the idea that violations should be redressed, that reparation should be 
made to the injured is ‘among the most venerable and most central of legal principles’.  
22  Chorzów Factory Case, Indemnity, 47. See recent ICJ decisions which reiterate this principle 
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1997), p. 81, para. 
152; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports (2004), p. 59, para. 119). 
23  D Shelton (n 20 above) 836 notes that Chorzów ‘remains the cornerstone of international 
claims for reparations, whether presented by states or other litigants’. 
24  Lusitania Case, (Portugal v Germany) RIAA 1928. 
25  Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname Inter. Am Ct Hr (Reparations, 1993). 
26  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Case (Belgium v Spain) ICJ Reports 1970, para 
33-4. See also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide , Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports 1951, p 23. 
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a state to the international community as a whole. In a recent case Democratic 
Republic of Congo v Uganda & others27 brought by the DRC on its own behalf, the 
ICJ found Uganda internationally responsible – and thus liable to pay reparations – for, 
amongst others: violations of international human rights and humanitarian law arising 
from the commission of acts of violence against Congolese nationals and destroying 
their property; failing to prevent such acts by persons under its control; and failure to 
distinguish between civilian and military objectives during armed conflict.28 While this 
decision is important insofar as it reiterates the inviolability of certain human rights 
and humanitarian law norms, and state responsibility – even for occupying powers – it 
seems to shed no light on the issues at hand.29  
The more recent case concerning the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Hetzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro),30 related to the alleged failure by Serbia to abide by its 
obligations under the Genocide Convention. Although more relevant in terms of the 
breaches of international law alleged, the case raises similar issues to the DRC v 
Uganda case above: the nature of state obligations and consequences of a breach of 
such obligations. Having concluded that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute 
between Bosnia and Serbia based on article IX of the Genocide Convention (relating to 
the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the convention),31 the ICJ stated that the 
obligations imposed on states parties by article IX were not limited to legislating, and 
to prosecuting or extraditing but include an obligation to prevent32 and not to commit 
genocide and the other related acts enumerated in article III of the Convention. 
However, as opposed to an individual, the obligation not to commit genocide imposed 
on states parties is not criminal in nature.33 
                                                
27  Case Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v Uganda) ICJ Decision (Merits) 
2005. Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf> (accessed on 10 May 
2007). 
28  Ibid, at 205-212, paras 200-215. 
29  The Court cited with approval prior cases on reparations Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, 
1927, P.C.I.J.,Series A, No. 9, p. 21; Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, para. 152; and Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v 
United States of America), Judgment, ICJ. Reports 2004, para. 119) 
30  Bosnia and Hetzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, (n 12 above). 
31  Ibid, para 140, 147. 
32  Ibid, para 160-65. 
33  Ibid, para 167-79. 
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The Court found Serbia in breach of its international obligations by failing to 
prevent the Srebrenica genocide34 and by failing to transfer Ratko Mladić, indicted for 
genocide and complicity in genocide, for trial by the ICTY – thus failing to fully co-
operate with that Tribunal.35 In terms of remedies, the Court held that since the case 
was not one in which either an order for payment of compensation, or, (in respect of 
the violation of the obligation to prevent), a direction to provide assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition, would be appropriate, the Court’s declaration of breach 
in each case (and a call to cooperate in respect of Mladic) constituted appropriate 
satisfaction.36 Like the other cases discussed in this section, this case has limited 
relevance for victim-specific issues, although it retains some interpretative value in the 
context of Article 21 of the Rome Statute insofar as the elaboration of substantive 
provisions on the crime of genocide is concerned.  
As the discussions in the following sections demonstrate, human rights cases 
offer more possibilities as a source of relevant jurisprudence.  
 
3.3 Reliance on International Human Rights Law by the ICC 
 
Bassiouni has identified, as one of the problems one confronts when engaging with 
issues related to victims, the numerous disciplines and by extension various branches 
of international law that deal with the issue – and thus the disparate goals, approaches, 
and methodologies deployed by these disciplines. Addressing the question of the 
effectiveness in redressing victim’s rights, Bassiouni remarks that:  
 [a] significant gap exists between international human rights law [IHRL] and international 
criminal law [ICL]. The parallel nature of these two bodies of law limits the reach of [ICL] to 
punish fundamental human rights violations ... If the concept of victims’ rights continues to 
develop in a compartmentalised fashion with gaps and overlaps, victims’ rights will never be 
effectively addressed.37 
 
In view of this, the key question for our purposes is whether the ICC, as an 
international criminal court, can rely on the jurisprudence of international human 
rights tribunals. It is argued that irrespective of the supposed ‘parallel nature of IHRL 
                                                
34  Bosnia and Hetzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, (n 12 above) para 438. 
35  Ibid, paras 439-50. 
36  Ibid, paras 167-79; para 463-65, 67. 
37  MC Bassiouni ‘International recognition of victims’ rights’ Human Rights LR6:2 (2006) 203 -
279 204-205. See also MC Bassiouni ‘The proscribing function of international criminal law in 
the protection of human rights’ (1982) 9 Yale J of World Public Order 193. 
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and ICL’ there is no impediment at the conceptual level (there may be at a practical 
level) to the ICC’s reliance on principles of IHRL in elaborating the ICC’s victims’ 
rights regime. Mendez,38 in treating the relationship between IHRL, IHL and ICL has 
rightly noted that ICL is a convergence of both human rights and humanitarian law and 
that they are not entirely alien bodies of law. Despite the conceptual divergence – ICL 
is based on individual responsibility while IHRL is based on the state responsibility 
framework – the fact that there are common underlying principles allows one to draw 
from both bodies of law in developing the theory and principles.  
Article 21 of the Rome Statute, the sources of law clause, contemplates such 
interplay. Having established that the Rome Statute itself, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE) are the primary sources of law for the 
Court,39 it provides that the Court may apply in the second place, and where 
appropriate, ‘applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict.40 These 
‘principles and rules of international law’ include those derived from IHRL. 
Additionally, the Statute notes that the interpretation and application of the listed 
sources of law must be ‘consistent with internationally recognized human rights’.41 As 
such, IHRL is not only envisaged as a source of principles and rules that may be 
applied by the Court – for our purposes, those relating to the rights of crime victims – 
but it also constitutes the framework of principles within which the interpretation and 
application of the entire gamut of ICC law should take place. In chapter one, it was 
argued that other than the objects of the Rome Statute and other specific concepts 
entailed in the Statute which imply a restorative justice approach, Article 21 provides a 
further possibility for the Court to import restorative justice principles into the Court’s 
jurisprudence through its reference to human rights. The following sections consider 
the jurisprudence of various human rights bodies relating to victims of serious 
violations. 
 
                                                
38  J Mendez, ‘International Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and International 
Criminal Law and Procedure: New Relationships in D Shelton (ed) International Crimes, 
Peace and Human Rights: The role of the International Criminal Court (2000) 66. 
39  Art 21(a) Rome Statute. 
40  Art 21(b) Rome Statute. 
41  Art 21(3) Rome Statute. 
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3.4 Victims and Human Rights Oversight Bodies 
 
The main ‘exception’ to the law of state responsibility is international human rights 
law, in the sense that it is the first area of international law where individuals may 
bring actions against states in international tribunals.42 While victims, in particular 
crime victims, ‘are missing’ in human rights treaties, international human rights 
oversight bodies have elaborated a substantial jurisprudence relevant to victims.43 
Victims-related comments made by these tribunals relate in large part to their 
interpretation of the right to access to justice or the right to be heard and the right to an 
effective remedy. This case law also relates to other key rights (such as the right to life 
and personal integrity), the violation of which is considered serious and may in itself 
amount to an international crime (such as torture), or relate to elements constitutive of 
ICC crimes. The discussion that follows focuses on these two broad ‘categories’, but 
also on any other references to victims by these tribunals that may be relevant to the 
theory and content of victims’ rights.  
 
3.4.1 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
 
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT),44 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)45 provide for the right of victims of torture and other human rights violations 
                                                
42  Shelton (n 4 above) 2. However, there have been developments in other areas of international 
law that do not concern this study. Recent developments have granted to none state actors 
greater rights of standing. See for instance the Convention on Settlement of Investment 
Settlement Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, UNTS 159; the Seabed 
Dispute Chamber of the Sea Tribunal (UNCLOS, Arts 186-7), 21 ILM 1261; the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (1993) 32 ILM 1480; and the Rotterdam 
Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade (1990) 30 ILM 1 all of which allow non state actors to bring 
complaints against states in certain cases. 
43  For a brief but useful overview of some case law of the major human rights bodies, see T 
Meron Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989) 136-154; M 
O’Flaherty Human Rights and the United Nations: Practice before the treaty bodies (1996); D 
McGoldrick The Human Rights Committee (1991). 
44  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
reprinted in 23 ILM 1027 (1984). 
45  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 6 ILM 368. On the 
ICCPR and Human Rights Committee, see generally MJ Bossuyt Guide to the travaux 
préparatoires of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1987). 
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to an effective remedy,46 which may be judicial or non-judicial.47 Articles 1 and 2(3) of 
the ICCPR are relevant to the rights of victims of crime. Article 1, which is similar to 
Article 1 of CAT, provides for the general obligations of the state to give effect to the 
treaty. Article 2(3) ICCPR is specific to the right to an effective remedy. Article 2(3) 
ICCPR provides that:  
[e]ach state party to the present covenant undertakes to ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; to ensure that any 
person claiming a such remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by 
the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; to ensure that 
the competent authorities shall enforce  such remedies when granted. 
 
While Article 2(3) ICCPR does not specify the applicable remedies,48 the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) has consistently interpreted this provision to include a 
remedy of prosecution for victims of serious violations,49 compensation in appropriate 
cases50 and guarantees of non repetition.51 In particular, the HRC has stated that this 
provision requires states to conduct an effective prosecution to remedy the harm 
caused to victims of serious violations – those relating to the right to life and personal 
integrity. In numerous cases involving arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, 
torture, and extrajudicial executions – all of which affect in one way or the other the 
right to life and personal integrity of the individual – the HRC has held that an 
effective remedy due to victims must include a criminal investigation that brings to 
justice those responsible.52 In these cases, monetary damages or disciplinary sanctions 
have been held not to be an appropriate remedy.53  
                                                
46  For a brief overview of the HRC’s jurisprudence on this question, see R Aldana-Pindell ‘In 
vindication of justiciable victims’ right to truth and justice for state-sponsored crimes’ rights in 
the criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes’ 35 (2002) Vanderbilt J. 
Transnat'l L. 1399 at 1416-1417; See also M Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: CCPR Commentary (1993) 58. 
47  Nowak,58; Chonwe v Zambia (HRC Communication 821/98) para 7. 
48  See Schachter ‘The obligation to implement the covenant in domestic law’ in L Henkin (ed) 
The bill of rights: the covenant on civil and political rights (1981) 311 325. 
49  The HRC has granted the remedy of prosecutions to direct victims of right to life and personal 
integrity violations-torture, inhuman and degrading treatment as well as disappearance and 
family members Raquel Aldana-Pindell ‘An emerging universality of justiciable victims’ rights 
in the criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes’ Human Rights Q. 1416 
1417. 
50  See for instance Vicente v Colombia, Communication No. 612/1995, P 10 (1997). 
51  See for instance Magana v Zaire (Communication 90/1981). The HRC also made orders on 
restitution in integrum requiring that the offending state return the complainant’s property. 
52  Chonwe v Zambia, (Communication No. 821/1998) para 7 (2000); Vicente et al. v Colombia, 
(Communication No. 612/1995) para 10 (1997) relating to arbitrary detention, torture, and 
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3.5 Regional Human Rights Bodies  
3.5.1 The Inter-American Court 
 
The Inter-American human rights system, founded on the American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration)54 and the American Convention on 
Human Rights (American Convention),55 has perhaps, of the three regional systems, 
the most advanced jurisprudence on victims, in particular victims of gross human 
rights violations. Although the two instruments like other human rights treaties make 
no specific mention of victims, the two oversight bodies in that system – the American 
Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) and the Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights (Inter-American Court)56 have elucidated a sizeable case law 
on a range of issues of relevance to victims of human rights.57 The jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court is commendable because although the Convention was adopted 
at a time when concerns relating to victims were hardly an issue that captured the 
attention of commentators let alone that of Courts, the Convention has been interpreted 
to accommodate developing norms on victims. 
The relevant case law for our purposes relates to two broad issues – the right to 
an effective remedy for human rights violations as well as the right to access justice on 
the one hand and the right to life as well as rights relating to personal integrity of the 
                                                                                                                                        
forced disappearance; Atachahua v Peru, (Communication No. 540/1993) para 10 (1996); 
Bautista v Colombia, (Communication No. 563/1993) P 10 (1995); Rodríguez v Uruguay, 
Communication No. 322/1988, P 14 (1994); Tshiongo v Zaire, (Communication No. 366/1989) 
para 7 (1993). 
53  See Bautista v Colombia, (Communication No. 563/1993), P 8.2 (1995) "[P]urely disciplinary 
and administrative remedies cannot be deemed to constitute adequate and effective remedies … 
in the event of particularly serious violations of human rights, notably in the event of an alleged 
violation of the right to life."); Vicente v Colombia, Communication No. 612/1995, P 8.2 
(1997); Sarma v Sri Lanka (2003) Aldana-Pindell, (n 46 above) 1416-1417. 
54  O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), 
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). 
55  American Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970); 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 
56   Both established under article 33 of the American Convention. 
57  On the practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights see generally Jo M Pasqualucci 
The Practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2003); T 
Buergenthal & D Shelton Protecting human rights in the Americas: case and materials 4th Ed 
(1995); D Harris & S Livingstone The Inter American system of human rights (1996); CM 
Quiroga The battle for human rights: gross, systematic violations and the Inter-American 
System (1992) 113-184. 
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individual. On the other.58 A survey of this jurisprudence discloses several key 
entitlements of victims: 1) the state duty to investigate and prosecute crimes that 
violate an individual’s right to life and personal integrity and the affirmation of a 
victim’s right to an effective prosecution;59 2) victims’ right to participate in 
proceedings; 3) victims’ right of standing to monitor the state’s actions and to advance 
their interests; 4) the right to truth (related to duty to investigate); and 5) reparations. 
 
3.5.1.1 Duty to Investigate and the Right to Truth 
 
To start with, the Inter-American Court has consistently held that the state has a duty 
to investigate alleged violations and to punish those responsible. This duty is closely 
linked to the rights of victims of serious violations to a prosecution, as well as the right 
to access criminal proceedings. As articulate in the leading case of Velásquez 
Rodriquez v Honduras,60 this duty to investigate ‘constitute[s] part of the reparation of 
the consequences of the violations of rights and freedoms’. The duty to investigate 
exists because relatives of direct victims have the right to know all the facts.61 In the 
Court’s view, as expressed in Bámaca Velásquez v Guatemala62 and other cases, there 
is a direct correlation between the state denying human rights victims access to 
effective justice or to procedural fairness in criminal trials and their right to learn the 
truth, which includes obtaining knowledge of the circumstances of the crime and the 
identification of those responsible. The Court noted in Bámaca that the ‘right to truth 
is subsumed in the right of the victim or his next of kin to obtain clarification of the 
facts relating to the violations.63  
                                                
58  For a brief discussion, see Aldana-Pindell (n 46 above) 1399; and more generally Jo M 
Pasqualucci, Ibid. 
59  For a detailed discussion of victims’ right to prosecution see Raquel Aldana-Pindell ‘An 
emerging universality of justiciable victims’ rights in the criminal process to curtail impunity 
for state-sponsored crimes’ Human Rights Q.  
60  Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Compensatory Damages, 1989) para 33. 
61  Las Palmeras v Colombia (Merits), Inter-Am. Ct HR (2001) Ser. C No 90 para 69. 
62  Bámaca Velásquez, Case No. 70, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. C, para 201. See also Castillo Páez 
Case No. 43, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C, para 85; Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre et 
al.) Case No. 75, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C, para 48. 
63  Bámaca Velásquez, para 201. 
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The Court has reiterated that the state is equally under an obligation, as part of 
this right of victims, to publish the results of the investigation.64 Publication of results 
contributes to the rehabilitation of the victims’ reputations,65 hence of their ‘dignity in 
the public mind … and in some measure make it possible to make amends for the 
damage done.’66  
 
3.5.1.2 Right to an Effective Prosecution 
 
From the Inter-American Court’s case law, the right to truth is linked to the victim’s 
right to an effective prosecution. The provisions of the American Convention relevant 
to this right and other aspects of victims’ rights relate to the general obligation of the 
state to give effect to the rights protected in the Convention,67 the right to be heard68 
and the right to an effective recourse for those who allege a violation of their rights.69 
Read together, these provisions have been consistently interpreted as enjoining states 
to provide victims of violations of the right to life and personal integrity an effective 
prosecution as a remedy.70  
In its first interpretation of Article 63(1) of the American Convention, the 
Court stated in Velásquez Rodriquez v Honduras that: 
 [t]he state has legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use 
means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations  committed within its 
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose appropriate punishment and to ensure the 
victim adequate compensation.71 
 
                                                
64  Barrios Altos Case (Merits, 2000) para 5; Bámaca Velásquez , para 8. 
65  Pasqualucci, (n 57 above) 243. 
66  See Chilean Supreme Decree No. 365 (25 April 1990) Establishing the National Commission 
on Truth and Reconciliation cited in Pasqualucci (n 57 above) 243. 
67  Art 1 American Convention. 
68  Art 8 American Convention. 
69  Article 25 provides in full: 1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any 
other effective recourse, to a competent Court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate 
his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this 
Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the 
course of their official duties. 2. The States Parties undertake: a. to ensure that any person 
claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for 
by the legal system of the state; b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and c. to 
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
70  For a general discussion, see Aldana-Pindell, (n 46 above) 1417. 
71  Velásquez Rodríguez IACtHR Series C 4 (Merits, 1988) para 174. 
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More specifically in the case of Paniagua Morales v Guatemala,72 the Inter-American 
Court has noted that the right to be heard enacted under Article 8 of the Convention 
contemplates victims' rights to have the crime investigated and to have those 
responsible prosecuted and punished when appropriate. The obligation to prosecute 
and punish perpetrators of serious human rights violations has been reiterated in 
numerous other cases.73 National laws, in particular amnesty laws74 that shield 
perpetrators from prosecution have been condemned on the grounds that they deny 
victims the right to know the truth and eliminate the possibility of prosecutions of 
those responsible.75  
The Court’s jurisprudence on this issue not only reinforces the stand 
represented by the ICC that certain serious human rights violations – those that amount 
to international crimes – must attract criminal sanction, but also proffers pointers on 
how national amnesties, though not specifically dealt with by the Rome Statute, should 
be dealt with.76  
 
3.5.1.3  Right to Access and Participation 
 
The Inter-American Court has stated that Article 25 of the American Convention read 
together with Article 8(1) of the same treaty guarantees victims access to the Courts, 
and by extension criminal proceedings. Article 25 enacts that: 
[e]veryone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a 
competent Court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights 
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even 
                                                
72  Paniagua Morales v Guatemala, Case No. 37, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.C, PP 155-56 
(1998). 
73  Durand and Ugarte, Case No. 68, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.C, P 130; Genie Lacayo v 
Nicaragua, Case No. 30, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C, P 76 (1998), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr; Blake, Case No. 48, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C, P 97; Villagrán 
Morales, Case No. 63, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. C, P 227; Bámaca Velásquez v Guatemala (n 55 
above) 182-83. See also Aldana-Pindell, (n 39 above) 1418. 
74  On the duty to investigate, right to truth and the amnesty question see generally D Orentlicher 
‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’ (1990) 
100 Yale L.J 2537; N Roht-Arriaza, ‘State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave 
Human Rights Violations in International Law’ (1997) 78 California LR 451; Jo M Pasqualucci 
‘The whole truth and nothing but the truth: truth commissions, impunity and the Inter-
American Human Rights System’ (1994) 12 Boston Univ Int’l LJ 321. 
75  Numerous cases address the question of amnesties: Constitutional Court v Peru (Merits), 2001) 
para 123; Bámaca Velasquez (n 62 above) 173. 
76  See analysis in chapter six of the complementarity regime. 
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though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their 
official duties. 
 
The Inter-American Court has interpreted this provision to entail a victim’s right to 
access to criminal proceedings. In the case of Castillo Páez v Peru, the Court held that 
victims' access to criminal proceedings is included in the right to access to a ‘simple 
and rapid recourse’ to competent tribunals.77 Such access is to facilitate the trial of 
perpetrators and for victims to obtain reparations.  
Apart from stating why victims should have access, the Court has not 
prescribed or indicated what ‘form’ such (participation) must take or what is their 
actual entitlement. On the face of it, it is thus not clear whether the Court endorses a 
role for victims beyond that of witnesses in respective national criminal justice 
processes. With respect to obtaining reparations, since the Court has not been 
prescriptive as to the forum in which this should be obtained, one can conclude that it 
is not necessarily before a criminal court. To the extent that chapter five of this thesis 
considers among other things, the form victim participation should take within the 
criminal process as well as at what stage reparations issues should be considered in 
view of Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence is 
of little utility. However, it can be argued that failure by the Court to prescribe modes 
of participation and the stage at which reparations should be considered is indicative of 
the Inter-American Court’s deference to national systems, which demonstrate in 
general ‘diverse accommodation of victims’ both in terms of their role in the criminal 
process and how they obtain reparations.78  
When the derivative right to participate is understood within the context of the 
Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence on the more developed right to truth and of an 
effective prosecution, it could be argued that victims must have an active role in both 
civil and criminal processes in which violations are addressed. In what is perhaps the 
least elaborate element in the Inter-American regime of rights of victims of serious 
violations, the court appears not to have considered two of the three issues (arising 
from the tripartite interests in the criminal process) that the ICC will have to deal with: 
whether such participation advances prosecution of the perpetrators of these serious 
                                                
77  Castillo Páez (n 62 above) para 106; Suarez Rosero Case para 65; Paniagua Morales et al 
(1998) Series C. No 37, para 169. 
78  Aldana-Pindell (n 46 above) 1407. 
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violations; and whether, irrespective of any benefits derivable from there by 
participating victims, they are detrimentally affected in particular being exposed to 
danger. Although the Inter-American Court has not mentioned this specifically, 
participation would not only serve an accountability function. Victims are also 
afforded an opportunity to advance their own interests.79 As stated in the discussions 
on reparations below, victims have the right personally to articulate their personal 
interests before the Court or do so through a designated legal representative.80 With 
respect to the third prong of interests, the Court has not conducted an in-depth analysis 
of defendants’ rights in relation to the duty to prosecute and victims’ interests. 
However by linking in its passing remarks, the right of victims to access the tribunals 
to Article 8 (1) rights – rights to a hearing and fair trial – the Inter-American Court 
indicated in Castillo Páez that fair trial guarantees must apply when perpetrators of 
serious violations are tried.81  
 
3.5.1.4 Reparations 
 
Of the three regional bodies, the American Court has probably been the most creative 
in its fashioning of reparations.82 Of various human rights tribunals, its jurisprudence 
seems to be the most relevant for our purposes. This case law is significant as it 
responds to several concerns raised by the ICC reparations regime, including ‘types’, 
nature, extent (quantum) of reparations as well as responses to a variety of victims and 
mass atrocity. As discussed below, the remedies ordered by the Inter-American Court 
have been in general influenced by a number of factors: the nature of the violation; the 
number of victims; and the effects of the violation on the victims.  
The Court’s power to order reparations is provided for under Article 63(1) of 
the American Convention:  
                                                
79  Ibid. 
80  Article 23, 2001 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court; Pasqualucci (n 57 above) 
183.  
81  See Castillo Páez, 106. 
82  See D Shelton, ‘Reparations in the Inter-American System’ in D Harris & S Livingstone (eds) 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights (1998) 151-172 153 noting that ‘while the Court’s 
jurisprudence reveals less generosity…than might be expected on the basis of the text of article 
63(1)’… the Court’s judgements represent the most far-reaching remedies afforded in 
international human rights law’. 
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 If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right… [it] shall rule that the injured party 
be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if 
appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of 
such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.83 
 
In terms of this provision, and supported by the Inter-American Court’s practice, the 
Court has a broad mandate:84 to ensure future respect for rights or freedoms that have 
been violated; to remedy the consequences of the violation; and to order compensation 
for the harm. The Inter-American Court in its very first case – Velásquez Rodriquez v 
Honduras – noted that this provision is an endorsement of the customary law principle 
and ‘general concept of law’ articulated in Chorzów that ‘every violation of an 
international obligation that results in harm creates a duty to make adequate 
reparation’.85 It can be argued that the Inter-American Court’s early acceptance of the 
centrality of the reparations provision and its own role in the realization of the rights in 
the Convention has enabled it to set a strong principled foundation, as well as deliver 
real results to victims. This runs through its reparations jurisprudence.86   
To begin with, the Inter-American Court’s rich case law reflects its recognition 
that reparations is a composite term that encompasses various remedial measures that 
may be deployed to address the breach of an international obligation (in this case the 
requirement that states respect and ensure the respect for human rights). In Castillo 
Páez, the Court noted that reparations ‘covers…restitutio in integrum, indemnisation 
(compensation), satisfaction, assurances of guarantees that the violations will not be 
repeated and others…’.87 However, it should be added that the Court has lacked 
consistency in this regard,88 and may be regarded as conservative in its approach, 
                                                
83  Art 63(1) American Convention. 
84  On the legislative history of art 63 (1) disclosing the state’s intention, see Pasqualucci (n 50 
above) 233; Shelton (n 75 above) 152. 
85  Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Compensatory Damages, 1989) para 25. 
86  See Paniagua Morales et al. v Guatemala (Reparations, 2001) para 78; Aloeboetoe et al v 
 Suriname (Reparations, 1993) para 15. See Jo M Pasqualucci (n 57 above2) 233. 
87  See Castillo Páez (reparations) para 48; Aloeboetoe (n 25 above) para 49 where the Court 
stated with respect to restitutio in integrum that it ‘is not the only way in which [the effect of an 
international unlawful act] must be redressed….in certain cases, such reparation may not be 
possible, sufficient or appropriate’. See also Blake v Guatemala (Reparations, 1999) para 114 
88  D Shelton (n 75 above) 154. 
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having generally limited its orders to restitution in integrum, compensation, and 
guarantees of non-repetition.89 We return to the issue of non-pecuniary damages later.  
As a basis for reparations, the Court has maintained as a general rule that it is 
required to order restitutio in integrum, which means that a victim of a violation 
should be restored, to the extent possible, to the situation preceding the violation. In 
the Barrios Altos Case, the Court held that:  
Reparation for damage caused by a breach of an international obligation requires, whenever 
possible, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which consists in establishing the previous 
situation. If that [is] not possible, the international Court must order that steps be taken to 
guarantee the rights infringed, redress the consequences of the infringements, and determine 
payment of indemnification as compensation for damage caused. 90 
 
More specifically, the Court indicated in Castillo Páez v Peru that in an attempt to 
meet the goals of full restitution, compensation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition may be ordered.91 Proportionality of reparations so awarded to the nature 
and seriousness of violations suffered is a key consideration.92  
Having been confronted with cases where restitutio in integrum was not always 
‘possible, sufficient or appropriate,’93 the Court has held that such cases must attract 
pecuniary compensation, in addition to other reparative measures. In this regard, the 
Court has held consistently that in matters involving violations of the right to life94 
(and personal integrity guarantees in general), reparation must of necessity be in the 
form of pecuniary compensation, given the nature of the right violated. In these 
instances, which constitute the most serious violations, the status quo ante cannot be 
re-established. The case of Aloeboetoe, in which several tribesmen had been killed by 
soldiers, and numerous summary executions and ‘disappearances’ had occurred, 
illustrates this category of cases.95  
                                                
89  See Dissenting Opinion by Judge AC Trindade in El Amparo v Venezuela (Reparations, 1995) 
relating to non-pecuniary reparations in which he notes that reparations go beyond restitution 
and indemnification to include rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees to non repetition. 
90  Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al v Peru) (Reparations, 2001) Inter-Am Ct HR, Ser C 
No 87 para 25. See also Velásquez Rodríguez (Compensatory Damages) para 26. 
91  Castillo Páez v Peru (Reparations, 1998), para 48; Pasqualucci (n 57 above) 239. 
92  Castillo Páez (Reparations) para 51; Pasqualucci 239. 
93  Aloeboetoe et al (n 25 above) para 49. 
94  Castillo Páez para 52; Garrido and Baigorria Case (Reparations, 1998) para 41. 
95  Aloeboetoe et al para 46; Velásquez Rodríguez Case, (Merits, 1988) Series C No. 4, para. 189; 
Godínez Cruz Case, (1989) Series C No. 5, para.199. 
 78 
With respect to the applicable law – whether international law or domestic law, 
as well as the amount and form compensation should take – the Inter-American Court 
has, rejecting contentions by states on a number of occasions, asserted that these must 
be determined in terms of international law.  In Castillo Páez, the Court reiterated its 
longstanding approach: 
The obligation to make reparation established by international Courts is governed, as has been 
universally accepted, by international law in all its aspects: scope, nature, modality and 
determination of beneficiaries, none of which the respondent state may alter by invoking its 
domestic law. 96 
 
This position is particularly useful given the often varied, contradictory and inferior 
levels of protection that exist under domestic law. In the Velásquez Rodríguez case, 
while the law under which Honduras proposed to compute compensation offered the 
most favourable national regime, it was considered by the Court to fall short of the 
appropriate international standards.97 However, the Court seems to have since adopted 
a flexible stance, in some cases endorsing national law on some aspects, in particular 
where there are gaps respecting specific issues in the international. This is best 
illustrated in the Aloeboetoe case in which the ‘effective law’ relating to succession – 
the tribal law of victims – was applied to establish beneficiaries. Chapter 6 considers 
whether such flexibility is available to the ICC.  
Tied closely to the question of which law applies is the question of who should 
be awarded reparations after a breach of an obligation is established. The American 
Convention does not define who is a victim. Article 63(1) provides that ‘fair 
compensation [should] be paid to the injured party’.98 In the case law, this term has 
been used synonymously with ‘victim’ in reference to the person(s) affected by the 
violation.99 The victim may be the person who directly suffers the violation and/or the 
next of kin100 in case of certain violations such as extrajudicial killings or forced 
disappearance.101  
                                                
96  Castillo Páez para 49 ; Velásquez  Rodríguez (Compensatory Damages) paras 27, 30  and 54. 
97  Velásquez Rodríguez (n 53 above) para 11. 
98  Pasqualucci (n 57 above) 235. 
99  Ibid. 
100  Defined in article 2(15) 2001Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court as ‘direct ants 
and ascendants, siblings, spouses, or permanent companions, or those determined by the Court 
if applicable’. 
101  See Bámaca Velásquez (Merits) Inter-Am Ct HR, 25 November 2000, Ser. C No 70 para 160; 
Garrido and Baigorria (Reparations, 1998) para 50; Blake v Guatemala (Reparations, 1999) 
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The Court’s assertion that the determination of beneficiaries is to be governed 
by international law has not prevented it from reverting to domestic law – or the 
effective law governing relationships among a particular group of petitioners.102 In 
Aloeboetoe, having found that the formal legal system had limited reach among the 
ethnic Saramaka from whom the petitioners were drawn, the Court applied Saramakan 
tribal law for purposes of determining who the beneficiaries of reparations should be. 
Among this group, due to the close-knit and matrilineal nature of the tribe, the circle of 
dependants was much wider, in conformity with polygamous Saramakan society, 
although Surinamese law did not recognise polygamy. However, the Court has limited 
the definition of ‘injured party’ to a victim’s next of kin and dependants.103  
Of importance to the victims’ claim to reparations is the question of who may 
espouse these claims. While in general the American Commission presents such 
claims to the Inter-American Court where they are not settled amicably, victims have 
locus standi and can independently make representations in reparations proceedings.104 
This is relevant because, as family or dependants, they have a separate claim 
independent of the deceased or ‘disappeared’ person, which entitles them to be 
considered as victims in their own right.105 With aims that resonate with the ICC’s 
victim participation regime, this right allows the injured party to defend his or her own 
interests during the reparations proceedings.  
With respect to the evidentiary standard of proof, the Inter-American Court has 
cited with approval decisions of other international tribunals on the question. In 
Castillo Páez,106 the Court reiterated that proceedings before the Court, as in other 
international tribunals, are distinguishable from domestic legal proceedings without 
detriment to relevant principles. The Court singled out procedural flexibility, in 
particular the evidentiary standard of proof, as one such instance where international 
                                                                                                                                        
para 114. See also UN General Assembly Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power defining ‘victim’ to include, where appropriate, the immediate 
family or dependants of the direct victim’. 
102  Shelton (n 75 above) 161; Aloeboetoe para 44. 
103  Aloeboetoe, para 83. 
104  Article 23 Inter American Court Rules of Procedure. 
105   See Castillo Páez, paras 58 – 60; Neira Alegria et al (Reparations) para 54; Aloeboetoe, para 
42. See the ECtHR jurisprudence cited approvingly by the IACtHR Timurtas v Turkey 33 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 6 (2000), which has established factors by which the next of kin may also be 
considered as victims, cited in Bámaca Velásquez (2000) para 163. 
106  Castillo Páez Case (Reparations), 38. 
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jurisprudence discloses the freedom with which courts weigh evidence and their 
avoidance of rigid rules on the amount of evidence required to support a judgment.107 
The Inter-American Court has adopted this standard in its case law.108 As discussed in 
detail in chapter six, these standards are of great relevance to the operationalisation of 
the ICC reparations regime, which does not furnish any detail regarding how various 
reparations issues should be dealt with. 
One main feature of proceedings before the Inter-American Court, as is the 
case for other human rights tribunals, is that when it comes to reparations (in particular 
pecuniary reparations), only those victims, usually individuals, who are able to 
marshal resources to approach the tribunal, can obtain a remedy. Victims who have 
sustained similar violations but are unable to approach an international adjudicatory 
body do not benefit from the Court’s orders. While the Inter-American Court blazed 
the trail in the Aloeboetoe case by ordering the creation of a fund for the benefit of all 
members of a tribe from which petitioning victims hailed – that is, beyond the 
traditional requirements that beneficiaries have to be family members and/or 
dependants – criticism of the Inter-American Court reparations jurisprudence has been 
directed partly at its failure to adopt a principled approach and establish general 
victims’ funds for victims in all cases.109 It is argued that given the nature of violations 
– mass atrocities that involved hundreds and sometimes thousands of victims – the 
general victim fund route would have been the most appropriate approach.110  
Though in a different context, while the states parties to the ICC may have 
anticipated this criticism by acting in solidarity with victims of international crimes 
and established the Victims’ Trust Fund (VTF), it is argued that the fund may lack the 
                                                
107  See Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, paras. 29-30 and 59-60; Corfu 
Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949.  
108  Castillo Páez Case (Reparations) paras 38 and 40; Loayza Tamayo Case, (Reparations, 1998) 
Series C No. 42, para. 37 and 38; Velásquez Rodríguez (1988) Series C No. 4, para. 127; 
Godínez Cruz Case, (1989) Series C No 5, para. 133; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, 
(Garbi and Corrales v Honduras, 1989). Series C No. 6, para. 130). 
109  Jo Pasqualucci ‘The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents and 
Procedure in Human Rights Law’ 26 Inter-American Law LR 297 331-2 cited in Shelton (n 82 
above) 170 who for this reason criticises the Court for its failure to advance international law 
of reparations. 
110  See Pasqualucci (n 57 above) 232; see also the report of the Honduran Human Rights 
Commissioner Rights speak for themselves-preliminary report on the disappeared in Honduras 
1980-1993 pointing to the ‘unfairness’ of only a few victims obtaining reparations at the 
IACtHR (in the Velásquez Rodriquez and Godinez Cruz Cases) while there were hundreds of 
similar cases in Honduras. 
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flexibility necessary to effectively to address the vast numbers of victims expected to 
approach the ICC.111  
For the Inter-American Court, fair compensation for injury as used in Article 
63(1) of the Convention includes material and moral damages, but excludes ‘punitive 
damages’, which concept does not exist in international law in the Court’s view.112 As 
noted above, the Court has elaborated a separate duty to investigate, prosecute and to 
punish those who violate rights. Material (pecuniary) damages, as used in case law 
covers a range of issues: loss of income, medical expenses, costs incurred in searching 
for the victim (where the state engages in a cover-up or fails to investigate), and other 
expenses of a pecuniary character resulting from the violation.113  
Moral damages, which in the Inter-American Court’s view may result from 
‘the psychological impact’ suffered by the victim or survivors due to the violations,114 
or as in the case of Aloeboetoe, the assault on the dignity and self worth of victims, 
family and tribal members, have been ordered as part of the package of reparative 
measures. To this end, the state has been ordered to pay a sum of money to each 
eligible survivor (family and dependants), to make a public apology (by the President 
and Congress), to return bodies for burial as well as undertake other far-reaching 
measures within the affected communities.115 In Aloeboetoe, where the state was 
required to institute a range of socio-economic projects such as construction of 
schools, hospitals, as well to memorialise the victims by way of monuments or street 
names, represents the most elaborate case of moral damages so far.116 Apart from these 
measures to be undertaken by the State, the Inter-American Court has taken the view 
that a judgment of the Court condemning conduct that violates the Convention is in 
itself ‘a type of reparation and moral satisfaction for victims’.117 The range of moral 
damages ordered by the Inter-American Court proffers a veritable list of possible 
options for the ICC. 
                                                
111  See Chapters 5 and 7 of this thesis. 
112  Velásquez Rodríguez (Reparations) para 39. 
113  Pasqualucci, (n 57 above) 255; Trujillo Oroza v Bolivia (Reparations, 2002) para 74. 
114  Velásquez Rodríguez, para 50. 
115  Aloeboetoe, paras 80-87 moral damages were based on the death of loved ones, denial of 
information about victims and their inability to obtain and bury their bodies. See also Velásquez 
Rodriquez 39-42. 
116  Aloeboetoe para 85-7. 
117  Velásquez Rodriquez (Reparations) para 36. 
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3.5.2 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention)118 established both a Court119 and a Commission.120 
Before both institutions were abolished and a new ECHR Court inaugurated in 1998,121 
they had operated alongside each other in complementary fashion.122 Although as 
noted by Harris et al the initial purpose of the Convention was not primarily to offer a 
remedy to specific individual victims of human rights violations, the ECHR and 
Commission’s approach eventually took this trajectory.123  
Three main provisions in the European Convention124 – those relating to the 
right to life,125 the prohibition against inhuman treatment126 and the right to an effective 
remedy,127 have been relevant to the elaboration of victims’ rights that could be applied 
to the criminal process. The ECHR has taken the view that these three provisions grant 
victims certain rights in the criminal process.128 As the ECHR’s approach changed 
from the initial stance of ‘abstention’ every time national remedies were called into 
question to one of engagement with the issues, the Court also began to explore the 
inclusion of the concerns of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice system in its 
                                                
118  European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 
U.N.T.S 221 (1953) signed at Rome November 4, 1950; entered into force September 3, 1953. 
119  Article 38 and 56 European Convention. 
120  Article 19 European Convention. 
121  European Convention Protocol 11, 11 May 1994 E.T.S No 155 (1994). 
122  See MW Janis, RS Kay & AW Bradley European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials 
(1995) 30-64 discussing the functions of the Commission including acting as protector of the 
Court’s judicial function, mediator and fact finder. See also D Shelton (n 4 above) 189-194; 
generally AH Robertson and JG Merrills Human Rights in Europe - A study of the European 
convention on human rights 3rd Ed (1993) chapters 6 and 7. 
123  D.J Harris, M O’Boyle & C Warbrick at 33 Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1995). Shelton has noted that that it took the old ECHR more than ten years to pronounce 
itself on remedies. Shelton (n 4 above) 194. 
124  European Convention for the Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 (1995) (as amended through Nov. 1998). 
125   Art 2 European Convention. 
126  Article 3 European Convention. 
127   Art 13 European Convention. 
128  For a brief, but useful discussion of the ECHR’s jurisprudence, see Aldana-Pindell, (n 46 
above) 1419-1422. 
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interpretation of Article 6, which had previously been interpreted as protecting 
defendants’ rights exclusively.129  
Because an entrenched culture of human rights in most of Europe has meant 
that fewer cases of gross human rights violations occur and that when they do happen, 
they are dealt with appropriately at the national level, limiting the Court’s caseload 
relating to this category of cases (Turkey and United Kingdom being the main 
sources); and also because engagement with victims’ rights is a relatively recent 
feature of the European human rights system,130 the ECHR has not had as much 
‘material’ to work with as the Inter-American Court. Robertson and Merrills have 
rightly fingered the ‘problematic’ nature of Article 13 as responsible for the paucity of 
remedies jurisprudence, observing that ‘in view of the obstacles which applicants must 
surmount, successful claims under this article are never likely to be numerous’.131  
Although for these reasons, and perhaps because the European Court’s mandate 
with respect to remedies as discussed below is less broad than its Inter-American 
counterpart, the European case law is much less rich, it has elaborated a sizeable body 
of jurisprudence relating to the rights of victims of serious violations of human rights 
(crimes). Like the Inter-American Court, the ECHR has attributed the rights discussed 
below to the direct victim of the violation or to his or her legal representative or next 
of kin,132 determined not by family links but the actual closeness of the relationship.133 
Close family members may espouse claims as representatives of the deceased or in 
their own right.134 
 
                                                
129  Article 6 European Convention provides for the right to access to justice and stipulates fair trial 
guarantees. 
130  P Rock Constructing victims’ rights (2005) has argued that the real concern for victims at the 
ECHR began in the mid 1990s. 
131  AH Robertson & JG Merrills Human Rights in Europe: A study of the European convention on 
human rights 3rd Ed (1993)170. 
132  Gül v Turkey, 34 European H.R. Report 28 (2000); Salman v Turkey, 34 European H.R. Rep. 
(2000) 17. 
133  In Timurtas v Turkey, ECHR, (2000) para 95 the ECHR set out criteria next of kin have to meet 
to bring representative claims: including ‘the closeness of the family relationship, the particular 
circumstances of the relationship with the victim, the degree to which the family was a witness 
of the events related to the disappearance, the way the family member was involved in attempts 
to obtain information about the disappearance of the victim and the state’s response to the steps 
taken.’ See also Cakici v Turkey, ECHR, (1999) para 98. 
134  Ilhan v Turkey 34 European H.R. Report (2000) 36 53-4. 
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3.5.2.1 Right to Prosecution 
 
In its elaboration of Article 13,135 which is similar to Article 25 of the American 
Convention, the European Court considers that the provision includes the duty to 
prosecute perpetrators as part of the effective remedy due to victims of violent crime. 
This accords with the mandate of the ICC and the obligation on states to prosecute 
perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ECHR has 
consistently found a violation of Article 13 in cases in which no criminal investigation 
was conducted into alleged right to life or personal integrity violations,136 or where the 
investigation was ineffective or riddled with major mistakes.137  
In the first place, the Court has found in these cases a violation of the right to 
life and/or the prohibition of inhuman treatment. By reading Article 13 together with 
Article 1, which obliges states ‘to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined [therein]’,138 the Court has ruled that states are required to 
conduct an effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible. As in the case of McCann v United Kingdom, relating 
to the right to life,139 the ECHR has consistently found a separate violation of the right 
to an effective remedy where such an investigation does not occur, thus reiterating the 
                                                
135  It provides that every person alleging a violation of the European Convention has a right to an 
effective remedy before a national authority. Together with article 41, which vests the Court 
with powers to order remedies, they constitute the ‘remedies regime’ in the European 
Convention. 
136  See for instance Kaya v Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1998) where the Court found double 
violation of the right to life and effective remedy after the death of the applicant’s brother was 
not subjected to any proper investigation by the Public Prosecutor. 
137  See Cakici v Turkey, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (1999); Timurtas v Turkey, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6 
(2000); Kaya v Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1998); Gulec v Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121 
(1998); Ergi, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18; Ogur v Turkey, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40 (1999); Tanrikulu v 
Turkey, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 950 (1999); Mahmut Kaya v Turkey, App. No. 22535/93, 1416 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 253 (2000); Kilic v Turkey, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 58 (2000); Salman v Turkey, 34 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 17 (date?); and numerous other cases involving extrajudicial executions in Turkey 
cited by Aldana-Pindell (n 39 above) 1420. 
138  The Court has reaffirmed that the duty go give effect to protected rights lies with the state. In Z 
and others v United Kingdom the ECHR recently reiterated that ‘[i]t is fundamental to the 
machinery of protection established by the Convention that the national systems themselves 
provide redress for breaches of its provisions, the Court exerting its supervisory role subject to 
the principle of subsidiarity. 
139  McCann v United Kingdom, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 161 (1996). See also Kaya v Turkey, 28 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 1 (1998). 
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positive obligation on the state to prosecute serious violations.140 In McCann, the Court 
found a violation of Article 2 because: the police investigation was not adequately 
independent as it was conducted by same entity accused of colluding with the 
murderers; the coroner’s inquest did not constitute an effective investigation for want 
of proper scope; and that the delay of ten years in instituting the investigation did not 
meet the requirement of an effective investigation. 141 
The duty to conduct an effective investigation has a bearing on victims’ rights 
to participate, which is discussed below.  
 
3.5.2.2 Access and Participation in the Criminal Process 
 
Recent cases have expanded the significance of Article 2 of the European Convention 
to include victims’ rights. This provision, which protects the right to life, has also been 
interpreted as conferring upon victims certain participatory rights in criminal 
proceedings.142 As was the case in Jordan v United Kingdom,143 the Court has taken the 
view that the entitlement to the right to life requires that a criminal investigation must 
not only be prompt, independent and effective, but also that it must be accountable, an 
attribute secured by open possibilities of ‘sufficient public scrutiny’. The Court is yet 
to expound on the possibility that the prohibition against inhuman treatment in Article 
3 also incorporates victims’ participatory rights in the associated criminal process. It is 
argued that there is no reason why the reasoning applied to the right to life violation to 
elaborate participatory rights should not be extended to other serious breaches of the 
Convention when the opportunity arises. 
A victim’s right to participate is facilitated by effective rights to obtain 
information regarding measures taken by the state after notice of violation. In this 
                                                
140  The European Court has interpreted Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition of torture) of the 
European Convention, when read in conjunction with the state’s general duty under Article 1 of 
the European Convention, to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in . . . [the] Convention as requiring states to carry out an effective official 
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. See 
in relation to Article 2. 
141  McCann v United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. B) 97, 140 (1996); para 75-80. 
142  See Jordan v United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 1020 Eur. Ct. H.R. 300 (2001); McKerr v 
United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2002); Kelly v United Kingdom, App. No. 30054/96, 
2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 240 (2001); Shanaghan v United Kingdom, App. No. 37715/97, 1814 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 400 (2001). 
143  Jordan v United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94. 
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regard, the Court has affirmed the right to be informed in the Ogur v Turkey,144 
deciding that Turkey violated Article 2 when it failed to inform victims or close 
relatives of the state’s decision not to prosecute.145 If for no other purpose, information 
would allow victims to approach a higher authority. When an investigation is 
commenced, the Court has taken the view that the right to be informed would require 
the investigating authorities to allow victims access to the investigation and court 
documents. In Gül v Turkey, the Court found violations of Article 2 against Turkey in 
a case where this had not happened.146 In Ogur v Turkey, where the decision of the 
relevant national tribunal was based solely on the record prepared by state prosecutors, 
and where next of kin had had no opportunity to introduce evidence, the right to access 
was held to have been breached.147 In Jordan, as in other cases, the European Court 
considered the inability of the next of kin to obtain copies of witness statements prior 
to their oral testimony as problematic,148 for the reason that it prejudiced victims’ 
preparation and ability to participate in questioning.149  
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the Court held in McKerr v United 
Kingdom150 that the invocation of ‘public interest immunity’ in the United Kingdom to 
prevent the posing of certain questions or the disclosure of certain documents that were 
material to the investigation also hindered an effective investigation. The Court, 
however, appeared to allow some leeway to the state, noting that the right to access the 
record was not an automatic one, and that it may happen later in the proceedings if the 
state can demonstrate that the contents must be kept confidential until later stages of 
the prosecution to safeguard the efficiency and efficacy of the procedures.151 While this 
decision may be wrongly cited by authorities as denying victims access to proceedings 
                                                
144  Ogur v Turkey, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 92. 
145  Ogur v Turkey, App. No. 21594/93, 92 (1999). In Jordan, 1020 Eur. Ct. H.R. 300, the Court 
criticized the British criminal justice system for not requiring the prosecutor to justify the 
decision not to prosecute and not subjecting such decision to judicial review. 
146  Gül v Turkey, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28, 93 (1999); Ogur, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 92. 
147  Ogur, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 92 (held that since the Administrative Court made its decision 
solely on the basis of state produced paper on file, the proceedings had been inaccessible to the 
victim’s relatives). 
148  Jordan, 1020 Eur. Ct. H.R. 300, 133; McKerr, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 147; Kelly, 2004 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 240, 116; Shanaghan, 1814 Eur. Ct. H.R. 400, ¶ 106. 
149  Jordan, 1020 Eur. Ct. H.R. 300, ¶ 134; McKerr, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 148; Kelly, 2004 Eur. 
Ct. H.R 240, 128; Shanaghan, 1814 Eur. Ct. H.R. 400, 117. 
150  McKerr, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, ¶ 151. 
151  Kelly, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 240, 115; McKerr, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 129; Shanaghan, 1814 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 400, 105; Jordan, 1020 Eur. Ct. H.R. 300, 121. 
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and relevant documents, it is argued that the justification for making it a conditional 
right is in keeping with the need that may arise from time to time to bar access to 
sensitive documents and protect defendants’ rights. As discussed in chapter five, issues 
relating to the right to be informed are easily some of the most difficult in the ICC, 
where the prosecutor is likely to plead confidentiality and the integrity of 
investigations among other reasons to prevent victim access to the ‘dossier’. 
 
3.5.2.3 Reparations 
 
The mandate of the ECHR with respect to remedies is narrower than that of the Inter-
American Court. Article 41 of the Convention provides that: 
[i]f the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority 
of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising 
from the convention, and if the internal law of the said party allows only partial reparation to 
be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if 
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. (Emphasis mine)  
 
The ECHR has taken the view that Article 41 limits its powers to make orders for 
pecuniary compensation.152 In making orders for remedial measures, the Court has 
invoked Article 41 read with Article 13 of the Convention. In spite of initial doubts, 
Article 13 has been held to enact a free standing right.153 In Klass v Federal Republic 
of Germany,154 the ECHR stated that:  
 [a]rticle 13 requires that where an individual considers himself to have been prejudiced by a 
measure allegedly in breach of the Convention, he should have a remedy before a national 
authority in order to have both his claim decided and if appropriate, to obtain redress. Thus, 
Article 13 must be interpreted as guaranteeing an ‘effective remedy before a national authority’ 
to everyone who claims that his rights and freedoms under the Convention have been violated. 
 
In Aydin v Turkey155 and other cases, the Court has consistently stated that national 
remedies provided in compliance with this provision may take one form or another as 
                                                
152  Pasqualucci (n 57 above) 234. 
153  For a decisive verdict on the Court’s twenty-year non committal stand on art 13, see Dissenting 
Opinion of Justices Matscher and Pinheiro Farina in Malone v United Kingdom, 1984 (No 82) 
7 EHHR 14, 48 cited in MW Janis et al European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials 433. 
 For early comments on article 13 ECHR, see Gray ‘Remedies for individuals under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ 6 Human Rights Review (1981). 
154  Klass v Federal Republic of Germany Series A, No 28, 2 Euro. HRR 214 (1978) para 28. 
155  Aydin v Turkey (57/1996/676/866) 25 (1997) para 103. 
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long as they meet the effectiveness standard. Accordingly, it has indicated that, as in 
the case of the ICCPR, these remedies may be either judicial or non-judicial.156  
The European Court has developed a practice where compensation is almost 
invariably ordered whenever it finds a violation of the Convention. However, in its 
view the notion of an effective remedy entails more than compensation of the victim.157 
While restitutio in integrum is a central principle in this jurisprudence,158 on occasion, 
the Court has ordered non-pecuniary reparations, indicating that a particular piece of 
legislation is not in keeping with Convention standards. Some commentators however 
have argued that it lacks the competence to nullify or amend the nonconforming 
national legislation.159 Apart from compensation (pecuniary damages), the Court has 
also made declarations, orders for non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses.160 
A number of principles can be teased out of the European Court’s 
jurisprudence that are of relevance to victims of human rights violations in general: a 
state has a responsibility in international law to give effect to provisions in human 
rights treaties and to remedy human rights violations; for every violation, there must 
be restitutio in integrum; the state’s obligation with respect to violations goes beyond 
compensating the victim. It includes systemic changes geared towards wholesale 
reform. Measures taken should, for instance, target offending laws. There is 
recognition that monetary relief is not the sole remedy and that (Court moved towards 
non-repetition.161  
                                                
156  Aydin v Turkey, para 103; Robertson & Merrills (n above) 169; Soering v United Kingdom 
14038/88 [1989] ECHR 14 (1989). 
157   A number of recent cases articulate this point. See Papamichalopoulos and Others v Greece 
(1995) 330B Eur.Ct.H.R (ser. A) para 34 (noting that a judgement in which the Court finds a 
breach imposes on the respondent state a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make 
reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation 
existing before the breach)  and Scozzari and Giunta v Italy (2002) 35 E.H.R.R 12. 
158  Restitutio in integrum in the jurisprudence of the ECHR. 
159  See S Thomsen, ‘Restitution’ in R Bernhardt (ed) 10 Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (1987) 378; Report of Committee of Experts on Human Rights to the European 
Committee of Ministers (1950) in Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the Travaux 
Préparatoires of the European Convention on Human Rights (1975) vol III (I Travaux 
Préparatoires) at 246-7 cited in D Shelton, (n 4 above) at 193. 
160  Shelton (n 4 above) 194-195 discussing the early practice of the Court regarding remedies 
(1972-1998) which she argues was inflexible owing to the Court’s conservatism and lack of 
enthusiasm for article 51 European Convention which provides in part that ‘the decision of the 
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party’. See also R Higgins 
‘Damages for Violation of One’s Human Rights’ in NA Sims (ed) Explorations in Ethics and 
International Relations (1981) 45. 
161  Robertson & Merrils (n 131 above) 199. 
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3.5.3 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) is the 
regional treaty oversight body established under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights162 with the mandate, among others, of receiving and determining inter-
state163 and individual petitions164 alleging human rights violations. Unlike the 
American Convention, European Convention and the ICCPR, the African Charter does 
not provide specifically for the right to an effective remedy.165 Commentators attribute 
the deliberate exclusion of certain key rights in the African Charter to particular 
circumstances under which the Charter was adopted, including the historical legacy of 
repressive postcolonial African regimes.166 Furthermore, its has been argued that the 
Charter’s silence on remedies is a consequence of its ‘ambiguity about individual 
complaints and its pre-occupation with serious or massive violations’.167 
However, despite the Charter’s silence on remedies, the Commission has made 
reference to victims’ general right to an effective remedy in two contexts: through its 
                                                
162  African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M 58 (1982), entered into force 21st October 1986. On the charter 
generally, see F Ouguegouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A 
comprehensive agenda for human dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa 2003); E Kodjo 
‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 1990 11 Human Rights LJ 271; F 
Viljoen, Internatioal Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) 236-259; VOO Nmehielle The 
African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions (2001). 
163  Article 54 African Charter. 
164  The right to file an individual petition alleging human rights violations is not evident in the 
Charter. The commission interpreted reference to ‘other communications’ in article 55 of the 
Charter to include individual complaints. On art 55, see see F Viljoen ‘Admissibility under the 
African Charter’ in M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: The system in practice, 1986-2000 (2002) 61-99. 
165  Cf. Protocol Establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 9 June 
1998, entered into force on January 1, 2004. Art 27(1) provides that ‘if the Court finds that 
there has been violation of a human or peoples’ rights, it shall make appropriate orders to 
remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation’. 
166     See CA Odinkalu ‘The role of case and complaints procedures in the reform of the African 
regional human rights system’ 2 African Human Rights LJ 225-246; F Viljoen (n 162 above); 
M Hansungule ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2000) 8 African YB of 
Int’l L 265; C Heyns ‘Civil and political rights in the African Charter’ in M Evans & R Murray 
(n 5 above), alluding to substantive inadequacies of the Charter in this regard. 
167  F Viljoen (n 162 above) 355. 
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admissibility jurisprudence168 and, as this author has argued elsewhere, the 
interpretation of several provisions relating to substantive rights.169 
Until recently, the Commission’s exercise of its interpretative function has 
been marked by tentativeness and restraint, with great deference shown to states. As a 
result, even its jurisprudence on the ‘derivative’ right to an effective remedy is but 
skeletal and ill-developed.170 While the Commission has emphasised that the African 
Charter, like other human rights treaties creates binding obligations for states, 
including the requirement that human rights violations must be remedied,171 the 
Commission refrained in its earliest cases from indicating any specific remedies even 
when a breach of the Charter was established.172 Although the Commission’s ‘remedies 
jurisprudence’ has improved – tending towards greater clarity –, it still reveals an 
unprincipled and uncoordinated approach.173 Furthermore, a survey of its jurisprudence 
does not disclose any cases interpreting provisions analogous to article 2(3) of the 
ICCPR, articles 1, 8 and 25 of the American Convention and articles 1 and 13 of the 
European Convention in a manner that creates or recognises victims' rights in the 
criminal process.174 For purposes of this thesis therefore, the jurisprudence of the 
African Commission is limited only to reiterating the general state obligation 
                                                
168   On the African Commission’s practice regarding the admissibility procedure generally, F 
Viljoen (n 164 above) 69-99; NJ Udombana ‘So far, so fair: The local remedies rule in the 
jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 97 American 
J of Int’l L 1. 
169  GM Musila ‘The Right to an Effective Remedy under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) African Human Rights LJ vol 6 no 2 442-464 444. 
170  See GM Musila, above 442; F Viljoen, (n 162 above) 353-356; D Shelton Remedies 219-226; 
Rachel Murray ‘Decisions of the African Commission on Individual Communications under 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1998) 46 International & Comparative 
Law Q. 412. 
171  On the interpretation of article 1 of the African Charter (general provision on State 
obligations), see Commission Nationale v Chad (communication no. 74/92 (1995)); Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and The Centre for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR) v. Nigeria (2001) Communication No. 155/96. 
172  See F Viljoen (n 162 above) 355 citing a number of cases. See for instance, Amnesty 
International v Zambia (Comm. No. 212/98 (1999) para 39 and 40 where the Commission 
found violation of various provisions but made no order regarding remedies. 
173  GM Musila (n 169 above) 461; F Viljoen (n 162 above) 366. 
174  Article 1 of the African Charter codifies he general obligation of the state to give effect to 
rights, entailing, as per the SERAC Case four duties-respects, protect, promote and fulfil. 
Article 7 enacts that every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This 
comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his 
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and 
customs in force. 
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respecting human rights violations, including the obligation to ensure that victims 
obtain an effective remedy. 
 
3.5.4 Relevance of Human Rights Case Law 
 
IHRL, as can be discerned from various sources including the jurisprudence of 
international human rights tribunals is central to the elaboration of victims’ rights to 
participation and reparations. In the discussions above, it emerged that in terms of 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute, the ICC may apply ‘principles and rules of 
international law’ including those derived from IHRL as secondary sources of law (the 
Rome Statute itself, Elements of Crimes and its Rules being the primary source). In 
spite of conceptual divergence between ICL (based on individual responsibility) and 
IHRL (based on the state responsibility framework), both bodies are underlain by 
common principles. More importantly, the requirement in Article 21(3) of the Rome 
Statute that interpretation and application of the listed sources of law must be 
‘consistent with internationally recognized human rights’ means that IHRL, as 
interpreted by various tribunals, serves as the framework of principles within which 
the interpretation and application of the entire gamut of ICC law should take place. 
Apart from other conclusions reached in the discussions in preceding sections, 
the case law relating to key entitlements in relevant human rights instruments as 
elaborated by the Inter-American Court and the European Court of Human Rights is 
relevant to the ICC victims’ regime in several other specific ways. The jurisprudence 
affirms the duty of states to prosecute perpetrators of violent crime as part of an 
effective remedy due to victims. This duty finds expression in the mandate of the ICC 
and the obligation the Rome Statute requiring states to prosecute perpetrators of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
The case law of these human rights bodies also asserts the right of individuals 
whose basic entitlements to life and to bodily integrity are violated to participate in 
related criminal proceedings to articulate their concerns and to learn the truth about 
criminality and if possible, obtain reparations. Although these tribunals have 
articulated with clarity the right to participate and why victims should have such 
access to proceedings, they don’t seem to prescribe what ‘form’ or ‘modes’ such 
participation must take or what is their actual entitlement. On this account, the 
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jurisprudence seems less helpful in the elaboration of the broad and multifaceted right 
to participate under Article 68(3) Rome Statute and the ICC RPE outlined in detail in 
chapter five. In the discussion of the right to participation as elaborated by the Inter-
American Court, it was noted that the lack of detail on modes of participation and the 
stage at which reparations should be determined is indicative of deference accorded to 
national systems.  
The jurisprudence of the two human rights tribunals relating to reparations is 
richest and most relevant for the ICC. Apart from repeatedly affirming the right to 
reparations for victims of violent crime, this case law, in particular that elaborated by 
the Inter-American Court proffers guidance on a range of issues including different 
modes of reparations, quantum of reparations and ways of structuring reparations 
schemes in case of mass victimisation. Chapter 6 addresses these questions in some 
detail within the context of the ICC. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
VICTIMS IN SELECT DOMESTIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
Enhanced awareness of victim’s rights and the passage of victims’ bills of rights in many 
countries in the last two decades may give the impression that victims of crime are much 
better off now than they have ever been. It may suggest that the criminal justice system has 
finally moved from its singular emphasis on the offender and its longstanding obsession with 
punishment to victim centred or victim-oriented policies and objectives. Alas! The reality is 
far different from the popular perception and the political rhetoric.1 
 
4.1 ICC Sources of Law and National Criminal Law 
 
Chapter one introduced the idea that the ICC presents an important opportunity for the 
incorporation of a nuanced paradigm of restorative justice in the international criminal 
process. Chapters 2 and 3 reviewed the jurisprudence of pre-ICC international criminal 
tribunals and other international tribunals (ICJ and human rights tribunals). As its main 
objective, this chapter sets out to inquire into the role and treatment of victims in 
domestic criminal law. It does this by exploring the rights of victims in select 
jurisdictions with a view to suggesting ways of operationalising the new ICC victims’ 
regime. This chapter suggests that various domestic systems have long provided for 
victims’ right to participation and reparations and suggests that irrespective of the 
seemingly inferior station conferred on domestic law and practice in the hierarchy of 
the ICC’s sources of law, the Court will inevitably refer to the jurisprudence of certain 
domestic criminal justice systems.  
The rationale and normative basis for relying on the suggested domestic 
experiences to develop the ICC victims’ regime must first be established. To start with, 
there are at least two linkages between the ICC and domestic criminal systems around 
which elements in the Rome Statute and international criminal law generally are based, 
justified and given effect, besides other general principles of international law that may 
be of relevance. The first stems from the complementarity facility of the Rome Statute 
that establishes the national sphere as the primary site for the implementation of the 
Statute.2 The second relates to national criminal law and practice as sources of law and 
                                                
1  E Fattah ‘Gearing justice action to victim satisfaction: Contrasting two justice philosophies: 
retribution and redress’ in law’ in H Kaptein and M Kaptein (eds) Crime, Victims and Justice: 
Essays on Principles and Practice (2004) 16-30 16. 
2  Arts 1 and 17, prmbl Rome Statute. 
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points of reference in the interpretation and elaboration of the provisions of the Statute. 
While complementarity is of relevance, this chapter focuses on it only to a limited 
extent – in considering how the dynamics of the complementary relationship between 
the ICC and national systems may influence the implementation of the ICC victims’ 
regime. We return to this later.  
As opposed to related branches of international law such as international 
human rights law (IHRL), international criminal law (ICL) has in its development 
relied, and continues to rely, quite substantially on national criminal law.3 For the 
reasons suggested – novelty and paucity of relevant jurisprudence from similar 
tribunals – the elaboration of the ICC’s victims’ rights regime requires such an 
approach. In its codification of the sources of law, having established that the Rome 
Statute itself, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE) 
are the primary sources of law for the Court, followed by, in appropriate cases, 
‘applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed conflict’,4 Article 21, captioned 
‘applicable law’, provides at 21(c) that: 
“[f]ailing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.” 
 
In view of this, the Court will only refer to national law and practice if it fails to obtain 
relevant guidance from the other sources outlined in this scheme. It seems evident that 
the Rome Statute assigns an auxiliary station to domestic law and practice. Reliance on 
domestic law is subject to only one condition – such domestic jurisprudence should be 
in keeping with ‘international law and internationally recognised norms and 
standards’. For the purposes of this thesis, these standards include fundamental 
guarantees for accused persons, the customary principle to provide redress for serious 
human rights violations and the inviolability of the judicial process. The sections that 
follow in this chapter proceed to examine relevant laws and practices relating to the 
place of victims in select domestic criminal justice systems.  
 
                                                
3  LS Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law Developments in Codification 
and Implementation (1997) 4-5; See A Cassese International criminal Law (2003). 
4  Art 21 (a) and (b) Rome Statute. 
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4.2   The Victim Rights Movement and National Experiences 
 
Unlike in ICL, victims of crime have had rights of participation and to reparations in a 
number of jurisdictions, both of the civil and common law tradition, for a considerably 
long time. While the concerns of victims precede it, gains in victims’ rights owe much 
to the victim rights movement (VRM) both in the United States and Europe. The 
movement began in the mid 1950s when the work of activists and civil society drew 
attention of reformists to the plight of victims within criminal justice systems. Victims 
were hitherto subject to deplorable treatment by the system.5 Unlike the VRM in 
Europe which for the earlier years focused on victim support and advocacy, that in the 
United States pursued a rights-based approach in championing the concerns of victims 
of crime. The US movement sought to change through legislation, both at state and 
federal level, the rules relating to the place of the victim in the criminal process. These 
concerns were in its advocacy rhetoric articulated as ‘victims’ rights’.6 In both cases 
however, the work of the movement resulted in reforms of the criminal justice systems 
to enhance focus on victims of crime. 
The discussion in this chapter reveals two broad approaches to victims’ issues in 
national criminal justice systems. For many of these, the state’s interests are fore-
grounded and those of the accused closely guarded, while victims remain largely on 
the fringes of the process. For this reason, victims have been described variously as the 
‘missing party’ and ‘the lost party’.7 A fewer countries afford victims rights of 
participation and reparation. At both levels, the role of victims has been for the most 
part limited to that of witnesses, in which capacity they serve to advance the 
prosecution’s interests of law enforcement. 
 
                                                
5  For more on the global ‘victim rights movement’, see H Strang, Repair or Revenge (2002) 26-
34  
6  See F Carrington & G Nicholson, ‘The Victim's Rights Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come’ (1984) 11 Pepperdine LR 1. In 1965, California became the first state to pass legislation 
providing compensation to crime victims. Many states followed suit. In this work, only federal 
initiatives are considered. 
7  CS Goddu ‘Victim’s “rights” or fair trial wronged’ 41 Buffalo LR 245-272 at 248; M Hekkila 
International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime: A study of the Statues of Victims 
before International Criminal Tribunals and the Factors Affecting this Status (2004) 57-136 at 
52 citing MP de Liege ‘Concrete achievements towards the implementation of fundamental 
justice for victims in France’ in MC Bassiouni International protection of victims (1988) noting 
that even in France, which is considered a very progressive system this is still the case. 
 96 
4.3   United States of America: Law Reforms Relating to Victim Participation 
and Restitution 
 
Within the United States, VRM proposals to redress victim wrongs took two distinct 
trajectories. On the one hand, there were proposals calling for compensation, medical 
aid and restitution; and on the other, those aimed at securing greater and more effective 
participation for the victim in the criminal process.8 The law-making achievements of 
the US movement are reflected in a series of revolutionary legislative initiatives at the 
federal level: the Federal Victims and Witnesses Protection Act (1982),9 the Victims of 
Crime Act (1984), and the stalled proposal to add to the 6th Amendment with a view 
to constitutionally entrench participatory rights of victims at all stages of the criminal 
process. 10  
Proposals regarding participation of victims included, for instance, suggestions 
to provide limited standing and due process rights to the victim;11 legal assistance;12 
cutting down on postponements to expedite trials; granting the victim the right to 
review a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute;13 and requiring the state to notify the 
victim of the status of the case as it progresses through the judicial system. Arguments 
were also made in favour of allowing the victim to express an opinion about negotiated 
pleas and right to make statements before and during trial as well as at sentencing.14 
Other proposals have contemplated victim-initiated criminal actions as well as 
representation by counsel.15 These are considered in depth below when assessing the 
participatory rights under various federal initiatives.  
                                                
8  RP Peerenboom at 68 citing R Aynes, ‘Constitutional Considerations: Government 
Responsibility and the Right Not to be a Victim’, 11 Pepperdine LR 63-4 (1984); J Gittler, 
‘Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of Issues and Problems’ 
11 Pepperdine LR 117, (1984) 121-125 (summarizing recommendations and initiatives for 
better treatment of victims as witnesses and expanded role of victims in criminal process). 
9  Pub. L. No 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified in scattered sections of 18 USC and Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 32 (c) (2). 
10  See generally D Chappel, ‘The implementation of victims’ rights in North America’ in MC 
Bassiouni (ed) International Protection of Victims 7 Nouvelles Etudes Pénales (1988) 337-384;  
11  P Hudson, 36-37; Aynes (n 8 above), 72-75. 
12   Hudson, 59. 
13   Hudson, 58; Aynes (n 8 above), 97-107 (also advocating allowing the victim greater say in 
determining what crimes are investigated). 
14   Gittler (n 8 above) 124. 
15   Ibid, 150-76; MA Young ‘A Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victim’s 
Perspective’ in (1988) 34 Wayne LR 51 56-7; A Goldstein ‘Defining the Role of the Victim in 
Criminal Prosecution’ (1982) 52 Mississippi LJ 511, 558-60. 
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Federal reforms in the United States began with the recommendations of the 
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, which was commissioned by President 
Reagan in 1982 to examine problems confronted by victims when facing the justice 
system and to suggest improvements in their treatment.16 In the same year Congress 
passed the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act which provided for among 
others, restitution, use of victim impact statements at the sentencing stage in federal 
cases, and victim and witness protection.17   
As the federal government's first attempt to respond to victims’ concerns 
following criticism that the federal criminal justice system was ‘offender-oriented,’18 
and thus unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of victims and witnesses,19 the 
Federal Victims and Witness Protection Act (FVWPA)’s stated objective was ‘to 
improve the treatment of victims and witnesses in the federal criminal system’.20 It 
provided for among others, restitution, use of victim impact statements at sentencing in 
federal cases, and victim and witness protection.21 For its part, the Victims of Crime 
Act (VCA) established the Crime Victims’ Fund.22 The Fund, which is used ‘to 
compensate victims of federal crimes and to provide assistance for eligible state victim 
compensation programmes and public and private victim assistance organizations’ 
through grants’23 receives funds from various federal revenue sources including 
criminal fines collected from convicted federal defendants, forfeited appearance bonds 
and bail bonds, and various other criminal penalties.24  
                                                
16   Proclamation No. 4831, 3 C.F.R. 18 (1982) cited in DL Roland (1989) 17 Pepperdine LR 
‘Progress in the victim reform movement: no longer the "forgotten victim"’ 35 at 36. 
17  Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub L No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3579-3580 (Supp. IV 1986) and Fed.R.Crim.P 32(c 
(2). See generally Merritt ‘Corrections Law Developments: Restitution Under the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act of 1982’ (1984) 20 Criminal Law Bulletin 44. 
18  See Slavin & Sorin, 507 citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Victim and 
Witness Assistance: New State Laws and the System's Response 1 (1983). 
19  Slavin & Sorin (n 18 above) citing Senate Report, 10; New State Laws, 1  
20  See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (1982) (Federal Guidelines for Treatment of Crime Victims and 
Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System). 
21  Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub L No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3579-3580 (Supp. IV 1986) and Fed.R.Crim.P. 
32(c)(2)). See generally Merritt (n 17 above). 
22  Roland (n 16 above) 37. 
23  Ibid 43-48. 
24  See WG Foote ‘State compensation for victims of crime’1992-MAR Army Law. 51 at 52 citing 
Program Guidelines for the Victims’ Compensation Program Under the Victims of Crime Act, 
55 Fed.Reg. 3180 (1990). 
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The VWPA introduced restitution beyond its previous sole use as a condition 
for probation,25 thus making it applicable alongside other forms of punishment that a 
Court could order with the intention of compensating victims to ‘the greatest extent 
possible’ to achieve ‘ultimate justice.’26 However, it imposed two conditions. The 
judge could only order restitution if such an order would ‘not unduly complicate or 
prolong the sentencing process,’27 or infringe upon the defendant's constitutional 
rights.28 These conditions – expeditious trials and other the rights of the accused – 
constitute the usual concerns of any criminal court, which are necessarily implicated in 
the functioning of an international criminal court that incorporates restorative justice. 
These are considered at some length within the US debate on constitutional 
entrenchment of victim rights and in the next chapter on participation.  
More recently, the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 199029 re-enacted the 
right to restitution30 and added further victim rights such as the right to be notified31 
and be present at all public court proceedings unless the court determines that 
testimony by the victim would be materially affected if the victim heard other 
testimony at trial,32 and the right to confer with the government’s attorney in the case.33 
The Act directs federal departments and agencies that are engaged in the detection, 
investigation, and prosecution of crime to ‘make their best efforts’ to ensure that the 
victims of violent crimes are accorded their rights as described in the Act.34 Legislation 
                                                
25  See Slavin & Sorin (n 18 above) 508 affirming this by citing Implementation of the Restitution 
Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 at 4; see 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) 
(restitution as condition of probation). 
26  Ibid, 508 citing 128 Cong. Rec. H8209 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Fish); id. at 
H8207 (remarks of Rep. McCollum). 
27  Ibid, 507 noting that this provision was included ‘to prevent sentencing hearings from 
becoming prolonged and complicated trials on the question of damages’ Senate Report, supra 
note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News at 2537. 
28  Ibid. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (1982) (Federal Guidelines for Treatment of Crime Victims and 
Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System). 
29      Victims' Bill of Rights, part of Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820 
(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (1994). 
30  See 42 USC § 10606 (b) (6) (1994). See AM Cellini ‘The proposed victims' rights amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States: Opening the door of the criminal justice system to the 
victim’ (1997) 14 Arizona J. Int'l and Comp. L. 839 854. 
31  See 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (b) (3) (1994). 
32  See 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (b) (4) (1994). 
33  See 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (b) (5) (1994). 
34  See 42 U.S.C. § 10606(a) which provides: ‘Officers employees of the Department of Justice 
and other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, 
investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that victims of crime 
are accorded the rights described in subsection (b) of this section.’ See Foote (n 24 above) 52. 
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providing for victim impact testimony in capital punishment hearings was enacted in 
1994.35 
 
4.3.1 Judicial Interpretation and the Constitutional Amendment Debate 
 
Under current legislation, while restitution has received wide coverage at federal and 
state levels, victim participation is limited to Victim Impact Statements at the 
sentencing stage. The President's Task Force recommended that the 6th amendment to 
the United States Constitution should be amended to guarantee victims participatory 
rights at all stages of the criminal judicial proceedings.36 This recommendation, which 
provoked opposition from various groups, is unlikely to be implemented at the federal 
level.37  
Arguments against constitutional entrenchment of victims’ rights at the federal 
level resonate with those opposed to the extension of participatory rights of victims 
beyond the current entitlement – victim impact statements. The reasoning behind this 
stand reflects how courts deal with victims’ issues today. The President’s Task Force 
had warned that making changes to the Sixth Amendment as proposed to allow victims 
to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings had the 
potential of unduly burdening or disrupting the criminal justice system.38 A number of 
commentators have subsequently endorsed this view, pointing to the potentially 
prejudicial effects of victim participation.39 Similarly, when the House and Senate 
versions of federal victims' rights amendments were introduced in April of 1996,40 
antagonists cautioned in rather alarmist terms against possible ‘staggering’ Court costs, 
                                                
35  See 18 USC § 3593 (1994). 
36  Roland (n 16 above) For an extensive analysis of the task force proposal, see LL Lamborn, 
‘Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: The Proposals for a Constitutional 
Amendment’ (1987) 34 Wayne LR 125, 172-200. The task force recommended that the sixth 
amendment be changed. Having recited defendants’ rights, it proposed to add …. ‘Likewise, 
the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be present and to be heard at all 
critical stages of judicial proceedings’. 
37  Dolliver criticised the proposal noting that it ‘is a bad idea whose time should never come’. See 
JM Dolliver ‘Victims' Rights Constitutional Amendment: A Bad Idea Whose Time Should Not 
Come’ (1987) 34 Wayne LR 87. 
38  Cellini (n 30 above) 866-867 citing Presidential Task Force 114-15. 
39  Dolliver (n 37 above) 90 noting that victim participation in a criminal proceeding ‘places the 
victim in direct conflict with the accused’ and is ‘less than fully civilized.’ See also Goddu (n 7 
above) 246 alluding to ‘potentially prejudicial role’ of victims in trials. 
40  See S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996); H.J. Res. 173, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996); H.J. Res. 174, 
104th Cong. § 2 (1996). 
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a ‘litigation debacle,’ and ‘distortion of the Courts [that] undermines impartiality, 
judicial administration and the rule of law to the risk of us all’.41 It is suggested that 
these concerns represent the issues that the ICC has to deal with when interpreting 
provisions relating to victims. The following two chapters consider this issue in some 
detail.  
The concerns alluded to above seem to have dictated the implementation of the 
restitution legislation and the treatment of the concerns of victims by United States 
Courts. The invocation by Courts of rules on standing to defeat the victim’s right to 
participate in the criminal justice process has been singled out as the main problem 
which necessitates constitutional entrenchment on the same footing as fair trial rights 
for defendants.42 Reviewing cases under the VWPA, Cellini observes that these 
decisions ‘are marked by invocation of a rigid formalism to avoid the ‘uncomfortable 
issues’ that might arise if a role for the victim in the criminal law process were to be 
recognized’.43 For example in United States v McVeigh,44 the presiding district Court 
judge ruled that victims or survivors of victims who chose to attend the trial 
proceedings or watch the closed circuit telecast of the trial would be barred from 
presenting victim impact statements at any subsequent sentencing hearing. When the 
victims and the National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA) sought to appear 
in the proceedings to assert their rights under relevant statutes45 to view trial 
proceedings whether or not they would testify as victim impact witnesses at 
sentencing, the district judge ruled that while victims may have certain rights under 
those statutes, they lacked standing to appear in the proceedings to assert those rights.46 
Cellini has criticised this ruling, noting that it represents ‘perhaps the most extreme 
                                                
41  Cellini (n 30 above) 866-867 citing the Proposed "Victims' Rights" Amendment, Hearing on 
H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174 Before the Judiciary Comm. of the United States House of 
Representatives, 104th Cong., 104-91 (1996) (written statement of Elisabeth A. Semel on 
behalf of the Nat'l Assn. of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
42  Cellini has stated in this regard that: […] despite extensive state and federal legislation 
authorizing victim participation at several stages of a criminal proceeding, victims continue to 
be ‘doubly victimised’ because they are denied any forum to protest a judicially decreed denial 
of their statutory rights…[w]hile treatment of the victim has generally improved, the victim's 
actual participation in the criminal justice process is still very limited. In spite of Congress' 
clear intent to assure restitution to the victim, awards of restitution continue to be problematic 
and a victim has no avenue for complaint. See Ibid 856; Dolliver (n 37 above) 82. 
43  Cellini (n 30 above) 857. 
44  United States v McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 1996). 
45  The Victims' Bill of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (b)(4) (1995) and the Closed Circuit Televised 
Proceedings for Victims Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 10608(a)(2) (1996). 
46  Cellini (n 30 above) 858. 
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manifestation of the judicial system’s hostility toward recognition of standing for 
crime victims’.47  
In a jurisdiction where private prosecutions are not recognised,48 the victim has 
limited possibilities of advancing his or her interests. Administrative and judicial 
procedures and extensive case precedent have over the years developed around the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of an accused offender.49 On the other hand, in the 
absence of specific mention of victims’ rights in the Bill of Rights, ‘no comparable 
body of law has developed for their protection’. Courts have instinctively applied the 
defendant’s familiar constitutional trump when claims to rights by victims (for 
instance to be present at trial proceedings) appear in any way to impact a fair trial for 
the defendant.50 Under these circumstances, victims can be left without any avenue of 
recourse. Although the Ninth Amendment guarantees ‘unenumerated rights,’ which 
may be thought to offer a footing for victims’ rights to participation absent a specific 
constitutional amendment,51 the attitude of the courts seems to indicate that victims are 
without any protected interest in the criminal process.52 
 
4.3.2 US and the ICC Victims’ Rights Regime 
 
While the United States experience may be of little relevance to the ICC, especially 
with respect to victim participation (limited at the federal level to Victim Impact 
Statements at the sentencing stage), it can inform the implementation of the Statute in 
various states party to the ICC. One main feature of the reforms undertaken in that 
country was extensive reparation programmes. Despite legal reforms, victims remain 
                                                
47  Cellini (n 30 above) 858. 
48  See JD Bessler ‘The public interest and the unconstitutionality of private prosecutions’ (1994) 
47 Arkansas LR 511; Linda R. S. v Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) in which the Supreme 
Court held that ‘a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 
nonprosecution of another,’ and that ‘a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the 
prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.’ 
For a critical review of this case, see AS Goldstein, ‘Defining the Role of the Victim in 
Criminal Prosecution’ (1982) 52 Mississippi L.J 515, 517. 
49  See constitutional amendments IV –VII. Const Amendment VI provides for rights relating to 
the trial: right to a speedy, public trial, by an impartial jury; to have notice of charges; to 
confront witnesses; and the right to an attorney. 
50  Cellini (n 30 above) 849. 
51  See generally TB McAffee ‘Federalism and the protection of rights: the modern ninth 
amendment’s spreading confusion’ Brigham Young Univ LR 351-388. 
52  Cellini (n 30 above) 849 notes that the result of the Courts’ attitude has been victims – most 
affected by a crime ‘can be denied even the access to the trial allowed the general public’. 
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dissatisfied in large part due to the susceptibility of their claims to constitutional 
attack. Experience shows that the rights of defendants, with an established 
constitutional tradition, have been used to override victims’ claims. The solution to 
this seems to be the elevate victims rights to participation to a constitutional footing.53 
Secondly, the United States experience demonstrates the difficulties – 
administrative, legal and otherwise – that may be occasioned by a shift, however 
slight, in the penal justice paradigm especially for countries where victims have 
traditionally played a very limited role. Even those with some level of recognition, are 
reminded of these challenges. Whatever avenue is chosen, states parties to the ICC will 
have to enhance existing mechanisms of victim involvement or institute new ones that 
approximate to the ICC standard.  
Thirdly, it illustrates that reforms to the penal systems that are aimed at 
genuinely improving the status of victims must receive appropriate legislative, 
including constitutional footing. Fourthly, it underscores the fact that innovative ways 
must be sought of generating money for victims’ funds that may be established at 
domestic level. Unfortunately, some of the facilities that are available to a national 
government such as taxation, targeted levies and fines are not available to the ICC.  
 
4.4 United Kingdom and Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
In general, the common law tradition is regarded as less victim-friendly than the civil 
law tradition.54 Of note is the fact that victims’ role in the criminal justice system is 
limited to that of witness, should they be called at all,55 with little or no participation 
beyond that.56 As is the case of the United States, a few common law countries allow 
for written Victim Impact Statements or victims’ statements of opinion at the 
sentencing stage and/or allow victims to be heard in parole hearings.57 As argued here, 
while it may not always be possible or advisable to involve victims, one can point to 
                                                
53  See Dolliver (n 37 above) 7. 
54  M Hekkila, (n 7 above) 46. 
55  Due to the adversarial nature of proceedings, victims could be summoned by either the 
prosecutor or the defence, who generally guide what such a victim says. See LN Henderson, 
‘The Wrongs of victims’ rights’ (1985) 37 Stanford LR 937-1021 1007. 
56  See PM Tobolwsky Crime victims and remedies  (2001) at 151 and 123-149 cited in Hekkila (n 
37 above) 46. 
57  Ibid, 47. 
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the complete exclusion of victims from plea bargaining arrangements that often 
involve reduction and acceptance of lesser sentences as a further illustration of the 
unresponsiveness of these systems to victims.58 From the United Kingdom example, 
one can sense a reluctance in common law countries to afford victims a greater say in 
criminal cases because of the  potentially ‘disruptive’ effects of such steps on the 
criminal justice system. Commentators attribute this to the emphasis on the separation 
between crime and tort. This is addressed further below.59  
The victim rights movement began in Britain in the early 1970s with the 
establishment of the Bristol Victims-Offenders’ Group out of which grew the National 
Victims Association (Victim Support) in 1973. Inspired by the United States 
movement, the developments in Britain, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Northern Ireland were soon replicated elsewhere in Europe, in particular in France 
and the Netherlands.60 Unlike the United States movement, which articulated its 
agenda in terms of ‘victims’ rights’ the movement in the United Kingdom, at least 
until the mid 1990s, focused on victim support. The focus on needs, rather than rights 
of victims changed in 1995 when Victim Support published a seminal report 
embodying a fundamental shift in strategy.61 At this time, victims’ issues had become 
increasingly topical and politicised due to interest from politicians and policy makers.62 
Criminal justice agencies began more fully to discuss victims.63 When the system 
began to engage seriously with the issues, it immediately became apparent that there 
was not much common ground. Many issues elicited divergence of opinion despite the 
                                                
58  Henderson (n 55 above) 981 notes that this can be problematic as a ‘victim who is not notified 
about a possible plea bargain, particularly one in which the defendant pleads to a lesser charge, 
may view the bargain as an invalidation of his or her experience.’  
59  See related discussion on civil law jurisdictions. 
60  On the history of the UK movement see generally B Williams Working with victims of crime: 
Policies, politics and practices (2000). 
61  See generally Victim Support The Rights of Victims of Crime (1995). 
62  See P Rock Constructing victims’ rights (2005) 263-330 discussing compensation and 
reparation in the United Kingdom. 
63  Rock (above) 7 attributes the new focus on victims issues in the United Kingdom to a number 
of factors, which resonate with the US experience: the unrelenting work of Victim Support 
within policy making circles; the dawning apprehensions about the dangers of alienating 
victims and witnesses from the criminal justice system; responses to international declarations 
on victims’ rights; the occupation by victims of crime of greater and salient positions within the 
criminal justice system; and discovery of  the suffering hitherto unrecognised groups of victims 
of rape, abuse (children) and domestic violence. 
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widespread agreement that something had to be done to ameliorate the status of 
victims.64 
 
4.4.1 The Right to Participate and Related Rights 
 
Vicims of crime have no locus standi in the criminal justice process and are not 
recognised as a party but may commence proceedings against a perpetrator as a private 
prosecutor.65 The role of the victim in the criminal process fetured prominently in most 
proposals for reforms. In its 1995 report, Victim Support elaborated the following 
rights as those it considered due to victims, partly in terms of already-existing law, and 
partly as proposals for reform: the right to provide and receive information; the rights 
to protection and compensation; and the rights to respect, recognition and support.66 
Given that these proposals were based on the assumed ‘exclusion’ of victims, it is 
notable that this report made no claim to the right of victims to be consulted and to 
participate in the system beyond their witness role.67  
With regard to access to information, in the United Kingdom as in a number of 
Western European jurisdictions, ‘practice guidelines’ require that the police and law 
enforcement officers at the first port of call inform victims of their rights, including the 
availability of compensation schemes.68 In practice, even such a right may be 
meaningless to victims. Brienen and Hoegan have remarked that ‘because the victim of 
crime has no locus standi in the criminal proceedings … there is very little procedural 
                                                
64  Rock (n 7 above) 248 has described this aptly: The position of the victim was ill-defined and 
contested in the mid 1990s. Who were eligible to be treated as victims was undecided. What 
their entitlement should be was undecided. How much encouragement should be given o their 
alleged demands was unresolved. Different segments of the criminal justice system were 
manifestly at odds about how best to respond, but they were in accord that it was imperative to 
exercise extraordinary caution whatever might be done. On the one hand, victims were taken to 
have expectations and demands that had to be met if the criminal justice system was to 
continue function. On the other hand, it was understood that an imprudent response would 
carry risks of victims becoming over mighty and upsetting the integrity of criminal justice’. 
65  M Brienen & E Hoegen Victims of crime in 22 European criminal justice systems (2000) 244 
66  Williams (n 60 above) 13. 
67  Ibid, 13; Rock (n 62 above) 9. 
68  For instance in Scotland, guidelines relating to how the police and lawyers deal with rape 
victims exist. Similar ‘Practice Directions’ issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions apply 
in Ireland. See M Joutsen ‘Listening to the victim: the victim’s role in European criminal 
justice systems’ (1987) 34 Wayne LR 95 104. 
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incentive to inform him of the developments in his case, unless he is required to testify 
as a witness.’69  
The use of Victim Impact Statements, widely in use in the United States, had 
been mooted in 1990 and piloted after 1996 as a new Victims’ Charter standard in 
various courts in the United Kingdom. Uncertainty over their precise aims, indecision 
by relevant authorities and opposition from lawyers and judges for their supposed 
‘disruptive’70 effects on the trial process prevented further implementation and 
prompted a change in approach. It was urged that the American model, primarily 
directed towards influencing sentencing, should be eschewed in favour of a model that 
does not expose the victim unnecessarily to trauma arising from exposure to an 
unfriendly courtroom situation.71 Uncertainty over whether victims should be allowed 
to make a statement at the beginning of the criminal process (thus directed towards 
providing information on a range of issues including victims’ needs) or towards the 
end (aimed at influencing sentencing), still linger.72 
Another element relevant to participation generally is plea-bargaining. This 
prosecutorial tool of common law provenance is used widely in the United States and 
United Kingdom.73 Commentators have lamented that, at the expense of victims, 
serious charges are dropped by the prosecution to avoid the expense of a trial, though 
they note that the matter seems to be a political one rather than one of prosecutorial 
discretion.74 At the international level plea bargaining entered the practice of two 
international tribunals – ICTR and ICTY – in the last few years, apparently as a 
necessary response to heavy case loads, the need to address complex crimes and 
dwindling resources.75 Plea bargaining raises a number of concerns seen within the 
context of the tribunals’ objectives: i) the rights and opportunity of victims to be 
                                                
69  M Brienen & E Hoegen (n 65 above) 285; Rock (n 62 above) 168. 
70  For a discussion of relevant case law, see Rock (n 62 above) 176-178. 
71  Rock (n 62 above) 175. 
72  Ibid 184-185. 
73  Williams (n 60 above) 108 
74  Ibid. See also S Lees (n 74 above). 
75  See A Tieger & M Shin ‘Plea agreements in the ICTY’ (2005) 3 J of International Criminal 
Justice 666-679. 
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heard;76 ii) the impact on the historical record; iii) the dismissal of charges; iv) equal 
treatment of offenders; and v) the reduction of sentences for increased efficiency.77  
Following concerns that the practice of nondisclosure by the prosecutor of the 
contents of these agreements had serious implications in the manner outlined, a new 
rule was added to the ICTY’s RPE providing that a Chamber ‘shall not be bound’ by a 
plea agreement and that the Chamber ‘shall require the disclosure of the agreement in 
open session or, on a showing of a good cause, in closed session’.78 No comparable 
provision exists in the ICC RPE. Should it become necessary to adopt such a rule, the 
ICC should draw from the relevant experience of national jurisdictions as well as the 
tribunals paying particular attention to victim-related concerns.  
 
4.4.2 Compensation and Reparations 
 
As in many European countries, a number of statutory reforms and policy changes 
were undertaken in Britain to address the concerns of victims in the criminal justice 
system.79 Before the 1995 proposals, the Home Office had issued a victim rights 
Charter in 1990 followed by another in 1996. Among the rights detailed in the first 
(unenforceable) instrument80 included the right to access to information on their cases, 
the right to seek compensation and a number of rights related to their presence in 
court.81 The 1996 Charter was formulated in imperative terms and at first glance 
seemed to go a little further. It was more detailed and explicit with respect to the four 
main obligations: provision of information; taking victims’ views into account; 
treating victims with respect and sensitivity in court; and providing emotional and 
                                                
76  Ibid, 674 arguing that since trials ‘are often viewed as the opportunity for the voice of the 
victims’, the absence of the trial process may be perceived as muting and disempowering 
victims’. 
77  Ibid, 667. 
78  Rule 62ter ICTY RPE. 
79  See generally P Rock Helping victims of crime (1990) cited in Cellini (n 30 above) 855 
(discussing the development of English and Welsh law and policy concerning victims); 
generally Rock (n 62 above). 
80  Although the Charter, which listed ‘guiding principles’, had some implications for police, 
prosecution and probation, action on their part was discretionary. On the Victims’ Charter, see 
Williams, 75-80; Rock (n 62 above) 155. 
81  See JO10368 RP2/93, cited in H Fenwick ‘Rights of Victims in the Criminal Justice System: 
Rhetoric or Reality?’ Criminal LR Nov 1995 843. Cellini ( n 30 above) 855. 
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practical support.82 However, with time, the language of rights associated with it was 
jettisoned. Rather, it became a mere ‘statement of standards’.83 In the end, the only 
right that victims could enforce within the system remained compensation (introduced 
in the 1970s), which received full legislative re-enactment in 1995.84  
 
4.4.3 Relevance of the United Kingdom Experience 
 
The dilemmas raised by victims’ concerns in the United Kingdom are not different 
from those, which engaged commentators and law reformers in the United States. 
Although the United Kingdom was ahead in Europe terms of championing victims’ 
concerns, closely following the United States experience, other European countries, 
notably of the civil law tradition, undertook far-reaching reform measures beyond 
victim support while the United Kingdom position remained largely unchanged. 
Consequently, victims’ rights in the United Kingdom, as in the United States, are still 
in the main limited to compensation, reparation and to limited rights to be informed. 
Secondly, as in the case of the United States, and as will be seen below the continental 
countries’ implementation of existing victims’ laws has been the main problem in the 
United Kingdom.85 State compensation of victims, which has been part of United 
Kingdom law since 1970s, has suffered due to budget cuts, and the diversion of funds 
into punishment and law enforcement (policing).86 However, apart from being the first 
European country to introduce state compensation, it has the most extensive scheme in 
Europe87 despite problems in implementation.88 Thirdly, the United Kingdom criminal 
justice system has remained largely offender-oriented, finding it difficult to 
accommodate victims. While victims’ concerns are no longer on the back burner, one 
commentator has observed that ‘the boundaries of their role and identity … [have 
                                                
82  Rock (n 62 above) 157. 
83  Ibid160 describing the discomfort of both defence and victims’ lawyers, in attributing the term 
‘rights’ to an instrument which promised much but delivered little in terms of hard enforceable 
entitlements. 
84  Criminal Justice Compensation Act, 1995, ch. 53 (Eng.); see also DS Greer, ‘A Transatlantic 
Perspective on the Compensation of Crime Victims in the United States’ (1994) 85 J of Crim L 
and Criminology 333, 335-36 (describing the British scheme for victim compensation). 
85  See Williams (n 60 above) 14-16. 
86  Ibid 15. 
87  Brienen & Hoegan (n 65 above) 244. 
88  S 104 Criminal Justice Act, 1988; Williams (n 60 above) 15; See also D Moxon, ‘Use of 
compensation orders in Magistrates’ Courts’ Research Bulletin 25, Home Office. 
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been] closely patrolled by lawyers and judges and those responsible for mounting trials 
who … [are] mindful of the precarious equilibrium of the criminal hearing and their 
duty to preserve the defendant’s rights in particular.’89 Finally, confidentiality issues, 
in particular the privacy rights of defendants, often get in the way of the right of 
victims to be informed.90 
 
4.5   Civil Law Tradition: France and Continental Europe 
 
While one cannot be prescriptive as to a ‘model’ domestic victims’ regime,91 in a 
number of respects the French criminal justice system, among a select group of civil 
law countries in Europe, may be considered one of the most progressive in its 
responsiveness to the concerns of victims. Victims have enjoyed an elevated status in 
the penal system since campaigns for reforms in the 1970s culminated into legislative 
enactments in 1981 and in subsequent years.92 It is perhaps not surprising that the 
initiative to include specific victims’ rights within the ICC were spearheaded by the 
governments of France and the United Kingdom during the preparatory talks for the 
adoption of the ICC and at the Rome Conference.93 For this reason alone, an 
understanding of the French penal system, and similar civil law experiences,94 despite 
certain limitations,95 is essential to the discussions relating to the implementation of at 
least some of the provisions in the ICC victims’ regime.  
                                                
89  Rock (n 62 above) 213. 
90  Ibid, 214. 
91  Joutsen (n 68 above) 95. Civil law countries have long provided for victim participation in 
criminal proceedings in partie civile proceedings and to make claims for restitution and 
compensation. See generally M Joutsen, ‘Alternatives in providing justice for victims: the 
European Experience’ in MC Bassiouni (ed) International Protection of Victims 7 Nouvelles 
Etudes penales (1988) 385-392. 
92   A number of that introduced amendments to the Penal Code include: Loi du 2 févr. 1981; Loi 
du 8 juillet 1983; Loi du 15 juin 2000 and Loi du 9 mars 2004. 
93  See French Proposal to Preparatory Committee charge of elaborating the Statute (1996); K 
Bonneau, Permanent delegate of the International Federation of Human Rights’ Leagues before 
the ICC, address at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies. 
94  Certain former Eastern Bloc (socialist) countries and some in Western Europe such as Austria 
and Germany have, in some respects advanced provisions on specific areas of victim concerns. 
See discussion of the German experience in Brienen & Hoegan (n 69 above) 353-388. 
95  The ICC victim’s regime does not duplicate any national criminal system, and is not 
comparable, at least in material scope, even to the most progressive national criminal justice 
systems where victims rights are recognised. 
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The victims’ regime in the French penal system, as is the case in a number of 
other continental systems, affords victims of crime five distinct rights: (1) the right to 
file a complaint; (2) the right to initiate prosecution; (3) the right to participate and be 
heard as a party in any prosecution; (4) the right to attach a claim for civil damages to 
the prosecution, the partie civile; and (5) the right to be informed.96 Varying 
combinations of these rights are enjoyed by victims in other continental European 
countries.97 
 
4.5.1 The Right to File a Complaint  
 
Continental systems generally grant victims the right to file a complaint. In France, it 
may be plainte simple, raising only issues of criminal responsibility or plainte avec 
constitution de partie civile that combines a criminal complaint and a civil claim.98 
Such complaint may be deposited at any police station or gendarmerie, irrespective of 
where the infringement occurred. The police then transmit the complaint and any 
further information from a subsequent investigation to the public prosecutor who can 
shelve it or charge the alleged perpetrator before a competent tribunal.99 In the ICC, 
victims have no such right, although they may send information to the Prosecutor, as 
they have done in the past, relating to alleged violations with which the Court is 
concerned.100 Such victim involvement nevertheless falls outside the ambit of victim 
participation, which is subject to provisions of the Statute, notably Article 68.101 
 
                                                
96  See generally R Frase, Introduction to the French code of criminal procedure (1988) 1-40 (G. 
Kock and R. Frase trans. 1988) 20-21 (discussing rights of civil party injured by commission of 
a crime); Campbell, ‘A Comparative Study of Victim Compensation Procedures in France and 
the United States: A Modest Proposal’ (1980) 3 Hastings Int’l and Comp LR (describing 
French procedure (action civile) by which a party may institute a civil suit against a defendant 
in criminal Court); Pugh, Ruminations Re Reform of American Criminal Justice (Especially 
Our Guilty Plea System): Reflections Derived From a Study of the French System, (1976) 36 
Los Angeles LR 947 (1976) at 965-66 (commenting on civil party's occasional domination of 
state interest in prosecution, and noting that French appellate Courts spend approximately 20% 
of their time on civil aspects of such "mixed" cases). 
97  For a discussion of various experiences, see generally Brienen & Hoegan (n 65 above). 
98  On constitution de partie civile see S Guinchard & J Buisson Procédure Pénale (3e éd)  (2005)  
99  See Ministère de la justice, 2003 ‘Les droits des victimes’ 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publicat/dvictimes1.htm> (Accessed on 24 November 2006). 
100  See ICC Booklet on Victim Participation at 12. 
101  ICC Booklet Victims before the International Criminal Court: A guide for the participation of 
victims in the proceedings of the Court’  (2006) at (ICC Booklet on Victim Participation) at 12 
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4.5.2 The Right to Initiate a Prosecution 
 
The right of victims to initiate a prosecution or to appeal to a Court if a prosecution is 
not forthcoming allows victims to commence proceedings where the prosecutor is 
unwilling to do so.102 This is also the case in the Netherlands.103 If the public 
prosecutor has chosen not to begin criminal proceedings against an accused, the crime 
victim may also institute an action civile for damages before a criminal tribunal, 
thereby forcing the Court to conduct the criminal inquiry as well.104 As such, it is a 
countermeasure to abusive exercise of prosecutorial discretion. However, studies show 
that victims, at least in France, use this procedure infrequently. 105 Some reasons why 
this is so have been advanced. Frase notes that the very existence of the procedure is 
‘highly successful in goading prosecutors to file charges.’ Additionally, victims are 
dissuaded from initiating prosecutions because of existing measures intended ‘to 
prevent frivolous charges.’ These include the requirement that victims post a bond and 
the further risk that they might be required to pay costs and damages.106  
The ICC does not provide for victim-initiated prosecution. Victims may only 
participate once the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation, triggered by the reference 
of a situation to the Court by the Security Council such as the case of Darfur,107 by a 
state party to the ICC including self-referral108 or pursuant to proceedings commenced 
by the Prosecutor proprio motu.109 Even if victims were allowed to initiate a 
prosecution before the ICC, giving effect to their rights in this manner would require a 
Court enabled to actively participate in an investigation such as that found in the 
                                                
102  Se S Frase, ‘Comparative criminal justice as a guide to American law reform: how do the 
French do it, how can we find out, and why should we care?’ (1990) 78 California LR 539 669. 
103  This may be achieved through an appeal to Court. See Brienen & Hoegan (n 65 above) at  
104  Cellini (n 30 above) 844; DP Kelly ‘Victims’ (1986) 34 Wayne LR 69 76; Cardenas, ‘The 
crime victim in the prosecutorial process’ (1986) 9 Harvard J.L and Pub Pol. 385. 
105  The risk of being held liable to pay costs and damages, together with the requirement that 
victims post a bond consignation to be set by the judge have been deterrent factors. See RS 
Frase, French System at 20-21; Guinchard & Buisson, Procedure Penal (2005) 703-704. 
106  The risk of being held liable to pay costs and damages, together with the requirement that 
victims post a bond consignation to be set by the judge have been deterrent factors. Guinchard 
& Buisson , Ibid, 703-704; Frase, French System at 20-21. 
107  Art 16 Rome Statute. 
108  Art Rome Statute. While the first situations before the Court have arisen from states referring 
themselves, or rather relevant situations on their own territories, this was not envisaged under 
the Statute. Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR) and the DRC are cases in point. 
109  Arts 15 and 53 Rome Statute. See D Sarooshi, ‘Prosecutorial policy and the ICC: Prosecutor’s 
Proprio motu action or denial?’ (2004) 2 J of International Criminal Justice 940-943. 
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French and civil law inquisitorial systems generally. However, as discussed later, 
prosecutorial discretion of the ICC Prosecutor is limited. Apart from the requirement 
that the interests of victims have to be taken into consideration in his/her work, the 
Prosecutor’s decisions are subject to judicial approval and review, notably by the Pre-
Trial Chamber, which may legally refuse to confirm charges brought against a 
person.110 Despite this, however, it is unlikely that the Court would direct the 
Prosecutor to investigate or charge a specific person.111 
 
4.5.3 The Right to Participate in Criminal Proceedings 
 
This right is of particular relevance to the ICC regime. Under French criminal 
procedure, the victim has the right to participate and to be heard through counsel in the 
prosecution of the criminal charge.112 Once a victim applies through the constitution de 
partie civile to be joined to the criminal proceedings in order to articulate his or her 
interests, including restitution, she/he becomes a party in the process.113 The role of 
participating victim being incompatible with that of witness, once a victim becomes a 
party to the proceedings they can no longer serve in the capacity of witness.114 Unlike 
under the procedure of most continental systems notably the German and the French, 
in the Netherlands the victim is not considered a party to the criminal proceedings but 
has the right, as under the Rome Statute,115 to be represented by an attorney during the 
proceedings116 and to have access, subject to conditions, to the record of the case.117  
The incompatibility of victim and witness roles may apply to the ICC, before 
which those who have been granted the right to participate in terms of the Statute can 
through counsel address the Court in their own right.118 While the right to participate in 
criminal proceedings has been comparatively narrower, and still is, in domestic 
                                                
110  See for instance art 17 (d) where the Court may refuse to admit a case ‘where [it] not of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’. 
111  The practice of the ad hoc tribunals as well as the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, support this view. 
112  Cellini (n 30 above) 844. See also RS. Frase (n 102 above) 669-70. 
113  See G Stefani, G Levasseur & B Bouloc Procédure Pénale (19th ed) 283. 
114  Arts 335 and 336 Fr. CPP. 
115  Rome Statute and REP. 
116  See Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure art. 12f-1. 
117  See ibid art. 12f-2. 
118  ICC Booklet ICC Booklet on Victim Participation (n 12 above) 13. 
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jurisdictions that provide for it,119 even after the establishment of the ICC, a recent 
amendment in French law approximates the ICC regime on participation which grants 
victims the right to participate at all stages of the proceedings.120 Although victims 
have long enjoyed an enhanced role in the criminal justice system, the amendment, 
which follows the ratification of the Rome Statute, constitutes the first specific legal 
affirmation of the guarantee of victims’ rights in that country.121 I t enunciates that ‘the 
judicial authorities oversee the information and the guarantee of the rights of victims 
during the entire penal process.122 This provision captures the essence of Article 68 (3) 
of the Rome Statute, which guarantees the right to participate but subjects it to judicial 
determination of appropriateness.123   
 
4.5.4 The Right to Restitution and Compensation 
 
As a substantive right, the right to restitution, or some form of material recompense to 
victims, has been central to penal system reforms in the countries under study. In 
France, as in the other countries of Western Europe and former Eastern Bloc countries, 
victims are assured the right to restitution, or in some cases state compensation. The 
French penal code establishes the right to civil action (action civile) for victims who 
have suffered direct injury caused by the commission of a crime.124 It establishes which 
right can be exercised before the criminal court (as partie civile, in which victims can 
bring a civil claim for restitution within a criminal proceeding)125 or separately before a 
civil court.126  
In the countries where partie civile or ‘adhesion’ proceedings are possible, 
such as France, Austria and Germany, the dichotomy between the two bodies of law is 
less pronounced. Cellini suggests that this is so because ‘no conflict is thought to exist 
                                                
119  For most, it is limited to Victim Impact Statements at the sentencing stage. The most 
progressive states such, including France before the amendment limited participation to the 
prosecution but with broader rights to information. 
120  Trial Chamber I Decision on Applications for Participation, n 45 above. 
121  Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 536. 
122  Art 1 Fr. CPP introduced by Loi du 9 mars 2004 
123  See Chapter 3; Trial Chamber I Decision on Applications for Participation, note 45 above. 
124  Art 2 Fr. Code de Procédure Pénal (Fr. CPP); Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 536. 
125  Art 3 Fr CPP; Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 536. 
126  Art 4 Fr. CPP; Cellini (n 30 above) 843; J Larguier ‘The Civil Action for Damages in French 
Criminal Procedure’ 39 (1965) Tulane LR 687 cited in Cellini (n 30 above) 843. 
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between the victim's and state’s interests.’127 This thesis argues that despite this, there 
will be moments when these interests will clash, or rather be at odds with each other 
within a specific proceeding, and that this clash will require balancing. Further, such 
‘merger’ of proceedings that reconciles civil law and criminal law, to achieve what 
Guinchard and Buisson refer to as l’unité du procès civil et penal,128 does not eliminate 
the debate on the civil law-criminal law dichotomy. This debate raises important 
questions on the functioning of the ICC, given that it brings together countries that 
generally adopt two different approaches to the question.  
While countries of the civil law tradition generally tend to downplay the 
dichotomy, therefore collapsing into one proceeding the interests of the state (the 
raison d'être of criminal law) and those of an individual (the concern of civil law), the 
distinction is pronounced for common law countries. In responding to the difficulty of 
defining criminal law as distinguished from civil law (tort or delict), Kenny, focusing 
on procedure, has argued convincingly that the only proper criterion of distinction is 
the degree of control exercised by the state over the proceedings. 129 Thus even in the 
case where victims have a right to a civil action within the process, this procedure 
remains auxiliary. Guinchard and Buisson note with respect to France, which comment 
applies to similarly placed civil law jurisdictions, that ‘in the logic of our procedure, 
the victim retains a secondary role to the prosecutor’.130 Likewise, the Prosecutor of the 
ICC exercises general control of proceedings subject to review by the Chambers. This 
issue is revisited later. 
For the ICC, the question is how the reparations component will be most 
effectively and appropriately implemented, whether within or alongside the criminal 
proceedings which have a longer pedigree in ICL. By including the adjudication of 
reparations (restitution and other forms) in a criminal Court, the Rome Statute seems 
to imitate the French and many civil law jurisdictions, which as already noted 
                                                
127  Cellini (n 30 above) 847. 
128  Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 537. 
129  Kenny Outlines of criminal law (15th ed) 1951 discounts the use of various criteria:(i) the 
degree of activity manifested by the state in the two types of proceedings (arguing that 
although the ‘contrast is a genuine and a vivid one’ it was incapable of being applied with 
precision); (ii) both criminal and civil cases may be heard by the same Courts; (iii) the object of 
the proceedings (arguing that while punishment is always the object of criminal proceedings, 
the award of civil damages in civil proceedings is equally punitive; (iv) while criminal 
sanctions never enriched any individual, it was not true to say that all civil actions do. 
130  Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 538. 
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generally disregard or downplay the criminal law/civil law distinction, at least with 
respect to civil claims associated with the commission of a crime. As noted in the 
discussion below, even in this case, victims still retain the option to pursue damages in 
separate civil proceedings. The constitutional amendment debate in the United States 
discussed above illustrates the presumed ‘incompatibility’ of the bodies of law. 
Among other reasons, fair trial guarantees have been deployed to preserve these ‘neat’ 
categories of law, which without doubt employ different standards in a number of 
respects.131 However, is this a well-founded presumption? What are the benefits to 
victims, and to the administration of justice, of merging the two into one institution 
thereby adopting a restorative justice paradigm for criminal law? Conversely, what are 
the disadvantages? While some of these questions are already addressed in the 
discussion on the United States victims’ regime, in particular with respect to the 
proposed constitutional amendment to entrench victims’ rights alongside fair trial 
guarantees, here, the discussion is taken further by examining how Courts in civil law 
jurisdictions deal with the question. This is of particular pertinence to the ICC. 
The joinder of civil claims to penal proceedings presents a number of positives. 
First, by permitting victims to be party to the prosecution, albeit in an auxiliary 
prosecutorial role, it not only empowers them but also offers them a measure of 
retribution while allowing them to obtain damages faster than would be possible 
before a civil jurisdiction. This allows for economy and maximisation of judicial and 
administrative resources.132 This can be cheaper for the victim as court costs are lower 
than for a separate civil claim and the results of the official investigation are available 
for use in documenting the victim’s claim. The burden to prove the case is removed 
from the victim.133  
Secondly, the fact that one court adjudicates both civil and criminal 
proceedings assured consistency in court decisions.134 Thirdly, the victim may be able 
to learn facts, and gain access to information that the court can obtain through the 
coercive mechanisms at its disposal, which would otherwise remain undisclosed in a 
                                                
131  Apart from the parties to a civil case which differ from those in a traditional criminal case, the 
two bodies have different standards relating to proof, the strict requirement for intent (mens rea 
for crimes). See JC Smith & B Hogan Criminal Law (6th ed) (1988)17-24. 
132  Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 703; Joutsen (n 68 above) 116. 
133  Frase (n 102 above) 670; Joutsen (n 68 above) 116. 
134  M Joutsen (n 68 above) 116. 
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civil setting. This has the potential of facilitating closure and the healing of the 
victim.135 Fourthly, as already noted, where constitution de partie civile is available, it 
militates against prosecutorial inaction by compelling the institution of charges. 
Fifthly, considering criminal and civil liability together endorses the fight against 
impunity through deterrence. At this level, as well as for the ICC, the centrality of 
victims in proceedings, and in particular a reparative policy, is in keeping with the 
comprehensive view of justice. This approach, as reflected in the initial fears that 
incorporating reparations within an essentially criminal tribunal is bad for an 
international criminal tribunal, is not without its critics, who have been vehement in 
their disapproval.  
First, for this system to work, it requires a good measure of knowledge of 
procedure and enterprise by the victim. Given that victims are generally not well 
versed in such matters, fears that this may slow down and delay the criminal process, 
with the resultant infringement of defendants’ rights to a speedy trial, are not 
unfounded. Within the ICC, the fact that some victims will come from countries where 
the very concept of participation in a capacity other than that of witness is alien does 
not help matters.136  
Secondly, some have argued that joinder of proceedings may unnecessarily 
complicate the process. For instance, in Germany and Austria where these objections 
are emphasised, studies show that this procedure is infrequently used.137 Complications 
and delays could be attributed to at least two factors: i) civil and criminal proceedings 
require different tests and standards in the assessment of liability; and ii) assessment of 
damages is often a long and complex process.138 While the requirement for the 
knowledge of procedure may be addressed in the ICC by the provision of counsel for 
participating victims, the other elements still present concerns.  
                                                
135  Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 703 
136  In the Lubanga case currently before the ICC, the fact that the country of the accused, as well 
as the victims recognises this concept has made it easier for them to request to be joined to the 
criminal proceedings. The legal tradition of counsel will certainly be a factor. 
137  Joutsen (n 68 above) 116 citing Riess ‘Die Rechtsstellung des Verletzen im Strafverfahren’ in 
Gutachten C Fur Den 55 Deutschen Juristentag (Munich 1984) C35-38. 
138  Larguier (n 126 above) 688 records that ‘… French appellate Courts, passing upon penal 
proceedings must devote approximately seventy per cent of their time to resolving civil 
questions’.
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If direct participation, at least for those who are granted permission to do so, 
has benefits beyond the possibility of presenting one’s concerns that may impact the 
trial, this unique opportunity is available through legal representation. It may be 
advisable that the determination of reparations be made in an associated proceeding 
after the criminal prosecution is finished, which would make the civil proceeding a 
mere formality especially where there has been a conviction. Initial indications are that 
this may be the approach of the Court.139  
Thirdly, in terms of the adage that ‘no-one can be a witness in their own cause’ 
once a victim becomes a party to proceedings, he or she is barred, in countries with 
partie civile or adhesion procedures, from serving as witness in the same case.140 
Further, when they initiate a prosecution and the case is dismissed, such victim may be 
subject to two adverse procedures: i) they may be arraigned by the prosecutor before a 
‘correctional tribunal’ (tribunal correctionnel) for abuse of procedure and liable to pay 
damages (amende civile);141 and ii) they may be pursued by the person wrongly or 
maliciously accused and could be liable to pay damages.142 Since the ICC does not 
provide for victim-initiated prosecutions, this will not arise. Furthermore, the Court, by 
applying relevant tests, will only admit deserving victims to join as parties. As seen in 
chapter five, it is notable that there is nothing in the Rome Statute or RPE that prevents 
a participating victim from serving as witness in the same case. 
Fourthly, making the civil claim ancillary to the main criminal proceedings 
means that the civil claim, which may be all that victims want or deserve, may not 
receive full attention from the Court.143 As emerges from the discussion in chapter five, 
current debates on the ICC reflect that little or no space has been accorded to issues 
relating to reparations by commentators who are more familiar, or perhaps more 
comfortable with, traditional international criminal justice issues. Adhesion or partie 
civile procedure works satisfactorily in jurisdictions where it has been instituted.144 
                                                
139  See ICC Booklet on Victim Participation (n 12 above) 11 on ‘stages of proceedings’. 
140  Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 703. 
141  Arts 91(1) and 177(2) Fr. CPP; Guinchard & Buisson (n 105 above) 703. 
142  Ibid, 716-719. 
143  Joutsen (n 68 above) 117. 
144  This applies widely in Nordic and Eastern European countries. See Joutsen (n 68 above) 117 
citing Eser, ‘Die Rechtsstellung des Beschudigten und das Verletzten im Strafprozesscht de 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in H Jescheck, G Kaiser and A Eser (eds) Zweites Deutsch-
Sowjetischeskolloquium Uber Strafrecht und Kriminologie (1984) 218 at 225. 
 117 
Contrary to negative assessments, Cardenas notes with respect to France that ‘there are 
no reports of disruption or delay in the efficiency of the prosecutorial system’.145  
 
4.5.5 The Right to Be Informed 
 
The difficulty of obtaining information has been the main problem for victims who 
want to assert their rights in the criminal justice process.146 Yet, this procedural right is 
central to the entire victim rights regime. Among other things, procedural information 
is important for the victim to know how to enforce their rights-what they can do, when 
and how. Equally, in a proceeding still largely controlled by the prosecutor, the victim 
may want to know what actions have been taken. For instance, it is absolutely 
essential, as the law recognises, for the victim to be informed when the prosecutor 
decides not to press charges, in order to allow the victim to pursue other available 
avenues of recourse.147 The victim may want to conduct a private prosecution or cause 
the Court to open an inquiry or he or she may want to commence civil proceedings for 
damages. As noted already, for victims of international crimes, the ICC does not 
proffer an option as to choice of proceedings at the international level. However, 
depending on where an ICC-related prosecution is conducted nationally, victims would 
have more options than that on offer at the ICC itself, such as those outlined in the 
preceding sections.148  
In France, Germany, Netherlands and a number of Eastern European countries, 
as the entry point to the justice system, the police are required to inform victims of 
their rights and their role in the criminal justice process. This duty falls on the 
prosecuting authorities when the prosecutor chooses not to prefer charges.149 In some 
countries, the law requires that the victim be informed of the possibility of filing a civil 
                                                
145  Cardenas (n 104 above) 385. 
146  Joutsen (n 68 above) 102. 
147  Ibid 105; French Code of Crim Proc. Arts 88, 420-421. 
148  See section on complementarity. 
149  Joutsen (n 68 above) 103 discussing the various mechanisms of implementing the right, 
entailing either legislation (as the case of Eastern Europe) or Ministry of Justice ‘guidelines’ or 
‘practice rules’ for those involved in law enforcement in Western European countries such as 
France, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Netherlands. 
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claim when this happens.150 In the case of the ICC this duty falls, at different stages of 
proceedings, on different authorities. The Prosecutor, as the custodian of all 
information and evidence,151 must for instance inform victims should a decision be 
made not to proceed with an investigation.152 The Registrar, who is the main channel of 
communication of the Court and heads the Victims Participation and Reparations 
Section (VPRS), has the responsibility of informing victims of their rights relating to 
participation and reparations. The Registrar is required to assist victims in obtaining 
legal representation and to provide their counsel with adequate support, information 
and facilities necessary for the performance of their duties and protection of their 
rights during all stages of the proceedings.153 Naturally, the victims’ counsel also bears 
the duty to keep victims informed.154  
The right to be informed extends beyond the institution of charges. Most 
jurisdictions have instituted the right to be informed on the progress of the case155 and 
the right to access and review documentation relating to the case. Because of 
complexities in procedure, countries such as Germany provide for the right to legal 
counsel during the criminal process.156 In a number of European countries, parties to a 
trial, including prosecutor and partie civile, have a general right to review official 
documentation.157 A number of important questions are raised in this regard with 
respect to the ICC. First is whether the right of victims to be informed would extend to 
the investigation stage of the proceedings when the Prosecutor is yet to decide who to 
charge with what crimes. Secondly, in view of the classification of matters that may be 
considered by the Court – into situation and case158 with two resultant categories of 
victims, i.e. victims of the situation and victims of the case,159 – do both classes of 
victims enjoy this right, and what does it entail? 
                                                
150  See for instance Code of Judicial Procedure ch 22, s 2(2) (1969), Sweden; Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, s 365 (1975) and Jutsen, 104. 
151  Rule 10 ICC RPE. 
152  Art 15 Rome Statute; See chapter three. 
153  Rule 16 (1) ICC RPE. 
154  Rule 13 ICC RPE; also ICC Booklet on Victim Participation at 13. 
155  Germany, France, Austria; Stefani et al (n 113 above) 284. 
156  Germ. Code of Crim Proc 395-397a (1987). 
157  Joutsen (n 68 above) 106. See for instance Fr. Code of Crim Proc. art 118(3) (1957); Aus. Code 
of Crim Proc. s 47(2); Neth. Code of Crim Proc art 333 (2). 
158  ICC recent case on victim participation. 
159  See Trial Chamber I Decision on Applications for Participation; ICC Booklet on Victim 
participation (n 12 above) 19. 
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Because law enforcement officers often find reasons not to disclose 
information, it is important to have this right, especially to access relevant 
documentation, enacted by law. Even for ICC, the prosecutor may not want to divulge 
certain information due to the fear that it may tamper with investigations, expose 
witnesses to danger or generally throw a wrench in the prosecution’s strategy. While 
justice by ambush is not encouraged, there are certain things the prosecutor may 
legitimately want to keep secret or expose to a limited number of people before trial 
that disclosure to victims (reading the file) does not assure. 
 
4.6   National Courts and the Question of Complementarity 
 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national criminal justice systems. This 
means that the ICC has a subsidiary role vis-à-vis relevant national criminal processes 
– investigations or prosecution of an accused160 – and will only assume jurisdiction 
where ‘the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out [an] investigation or 
prosecution’161 The Prosecutor’s policy on prosecution, in particular choice of 
situations to investigate, is organised in part around this key principle’.162  
The key question for the purposes of this thesis is this: is a discussion on 
complementarity relevant when considering victim participation and reparations given 
that presumably, that victims will only appear before the ICC when there is a criminal 
prosecution before it? The assumption is that there will be no inquiry into victims’ 
concerns, in particular into any reparations that may be ordered independent of a 
criminal prosecution. This view finds support in at least two related but distinct 
realities. 
 First, given the decidedly auxiliary character of reparations proceedings, it is 
unlikely that victims who are not associated with a case before the Court will benefit 
from reparations. Secondly, the very nature of the complementary relationship 
between the ICC and national systems is defined in terms ‘investigation and 
                                                
160  D Sarooshi (n 109 above) 940. 
161  Art 17 (a) Rome Statute. 
162  See ‘Paper on some policy issues before the ICC’ at http:/www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905-Policy-Paper.pdf (accessed on 23 November 2006). See also 
Sarooshi (n 109 above) 940. 
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prosecution.’ No mention of victims is made in this context.163 In effect, the object of 
the complementarity facility is acknowledged to be ‘the encouragement of prosecution 
of persons accused of crimes … in as many states’ domestic legal systems as 
possible’.164 Accordingly, there must be recognition of the fact that the ICC, while an 
important cog in the system of international criminal justice, is not a panacea to its 
problems, especially those related to justice for victims. Domestic systems will have  
to deal with the bulk of victims and must be so enabled. While there is room to argue 
that failure to address victims’ concerns in an investigation or prosecution in terms of 
Article 17 admissibility criteria (with the result that proceedings are considered a 
sham) could amount to failure by the state thereby engaging ICC jurisdiction, it is 
highly unlikely that a domestic process could be disregarded solely for this reason.  
One striking feature of the states that have so far adopted ICC-related 
legislation is that focus has been on providing a framework for the prosecution of ICC 
crimes and cooperation with the Court. They generally do not make provision for 
victim-related concerns, in particular reparations, which as stated are as much a 
novelty at the international level as they are alien to most domestic systems. 
Presumably, their existing frameworks (assuming that they have them) for victim 
participation and reparations apply in the absence of new enactment.165 Most domestic 
frameworks remain inadequate in comparison to the ICC victims’ regime.166  
In view of the above, there are a number of scenarios, some of which are 
already playing out in the current practice of the ICC, that necessitate a discussion on 
the intercourse between the ICC and national criminal justice systems from a victim’s 
vantage point: i) what happens to victims when a state refers itself, or rather a situation 
on its territory, to the ICC? (At first blush, the temptation is to assume that the state 
has presumably divested itself of all responsibility to address victims’ concerns); ii) a 
given situation may give rise to a number of cases before the ICC, alternatively before 
the ICC and domestic tribunals; iv) the prosecution may take place in a state other than 
                                                
163  Art 17 Rome Statute. 
164  Sarooshi (n 109 above) 940-941. See also ICC Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on ‘the 
complementarity nature of the ICC’, 177. 
165  See in the case of South Africa Rome Statute Act, 2000; Kenyan International Crimes Bill 
2008 and Senegal’s Loi Nº 2007-05 du 12 février 2007. See however, Canadian Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) which establishes a fund for victims (s 30). 
166  Some countries, such as France have adjusted domestic legislation (2004 amendment to CPP) 
to conform with the ICC on the question of victims. 
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that of victims’ nationality; iv) if reparations proceedings depend on successful 
prosecution of an alleged perpetrator, questions may arise when such perpetrator is 
acquitted, say on a technicality, with the distinct possibility that he or she will not be 
prosecuted again elsewhere or be released before commencement of trial on 
adjudication of a Pre-trial Chamber that ‘the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify 
further action by the Court.’167  
 
4.7   Locating Domestic Law and Practice in the ICC 
 
The Statute prescribes the extent to which the ICC may rely on national law and 
practice. Yet, the Statute seems to relegate domestic law to a subsidiary role. For this 
reason alone, it may appear that the lessons the ICC may draw from domestic 
experience are limited, given that this source of law is only of subsidiary rank.168 It was 
argued that given the lack of jurisprudence on many aspects of the victims’ regime any 
available resource that may inform its interpretation would be used by the Court. This 
makes domestic experience relevant, especially those that reflect in varying degrees 
fundamentals of the new victims’ regime.  
There is no single national regime that may be considered a model of victim 
rights, though certain countries from the civil law tradition were singled out as being 
particularly progressive and informative. The ICC will have to consider what lessons it 
may extract from these experiences in interpreting the right to participation and to 
reparations in the Rome Statute. The fact that the ICC, like the ad hoc tribunals, is a 
‘mixed’ tribunal, uniting elements of both adversarial and inquisitorial legal traditions 
should make it easier to draw on these lessons. 
In all the countries sampled – the United States, United Kingdom as well as the 
continental European countries – various laws have bestowed upon victims, in varying 
degrees, various procedural rights as well as the right to restitution and 
compensation.169 Procedural rights include the right to participate at various stages of 
the criminal process, to be kept informed by the prosecuting authorities of 
                                                
167  Art 17 (1)(d) Rome Statute. 
168  See Trial Chamber I Decision on Applications for Participation. 
169  M Groenhuijsen ‘Victim’s rights ad restorative justice: piecemeal reform of the criminal justice 
system or a change of paradigm? in H Kaptein & M Kaptein (eds) Crime, Victims and Justice: 
Essays on Principles and Practice (2004) 63-79 at 63 for an overview of these developments. 
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developments in the case, supplying information to the prosecutor beyond witness 
roles. Other non-procedural rights include the right to consult and be represented by 
counsel in the case, and that to increased protection, in due consideration of security 
and privacy. Since these issues seem to be a summation of the concerns expressed in 
the Rome Statute regarding victims, the chapter concluded that challenges associated 
with their implementation in the countries under discussion are instructive for the ICC. 
Contrary to the seemingly inflexible view taken by those opposed to victim-
centric criminal justice systems, it was noted that successful inclusion of victims in the 
criminal proceedings of civil law systems, and some surviving instances of the private 
prosecutor concept in common law criminal proceedings, reveal that victim 
participation can be achieved without disruptive results or compromising of the goals 
of the criminal justice system.170  
This chapter also identified reasons that have prevented victims from fully 
benefiting from reforms. Among these, two stand out: the implementation of the 
reforms in place; and the ascertainment of the precise theoretical nature of the 
reforms.171 Both issues are absolutely crucial to the ICC. Given that the Statute is 
drafted in broad terms, requiring in one instance that the Court ‘develop principles’ in 
particular in respect of reparations, the Court must take a leading role in its 
implementation. Quite clearly, given that the Prosecutor may be driven by a singular 
objective – that of law enforcement, with the consequence that the concerns of may be 
disregarded – the Court must take seriously the role of custodian of victims’ that it has 
in terms of the Statute. 
 
                                                
170  Cellini (n 30 above) 867; in the case of the US where even the introduction of victim impact 
statements were opposed at introduction but have since been successfully applied, see GA Fait 
‘Victims’ rights regime-where do we go from here? More than a modest proposal’ (2002) 33 
McGeorge LR 705. 
171  Groenhuijsen (n 169 above) 664. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OPERATIONALISING THE VICTIMS’ REGIME: THE RIGHT TO 
PARTICIPATE IN PROCEEDINGS 
 
… [I]n the drama that is called the criminal trial, there can only be one leading actor. And that 
is the one who acted, not the one who suffered. No compassion with victims, no 
disappointment with the current state of criminal justice can change that.1 
 
5.1 Legal Framework of Participation 
 
Having argued in chapter one that for various reasons a ‘pure’ version of restorative 
justice conceived as practices and principles (values) is unlikely within the ICC, the 
chapter considers what ‘future’2 restorative justice has in the Rome Statute framework 
by examining one aspect of restorative justice – participation. With reference to 
discussions on national and international tribunals in previous chapters, the chapter 
discusses the operationalisation of various elements of this right as contained in the 
ICC Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE). It also discusses the 
forms of participation possible at various stages of the process, the initiation of 
proceedings, the appointment of legal representatives and the giving of evidence and 
particular interventions at various stages of the proceedings.  
The Statute and ICC RPE contain various provisions, both general and specific. 
The general principle that victims have a right to participate, subject to certain 
considerations, is encapsulated in Article 68(3) of the Statute. Section III of the ICC 
RPE then sets out in greater detail the provisions applicable to the participation of 
victims at various stages of the ICC proceedings – pre-trial, trial and post-trial (review 
and appeals). Various other provisions in the Statute itself also provide specific 
instances when victims can participate. The conditions of participation set out in 
Article 68 (3) determine the nature and scope of this right: 
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and 
concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be 
appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented 
                                                
1  Y Buruma, ‘Doubts on the upsurge of the victim’s role in criminal law’ in H Kaptein & M 
Kaptein (eds) Crime, Victims and Justice: Essays on Principles and Practice (2004) 14. 
2   See B Hudson ‘The Institutionalisation of Restorative Justice: justice and ethics of discourse’ in 
E van der Spuy (ed), Restorative Justice: Politics, Polices and Prospects (2007) 56-72 56 who 
refers to other possibilities of restorative justice as ‘futures’ of restorative justice. 
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by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
 
As such, this provision is not only the general one relating to victims’ participatory 
rights but is also a focal point in the ‘balancing’ of tripartite interests – those of the 
prosecutor, defence and victims. More specifically, the Statute and ICC RPE specify 
circumstances in which victims may participate. In particular victims have: an absolute 
right to attend trial proceedings;3 a discretionary right to participate in specific 
circumstances – put questions to the accused, witness or experts;4 the faculty to make 
representations before the Court even in Pre-Trial procedure;5 the right to be heard 
before decisions on reparation;6 and the right to intervene in appeals concerning 
reparation orders.7 
Despite these extensive stipulations – which, if implemented well, will have 
far-reaching implications for victims and for international criminal justice system – 
Lee8 has observed that ‘victims do not have the right to become a genuine party to the 
proceedings, but they do have the right to be represented before the ICC.’ For his part 
Donat-Cattin does not consider victims essential parties to the proceedings: ‘if the 
prosecution and the defence are necessary parties to the Court’s process, victims are 
‘potential’ parties, because their participation is not strictu sensu essential’.9 Donat-
Cattin however rightly acknowledges that the possibility of a trial taking place without 
victims does not mean that they do not have a right to participate or interests to protect 
in the process. Further, their potential contribution to the accomplishment of the 
                                                
3  Rule 91(2) ICC RPE. 
4  Rule 91(3) (a) ICC RPE provides: When a legal representative attends and participates in 
accordance with this rule, and wishes to question a witness, including questioning under rules 
67 and 68, an expert or the accused, the legal representative must make application to the 
Chamber. The Chamber may require the legal representative to provide a written note of the 
questions and in that case the questions shall be communicated to the Prosecutor and, if 
appropriate, the defence, who shall be allowed to make observations within a time limit set by 
the Chamber. 
5  Art 15 (3) Rome Statute. 
6  Art 75(3) Rome Statute. 
7  Article 82 (4) Rome Statute. 
8  RS Lee ‘XI’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
9  D Donat-Cattin ‘article 68’ in Otto Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: observers’ notes, article by article 869 873. 
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Court’s main objective – truth searching – renders them indispensable.10 Their 
participation at any given stage is subject to a judicial verdict in terms of Article 68(3). 
Before discussing in detail each phase of proceedings and the modes of victim 
participation at each stage, the following sections outline some general themes. 
 
5.2  Prosecutor, Defendants and Victims: A Three-Legged Stool?  
 
By affirming the right of victims to participate, the Statute has introduced a third 
‘party’ to criminal proceedings besides the traditional two – prosecution and defence. 
It has been feared, as advanced by some commentators,11 that granting participatory 
rights to victims beyond their ‘traditional’ role of witnesses would impact negatively 
on the criminal process – both on law enforcement and on fair trial guarantees. As we 
have seen, these arguments are not new in debates around victims’ rights, having been 
raised in national criminal justice systems when related reforms were contemplated.12 
Among others, commentators raised, as a bulwark against reforms, defendants’ rights 
they claimed would be adversely affected, in turn impairing fair trial and efficient 
justice. The claim was that the criminal process would be ‘burdened’ with victims’ 
concerns. As seen in the previous chapter, some of these concerns seem not to occupy 
commentators in some domestic criminal justice systems – predominantly civil law 
countries – that have a long tradition of victims’ rights to participate and to reparation 
in the criminal justice system.  
Whether a victim is merely a ‘potential’ party to the proceedings as suggested 
by Donat-Cattin13 or not, the Statute and ICC RPE introduce a new dynamic to 
international criminal procedure. They are only a ‘potential’ party because they do not 
have an automatic right to participate, as is the case for the Prosecutor and the defence. 
                                                
10  Ibid. 
11  Some delegates at the Rome conference mostly having the adversarial model in mind, had 
feared the ‘crippling effect’ a large number of victims would have in any given ICC trial. GJ 
Mekjian & MC Varughese ‘Hearing the victim’s voice: analysis of victims’ advocate 
participation in the trial proceeding of the international criminal Court’ (2005) XVII 1 Pace 
Univ School of LJ 1-46 19. 
12  J Dolliver ‘Victims’ rights constitutional amendment: a bad idea whose time should not come’ 
(1987) 34 Wayne LR 87; AM Cellini ‘The proposed victims' rights amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States: Opening the door of the criminal justice system to the victim’ 
(1997) 14 Arizona J. Int'l & Comp. L 839 856. 
13  Donat-Cattin (n 9 above) 873. 
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However, the provisions in the ICC statute and RPE accord victims specific rights 
such that they can no longer be treated merely as witnesses. The Statute specifically 
provides for victims to participate in the proceedings of the Court. Participation by 
victims directly or through their representatives serves a number of purposes. Firstly, it 
aims to protect their interests within the criminal trial; related to this, participation has 
an accountability function, ensuring that the Prosecutor and the Court in general act 
openly and transparently. Furthermore, it serves to ensure that victims realize their 
right to justice before the Court;14 through participation, relevant conflict societies and 
victims are afforded a contact point to international justice.15 As noted in the 
discussion on the concept of ‘interests of justice’ below, participating victims, just like 
the prosecutor and defence, have a role to play towards the achievement of the 
objectives of the ICC. In considering the role of the Court in proceedings, it is 
emphasised that balancing of interests will be required because each ‘party’ has 
different interests to pursue and protect within that process. 
 
5.2.1 Prosecutor and Law Enforcement: Trumping Other Interests? 
 
The functions of the Prosecutor and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) are set out in 
the Statute. These are rooted in the fundamental objective of the ICC – to ensure that 
‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community do not go 
unpunished and that effective prosecution must be ensured.’16 Accordingly, the basic 
function of the Prosecutor is that of law enforcement – to bring to trial, in terms if the 
Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), persons alleged to have 
committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Article 42 of the Statute 
provides: 
The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court. It shall 
be responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and 
prosecutions before the Court. A member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions 
from any external source.17  
 
                                                
14  Donat-Cattin (n 9 above) 873. 
15  Ibid 871. 
16  Para IV Prmbl, Rome Statute. See O Triffterer ‘Preamble’ in O Triffterer (1999) 1-16 11 
17  Art 42 Rome Statute (emphasis mine). 
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The above provision refers to ‘referrals’, which should be understood to refer to two of 
the three trigger mechanisms – referrals from the Security Council and states. Apart 
from this, the Prosecutor is empowered to commence investigations independently 
subject to specific conditions,18 including Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) approval.19 Article 
42 is supplemented by Articles 53 and 54 of the Statute. Article 53, the first under the 
general rubric ‘initiation of an investigation’20 is of particular relevance to victims’ 
rights. This is examined further below.21 Article 54 sets out in greater detail the duties 
and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations. Of direct relevance to 
victims, Article 54 (1) (b) requires the Prosecutor to: 
 [t]ake appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes 
 within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests and personal 
circumstances of victims and witnesses, including age, gender as defined in Article 7, 
paragraph 3, and health, and take into account the nature of the crime, in particular where it 
involves sexual violence, gender violence or violence against children 
 
Various provisions read independently or together lead to the conclusion that the 
Prosecutor will be required to balance the imperatives to prosecute crimes in terms of 
the statute and respect and protection of the rights of victims and witnesses as well as 
accused and defendants. In this regard, Article 54 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute requires 
the Prosecutor to ‘fully respect the rights of persons arising under [the] Statute.’ The 
Court, in particular the PTC, will be an important ‘mediator’ and ‘guarantor’ of 
guaranteed rights. The relation between the Prosecutor and various persons under the 
Statute on one hand, and the Court on the other, are expounded upon at a later stage in 
our discussion of specific aspects of victims’ right to participate. 
 
5.2.2 Re-Examining Fair Trial 
 
The Rome Statute predicates victim participation at particular stages of the ICC 
process on, among others, its benign effects on defendant’s rights, its conformity with 
fair trial guarantees and the efficiency of the Court in delivering its mandate.22 The 
PTC will therefore only permit particular victims to participate or intervene if their 
                                                
18  Art 15 Rome Statute. 
19  Art 61 Rome Statute. 
20  Part V Rome Statute. 
21  Art 53 Rome Statute, see section below. 
22  Generally, art 68 Rome Statute. 
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intervention would not be ‘prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused 
and a fair and impartial trial’23 and if the role apportioned to them does not overly 
burden the Court so as to encumber its efficiency.  
But, what is a fair trial? Before the victim’s regime in the ICC, it would be 
granted, and indeed would have been accurate, to regard ‘fair trial’ synonymously with 
the rights of suspects and accused persons. This is not entirely accurate in a process 
where a third leg of rights and interests are imperative – those of victims. Further, the 
proper understanding of ‘interests of justice’ in the Statute, which necessarily 
incorporates the interests of suspects and accused persons, those of the international 
community as represented by the Prosecutor and those of victims, supports this view.24 
Donat-Cattin rightly distinguishes between defendant’s rights and ‘fair trial’, accepting 
the overlap of the two concepts. To him, fair trial means ‘equitable justice for 
defendants, victims and the international society.’25 It must therefore be considered as 
a composite concept that entails at least three interests. The ICC’s mandate must be 
seen in this light. 
The Rome Statute and rules contain several provisions relating to rights of 
suspects and accused persons. Article 67 of the Rome Statute catalogues fair trial 
guarantees substantially similar to those contained in major human rights 
instruments.26 A number of these, which we discuss in some detail, are of relevance to 
this discussion: the right to be tried without undue delay;27 the right to examine 
personally or through representation of witnesses under same conditions as the said 
witnesses;28 and presumption of innocence.29 The Trial Chamber (TC) is obliged to 
‘ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the 
rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses’.30 
Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, which establishes victims right to be heard 
and to participate as well as the framework within which this is to happen, specifically 
                                                
23  Art 68(3) Rome Statute. 
24  See discussion of ‘interests of justice’ below. 
25  Donat-Cattin (n 9 above) 877. 
26  See art 14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; European Convention on 
Human Rights; arts 6 and 7 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and American 
Convention on Human and Peoples Rights. 
27  Arts 66 & 67 (c) Rome Statute. 
28   Art 67 (e) Rome Statute. 
29  Art 67 (g) Rome Statute. 
30  Art 64 Rome Statute. 
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refers to defendants’ rights in the scheme of criteria. The discussion to follow of 
specific aspects of the right to participate canvasses how relevant defendants’ rights 
may be impacted, and whether such impact would fall within the parameters delineated 
by Article 68(3). 
 
5.2.3 ‘The Interests of Justice’ 
 
The Statute and ICC RPE do not furnish a definition of ‘interests of justice’. The texts 
do not elaborate on specific factors or circumstances to be taken into consideration in 
discussions and application of the term as used in the Statute. The term is mentioned in 
several contexts in the Statute and in the ICC RPE: criteria for commencement or 
otherwise of an investigation;31 assignment of legal assistance to suspects during 
investigation;32 appointment of counsel during confirmation hearings where the 
accused has fled or cannot be found;33 proceedings on admission of guilt, where 
TRIAL CHAMBER considers it necessary for normal procedures of evidence to be 
followed;34 privileged information;35 restrictions on disclosure of confidential 
information by the prosecutor;36 seat of ICC proceedings;37 and the possibility of joint 
and separate trials.38  
In each of these contexts, it is possible that different considerations apply in 
interpreting what the ‘interests of justice’ are. No doubt, ‘interests of justice’ is a 
concept that is central to the prosecutorial function as it relates to investigation to the 
                                                
31  Art 53 (1) (b) Rome Statute 
32   Art 55 (2) (c): To have legal assistance of the person’s choosing, or, if the person does not have 
legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests 
of justice so require, and without payment by the person in any such case if the person does not 
have sufficient means to pay for it. 
33  Art 61(2) (b) Rome Statute. 
34  Art 65 (4) (b) Rome Statute. 
Where the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the 
case is required in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims, the Trial 
Chamber may:  
(a) Request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence, including the testimony of witnesses; 
or  
(b) Order that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this 
Statute, in which case it shall consider the admission of guilt as not having been made and may 
remit the case to another Trial Chamber.  
35  Rule 73 ICC RPE. 
36  Rule 82 ICC RPE and article 54 (3) (e) Rome Statute. 
37  Rule 100 ICC RPE. 
38  Rule 136 ICC RPE. 
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conclusion of the prosecution. It necessarily underpins the victims’ rights regime and 
the understanding of the relationships between various players in the ICC. The policy 
document on the interests of justice from the OTP suggests that at the preliminary 
level, ‘interests of justice’ will serve as directive principle in one specific context – in 
the making of decisions relating to whether or not the prosecutor should commence an 
investigation in a particular matter.39 
While this concept may have different elements depending on the stage of 
proceedings, the main object of the ICC – punishing and prevention of serious 
international crimes - will have far-reaching implications as a benchmark in 
determining ‘the interests of justice’ in any given circumstance.40 A number of other 
considerations, which hinge on that broad objective, appear to be necessary factors in 
the understanding of ‘interests of justice’.  
First, from a victim’s standpoint, the need to seize every opportunity to ensure 
that victims’ suffering is appropriately acknowledged, and that they have a say in the 
criminal process, is an important consideration. Secondly, it is in the interest of justice 
that the process is conducted in such a manner that the rights of suspects, accused 
persons and defendants are respected. In the discussion relating to Article 68(3) of the 
Rome Statute below, the chapter considers how these are balanced in particular 
circumstances. 
Thirdly, the need to uphold fairness – to conduct a fair trial in which each of 
the interests involved are afforded ample consideration in terms of the Statute -must be 
an elemental factor of ‘the interest of justice’. Donat-Cattin emphasizes the importance 
of victim participation, noting that ‘the participation of victims and contribution to the 
Court’s process leads to the ‘development of a fair, effective and comprehensive 
proceedings’.41 It is apparent ‘the interest of justice,’ entails multiple elements. As 
such, the Court and other actors in the Court may use it to rationalize specific action 
and orders by the Court.  
For victims, ‘the interests of justice’ would require that their right to 
participation represented in Article 68(3) should be interpreted in its fullness and that 
                                                
39  See Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy paper on the interests of justice’ (OP Policy Paper) 
available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-InterestsOfJustice.pdf> at 1 
(Accessed on 2 October 2007). 
40  Ibid, 4 referring to the objectives of the ICC as ‘significant touchstones’. 
41  Donat-Cattin (n 9 above) 873. 
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no unnecessary obstacles should be erected in their path. In particular, the interests of 
the accused should not be used as a blanket trump of victims’ rights to participate in 
particular proceedings. Neither should the prosecution’s law enforcement function 
operate in the same automatic way. As seen above, the trend so far has been that the 
Prosecutor has opted to oppose automatically any attempt by victims to participate in 
all proceedings, a practice that has not only the potential of impeding victims’ exercise 
of their right to participate, but also the right of defendants to an expeditious trial by 
dragging out proceedings given the fact that victims would be expected to defend their 
right to participate in every proceeding. The interests of justice would dictate a case-
by-case approach, which would allow only for objections to participation that have 
merit. 
For defendants have a right to legal counsel in the proceedings, which may 
necessitate legal aid in case of inability of defendants and accused persons to marshal 
their own resources. Fairness and the imperative of fair trial direct such action. A 
fundamental approach in achieving fairness – one that cannot be avoided in the context 
of a multiplicity of interests – will be that of balancing the interests at various stages, 
hence the role of the Court. These general elements of the ‘interests of justice’ and 
others are revisited elsewhere in this chapter in our discussion of pre-trial, trial and 
‘post trial’ proceedings, in particular when considering the interests of victims and 
those of various other parties to the proceedings. 
 
5.3 Participation and Legal Representation  
5.3.1 The Ad Hoc Tribunals and National Jurisdictions 
 
As outlined in more detail below, victims are entitled to a legal representative to 
facilitate their participation in the proceedings in their capacity as victims. The ad 
hoc tribunals, which did not provide for the right to participate for victims, offer no 
guidance in this regard. At the normative level, general international law presents a 
different picture. The 1985 UN Victims' Declaration provided for the right of victims 
to counsel.42. Although it is now more than twenty years since the adoption of the 
                                                
42  United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power, 1985 (GA/RES/40/34); Council of Europe Recommendation on the position of the 
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Declaration, in the majority of countries victims of serious crime, unlike criminal 
defendants, do not have a right to legal representation.43 In jurisdictions that have 
Victim Rights Charters such as South Africa, Canada, Jamaica, Ireland and Hong 
Kong, the right to counsel is entirely excluded or is afforded what is merely 
rhetorical recognition.44 In many countries, awareness has seen the involvement of 
private and non-governmental organizations to assist victims by providing legal aid 
and advice.  
To illustrate the trend indicating strong constitutional guarantees for 
defendants while victims of crime lack protection, in the US for instance the 6th 
Amendment has been interpreted to include the right to assisted legal 
representation in federal and some state prosecutions for defendants. Victims do 
not have a comparable right.45 The same applies in the United Kingdom, as is the 
case in many countries.46 This situation poses major problems relating to access to 
justice. Without assistance to navigate a complex criminal process in an unfriendly 
environment, victims of crime find themselves with difficult and often dangerous 
tasks.47 Importantly, their rights are met with the constitutionally entrenched and thus 
‘trumping’ rights of defendants. In general, victims are unaware of legal alternatives 
                                                                                                                                        
victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure (Recommendation (85/11); European 
Union Framework Decision on the Standing of victims in criminal proceedings, 2001 
(2001/220/jHA); Commonwealth Guidelines on Treatment of Victims at 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Shared_ASP_Files/UploadedFiles/%7B99410136-47A1-
478F-B549-DB753CF8B20B%7D_Victims%20of%20Crime.pdf> (accessed on 17 September 
2005). See also the Draft UN Convention on Justice and Support for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power, which seeks to implement the 1985 declaration in binding treaty form. 
43  See with respect to Europe M Brienen & E Hoegen Victims of crime in 22 European criminal 
justice systems (2000). Australia and New Zealand have specific laws -Victims of Crime 
Assistance Act 1996 and the New Zealand Victims' Rights Act 2002 which provide for state 
assistance in this regard. 
44  See South African Service Charter for Victims of Crime in South Africa (Victims’ Charter); 
Hong Kong Victim Rights Charter; Canadian Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime, 2003; United Kingdom Code of Practice for Victims’ Rights. 
45  See the earliest cases in each instance: Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 (1938) 462 in which the 
supreme Court held that a person charged with crime in a federal Court is entitled by the Sixth 
Amendment to the assistance of counsel for his defense and Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 355 
(1963) holding that ‘that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
Court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him’; Scott v Illinois, 440 U.S 367 (1979) extended this right to misdemeanors in which 
imprisonment is imposed. See also P Bower ‘Access to Justice: The Judge's Role’ Michigan 
Bar Council J (2002) 79(1) 1. 
46   See generally Brienen & Hoegan (n 43 above); for a brief overview C Stahn, H Olasolo & K 
Gibson ‘Participation of victims in pre-trial proceedings’ (2006) 4 J of International Criminal 
Justice 219-238. 
47  PC Bower (n 45 above) 1. 
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available to them and lack means and direction to obtain counselling to protect their 
interests.48 A similar situation obtains in civil law countries, although the plight of 
victims is somewhat ameliorated by the role of the investigative judge involved 
actively in the case, as for instance in partie civile proceedings. This does not however 
obviate the need for legal counsel since a victim may need to assess their options 
before and during proceedings.49 
 
5.3.2 ICC Representation Framework 
 
To facilitate their participation, victims50 have the right to be legally represented in the 
ICC proceedings.51 The right is rightly considered ‘the most important and most 
procedurally challenging aspect to apply within the ICC’.52 The importance of the right 
to legal representation from a victim’s standpoint is not difficult to see when one 
considers the complex nature of procedures involved in the ICC. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber II has acknowledged the importance of representation to the effective 
participation of victims.53 Rule 90(1) ICC RPE provides for the right of a victim to 
choose an appropriately qualified54 legal representative.55 Where there are a number of 
victims, they may be requested by the Chamber to choose a common legal 
representative or representatives.56 One suggested reason for such request is 
‘ensuring the effectiveness of the proceedings.’57 It may become necessary, in case 
victims are unable to choose a common legal representative(s) within acceptable 
time limits for the Registrar to designate common legal representative (s) on 
request from the Chamber. This has happened severally in the cases currently 
                                                
48  Ibid; Generally, MA Young ‘A Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victim’s 
Perspective’ in 34 Wayne LR 51 1987-1988. 
49  M Joutsen ‘Listening to the Victim: The Victim’s Role in European Criminal Justice Systems’ 
in (1987) 34 Wayne LR 95 104. 
50  Mekjian & Varughese (n 11 above) 16 ‘The ICC definition of ‘victim’ in Rule 85 ICC RPE is 
wider than the ad hoc tribunals’. 
51  Rule 90(1) ICC ICC RPE. 
52  Mekjian & Varughese (n 11 above) 22. 
53  Situation in Uganda, In the case of the Prosecutor v Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot 
Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, 10 August 2007 Decision on victims’ applications for 
participation, No: ICC-02/04-Uganda Situation [Uganda Participation Decision] para 55. 
54  Rules 90(6) and 22 (1) ICC ICC RPE. 
55  Rule 90 (1) ICC ICC RPE. 
56  Rule 90 (2) ICC ICC RPE. 
57  Ibid. 
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before the Court, with Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) stepping in to 
represent victims not represented by the common counsel.58  
In designating common legal representative(s), two considerations for the 
Victims and Witnesses Unit in the Registry are relevant.59 The distinct interests of 
the relevant victims as stipulated in Article 68(1) Rome Statute60 should be 
represented and conflict of interest (among victims) should be avoided.61 The duty 
imposed on the Registrar in this regard is ‘all reasonable steps’. The Registry may 
provide assistance including financial assistance to a victim or group of victims 
who lack the necessary means to pay for a common legal representative chosen by 
the Court.62 
 
5.3.3 Some Thoughts on the Challenges of Representation 
 
The first challenge consists in the fact that proceedings could potentially attract tens or 
hundreds of persons who qualify as victims. For practical considerations, apart from 
limiting the number of ‘victims of a case’, it may become inevitable that a group of 
victims are jointly represented in proceedings. This raises a number of pertinent 
questions: why do victims participate? Does representation not, especially where 
victims with a multiplicity of interests are grouped together, negate not only the very 
essence of participation but also the tenets of restorative justice embodied in the ICC? 
In other words, is the need – indeed the imperative – of ‘bundling’ of victims 
incompatible with the right of a particular victim(s) to participate?  
As provided by the ICC RPE, an individual victim’s right to choice of counsel 
is protected. A cursory reading of Rule 90(2) ICC RPE suggests that the right still 
                                                
58   Rule 90(3) ICC ICC RPE. See for instance in the Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
case, ‘Decision on Participation’ Pre-Trial Chamber III, 12 September 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-
103-tENG-Corr, pp 5 and 6. 
59  See Art 43(6) Rome Statute. 
60  Article 68(1) stipulates: The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so 
doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, 
where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. The 
Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of 
such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused and a fair and impartial trial. 
61  Rule 90(4) ICC ICC RPE. 
62  Rule 90(5) ICC ICC RPE. 
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applies even where there are several victims in one case. Accordingly, where the Court 
acting through the Registry intervenes to designate a representative, this right is called 
into question. It is necessary not only to motivate such action, but also to do so by 
raising a weightier consideration. The assumption behind the choice of counsel 
argument, which may indeed be inaccurate, is that a particular victim is best placed to 
appoint a representative to articulate and protect his/her interests. This is one factor 
informing the ‘interference’ by the Court in ordering the designation of a 
representative(s), rationalized by an effectiveness of proceedings argument, which also 
takes into consideration the complexity of procedures and the time factor in view of 
defendants right to expeditious trial.63 While the rights of defendants are not 
specifically mentioned under Rule 90, this is an underlying consideration as codified 
under the regulatory Article 68(3) Rome Statute.64  
The argument in favour of victims appointing their own representatives 
perhaps reflects the dilemma of victims who may be forced, for reasons of 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Court, to appoint representatives or have these 
appointed for them rather than directly represent themselves. This focuses attention to 
the question of why victims participate. Can the current arrangement – the requirement 
for victims to participate through proxy – be considered a negation of the right 
championed so vigorously by the victim rights movement?  
A comprehensive response to this question may require us to wade into a 
deeper and problematic question – what do victims want? While for want of requisite 
tools we cannot accomplish an inquiry of any significant depth into this question, it is 
often suggested – in line with the central claim of the victim rights movement – that 
participation by victims in the criminal justice process is necessary for victims to 
articulate and protect their interests.65 The claim made, and correctly so, is that 
                                                
63  D Boyle ‘the rights of victims: participation, representation, protection, reparation’ J of 
International Criminal Justice 4 (2006) 307-313 at 311 (arguing that joint legal representation 
provides a supplementary means of organizing effective victim participation). 
64   This consideration has been raised in current proceedings before the ICC. See Fifth Decision on 
Victims' Issues Concerning Common Legal Representation of Victims in Prosecutor v Jean-
Pierre Gombo, of 16 December 2008, para 7, PTC III stated that in view of art 68(3) of the 
Rome Statute, appointing common counsel was appropriate to ensure effectiveness of pre-trial 
proceedings. See also Trial Chamber I, ‘Decision on victims' participation’ ICC-01'04-01 06-
1119, para. 123. 
65  See in the context of the ICTY Eric Stover The Witnesses: The Witnesses: War Crimes and the 
Promise of Justice in The Hague (2003). 
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victims’ interests do not always converge with those of the prosecutor and are thus at 
risk of being ignored by a prosecution focused on law enforcement. Others have 
proposed - usually without much empirical evidence – that direct participation by 
victims has cathartic benefits to individual victims.66 Another group – not necessarily 
opposed to this position have argued that inclusion of victims in the process would 
associate and bring victims closer to the goals of justice being pursued.67 Applying this 
logic to the international arena, in particular the ICC, the imperative of dealing with 
post-conflict societies cannot be achieved without involving victims of international 
crimes.  
However, while, the propositions on the question – why victims’ participatory 
rights – are as varied as the disparate disciplines that have engaged with the question 
of victims in one degree or another68 all, at national and international level victims 
have however been united in the need to have their interests adequately represented 
and protected. In our view, given the questionable cathartic benefits of direct 
participation by victims especially in view of the possibility of ‘re-victimization’69 of 
vulnerable victims in an adversarial process, what should be sought for and by victims 
is effective representation. It should not be an issue who articulates victims concerns 
as long as they are made forcefully in a manner that impacts relevant processes and 
outcomes.  
The ICC RPE provides for what appear to be sufficient guarantees for victims. 
Rules 90(2) and 90(4), by making reference to ‘effective proceedings’ – which by no 
means excludes adequate and timely representation of victims’ ‘interests – and the 
requirement that the registry in designating a representative(s) should take’, all 
                                                
66  A Tieger & M Shin ‘Plea agreements in the ICTY’ (2005) 3 J of International Criminal Justice 
666-679. The first plea agreement in the history of the ICTY was the negotiated guilty plea in 
Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Case No : IT-96-22-T, (1997) 674; B Hamber, ‘Do Sleeping Dogs 
Lie? The Psychological Implications of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa’, seminar presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 
Johannesburg, 26 July 1995, quoted in Stover (n 64 above) 20; LN Henderson, “The Wrongs of 
victims’ rights’ (1985) 37 Stanford LR 937-1021. 
67  See H Strang & J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Civil Society (2001) 83-98 93; See also J 
Braithwaite & H Strang ‘Introduction: Restorative Justice and Civil Society’ in H Strang & J 
Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Civil Society (2001). 
68  MC Bassiouni ‘International recognition of victims’ rights’ Human Rights LR (2006) 6:2 203 -
279 211-212 noting the variety of approaches in the victims’ movement. 
69  A Tieger & M Shin (n 66 above) 674; Stover (n 65 above 2-3) noting that the argument rests 
upon the premise that Courtroom testimony is at least as likely to be painful and traumatic as 
therapeutic. 
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reasonable steps’ to protect distinct interests, seek to institute a regime of 
representation responsive to the imperatives of participation. Regulation 79(2) 
preserves the right of victims to be consulted when this choice of counsel is made 
while respecting local traditions.70 Rule 90(4) and this regulation permit the Registrar 
through the Victims and Witnesses Unit to designate special representatives for 
particular categories of victims, including women, children and relatives of direct 
victims. However, the prospect that one or several special representatives may in no 
way represent each category in any particular case guarantees effective representation. 
As we discuss under the section on ‘trial phase’, the Court may exclude these 
representatives from proceedings on grounds of ‘efficiency’. The importance of the 
provision on legal aid, which aims to address affordability of representation in view of 
the indigence of victims, also cannot be overstated.71 
Having outlined the framework of representation and concerns relating to 
‘how’, we turn to consider the specific forms and modes of participation by victim 
representative(s) at the three main stages of proceedings – investigations, trial and 
appeals. Proceedings relating to reparations are dealt with in the next chapter. 
 
5.4 FORMS OF VICTIM PARTICIPATION: PRE-TRIAL PHASE 
5.4.1 Basis for the Right to Participate  
 
Despite concerted objections from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) as to the 
applicability of Article 68(3) to the investigation stage, the Court, by use of 
terminological, contextual and teleological argument affirmed in its seminal decision 
on participation that victims are entitled to participate at the investigation stage of 
proceedings. In its view, the right applies even before a decision is made to charge 
anyone suspected of an ICC crime(s). 72 In the relevant segment of the judgment, the 
                                                
70  When choosing a common legal representative for victims in accordance with rule 90, sub-rule 
3, consideration should be given to the views of the victims, and the need to respect local 
traditions and to assist specific groups of victims. 
71  As outlined in later discussions this procedure embodied in Rule 90 ICC ICC RPE reflects the 
practice in a limited number of national jurisdictions in which victims are entitled to participate 
in criminal proceedings. 
72  See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the case of the Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecution's Observations on the Applications for Participation of Applicants 
a/0001/06 to a/0003/06, 6 June 2006 Doc. No.: ICC-01/04-01/06 [DRC Situation Participation 
Decision]. 
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PTC I emphasized that victim participation at the investigation stage is consistent with 
the object and purpose of the ICC victims’ participation regime.73 The second decision 
relating to the situation in Uganda confirms this position.74  
The right of a victim to participate at this stage is however subject to two 
considerations stipulated in Article 68(3): 1) it must be appropriate for the victim to 
participate; 2) the personal interests of the particular victim must be affected. As 
regards appropriateness, the Prosecutor argued in the DRC Participation Case that 
third party intervention at this stage would: 1) jeopardize the appearance of integrity 
and objectivity of the investigation; and 2) involve a measure of disclosure which 
would be inconsistent with basic considerations of efficiency and security.75 
Rejecting both propositions, PTC I stated that the participation of victims 
during investigations of a situation does not in itself compromise the appearance of 
integrity and objectivity of the investigation. Further, the Court did not consider this 
inherently inconsistent with basic considerations of efficiency and security.76 To the 
Court, the extent of a victim’s participation and not their participation per se is the core 
consideration in determining the adverse impact on the investigation.77 In my view, 
this core criterion should underlie the entire victim participation regime.  
The Statute, in particular Article 68(3) and the rules provide a framework in 
which any assertion either by the Prosecutor or by defence tending to show such 
adverse impact can be tested. In view of the express right of victims in Article 68(3) 
and other provisions, any argument that mere participation of victims is improper is 
made in futility. The OTP’s position betrays its view that any concession to victims’ 
rights to participate operates as an encumbrance to its prosecutorial function. Yet, 
there are sufficient safeguards in the Statute and RPE in terms of which the PTC is 
entitled, as the PTC itself has confirmed, to take measures when victims participate to 
preserve the integrity of the proceedings in terms of the Statute78 and to ensure that 
                                                
73  Ibid, para 50. 
74  Uganda Situation Participation Decision (n 53 above). 
75  DRC Situation Participation Decision (n 72 above) para 56. 
76  Ibid, para 57. 
77  Ibid, para 58. 
78  See arts 56 and 57 Rome Statute; Ibid para 60. 
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victims’ participation ‘is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
defence.79 
Article 68(3) does not specify ‘victims’ interests’ that have to be affected for 
one to exercise his or her or one’s right to participate. Neither does it offer any 
guidance on how these may be identified. This lack of clarity may be understandable, 
in view of the fact that a particular case, let alone a situation, will have many victims 
with varying interests. Moreover, the interest of particular victims vying for 
recognition and or protection may vary at different stages of the proceedings. The 
Court’s seminal decision is, perhaps for these reasons, vague. The Court only ventured 
to suggest why victims’ interests would be affected and left open for deduction which 
interests these are: 
The personal interests of victims are affected in general at the investigation stage, since the 
participation of victims at this stage can serve to clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators and 
to solicit reparations.80  
 
While a victim may assist in clarifying facts, and hence is potentially a witness later 
on, serving as witness is separate from the ICC victims’ rights regime. There is some 
doubt that it serving as witness can be considered ‘an interest’ of victims. Haslam 
suggests that the said interests must be a ‘judicially recognizable’ interest.81 Though 
not specifically referred to as such, the statement discloses two examples ‘victims’ 
interests. First, it is generally an interest of victims to have perpetrators of crimes 
punished. Secondly, whenever a victim satisfies requirements to seek reparations, 
his/her interest is affected.82 
The approach taken by the Court cannot be heavily criticized on this account. 
The decision should be considered as a ‘framework’ ruling on the issue of 
participation. The Court rightly recognised that a multiplicity of interests could be in 
issue and left the door open for a case-by-case determination of requisite victim’s 
interests:  
  This general assessment … which relates to the whole of the proceedings before it, does not 
rule out the possibility of a more specific assessment of victims’ personal interests based on the 
                                                
79  DRC Situation Participation Decision (n 72 above) 70. 
80  Ibid, para 63. 
81  See E Haslam ‘Victim participation at the International Criminal Court: A triumph of hope 
over experience?’ in D MacGoldrick, P Row & E Donnely (eds) The Permanent International 
Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues’315-334 326. 
82  Art 68(3) Rome Statute; DRC Participation Decision (n 72 above) para 62. 
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applications filed by victims in accordance with the modalities of the participation of victims in 
the proceedings …83 
 
The ICC Appeals Chamber has had occasion to indirectly comment on this issue in its 
first decision on victim participation related to PTC I confirmation decision. In a 
separate opinion attached to that decision of the Appeals Chamber, Judge Song 
elaborated two general interests of victims: to obtain reparations and to receive 
justice.84 Judge Song considered that victims might have interests in procedural 
questions, as they are important for the outcome of substantive questions.85 In the same 
proceedings, victims submitted that their interests in participating in the proceedings 
are diverse, and include obtaining reparations, expressing their views and concerns, 
verifying facts, protecting their dignity during the hearings and securing recognition as 
victims.86 The Appeals Chamber agreed that victims have multiple interests to protect, 
but that these must be linked to evidence brought to substantiate specific charges 
against the accused.87 Some, if not all of these interests would be encompassed in 
Judge Song’s formulation of ‘justice’ above. 
In our discussion below of specific modalities of participation at various stages, 
we attempt to identify victims’ interests that may be at issue in particular proceedings. 
It is noteworthy that while the criterion of ‘victim’s interests’ is not included in other 
provisions (other than Article 68(3)) that confer specific participatory rights to victims, 
it is an additional requirement that has to be met in those specific instances when the 
right is claimed.88 
Rule 85 ICC RPE sheds some light on this issue by requiring that the personal 
interests claimed by a victim must be causally connected with the specific ICC crimes 
charged, the commission of which occasioned them harm.89 The PTC has emphasised 
                                                
83  See arts 15 (3) and 19 (3) Rome Statute; DRC Participation Decision, para 64. 
84  Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 
and a/0105/06 concerning the "Directions and Decisions of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 
February 2007, 1CC-01/04-01/06-925. Separate Opinion of Judge Song, para 10. 
85  1CC-01/04-01/06-925, Separate Opinion of Judge Song, para 19. 
86  Appeals Chamber Decision (n 84 above) para 39. 
87  Ibid, para 97. 
88  In DRC Situation Participation Decision (n 72 above) para 62. 
89  Art 85 ICC RPE, a victim is a natural person who has suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. Victims may include 
organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which is 
dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes and to their historic 
monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes. See Uganda 
Situation Participation Decision, para 105. 
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this requirement.90 Causal connection is a primary condition which must be met before 
the actual interests claimed by a victim are examined. An individual (or group) would 
have to show that he or she is indeed a victim of a particular crime charged, and as a 
result they have a specific interest they would like to assert and to have protected. This 
will for instance be that they would like to furnish evidence that would lead to 
punishment of the perpetrator and or that they seek reparations as a result thereof. 
The PTC I rightly distinguished two categories of victims: ‘victims of a 
situation’, these being victims of crimes from a general context, usually a country 
under investigation, and ‘victims of a case’, being the victims allowed by the Court to 
participate in particular hearings after the issuance of a warrant.91 The causal 
requirement means that only those in the latter category have a right to participate. 
means that out of the large pool of victims from any given situation, say the DRC with 
which the ICC is currently seized, only a few  may participate in the investigation 
itself and perhaps even fewer in the eventual case resulting from such investigation. In 
essence, the right of victims to participate in the investigation is merely a ‘potential’ 
one until the PTC makes a determination.92 
Before examining the specific forms participation of victims in pre-trial 
proceedings may take, the role of the PTC is first considered. 
 
5.4.2 Role of PTC in Pre-Trial Proceedings 
 
The PTC has a central role in the victim participation scheme. Given the novelty of the 
right to participate in international criminal justice, the dogged resistance from the 
Prosecutor who has made and will continue to make attempts to limit its scope as 
much as possible and the generally adversarial nature of the ICC among other factors, 
it is impossible to consider victims’ participatory rights to any appreciable extent in 
isolation of the PTC’s mandate.  
                                                
90  See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
paras 9 & 10 of Prosecution's Observations on the Applications for Participation of Applicants 
a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 (ICC-01/04-01/06) that echo these views. 
91  See DRC Situation Participation Decision (n 72 above) para 65-66; See OP Policy paper (n 39 
above) 2. 
92  Donat-Cattin (n 9 above) 873. 
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One commentator notes with respect to the PTC’s role at the investigation 
stage, which is relevant to the other stages of the proceedings, that ‘the question of 
victims’ participation in the investigation stage is intrinsically intertwined with the 
powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber vis-à-vis those of the Prosecutor’.93 This speaks to 
the PTC’s control function, which manifests in a number of ways at various stages of 
the proceedings.94 In the context of victims rights, the PTC’s control function 
converges with its other function – that of ensuring a fair and expeditious trial.  
The PTC’s general mandate in this regard is codified in Article 68(3), which 
provides for conditional participation by victims. Two main criteria, which will be 
subject to interpretation every time victims make an application to participate are: 
determining the appropriate stage in the proceedings, as well as the modes of victim 
participation; and determining whether such participation may occasion prejudice to 
accused persons. Donat-Cattin, observes with respect to the PTC’s exercise of control 
that ‘such a form of control... shall orient the decision towards the appropriate phase in 
which victims (or representatives) are to intervene, without denying the victims the 
exercise of their right’.95  
Donat-Cattin’s remark, or more aptly counsel, recognizes the centrality of the 
PTC to the realization of this right by victims. It is perfectly likely that the Prosecutor 
would not want to be ‘encumbered’ by victims’ concerns in the performance of his 
fairly straightforward mandate, which requires him or her to establish the guilt or 
otherwise of those charged as efficiently as possible. By citing the OTP’s initial stance 
on this issue, which has tried to limit as much as possible the scope of victims’ right to 
participate through its arguments in initial applications at the PTCs, this argument can 
be sustained without fear of contradiction.96  
                                                
93  J de Hemptinne & F Rindi ‘ICC Pre-Trial Chamber allows victims to participate in the 
investigation stage of proceedings’ J of international Criminal Justice 4 (2006) 342-350 at 349 
94  See with respect to investigations in proceedings commenced proprio motu art 15(3) Rome 
Statute and investigations relating to proceedings arising from a referral – art 53(3)(a). The 
varied extend of the PTC’s powers in the two instances is considered below under our 
discussion relating to the first phase of ICC proceedings. 
95  Donat-Cattin (n 9 above) 880. 
96  See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the case of the Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecution's Observations on the Applications for Participation of Applicants 
a/0001/06 to a/0003/06, 6 June 2006 Doc. No ICC-01/04-01/06; DRC Situation Participation 
Decision 17 Jan 2006. 
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The PTC has a major role to play in determining whether charges should be 
proffered against a particular suspect, informed by the criterion of ‘gravity’.97 While 
the PTC’s finding on this question may not necessarily be motivated by its desire for 
victims of alleged crimes to participate at a later stage, the nature of suspected actions, 
number of victims and nature of victimization would certainly feature in the 
determination of ‘gravity’ of alleged crimes. In any case, the PTC may allow victims’ 
presentations during the process to furnish evidence in favour of a finding that crimes 
proposed by the Prosecutor are serious enough to warrant further consideration by the 
Court.98 
In the relationship between the Prosecutor and PTC lies an open space for a 
potentially crippling struggle for control, which may undermine victims’ right to 
participate at particular stages especially where it is optional. In considering initial 
decisions so far rendered by the PTC (in particular PTC I), commentators see a desire 
by the Court to assert itself.99 With respect to victims’ role at the investigation stage, in 
a comment that may equally apply to the rest of the proceedings, De Hemptinne and 
Rindi consider the manner in which PTC will interpret what appear to be its limited 
powers as the most decisive factor in shaping the form and scope of victim 
participation.100 While the Court seems to want to assert a greater role in 
investigations, as shown in the ICC Regulations in terms of which it can request the 
Prosecutor ‘to provide specific or additional information or documents in his or her 
possession’,101 there is still ambiguity regarding the actual scope of PTC’s investigative 
powers which will in the end determine ‘appropriate levels of victims’ participation in 
proceedings.’102  
 
5.4.3 Forms of Participation at the Investigation Stage 
 
                                                
97  Art 17 (b) Rome Statute. 
98  Article 15 (3) Rome Statute supports this interpretation. 
99  See generally J de Hemptinne & F Rindi (n 93 above) 342-350. 
100  Ibid 349. 
101  The Pre-Trial Chamber may request the Prosecutor to provide specific or additional 
information or documents in his or her possession, or summaries thereof, that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber considers necessary in order to exercise the functions and responsibilities set forth in 
article 53, paragraph 3 (b), article 56, paragraph 3 (a), and article 57, paragraph 3 (c). 
102  Hemptinne & Rindi (n 93 above) 350. 
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The Rome Statute does not envisage victim-initiated prosecutions.103 The prosecutorial 
function in general and the decision to commence investigations and to proffer charges 
in particular lie entirely with the Prosecutor.104 Although it may appear that for this 
reason victims are entirely excluded from the investigation stage of the proceedings, 
this is not the case. As our ensuing discussion shows, a number of provisions formally 
recognize their input in specific instances: various provisions require that victim’s 
views be taken into account by the appropriate officials responsible for the decisions; 
and the Statute and ICC RPE secure the right of victims to be informed of the 
proceedings. 105 
A discussion of the modalities of participation in terms of various provisions 
follows. First, Article 68(3), which enacts the right of victims to be heard, imposes an 
obligation on the Court vis-à-vis persons recognised as victims in terms of which they 
are authorised, irrespective of ‘any specific proceedings being conducted in the 
framework of such an investigation, to be heard by the Chamber in order to present 
their views and concerns and to file documents pertaining … [to an] investigation of 
… [a] situation’.106 Although not expressly commented on by PTC I, it is evident that 
Article 68(3) entails both substantive and procedural elements of the right to 
participation. It affords individuals standing to claim their status as victims and to 
assert their recognised rights. 
 
5.4.3.1 Measures Protective of Persons and Evidence  
 
The first instance in which victims have a specific right to participate relates to the 
PTC’s powers, in particular relating to when the PTC adopts measures in relation to 
persons and evidence : the protection and privacy of witnesses and victims; 
preservation of evidence; protection of arrested persons or those who have appeared in 
                                                
103  See Aldana-Pindell, ‘In vindication of justiciable victims’ right to truth and justice for state-
sponsored crimes’ rights in the criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes’ 
35 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l Law 1399-1501 1429 noting that ‘the Rome Statute and ICC RPE 
do not grant victims complete autonomy to make decisions regarding either the initiation of 
criminal investigation or how the investigation should proceed before trial’; Mekjian & 
Varughese (n 11 above) 19. 
104  Art 42 Rome Statute. 
105  R Aldana-Pindell (n 103 above) 1429; Mekjian & Varughese (n 11 above) 19. 
106  Although made with respect to the situation in the DRC, the PTC I view applies to any 
situation or case in general. See DRC Participation Decision 17th Jan 2006 para 200-237. 
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response to summons; and the protection of national security information.107 Equally, a 
unique investigative opportunity may arise (which requires quick action to secure 
evidence) necessitating adoption of measures considered essential for the defence at 
trial in case of such unique investigatory opportunity.108 It appears that in these cases, 
only victims known to the OTP and Registry will be afforded an opportunity to 
express themselves in such proceedings. 
 
5.4.3.2  Specific Proceedings Under Art 68(3) 
 
As a framework provision on participation, Article 68(3) seems sufficiently broad to 
found all sorts of applications by the Prosecutor, defence or victims and their 
representatives on this specific question. PTC I has confirmed this view, noting that 
situations when specific proceedings are initiated by the Prosecutor or Defence 
Counsel and other requests by victims in terms of this article present an open 
opportunity for victims to voice their concerns.109 Procedural issues relating to such 
applications by victims are dealt with in the RPE.110 In the PTC I’s view applications 
by victims will be decided on a case-by-case basis to determine the impact on their 
(the victims’) interests.111 In all instances, the Court retains the power to determine the 
possibility and actual form victim participation will take.112 
 
5.4.3.3 Authorisation of an Investigation Proprio Motu by Prosecutor 
 
Article 15 of the Statute, which governs the Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigative 
powers in general, is the first instance in which victims are vested with procedural 
rights outside the context of a case.113 Article 15(3) Rome Statute, which falls under 
the general rubric of prosecutor-initiated investigations (as opposed to investigations 
                                                
107  In terms of art 57(3) (c) Rome Statute; art 54(3) (f) relating to the duties of the Prosecutor in 
this regard. 
108  Art 56(3)a Rome Statute. 
109  DRC Situation Participation Decision (n 72 above) para 74. 
110  Rule 89 ICC RPE. 
111  DRC Situation Participation Decision (n 72 above) para 75. 
112  See J Hemptinne & F Rindi (n 93 above) 346 noting, in response that victims’ rights at this 
stage are only potential, that the PTC ‘wishes exercise strict control over the actual 
implementation of the victims’ right of participation’. 
113  Uganda Situation Participation Decision, para 93. 
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arising from referrals either from the UN Security Council or a state party to the 
ICC),114 provides the possibility of victims participating before the full investigation 
phase of the proceedings when the Prosecutor seeks authority to commence such 
investigations: 
If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he 
or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, 
together with any supporting material collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-
Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.115 
 
In terms of this provision, once the Prosecutor concludes that there is reasonable basis 
to commence an investigation, victims – those who have had some prior contact with 
the Court and are known either to the Prosecutor or the Victims and Witnesses 
Unit116 - have the first opportunity to participate by making written representation to 
the PTC.117 This means that victims can participate from the start. Their participation 
may have at least two objectives – to support an argument for or against 
commencement of an investigation and eventually a case; and 2) to begin to assert 
their interests early in the proceedings. The Court noted in the DRC Case that victims’ 
interests are affected since this is the crucial stage when perpetrators of crimes at issue 
are identified.118 In the Uganda Case, PTC II was of the view that victims’ interests are 
affected as their views may help establish the factual and legal elements for the 
decision to authorise the investigations.119  
The permissive ‘may’ rather than a peremptory ‘shall’ used in Article 15 (3) 
speaks to the non-compulsory nature of this entitlement – it signifies that relevant 
victims merely have the possibility of intervening as prescribed in pre-trial 
procedure.120 The facultative nature of this right diminishes substantially the possibility 
of victims asserting any influence on the proceedings at this stage. Essentially, this 
                                                
114  In this case, victims are only involved when the referring party – UNSC or the state seeks 
confirmation. 
115  Uganda decision para 90 on victim’s role under art 15 Rome Statute. 
116  Rule 50 (1) ICC RPE. Prosecutor has an obligation to inform them (or their representatives) 
unless such action would pose a danger to the integrity of investigations or well being of 
victims; Uganda Participation Decision (n 53 above) para 91. 
117  Rule 50 (3) ICC RPE; Regulation 50(1), ICC Regulations; Uganda Participation Decision para 
91 reiterating that the Prosecutor has an obligation to inform known victims before 
commencing these proceedings before PTC. 
118  DRC Situation Participation Decision (n 72 above) para 72. 
119  Uganda Situation participation Decision (n 53 above above) para 90. 
120  Donat-Cattin (n 9 above) and GJ Meksjian & MC Varughese (n 11 above) both use the term 
‘faculty’.  
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means that victims may be faced with the prospect of being spectators – and being 
‘appended’ to the process at a later stage. The impact of victims on the process, in 
view of the broad restorative justice goal of the ICC, must be asserted from the start, 
with concessions to the efficiency of Prosecutor’s functions. This logic was central to 
the victim rights movement that articulated the necessity of expanding victim influence 
from the end of the process (sentencing) to all stages of the proceedings. In the current 
arrangement, where the prosecutor is merely exhorted to consider victims, they risk 
becoming ‘hostage’ to the Prosecutor’s functions.  
While victims may not have actual control over how an investigation should 
proceed, or if it should be initiated at all, and what charges should be proffered – these 
being in the exclusive province of the Prosecutor – the imprint of victims’ concerns on 
these decisions other than through direct input can be achieved through the conduct 
and standards expected of the Prosecutor when initiating an investigation in terms of 
Article 53 and 54 Statute.121  
 
5.4.3.4 Confirmation: To Investigate or Not? 
 
When deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the prosecutor is obliged to 
consider – in addition to the admissibility of the relevant ICC crime alleged122 – the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims.123 While the rules do not clarify the 
two terms – ‘gravity’ and ‘interests of victims’ – the extent of the effect the alleged 
crime has had on the victim(s) is one of the elements to be considered in assessing 
‘gravity’ of the crime.   
When an ICC crime has been committed and the admissibility requirement is 
met but the Prosecutor decides not to continue with an investigation on grounds that it 
would not be ‘in the interests of justice’ to do so, s/he is obligated to inform the 
PTC.124 In the same vein, after investigation, if he or she decides not to prosecute on 
the same grounds – gravity of crime and interest of justice – this decision must be 
                                                
121  Arts 53 and 54 govern investigations generally irrespective of how the matter came to the ICC 
through either of three trigger mechanisms. 
122  In terms of art 53(1) (a) and (b) Rome Statute, there should be reasonable basis that an ICC 
crime has been committed, and that admissibility requirements in terms of art 17 Rome Statute 
have been met. 
123  See wording and general tenor of art 53, in particular art 53 (1) (c) Rome Statute. 
124  Art 53(1)(c) Rome Statute. 
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communicated to the PTC. In both instances, the PTC is empowered to bring its 
powers of review to bear, and may force the Prosecutor to reconsider and reopen 
investigation (or prosecution).125 
 The confirmation proceeding may be initiated by the state that made the 
referral or the Security Council126 or by the PTC on its own initiative.127 An obvious 
handicap to victims is the fact that it appears that they do not have a similar right. Yet, 
they often will have, from a victim’s standpoint, more important interests to protect 
than states. It could, however, be argued that victims’ interests are partly covered since 
PTC’s decision shall be communicated to all parties involved in the review.128  
The endorsement or otherwise by the PTC of the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
investigate or proceed with an investigation is necessarily a balancing one which 
involves a consideration of, among others, victims’ concerns. The PTC would have to 
consider whether in the particular circumstances victims are better served by restraint 
from prosecution rather than by insisting that the prosecutor should investigate and 
eventually charge and prosecute suspects. The important issue here would be how the 
Court interprets ‘interests of justice’ in any particular situation. One factor that may 
confront the Court and which will have a bearing on this finding include, apart from 
the suspects’ rights, is whether there are other ongoing processes, usually at the 
national level - political or otherwise – aimed at addressing to one extent or another 
victims concerns. Such alternatives, considered further below, will include subsequent 
peace and transitional justice mechanisms – TRCs and the like – that incorporate 
accountability for crimes under investigation by the ICC. The centrality of the PTC in 
the decision once again highlights the salient point that the role afforded to victims 
will, irrespective of what appear in the Statute and Rules as peremptory roles for 
victims depend on how the PTC exercises its review and investigative mandates. 
 
5.4.3.5 Charging, Confirmation of Charges and Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
                                                
125  Rule 110 (1) and (2) ICC RPE empowers the PTC to request the Prosecutor to reconsider the 
decision not to prosecute on the grounds of gravity of the crime and interest of justice. 
126  Art 53(3) (a) Rome Statute. 
127  Art 53(3)(a) Rome Statute. 
128  Rule 110(1) ICC ICC RPE. In terms of Rule 110(2) ICC ICC RPE, the decision reviewing the 
Prosecutor’s position requires a majority of PTC judges concurring. 
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Once the prosecutor has gathered evidence in respect of specific crimes, he or she is 
expected to bring charges against identified individuals. The Statute confirms the 
Prosecutor’s overall authority over prosecutions, in particular charging of suspects.129 
Article 61 relating to confirmation of charges does not provide for participation by 
victims or their counsel, nor does it expressly refer to either. However, PTC I, by 
reading a multiplicity of relevant provisions, allowed victims to participate through 
counsel in Lubanga Confirmation hearing.130 This is likely to be a standard practice in 
future. In terms of modes of participation, Pre-Trial Chamber I ordered that victims; 
may make opening and closing statements;131 may, through legal representative 
participate at public hearings on a case-by-case basis; and would not be permitted to 
add any point of fact or any evidence and may only be allowed to question or propose 
questions for witnesses subject to conditions.132 As discussed later on, the Appeals 
Chamber has taken a different view on the possibility of victims contributing in terms 
of fact and bringing evidence.133 Although victims may participate in these forms at 
this stage, victims do not seem to have a real chance of shaping the charge sheet. 
Proceedings in the Lubanga Case seem to support this view. In this case, in which 
Thomas Lubanga Dylo was charged with enlisting or conscripting children under 
fifteen years or using them actively in hostilities in the context of an internal armed 
conflict, victims’ complaints that he should have been charged with more crimes went 
unheeded.134 
                                                
129  Art 61 Rome Statute. 
130  Arts 57(3) (c), 61(5), 61(7), 67 and 68(3) Rome Statute and Rules 87, 88, 89(1), 121 and 122 
ICC RPE. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, The Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dylo, Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, 
a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing, 22 September 2006. Victims’ counsel 
were able to make opening and closing statements as well as to file written observations 
following the confirmation hearing. 
131  Ibid, page 6-7. 
132  Having initially barred participating victims from questioning the sole prosecution witness on 
account of their anonymity status, PTC I later allowed them to propose a question. See ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-39-ENG. pages 95 and 141.  
133  Infra, note 201. 
134  See Document Containing the Charges, filed on 26 August 2006; charges in terms of Arts 8(2) 
(B) (XXVI) and 8(2)(E)(VII) Rome Statute; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Decision on Confirmation of Charges (Lubanga 
Confirmation Decision), para 9. 
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By contrast, the PTC has wide powers to influence the Prosecutor’s decision.135 
In the Lubanga Case, the PTC reminded the OTP that the charge sheet should have 
included another charge relating to the same crime but committed in an international 
armed conflict. The Court provided no other reason for its view than that the Rome 
Statute provides the same protection in relation to conscription and use of child 
soldiers.136 In our view, there are at least two grounds upon which the PTC can have an 
influence on what crimes the Prosecutor should proffer against an accused: in general 
through the confirmation of charges proceedings or even earlier – coherence of 
jurisprudence and ‘sufficient gravity test.137 If PTC contemplated these, it did not 
expressly articulate them. After the sweeping statement above regarding similar 
protection, the PTC I appeared to base its decision solely on a factual analysis of the 
situation at all material times tending to show the co-existence of internal and 
international armed conflicts.138  
The first ground we suggest seems to be the imperative that the Court needs to 
develop coherent jurisprudence with respect to particular ICC crimes. Although the 
PTC in Lubanga did not specifically mention this, it seems to be the main factor 
underlying its refusal to adjourn proceedings in terms of Article 61(7) Rome Statute so 
that the charges could be amended.139 The Rome Statute seems to needlessly create a 
dichotomy between comparatively similar crimes on the basis only of the context in 
which they were committed. The only justification for such dichotomy could be that 
international humanitarian law instruments have maintained the dichotomy between 
the two types of conflicts and that this must necessarily be reflected in the Rome 
Statute, which draws the war crimes provisions from both contexts.  
In the Lubanga Case, it did not make sense that Lubanga was only charged 
with the war crime of conscripting or using children under fifteen years in hostilities in 
                                                
135  Art 61(7) Rome Statute confers upon the PTC powers to: confirm charges; decline to confirm 
charges where there is insufficient evidence; adjourn and request for more evidence; and to ask 
the Prosecutor to amend charges to reflect those provable by available evidence. 
136  Lubanga Confirmation Decision, para 204 PTC I agreed with counsel for victim a/0001/06 that 
the Rome Statute provided the same protection with respect to the crime charged, whether it 
was committed in an internal or international conflict. 
137  Art 61 Rome Statute. 
138  Lubanga Confirmation Decision, para 71-. 
139  Art 61(7) Rome Statute confers upon the PTC powers to: confirm charges; decline to confirm 
charges where there is insufficient evidence; adjourn and request for more evidence; and to ask 
the Prosecutor to amend charges to reflect those provable by available evidence. 
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an internal armed conflict, yet the conflict at all material times demonstrated elements 
of an international armed conflict as well. While this outcome of the Lubanga 
Confirmation Decision may indicate a contestation of turf between the Office of the 
Prosecutor and the Pre-trial Chamber,140 the PTC is justified in its move which seems 
to be motivated by the need for coherence in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
The second ground on which the PTC can influence the Prosecutor’s decision 
derives from the ‘sufficient gravity test’ provided for under admissibility requirements 
in terms of which the Court can refuse to admit a matter on the basis that crimes 
alleged are not of sufficient gravity.141 While the test may operate preponderantly to 
lead to the exclusion of charges on grounds that they are not sufficiently grave to 
warrant attention from the Court, it is perfectly possible that the Court, on the basis of 
available evidence, will ask the Prosecutor to amend the charge sheet to include or 
augment the charge to a graver crime. The PTC’s powers under Article 61(7)(c)(ii) 
support this view.142  
Although complaints from victims that there was evidence to support graver 
crimes committed in the conflict in the DRC by the accused were rebuffed by the 
Prosecutor and were not canvassed by the PTC, the ruling the Lubanga Confirmation 
Case seems to support the view that the Court is willing to interfere with prosecutorial 
discretion in relation to charging.143 As such, there is room for it to act to advance 
victims’ interests in this sphere. However, the Prosecutor seems to have chosen, as he 
is entitled to, to proffer charges he could easily prove against Lubanga. There is doubt 
however, in view of victims’ rights in the ICC, whether the inclination by the OTP not 
to entertain concerns from victims when framing charges is tenable and sustainable 
under the ICC. 
                                                
140  OP says PTC overreached its power under art 61(7) Rome Statute. 
141  Art 17(1) (d) Rome Statute. 
142  7. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the basis of the hearing, determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each 
of the crimes charged. Based on its determination, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall: 
 … 
 (c) Adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider: 
 … 
 (ii)     Amending a charge because the evidence submitted appears to establish a different  crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
143  It is notable that art 61 seems to exclude victims entirely from the process. The Prosecutor, the 
accused, and PTC are the only ones entitled to participate in confirmation proceedings. As such 
it is the PTC to reflect victims’ concerns in exercising its powers under art 61(7) of the Statute. 
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5.4.4 International Tribunals 
 
The ad hoc international criminal tribunals offer no relevant experience as regards the 
participation of victims at the investigation stage of criminal proceedings as no 
comparable provisions exists in the statutes or RPE of the tribunals. By contrast, there 
is a burgeoning body of jurisprudence from international human rights tribunals 
relating to a number of aspects on victim participation, although these views generally 
lack in specificity and are not systematic. This is understandable since these bodies are 
not criminal tribunals thus their comments can only be general in character.  
On the status and role of victims in criminal proceedings, PTC I cited with 
approval the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) decision affirming 
victims’ ‘independent voice and role’ in Berger v France144 which confirmed its earlier 
decisions that victims participating in criminal proceedings cannot be regarded as 
either the opponent or necessarily the ally of the prosecution, their roles and objectives 
being clearly different.145 The European Court has interpreted Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on the right to a fair hearing to include the right of victims to 
participate from the investigation stage of proceedings. In the European Court view, 
the right to participate from the investigation stage is of particular importance where 
the outcome of the criminal proceedings is crucial to obtaining reparations.146 
The Inter-American Court has taken the same view in its interpretation of 
Article 8(1) of the American Convention.147 It has held consistently after Blake v 
                                                
144  ECHR Berger v France, ‘Judgment’ 3 December 2002, Application No 48221/99, para. 38; 
European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Perez v France, “Judgment”, 12 February 
2004, Application No. 47287/99, para. 68. 
145  DRC Participation Decision (n 72 above) para 51. 
146  See ECHR decisions in Moreira de Azevedo v Portugal, ‘Judgment’, 23 October 1990, Series 
A No. 189; Tomasi v France, ‘Judgment’, 27 August 1992, Series A No.241-A; Acquaviva v 
France, ‘Judgment’, 21 November 1995, Series A No.333-A; Selmouni v France, ‘Judgment’, 
28 July 1999, Application No.25803/94; Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy, ‘Judgment’, 17 January 
2002,Application No. 32967/96; Perez v France, ‘Judgment’, 12February 2004, Application 
No. 47287/99; Antunes Rocha v Portugal, ‘Judgment’, 31 May 2005, Application No. 
64330/01. 
147  Provides that: Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a 
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by 
law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the 
determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature. 
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Guatemala148 that victims of human rights violations or their relatives are entitled to 
take steps during criminal proceedings, from the investigation stage and prior to 
confirmation of the charges for a number of reasons, to have the facts clarified and the 
perpetrators prosecuted, and to request reparations for the harm suffered.149 
 
5.4.5 National Experiences 
 
One finds contrasting experiences in civil law and common law countries in general 
relating to the involvement by the victim at the investigation stage of criminal 
proceedings. In the contemporary common law tradition, the victim ‘remains largely a 
bystander to the criminal justice system’.150 Although relied upon as witnesses to prove 
the commission of the crime and its effects victims do not exert much influence on the 
course of investigation, prosecution, trial or sentence.151 As outlined in chapter three of 
this thesis, national experience does not disclose a separate role for victims other than 
‘assisting with investigations’ with little or with an insignificant in the actual direction 
of proceedings, unless they are mandated to conduct a private prosecution. It was 
noted in the last chapter that only a few common law countries allow for private 
prosecutions. It is precisely for these reasons that the victims’ rights movement 
embraced restorative justice to give centrality to victims in their interactions with the 
offender. It emerged also that civil law countries have long recognised in varying 
degrees the right of victims to participate in criminal proceedings in general and to an 
extent in the investigations. In the case of partie civile procedure, victims have the 
right to initiate investigations by constitution de partie civile and to be informed of 
proceedings subject to the usual confidentiality requirements. Since the procedure in 
these systems is not as elaborate as that in the ICC, victims are accorded a lesser role 
at this stage, at which the investigating judge exercises overall control and is 
responsible for the general conduct of the investigation. 
                                                
148  Blake v Guatemala ‘Judgment’, 24 January 1998, Series C No 36 para 97. 
149  See also Villagrán Morales, Case No. 63, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. C, P 227; R. Aldana-Pindell, 
‘An emerging universality of justiciable victims' rights in the criminal process to curtail 
impunity for state-sponsored crimes’, (2004) 26:3 Human Rights Q. 605. 
150  M Wolfgang, “Making the Criminal Justice System Accountable” (1972) Crime and 
Delinquency, January, 15 at 18; R Refshauge ‘Victims rights and the role of the prosecutor’ 
Criminal Reform Conference Paper, July 2006. 
151  Ibid, 10. 
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5.5  TRIAL PHASE 
5.5.1 Victims and the Trial: What Expectations? 
 
The trial phase represents the most visible stage of participation for victims, not only 
in their traditional role as witnesses on both sides, but also as independent participants 
with special interests to articulate before the Court. Some may question what victims 
can expect or achieve through such participation in an adversarial environment where 
the Prosecutor seems to be the main player. In these circumstances – as is the case in 
criminal procedures in many national criminal justice systems where victims play no 
independent role - the prosecutor is ordinarily expected to represent and to protect the 
interests of third parties including victims. Such a claim fails to recognise, irrespective 
of duties imposed by Statute, that the Prosecutor’s and victims’ interests do not always 
converge and that the Prosecutor may often be driven by a singular objective in 
furtherance of his/her law enforcement function – establishing guilt (or lack of it) as 
efficiently as possible, a fact that may lead to ignoring issues central to victim’s claims 
and concerns. The cathartic possibilities arising from a victim being heard aside, (for 
those who get the chance) an independent voice is necessary. The Prosecutor’s 
opposition to what may turn out as benign effects on his work and to the rights of 
accused persons, and to what is in any case subject to strict judicial controls, attests to 
this necessity.152 
 
5.5.2 Trial and Victims in National Systems 
 
In national criminal justice systems, the scope of victim participatory rights at trial 
varies significantly from one jurisdiction to another but may be said to fall into four 
broad categories. In the first group of states, which are very few, participating victims 
exercise full prosecutorial rights.153 While granting victims such a right gives them an 
                                                
152  In the DRC Situation Participation Decision (n 72 above), the Court has, while asserting these 
rights, affirmed its intention to subject their exercise in specific cases to scrutiny and controls 
153  Art 101 Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure; See generally United Nations Office for Drug 
Control and Crime Prevention, Handbook on Justice for Victims: On the Use and Application 
of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (UN 
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opportunity to express their concerns and views throughout the proceedings, the need 
for professional prosecution has had the result that most prosecutorial work is left to 
trained prosecutors.154 In the second group of states, part (subsidiary) prosecutorial 
powers are accorded to victims, enabling them to perform functions related to 
prosecutorial work such as submit evidence, suggest questions to be posed to witnesses 
and the defendant, and to comment on statements and evidence submitted in the 
proceedings.155 In the third group of states, victims have an even lesser role. 
Participation by victims is limited to Victim Impact Statements or Victim statements 
of opinion, largely aimed at influencing sentencing.156 The majority of jurisdictions are 
in the last group, where victims play no part beyond their role of witness.157 It is clear 
that only a handful of states allow any meaningful role for victims in trial proceedings.  
As was discussed at some length in a preceding chapter, this state of affairs 
may be explained by concerns that victim participation is disruptive, burdensome, and 
potentially prejudicial to defendants through delays occasioned by the increased 
number of actors. By granting victims rights to participate at trial, the Rome Statute 
seems to dispel these claims. However, safeguards in the Statute, in particular Article 
68(3) and other relevant provisions, endorse the idea that the claims by those opposed 
to any extended role for victims of crime are not entirely without merit. Hence the 
close controls and active role for the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers of the ICC 
discussed below. 
 
5.5.3 Victims in the ICC Trial Framework 
 
Participation by victims at the trial stage will certainly be the most public and most 
visible. Whether from a victim’s standpoint their participation at this stage will have a 
                                                                                                                                        
Handbook on Victims) (1999) 39; C Stahn, Olasolo H and Gibson K ‘Participation of victims in 
pre-trial proceedings’ J of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006), 219-238 at 220. 
154  UN Handbook on Justice for Victims 39. 
155  See generally United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Handbook on 
Justice for Victims: On the Use and Application of the Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (New York, 1999) 39; C Stahn et al (n 153 
above) 220. 
156  Victim impact statements are in use in the US, Canada, New Zealand, Israel and Australia. 
157  See for instance ss 150 and 151 Criminal Procedure Act 51 1977 South Africa, which provides 
for roles for the prosecutor and accused only; Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter 75) Laws of 
Kenya; Criminal Procedure Code Act 30 of Ghana; Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
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greater impact in asserting their rights than at the preliminary stage is a different issue 
altogether. We have previously considered how effective participation at the pre-trial 
stage not only sets the tone for the trial stage but also is imperative for the effective 
exercise of victims’ rights in the entire ICC process. Whilst at the trial stage of the 
proceedings victims are granted an absolute right to participate by themselves or 
through their legal representatives, the drafters seem to have favoured participation 
through counsel. How this reality somewhat erodes an individual victim’s right to 
participate but at the same time enhances the quality and effectiveness of input in the 
process has been canvassed above. 
Broadly, the general participation framework applicable to the pre-trial stage is 
relevant at this stage of proceedings – Article 68(3) Rome Statute, Rule 89 ICC RPE 
and other relevant rules of procedure. Specific provisions of the Statute and rules 
relevant to particular modes of participation and other elements at the trial stage are 
outlined below. Before discussing specific modes of participation by victims at trial, 
proceedings when guilt is admitted are considered first. 
 
5.5.4 Admission of Guilt and Plea Agreements 
5.5.4.1 Plea Agreements at ICTR and ICTY 
 
The debate on the right of victims to participate in criminal proceedings in general and 
at trial in particular touches another important practice – plea agreements. These are in 
use in many national systems and at the ad hoc criminal tribunals. Though practised 
for many years in some domestic criminal justice systems, plea agreements – which 
involve negotiations relating to crimes to be charged and possible sentences to be 
imposed – are of recent advent in international criminal justice. Plea agreements have 
entered the practice of the two international tribunals – ICTR and ICTY – in the last 
few years, necessitated by heavy case loads, the need to address complexity of crimes 
and dwindling resources.158 The proportion of cases concluded through plea 
                                                
158  See A Tieger & M Shin (n 66 above) 666-679. The first plea agreement in the history of the 
ICTY was the negotiated guilty plea in Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Case No : IT-96-22-T, (1997) 
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agreements to that of the total cases finalised by both tribunals suggest that this 
practice is now a permanent feature in the practice of both tribunals.159  
As practised by the UN tribunals and national systems, plea agreements raise a 
number of concerns from a victim’s perspective including: the right and opportunity of 
victims to be heard; the impact on the historical record; the dismissal of charges; and 
the reduction of sentences in the interests of increased efficiency.160 The trial stage may 
be considered as the opportune moment for victims to be heard. Tieger and Shin opine 
that the absence of a trial may be seen as ‘muting and disempowering victims.’161 
Since one objective of the tribunal is to establish truth and to create, to the extent 
possible, a full historical record, an abridged version of the trial proceedings certainly 
undercuts the related right of victims – that to truth. Greater involvement by the judges 
in the process may perhaps ensure a balance favourable to victims. 
At the tribunals, prosecutors negotiate plea agreements without the 
involvement of victims or the judges, although sentencing is at the discretion of the 
Trial Chamber.162 Following concerns that the practice of non-disclosure by the 
prosecutor of the contents of plea agreements had serious implications, a new rule was 
added to the ICTY’s RPE providing that a Chamber shall not be bound by a plea 
agreement and that the Chamber ‘shall require the disclosure of the agreement in open 
session or, on a showing of a good cause, in closed session’.163 As noted, a good 
proportion of cases concluded at the tribunals have been achieved by negotiated guilty 
pleas.164 
 
5.5.4.2 Plea Bargaining in National Jurisdictions 
 
                                                
159  Alan Tieger & Milbert Shin (n 66 above) 627. 
160  Ibid 667. 
161  Ibid 674 argue since trials ‘are often viewed as the opportunity for the voice of the victims’, the 
absence of the trial process may be perceived as muting and disempowering victims’. 
162  Articles 22 and 23 of the Statute and Rule 101 ICTR ICC RPE. 
163  Rule 62ter ICTY ICC RPE. 
164  GR Watson ‘The changing jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’ 37:4 New England R. 882-883; M Bohlander, ‘Plea bargaining before the ICTY’ 
in Richard May et al. (eds) Essays on ICTY procedure and evidence in honour of Gabrielle 
Kirk McDonald (2001) 151; Prosecutor v Jelisic, Case No.: IT-95-10, Judgement, 5 July 2001; 
Prosecutor v Todorovic, Case No.: IT-95-9/1, Sentencing Judgment, 31 July 2001, paras. 7-17; 
Prosecutor v Sikirica, Case No.: IT-95-8, Sentencing Judgement, 13 Nov 2001, paras. 17-39; 
Prosecutor v Simic, Case No.: IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, 17 Oct. 2002, paras. 9-23. 
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Plea agreements have been widely used for years in most common law jurisdictions.165 
The practice is in general shunned in civil law countries, which adopt an approach 
focused on the establishment of truth. In civil law countries that have plea bargaining, 
the practice is of relatively recent advent in criminal procedure.166 As is the case in 
most common law countries, the Prosecutor makes most critical decisions in the daily 
administration of justice including which laws to apply, what charges to proffer and 
punishments to be meted out.167 Plea agreements have attracted a fair share of criticism 
from those who consider them trading justice for efficiency. Plea bargaining seems to 
be motivated by, and has been endorsed by the Courts in these countries on, largely 
economic grounds.168 In the United Kingdom, commentators have criticised this 
practice, arguing that at the expense of victims, serious charges are dropped by the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to avoid the expense of a trial.169 With seemingly 
all-powerful prosecutors, plea bargains raise serious rights concerns similar to those 
discussed in relation to the practice at the ad hoc tribunals both for defendants and 
victims.170  
 
5.5.4.3 Plea Agreements in the ICC: A Possibility? 
 
With respect to the ICC, an interesting situation is presented. In principle, most states 
did not want plea-bargaining to be introduced in the ICC.171 In principle, one main 
consideration seems to have motivated this somewhat hard and even impractical stance 
taken by states – that due to the seriousness of ICC crimes, a full trial must always 
ensue once evidence supporting a chargeable crime is available.172 Related to this, and 
given the emphasis on victims in the Rome Statute, it may be in the interest of victims 
to hold a full trial to, among others, establish a full historical record and provide a 
                                                
165  B Williams Working with victims of crime: Policies, politics and practices (2000). 
165  See generally Victim Support The Rights (2000) 108. 
166  R Frase ‘Comparative criminal justice as a guide to American law reform: how do the French 
do it, how can we find out, and why should we care?’ (1990) 78 California LR 539. 
167  Yao Ma ‘Prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining in the United States, France Germany 
and Italy: A comparative perspective’ International Criminal Justice Review 12 2002 22. 
168  Ibid, 26. 
169  See S Lees Ruling passions: sexual violence, reputation and the law (1997). 
170  Yao (n 167 above) 26. 
171  See F Guariglia, 824. 
172  Ibid, 824. 
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broader basis for reparations claims. One may however argue that avoiding a full trial 
may indeed be good for victims who may be exposed to further suffering at trial.173 We 
can assert with some conviction on the basis of international experience of the unlikely 
necessity for plea bargains in the ICC. This arises from the fact that the conditions that 
necessitated plea agreements in the UN tribunals – limited resources and heavy 
workloads – are unlikely to afflict the ICC. The fact that only four suspects are in the 
custody of the Court and that only one trial has commenced speaks for itself. 
The commitment to the ideal of full trials in every ICC case charged and the 
fact that plea-bargains are unlikely to be necessary for resources reasons aside, the 
reality is likely to be different.  The Prosecutor may still choose to urge defendants to 
plead guilty to obviate the need for long and costly trials where overwhelming 
evidence exits. This is unlikely to happen soon as the ICC is presently concerned with 
building reputation for itself and may be inclined to snap up any available case to its 
final conclusion.  
However, Article 65(5), which falls under the general rubric ‘proceedings on 
admission of guilt’, seems to contradict these intentions:  
 Any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding modification of the charges, 
the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall not be binding on the Court.  
 
Irrespective of drafters’ intention, this provision could be the basis for plea bargains in 
the ICC. It is interesting to note that this provision seems to reproduce, almost in its 
entirety, the amended rule relating to plea agreements at the ICTR and ICTY. Article 
65(5) presupposes in our view that the Prosecutor could in practice enter negotiations 
with accused persons over admission of guilt, charges to be preferred and sentences to 
be imposed.174 If by interpretation Article 65(5) will be held to support plea 
agreements, the formulation of Article 65(5) affirming that such agreements are not 
binding on the Court would allow the Court to exercise control and to reject such 
bargains. One reason for doing so could be that the agreement is not in the interests of 
justice, in this case, in the interest of the rights of victims to participate. Where the 
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agreements. 
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Prosecutor attempts to cut a deal that excludes civil liability arising from crimes 
charged for instance, the Court would reject on account of victims’ right to reparations. 
Unlike at the national level and at the ad hoc tribunals before the amendment to 
the rules, the Prosecutor does not seem to have much to offer to an accused other than 
to motivate leniency before the Court. There is no scheme of sentencing in the Statute 
or RPE and sentencing is a prerogative of the Trial Chamber.175 Whatever approach is 
taken, the Trial Chamber is in a good position to ensure that victims’ interests are 
factored into the pleas. The Statute and rules support the involvement of victims at all 
stages subject to established criteria. 
 
5.5.5 Modes of Participation at the Trial Proper 
 
Where guilt is not admitted and the case goes to full trial, victims are afforded 
possibilities to participate, through their legal representatives who can make oral 
presentations and interventions at the hearing, through written submissions, or both. It 
is evident from this that the victims’ legal representative is not intended to be a silent 
observer during proceedings. Rule 89 ICC RPE secures victims’ right to make opening 
and closing statements at trial. This rule, which governs applications for 
participation generally, which are made to the Registrar and transmitted to the 
Prosecutor and defence for comment, provides in the relevant part of sub-rule 1: 
 […] Subject to the provisions of sub-rule 2, the Chamber shall then specify the 
proceedings and manner in which participation is considered appropriate, which may 
include making opening and closing statements. 
 
PTC I has ruled similarly in prior rulings.176 A basic reading of this rule suggests that 
the drafters envisaged broad participation. Rule 89, and Rule 91 that governs aspects 
relating to the manner in which the victims’ representative is to participate, are 
                                                
175  In terms of art 77 (Part 7) Rome Statute only life imprisonment is prescribed for in case of 
‘extreme gravity’ of crime. Imprisonment terms may in other cases not exceed 30 years; 
Guariglia, 831. 
176  Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo) 
Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 
at the Confirmation Hearing, 22 September 2006 at 6 in which PTC confirmed that victims 
have a right to make opening and closing statements at proceedings in which they are allowed 
to participate. 
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underlain by the premise that it is for the Court to decide on the issues.177 Rule 91(2) 
ICC RPE entitles victims’ representatives to participate:    
A legal representative of a victim shall be entitled to attend and participate in the proceedings 
in accordance with the terms of the ruling of the Chamber and any modification thereof given 
under rules 89 and 90. This shall include participation in hearings unless, in the circumstances 
of the case, the Chamber concerned is of the view that the representative’s intervention should 
be confined to written observations or submissions. The Prosecutor and the defence shall be 
allowed to reply to any oral or written observation by the legal representative for victims. 
 
In terms of this rule, the right to take part in hearings, and thus make oral 
representations seems to be a discretionary one. However, there is a presumption that 
the victim’s representative will always be present and participate in hearings unless the 
Chamber decides otherwise.178 When the victim’s representative participates in 
hearings, he or she may intervene by questioning a witness, an expert or the accused.179 
This right will be granted on prior written application to the Chamber, which is entitled 
to see the questions in advance and may convey them to the Prosecutor and defence if 
appropriate. The Trial Chamber will regulate the right to question in terms of Rule 
91(3)(b) which requires that it take ‘into account the stage of the proceedings, the 
rights of the accused, the interests of witnesses, the need for a fair, impartial and 
expeditious trial and in order to give effect to Article 68, paragraph 3.’ As 
discussed already, Article 68(3) of the Statute provides for general terms on which 
victims may participate – personal interests, appropriateness and defendant’s 
rights.  
The right of a legal representative to put questions to witnesses, experts, and 
accused is likely to be a very contentious one. The reason is that this may be damaging 
to strategies adopted both by the prosecutor and or the defence. Lee records that this 
fear preoccupied delegates at the Conference.180 It is perhaps for this reason that 
despite the representative’s right to participate in this way, it was necessary to put the 
Trial Chamber in close control. Where the Trial Chamber considers that questions 
prepared by the victims representative must be asked, but that it is inappropriate for the 
representative to do so, it may for this reason take up the role and ‘put the victim’s 
representative’s question to the witness, expert or accused on behalf of the victim’s 
                                                
177  Mekjian & Varughese (n 11 above) 25. 
178  Lee (n 25 above) 466; Mekjian & Varughese 27. 
179  Rule 91(3)(a) ICC RPE; Ibid, 26. 
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legal representative.181 The need to balance interests of parties is nowhere clearer. 
While Rule 91 as read together with Article 68(3) embraces an extensive role for 
victims to ensure that their voice is heard, it embodies the recognition that the interests 
of the defence and prosecution have to be protected. For this reason, the central role of 
the Court in the realisation of the victims’ right to participate could not be more crucial 
because of the delicate balance required. 
Another mode of participation provided for under Rule 91(2) ICC RPE is 
through observations or submissions. While the difference is not evident, judging from 
how these terms have been used in the Statute and RPE, ‘observations’ means that 
counsel is allowed to comment, in this instance, in writing, on presentations or 
submissions made by either the Prosecutor or the defence. This could for instance be 
after a particular hearing or in response to an application by either party. 
‘Submissions’ on the other hand refer in our view to, in this instance, written views of 
the victims’ representative made in advance of accessing prosecutor’s or defence’s 
arguments on a specific issue(s) or applications.  
Through written observations and submissions, victims’ representatives who 
have participated in various proceedings so far have not limited their views to victim-
specific concerns. They have acted as a sort of ‘amicus curiae’ and provided the Court 
with views on a range of issues under discussion.182 The participation of victims’ legal 
representatives is turning out not only to serve and advance victims’ interests, but is 
also valuable to the Court in the sense that it is afforded an extra source of thought-out 
opinions on broad issues before it. 
With regard to the all important enabling procedural right to access information 
and documents and to be notified of proceedings, the Court has ruled that Rule 131(2) 
of the ICC RPE affords participating victims the right to consult the record of the 
proceedings, including the index, subject to any restrictions concerning confidentiality 
and the protection of national security information. The Appeals Chamber has 
endorsed the position that Rule 92(5) ICC RPE which provides for a mandatory right 
for victims or their legal representatives to be notified in a timely fashion of all public 
proceedings and filings before the Court. In its view, victims will additionally be 
                                                
181  Rule 91(3) (b) ICC RPE. 
182  For instance, see written submissions relating to Lubanga Confirmation Hearing.at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int> . 
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afforded access to confidential material to the extent that such access does not breach 
other necessary protective measures if in the view of the Chamber a victim's personal 
interests are materially affected.183 
 
5.5.5.1 Trial, Defendants’ Rights and Role of Trial Chamber 
 
Victims have proposed in a recent hearing that the extent and the form victim 
participation will take during the trial will largely depend on whether the Chamber 
decides to hold reparations hearings as part of trial or as a separate post-trial 
procedure. Victims have argued in the appeal proceedings following the confirmation 
hearing in Lubanga that if reparations are part of the trial, then victims should have 
appropriately broad rights to examine witnesses (under Regulation 56) and should be 
allowed to intervene whenever the evidence or the issues during a hearing relate to 
reparations.184  
The defence has suggested that victims should be allowed to participate in 
specific stages of the trial only when their interests are affected and that it should not 
be a blanket permit covering the entire trial. They argued that if the Chamber grants 
the victims the opportunity to participate in the various ways requested by their legal 
representatives, this would essentially afford victims the same rights as the prosecution 
and the defence and could in consequence create an imbalance in the trial, thereby 
prejudicing the rights of the accused.185 The defence urged the Court to consistently 
appoint common legal representatives for victims rather than allow individual victims 
to participate under Article 68(3), in order to promote promptness, efficiency and 
expeditiousness.186  
Although the Appeals Chamber in its majority decision did not address this 
question directly, Judge Song’s separate opinion attached to the Appeals Chamber’s 
decision is relevant, insofar as it addresses the potential delays that may be occasioned 
                                                
183  Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Appeals Chamber Decision of 18 Jan 2008, paras 106-
107. 
184  Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 
and a/0105/06 concerning the "Directions and Decisions of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 
February 2007, 1CC-01/04-01/06-925 para 10-18. 
185  Ibid, para 52. 
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by allowing victims to put questions to witnesses and experts when reparations issues 
arise during trial. Judge Song concluded that participation of victims per se is not 
contrary to a defendant’s right to an expeditious trial, as ‘[u]nless special 
circumstances exist, this delay is not inconsistent with the rights of the accused, but 
merely a consequence of the fact that the Statute provides for the participation of 
victims in the proceedings before the Court.’187 Once again, appropriate intervention 
and control by the Court is crucial in maintaining the right balance in proceedings.  
As regards questioning of witnesses, the accused and experts, the Appeals 
Chamber has endorsed the approach suggested by the victims that questioning should 
not be limited to reparations issues, noting that the Court will allow questioning as 
long as the victims’ interests are engaged. In the same vein, victims will be allowed to 
adduce evidence at trial if it contributes to discovery of the truth or if the Court 
requests it, presumably for this purpose.188 The Appeals Chamber has rightly refused to 
lock out victims on the basis of abstract speculation that their participation as 
described prejudices defendants. It correctly endorses what seems to be the emerging 
case-by-case or participant-by-participant approach taken by both PTC I and PTC II in 
earlier decisions discussed. 
A question that may arise is whether the roles described above for victims 
could result in ‘double prosecution’ of the accused. Would such fears be justified? As 
noted above, while the right of victims to participate at all stages is unequivocally 
entrenched, victims are not a ‘true or genuine party’ to proceedings since their role in 
any particular proceeding is subject to judicial approval. As such, while victims may 
be allowed to put questions to the accused, witnesses and experts, their status could 
never be elevated to that of a prosecutor. While intervention is largely to protect their 
interests, it is conceivable that submissions made by them or their representatives 
could strengthen the Prosecutor’s case against the accused. Their role is however vital 
given that the Prosecutor’s interests may not always converge with those of victims. 
As the evolving jurisprudence shows, the Prosecutor has for the most part allowed 
victims’ representatives to make their own case as long as they do not jeopardise the 
OTP’s strategy or conceivably prolong the process. Similarly, the defence has on 
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occasion endorsed victims’ submissions by not challenging them.189 However, while 
victims’ representatives cannot do the Prosecutor’s job, their input, to the extent that it 
helps the Prosecutor’s case may mean that there is an imbalance in terms of resources. 
Nevertheless, one does not immediately see how this would result in prejudice to the 
defence, especially in view of the Court’s control function.  
With respect to the presumption of innocence, defence counsel suggested that 
reparations proceedings should be dealt with separately from the trial, since the issue 
of reparations only arises if there is a guilty verdict. In their view, although Regulation 
56 permits the Trial Chamber to hear evidence for a decision on reparations and for 
purposes of trial at the same time, this should be the exception rather than the general 
rule as the latter approach would undermine the presumption of innocence.190 The 
Appeals Chamber has rejected this suggestion,191 endorsing the Prosecutor’s proposal 
for a ‘blended approach’ providing that if both issues can reasonably be dealt with in 
the same proceeding, victims should be allowed to question witnesses on 
reparations.192 The Court undertakes in terms of its mandate to carefully separate the 
relevant evidence relating to reparations from that tending to show the guilt of the 
accused at this stage.193  
From the above discussion, the weighty nature of the Trial Chamber role is 
evident. The Trial Chamber is obliged to ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and 
is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the 
protection of victims and witnesses.194 Trial Chamber is required to regulate the 
participation of victims and victims’ counsel in the terms described. When doing so, it 
is obliged to ensure that a balance is maintained among the often contending interests 
– those of prosecutor, defendants and victims (and witnesses) as outlined above. It 
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needs n general, Trial Chamber takes must assume the leading role with which it is 
entrusted in the conduct of proceedings.195  
However, developments in the Lubanga case show that the manner in which 
the Trial Chamber exercises its powers in terms of article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, in 
particular in regulating the interactions between victims and the Court could prove 
problematic for defence rights. Just as the Prosecutor concluded his case, the Trial 
Chamber I issued a decision on 14 July 2009, relating to the possible 'legal 
recharacterisation' of the facts. Trial Chamber is of the view that the facts in case 
against Lubanga characterises five new crimes under the Rome Statute: three charges 
of sexual slavery (both as a war crime and a crime against humanity), one of inhuman 
treatment and one of cruel treatment).196 This was in response to a request from 
victims’ representatives, who had argued since Lubanga was first indicted that the 
Prosecutor should not have limited his case to recruitment and use of child soldiers, 
but should have included ‘blood crimes’.197 
The recharacterisation decision in Lubanga raises a number of complex legal 
questions. How does Regulation 55(2) (judge made rules)198 relate to Article 61(9) of 
the Rome Statute relating to confirmation of charges? An integrated reading of article 
61 seems to suggest that Trial Chamber’s powers are limited to allowing the 
Prosecutor to withdraw charges after trial has commenced. How does one read Article 
74(2) of the Rome Statute, which provides that ‘the decision shall not exceed the facts 
and circumstances described in the charges [and that] the Court may base its decision 
only on evidence submitted and discussed before it at trial’. We do not delve into these 
questions here.199 However, it suffices to conclude that the manner in which these 
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provisions are interpreted impinge on fair trial guarantees in a fundamental way. At a 
practical level, the most obvious result of this decision is that the trial may drag on for 
a few more years, with profound implications for the right to an expeditious trial. 
Although the matter is far from being concluded, the question is whether it is fair to 
spring new charges on the accused at this late hour, despite the Prosecutor having had 
opportunities in the past. However, including the new crimes perhaps reflects better 
the nature of crimes suffered by victims at all material times.200 This said, the 
developments – although far from conclusion – illustrate how asserting victims’ rights 
could prejudice in a serious manner the rights of the accused. Whether the facts that 
have already been adduced so far can support the charges as Trial Chamber suggests is 
another matter altogether. 
 
5.5.5.2  Beyond the Trial: Appeals and Other Proceedings 
 
The Appeals Chamber is vested with power to hear appeals on matters arising from the 
Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. So far, the Appeals Chamber has only heard one appeal 
and rendered a decision relating to specific aspects of the participation of victims.201 
Since the Appeals Chamber applies the Statute, Rules and regulations of the Court, the 
same criteria relating to victim participation are applicable.202 In its first decision, the 
Appeals Chamber dismissed the joint application of three victims to participate in the 
determination of the preliminary issue of the admissibility of the appeal against the 
decision on the confirmation of charges. The majority found that the applicant victims’ 
personal interests were not affected by the issue, since the Appeals Chamber's 
determination would neither result in the termination of the prosecution nor preclude 
the victims from later seeking compensation, and the victims had not put forward any 
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other basis on which their personal interests were affected.203 This ruling shows clearly 
that it is in the interest of victims of crime that suspects against whom there is 
evidence are prosecuted and that victims would be entitled to intervene in proceedings 
when there is a possibility of termination.  
The view above – that victims would be allowed to participate at appeal if their 
interests were shown to be affected – was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in 
Lubanga204 following Trial Chamber I decision to dismiss charges against the accused 
over abuses incurred by the Prosecutor’s non-disclosure of exculpatory materials 
covered by Article 54(3)(e) Rome Statute agreements. The Appeals Chamber  agreed 
with victims and the Prosecutor that since the Appeals Chamber’s ruling (over the 
Prosecutor’s appeal of Trial Chamber I’s release decision) could result in termination 
of the case against Lubanga, victims interests were affected since they could not 
participate in the trial and would be unable to request for reparations against the 
accused.205  
In reparations proceedings, victims have the right to participate through legal 
representatives on two occasions. The first relates to proceedings when reparations are 
considered. In this regard, the Statute provides:  
Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall take account of 
representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, other interested persons or 
interested States.206 
 
The second possibility arises when there is an appeal relating to reparations orders – 
brought either by the victim, convicted person or bona fide owner of the property in 
question. The Statute stipulates as follows: 
A legal representative of the victims, the convicted person or a bona fide owner of property 
adversely affected by an order under Article 75 may appeal against the order for reparations, as 
provided in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.207 
 
The restrictions on questioning of accused, witnesses and experts applicable during 
trial do not apply during reparations proceedings:  
For a hearing limited to reparations under Article 75, the restrictions on questioning by the 
legal representative set forth in sub-rule 2 shall not apply. In that case, the legal representative 
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may, with the permission of the Chamber concerned, question witnesses, experts and the 
person concerned.208 
 
This means that should reparations issues not be dealt with at the trial stage, victims 
seem to have broader scope and more possibilities to participate at the post trial 
stage.209 Suffice to say for purposes of this chapter that following the Appeals Chamber 
decision in Lubanga, it is unlikely that the Court will conduct a fully-fledged 
reparations proceeding within the trial itself. Although at the appeals stage, it will be 
necessary, should a matter come to appeal that combines both reparations and ‘non-
reparations’ concerns, that the Chamber consider both in the same hearing. That said, 
should a matter come on an appeal that combines both reparations and non-reparations 
concerns, it will be necessary for the Chamber to consider both in the same hearing. 
Concerns relating to reparations are dealt with in some detail in the next chapter.  
                                                
208  Art 91(4) ICC RPE. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
OPERATIONALISING THE VICTIMS’ REGIME II: REPARATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction: The ICC Reparations Framework 
 
As noted in chapter one, the Rome Statute has been celebrated largely for providing 
for the right to reparations.1 Previous chapters discussed how this issue has been dealt 
with in national and international tribunals. This chapter examines particular aspects of 
the right in the Rome Statute. In this regard, the chapter makes reference to the rather 
muted normative developments at the international level in the period preceding its 
adoption,2 human rights jurisprudence as well as relevant mass reparations 
mechanisms deployed in varying contexts. 
There are two ‘focal points’ for the victims’ reparation function – the Court in 
terms of Article 75 and the Victims’ Trust Fund (VTF) in terms of Article 79 of the 
Rome Statute.3 Article 75 of the Statute establishes the right to reparations providing 
that ‘the Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.’4 For its part, Article 79 
creates the Victims Trust Fund (VTF) for the benefit of victims of crimes within the 
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Un Doc E/CN.4/2000/62) (Bassiouni Report). 
3  L Taylor ‘Thoughts on victims’ reparation and the role of the Office of the Prosecutor’ (2003) 
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4  Art 75(1) Rome Statute; For a history of the provision, see D Donat-Cattin ‘article 68’ in 
Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: observer’s 
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jurisdiction of the Court, and for the families of such victims.5 The Court is required to 
‘determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, 
victims and will state the principles on which it is acting.’6 Having so determined, the 
Court is empowered to make an order directly against a convicted person specifying 
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims. In appropriate cases, the Court 
may order that such an award be made through the Trust Fund. 7 Rules 94 to 99 ICC 
RPE set out the procedures for reparations to victims.8 In some instances, this 
procedure is linked to the participation regime.9 As related to the VTF, the RPE cited 
as well as the Regulations of the Assembly of States Parties complete the legal 
framework.10  
Neither the Statute nor the ICC RPE prescribes how these provisions will be 
implemented. 11 It falls to the Court to establish not only appropriate mechanisms and 
procedures for processing reparations but also the relevant principles as required by 
Article 75(1) Rome Statute. Wierda and de Greiff have observed with regard to the 
complexities involved in this regime that ‘while the principles are beyond dispute, the 
modalities are far from resolved’. They rightly observe that ‘the creation of a Trust 
Fund closely associated with a Court raises both practical and conceptual challenges 
that require careful deliberation’.12  
This chapter suggests that any bid to implement the ICC reparations regime 
must address at least the following issues, which are discussed further below: 1) 
                                                
5  Art 79(1) Rome Statute. 
6  Art 75(2) Rome Statute. 
7  Art 75(2) Rome Statute. 
8  Reparations may be granted by the Court upon request of victims or based on a motion of the 
Court itself.  
 The Court may invite to the reparations’ hearings not only the victims and the convicted 
persons (with their respective attorneys), but also other interested persons or interested States 
whose properties could be affected by the rulings on reparations.  
 In terms of Rule 91(4), no restrictions in terms of 91(2) RPE applies to questioning of 
witnesses in reparations proceedings. 
9  Art 75(2) Rome Statute; Dylo Appeals Camber Decision; Rule 91(2) ICC RPE 
10  Assembly of States Parties Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims.  
11  See M Henzelin, V Heiskanen & G Mettraux ‘Reparations to victims before the International 
Criminal Court: Lessons from international mass claims processes’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law 
Forum 317-344 at 338 noting that the ‘Statute and Rules do not provide … any predetermined 
mechanisms or procedures for processing reparations claims and the implementation of 
awards’. 
12  M Wierda & P de Greiff ‘Reparations and the International Criminal Court: A Prospective 
Role for the Trust Fund for Victims’ International Center for Transitional Justice’ (2005) 1; 
See M Henzelin et al (n 11 above) 319 writing of the challenges facing the ICC in this regard 
as ‘momentous’ and ‘great’. 
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whether the trial and reparations (‘civil liability’) issues, can and should be combined 
in one proceeding; 2) whether Articles 75 and 79 establish two separate ‘reparations 
frameworks’ within the Court, and, if so, what are the links and how should they be 
implemented to complement each other in the Court’s reparations mandate; 3) what 
are the reparations principles and rules related to actualization of the specific issues 
such as assessment of damage, loss or injury to or in respect of victims? ; 4) what is 
the link between the right to participate and the right to reparations – is the latter 
predicated on the former? – in view of the fact that: i) at least some reparations issues 
may be dealt with within the trial; ii) reparations proceedings must necessarily involve 
some participatory role for victims whether effected within the trial or in separate 
proceedings.13  
This chapter attempts to answer these questions by reference to the Statute, the 
ICC RPE and ASP Regulations on the Trust Fund as well as to relevant practice and 
jurisprudence from international and domestic tribunals. Evidently, the nature of 
reparations issues are such that principles and practices may have to be sought beyond 
criminal law.14 Additionally, in view of the novelty of reparations in international 
criminal tribunals, the practice of other international tribunals, in particular human 
rights tribunals, as well as domestic tribunals outlined in chapters three and four 
respectively is of particular relevance.  
Before addressing these issues systematically, the justification for reparation in 
the ICC is considered. 
 
6.2 Reparations as Restorative Justice: Why Reparations in the ICC? 
 
In the introductory chapter, it was concluded that discourse in international criminal 
justice tends to inaccurately equate ‘restorative justice’ with ‘reparations’ to the 
                                                
13  de Greiff (n 12 above) at 1-2 identify two broad ‘challenges’ which are considered within the 
context of the issues outlined by this chapter: 1) the fact that Court and a ‘fund’ generally 
present two different approaches to reparations; and 2) conceptually, reparations is tied to 
issues of responsibility. See Henzelin et al.  
14  See L Taylor (n 3 above) 4 that since ‘the principles of compensation, restitution, rehabilitation 
and other forms of reparations are not rooted in the criminal law’… ‘those who organize and 
manage the victims’ reparation function will require expertise in fields such as personal injury 
and other wrongs, claims processing and management, remedies, victims’ rights and banking 
and financial matters’.  
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exclusion of other constitutive elements of restorative justice. This finding, supported 
in subsequent chapters, strengthened the basic assumption of this study – that 
restorative justice is a wider concept underpinned by a number of values and 
principles. While this thesis agrees with the discredited position, at least to the extent 
that it recognizes ‘restorative justice’ as constitutive of reparations as a basic element, 
it is deemed important to briefly investigate the assertion that restorative justice is 
nothing more than reparations.  
Further investigation of this seemingly ‘given’ position – that ‘restorative 
justice’ is ‘reparations,’ – serves, for the purposes of this thesis, at least two things. 
First, it responds to an important question: why reparations as a right in an essentially 
criminal process. Secondly, it lays foundation for addressing some of the more critical 
questions and challenges posed by what is viewed here as the ‘transformation’ of the 
criminal process by including the victims’ rights regime in the ICC. In view of these 
two concerns, the question ‘why a reparation right’ in the ICC?’ is therefore not a 
superfluous one. Nor does it generate artificial challenges for the Court.  
Since the unprecedented trial of war criminals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the 
idea that victims of human rights violations have a right to seek action against the 
responsible individuals or states is well established in numerous international human 
rights instruments both at global and regional level.15 Although entrenchment of these 
principles in international instruments comes with a positive obligation requiring states 
to provide effective remedies at the national level, advancements in norm generation at 
the international level have not been matched by effective implementation on the 
domestic plane.  
Increasingly therefore, although international mechanisms are meant to 
complement those at the domestic level, they are often the only available viable route 
                                                
15  V Morris & MP Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (1995) 1-11; Art 8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Arts 
2(3)a, 14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) G.A. Res. 217A (111), 
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., arts. 8,10, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); art 14 the Convention 
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) G.A. 
Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (1984); 
23 I.L.M. 1027, 24 I.L.M. 368; Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Dec. 
11, 1985); art 6 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights; European Convention on 
Fundamental Rights; American Convention on Human Rights.  
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to justice for victims. When a state is unable to prosecute perpetrators for want of 
relevant institutions, it is needless to entertain the thought of the possibility that 
victims’ concerns could be addressed in such a situation. On this account, it is opined 
that the international institutions established to punish perpetrators should be equally 
empowered to attend to specific victims concerns. This is in keeping with collective 
commitments in relation to victims. But while this explains the need for mechanisms 
that complement domestic efforts to incorporate victims’ concerns and rights, it does 
not necessarily explain why an international body adjudicating criminal law should 
include a reparations component. 
At the national level, commentators have explored the justifications for using 
restitution in substantive criminal proceedings to compensate victims of crime. Writing 
in the context of United States and Australia, both of which reformed their criminal 
justice systems to provide for victims in the last few decades, Kerch identifies two 
justifications: to restore the voice of victims in the system and to empower them and to 
build legitimacy of the criminal justice system by restoring public faith in its 
functions.16 Oftentimes, there is failure to appreciate the centrality of crime victims to 
the success of the system. The author notes that legitimization is only achievable 
through the recognition of restitution as a valid substantive goal of criminal law 
beyond retribution, reformation, deterrence, and incapacitation.17  
A third reason suggested here for the need to incorporate substantive issues of 
restitution and compensation in the criminal trial relates to the failure, for a range of 
reasons, of alternative avenues to proffer viable choices for victims. 18 
Critics of the distinction between criminal and civil law have rightly argued 
that abandoning victims of crime to their own devices and requiring that they pursue 
                                                
16  M Kerch ‘The empowerment of the crime victim: a comparative study of victim compensation 
schemes in the United States and Australia (1994) 24 California Western ILJ 345. 
17  Ibid, 347. 
18  LN Henderson, ‘The Wrongs of victims’ rights’ (1985) 37 Stanford LR 937-1021 at 1007 
noting that: [i]f crime victims have ‘rights,’ the right to recover from the wrongdoer is the most 
tenable individually based right. Restoration of the victim to the status quo ante is what the tort 
system is supposed to accomplish, and its failure to do so in instances of criminal harm has led 
many commentators and politicians to advocate grafting tort principles onto the criminal law, 
typically at the sentencing stage’. 
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civil remedies in a different forum is ‘unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative’.19 In 
support of restitution within the trial, or as a complement to imprisonment, it can be 
argued convincingly that criminal law and civil law are mutually complementary and 
that they have overlapping goals of retribution, deterrence, compensation, and 
rehabilitation.20 
For victims of international crimes, the argument that they can approach a 
relevant civil tribunal at the international level cannot be entertained in the absence of 
such tribunal. As discussed in chapter three, there are so far, two kinds of international 
tribunals/commissions that have adjudicated civil claims at this level - those in respect 
of claims between states; and special commissions in respect of property-related 
claims from individuals against states in the context of diplomatic protection. For 
reasons advanced in that chapter, the state responsibility framework in which these 
tribunals operate is unsuited to individual claims related to international crimes of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Proposals for such a specialized 
tribunal are yet to be effected.21 It was demonstrated in chapter two that international 
criminal tribunals since Nuremberg have lacked competence to adjudicate beyond 
criminal sanction. It was noted that in that chapter that the failure to provide for 
victims beyond routine protection has been one of the shortcomings of these tribunals. 
Against this backdrop, the creation of an institution that incorporates both elements – 
punishment through criminal prosecution and reparations to victims of international 
crimes at the international level responds in similar fashion as certain national criminal 
justice systems discussed in chapter four did in the 80s. These instituted criminal 
justice reforms granting the right to reparation to victims and creating compensation 
funds. 
The idea that an international criminal tribunal such as the ICC can and should 
dispense such form of justice is not new. The earliest proposal for a permanent 
international criminal Court recognised the need to incorporate a restitutive element in 
                                                
19  See for instance Editorial Notes Victim restitution in the criminal process: a procedural 
analysis’ (1984) 97 Harvard LR 933 – 37; K King ‘Criminal Restitution’ (1988) 31 Howard LJ 
423. 
20  See Editorial Notes, at 934-37. 
21  See generally R Dixon, ‘Rape as a crime under international humanitarian law: where to from 
here?’ 13 European JIL 697 who argues for the establishment of an international victims' 
compensation/reparations tribunal (ICVT) for the victims of gender-based crimes of genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
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such a tribunal. This proposal, made in 1872 by Gustave Moynier, co-founder of the 
ICRC, suggested the creation of an international criminal Court to try people for 
breaches of the laws of war as then established.22 More specifically, it proposed that 
persons convicted in such a Court for breaches of the Geneva Convention of 186423 
should pay compensation to victims, the scope of which he did not specify.24 In case of 
a convicted person being unable to pay, their governments would be responsible. The 
latter suggestion, which would imply state responsibility to pay compensation to 
victims of international crimes (at the time limited to the Convention of 1864), was the 
subject of intense and protracted debates during the negotiation of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC.25  
In Rome, some states were opposed to the inclusion of the right to reparations 
in the ICC partly because they feared that such provision could undermine the 
individual criminal responsibility basis of the Court and that it would expose them 
[states] to undesired reparations claims.26 Three further objections were raised by states 
to motivate their objections to the inclusion of reparations in the Statute. These 
concerns, which remain relevant today, are challenges that remain to be addressed as 
the ICC attempts to give effect to the reparations provisions.27  
                                                
22  See Draft convention for the establishment of an international judicial body suitable 
for the prevention and punishment of violations of the Geneva Convention by Gustave 
Moynier, Geneva, 1872 (art 1) (Draft Moynier Convention); Gustave Moynier ‘Note sur la 
creation d’une institution judiciaire internationale proper a réprimer les infractions a la 
Convention de Genève Bulletin international des Sociétés de secours aux militaires blesses, 
Comite international, No. 11, avril 1872 at 122-227 (Cited in Amnesty International ‘The 
International Criminal Court: ensuring an effective role for victims’ at 
<http://www.vrwg.org/Publications/02/AIRoleforvictims99.pdf>(accessed on 12 January 2005) 
3. 
23  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the 
Field (22 August 1864), which laid the foundation for contemporary international humanitarian 
law but was later replaced by the Geneva Conventions of 1906, 1929 and 1949 on the same 
subject. 
24  Art 7 ‘Draft Moynier Convention’. See Christopher Keith hall, ‘The first proposal for a 
Permanent International Court’ International Rev. Red Cross No 322 at 57-74 at 73, also 
available at <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JP4M> (Accessed on 6th 
February 2006). 
25  The idea of state responsibility to pay restitution was the subject of protracted debates at the 
Rome Conference. See C Muttukumaru ‘Reparation to victims’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The 
International Criminal Court: The making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results 
(1999) 262-270 at 264; T Ingadottir ‘The trust fund for victims’ in T Ingadottir (n 25 above) 
(ed) The International Criminal Court: Recommendations on policy and practice (2003 111-
141 128. 
26  See Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 264 speaking of the feared potential of art 73 (later art 75) as a 
‘stalking-horse’ for reparations claims against states. 
27  See section 6.5 below. 
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First, states were concerned with the possibility that a reparations component 
would distract the Court’s attention from what they considered its core purpose, 
envisioned as to ‘prosecute, in fair and effective manner, those accused of the most 
serious crimes of international concern.’28 The introductory chapter of this thesis has 
suggested that functions of the ICC as currently constituted are multifaceted. As such 
this first concern, which related to an ICC before the inclusion of the right to 
reparations, stands inaccurate today.  
Opponents of the right to reparations advanced a second objection linked to the 
first one. They suggested that the inclusion of reparations raised the practical 
difficulties involved in asking a criminal Court to adjudicate on the form and extent of 
reparations not least because ICC judges would originate from different legal 
traditions.29 It is notable, as outlined in greater detail in chapter three of this study, that 
although procedural aspects differ, some national criminal justice systems have long 
embraced such a right for victims. Others, predominantly of common law tradition, do 
not recognise this right. Concerns of a conceptual and practical nature generated by 
this dichotomy are addressed in the context of defendants’ rights in this and the 
previous chapter (in view of the right to an expeditious trial and effectiveness of the 
Court process). 
Thirdly, some states were concerned about the implications the award of 
reparations by a supranational criminal Court would have for domestic criminal justice 
systems that do not recognise the concept of reparations for victims of (serious) 
crime.30 Chapter three of this study revealed the inconsistencies in national law on the 
subject. In the discussion of interactions between the ICC and national criminal justice 
systems as it relates to reparations, it is here suggested that these fears, while valid – in 
as far as they are a reaction from an untenable position that may arise where similarly 
placed victims are treated differently at the ICC and in national tribunals – fail to 
appreciate the fact that any disparities between the ICC reparations regime and 
national law do not prevent both systems from functioning as independent juridical 
                                                
28  Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 263; see discussion in chapter one above on objects of the ICC. 
29  Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 264; Prep Com. 
30  Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 264; Prep Com. 
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spaces, though complementary to each other.31 The inclusion of the provision to the 
effect that victims’ rights under the Rome Statute do not prejudice their rights under 
national and international law is recognition of varying protections under different 
legal regimes, although the highest standard is to be sought, whether under 
international law or national law.32  
According to Muttukumaru, ‘the real question’ for states in Rome was whether, 
notwithstanding the objections, a right to reparations ought to prevail.33 It is opined 
that overall responses to this question, the triumph of the proponents of Article 75 and 
its eventual inclusion in the final text of the Statute are relevant factors in appreciating 
the paradigm embodied in the ICC. Chapter one of this thesis outlined at length the 
factors on the basis of which it is argued that a restorative justice approach is intended 
in the ICC.34  
During the negotiations for the ICC Statute, states unsupportive of reparations 
took the view that the very establishment of the Court constituted implicit recognition 
of victims’ rights through its retributive and deterrent functions and that guarantees of 
non-repetition were assured in case of convictions.35 However, Muttukumaru records 
that with the passage of time, delegations gradually took the view that ‘a Court whose 
exclusive focus was purely retributive would lack a dimension needed to deliver 
justice in a wider sense’ and that it was ‘increasingly realised that victims not only had 
an interest in prosecution of offenders but also had an interest in restorative justice, 
whether in the form of compensation or restitution or some other form.’36 The 
realisation that reparations could foster reconciliation and restoration of individuals 
and society in general convinced states to embrace what is evidently a broader concept 
of justice. As noted in the introductory chapter of this study, while commentaries on 
                                                
31  M Delmas-Marty, ‘Interactions between national and international criminal law in the 
preliminary phase of trial at the ICC’ (2006) 4 J of International Criminal Justice 2-11 at 2 
refers to the international and national spheres as separate espaces juridiques. 
32  Art 75(6) Rome Statute; Donat-Cattin, 976-77. 
33  Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 264. 
34  These factors, motivated in Chapter one are: 1) the objects of the ICC; 2) the victims’ 
participatory and reparative regime and related mechanisms themselves; 3) various other 
mechanisms and concepts in the Statute and Rules such as ‘interests of justice’, a new reading 
of ‘fair trial’ unlimited to defendants and ‘fairness’ and; 4) a proper reading of the application 
and interpretative clause (article 21) as not only supportive but also demanding of a restorative 
justice approach in interpretation. 
35  Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 264.  
36  Ibid. 
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the ICC do not elaborate their claim, they seem to be united in the fact that the ICC 
embodies ‘a broader concept of justice’.37   
As outlined in some detail in chapter one, it is argued that the inclusion of 
reparations in the ICC firmly grounds restorative justice in the Court and its processes. 
It is suggested that together with the participatory regime discussed in the previous 
chapter, the right to reparations grounds victims’ concerns in the Court in such a 
manner that first, they must temper the interpretation of prosecutorial functions and 
defence rights, and secondly they must affect fundamentally the overall functions of 
the ICC and the kind of justice it dispenses.  
 
6.3 Reparations: Definitions and Forms 
 
While the right to reparations as formulated in Article 75 of the Rome Statute is new, 
there is already sound legal basis for such a right elsewhere and various accounts of 
what it entails. In chapter three, the jurisprudence from international tribunals 
operating in a state responsibility framework was discussed in general fashion. The 
focus here is to apply relevant principles and models elaborated in national and 
international Courts and commissions to the ICC framework, which entails individual 
‘civil responsibility’. Before considering various models in the next section, the 
various forms of reparations are briefly outlined.  
The question of terminology in the context of remedies is an area riddled with 
uncertainty and confusion.38 Even at national level, commentators lament this apparent 
lack of clarity.39 While the Rome Statute may provide some guidance as to what forms 
of remedies are applicable, what is meant by particular remedies and the operational 
principles remain to be clarified. Article 75 makes reference to reparations, restitution 
                                                
37  Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 264; see Pablo de Greiff ‘Introduction: Repairing the past: 
compensation for victims of human rights violations’ in de Greiff (ed) The Handbook of 
Reparations (2006) 1-18 2 noting that reparations may occupy a special place in a transition 
out of conflict or towards democracy. See Final TRC Report, Volume 5, Chapter Five noting at 
para 21 that ‘without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing 
and reconciliation, either at an individual or a community level.’ 
38  See D Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (1999) 1 lamenting the lack of 
precise theory and terminology of remedies in international law. 
39  See for instance A Kull ‘Rationalising restitution’ (1995) 83 California LR 1191-1242 at 1191 
decrying the ‘linguistic confusion that bedevils the law of restitution’. 
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and compensation all in the same breath, but seems to suggest that restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation are ‘types’ of reparations.40  
It is thus useful to appreciate the broader language of remedies in international 
and municipal law. In general, there is a tendency by legislators, Courts and scholars 
alike to use these terms eclectically, more often than not attributing similar meanings 
to different terms.41 One of the most crucial questions posed at the Rome Conference 
during deliberations for the adoption of the Rome Statute was whether a possible right 
to reparations would be limited to compensation, or would extend to other forms of 
reparations.42 The final formulation of Article 75 suggests an open-ended approach, in 
the sense that the Court may extend its appreciation of ‘reparations’ and attendant 
principles beyond the enumerated ‘types’.  
‘Reparations’ has a basis both in tort (delict) law and the law of state 
responsibility.43 In human rights, it is a generic term representing ‘all types of redress, 
material and non-material, for victims of human rights violations’.44 As such, 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation cover particular aspects of reparation.45 
Reparation, which is ‘generally framed as repair for past damage, putting the victim 
back where he or she would have been had the wrong not occurred’,46 usually denotes 
a monetary consideration (compensation) or ‘other valuable resources’. However, it is 
not limited to this.47  
                                                
40  Art 75 Rome Statute provides in part: ‘The Court shall establish principles relating to 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 
41  AT Harland ‘Monetary remedies for victims of crime: Assessing the role of the criminal 
Courts’ (1982) Univ of California LR 52 60-64 describing this confusion within the context of 
US debates. 
42  Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 263. 
43  N Roht-Arriaza ‘Reparations decisions and dilemmas’ (2004) 27 Hastings International and 
Comparative LR157-219 at 129.Various human rights treaties provide for the right to an 
‘effective remedy’ and exhort states to ensure such in case of violation of protected rights; 
Chorzow Factory Case; Articles of State Responsibility; D Shelton ‘Righting Wrongs: 
Reparations in the articles of State Responsibility’ 96 American J of International Law (2002) 
833-856. 
44  Theo van Boven ‘Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for 
victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 of 2 July 1993, para 13. 
45  Theo van Boven (n 44 above); B Saul ‘Compensation for unlawful death in international law: a 
focus on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2004) 19 American Univ ILR 523-584 at 
541. 
46  Roht-Arriaza (n 43 above) 1160. 
47  Roht-Arriaza (n 43 above) 159; KO Gorgone ‘Between vengeance and forgiveness: facing 
history after genocide and mass violence’ (2000) 24 Suffolk Transnational LR 211-232 218. 
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The UN's Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation lists five 
basic categories of reparations: (i) restitution or restitutio in integrum, which is aimed 
at restoring the victim to the status quo ante or ‘original situation’ before the violation 
occurred; (ii) compensation, in terms of which every quantifiable harm - material and 
non-material - is compensated; (iii) rehabilitation, which could include all relevant 
medical, psychological, social and legal support services; (iv) satisfaction, which is 
fairly broad and would include such varied measures as public apologies, truth-finding 
processes, sanctioning perpetrators; and (v) guarantees of non-repetition, including 
institutional and legal reform, and promoting mechanisms to prevent and monitor 
future social conflict.48  
Satisfaction or moral reparations takes various non-material forms including 
official acknowledgement of wrong, apology, disclosure of the details of the offence, 
service to the victim or a cause chosen by them.49 Satisfaction may be fulfilled by more 
elaborate ways of ‘telling the story’ including an undertaking to memorialisation.50  
The actual scope and meaning of restitution is not uncontroversial. Restitution 
may be defined as the ‘action of restoring or giving back something to its proper owner 
or making good or giving an equivalent for any loss, damage or injury previously 
inflicted’.51 This definition conflates two issues: giving back something to its proper 
owner; and ‘making good for loss, damage or injury.’ Kull has argued convincingly 
that restitution refers to the body of substantive law, and the set of remedies associated 
with this body of law, in which liability is not founded on tort or contract but depends 
                                                
48  Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, GA Res., UNGAOR, 60th Sess., UN Doc. A/Res/60/147 (16 December 
2005) paras. 19-23. See also, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni: 
The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. UNESCOR, 56th Sess. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, 
(January 18, 2000) which provides a comprehensive outline of reparations. 
49  J Coben & P Harley ‘International conversatins about restorative justice, mediation and the 
practice of law’ (2004) 25 Hamline J. Pub L & Policy 235-234 239 241; Roht-Arriaza (n 43 
above) 158-160. 
50  The Inter American Court on Human Rights has on numerous occasions required governments 
to construct monuments in remembrance of victims of gross human rights violations. See 
generally B Saul (n 45 above) 157. 
51  See Black Law Dictionary (5th Ed 1979) 118; D Laycock ‘The scope and significance of 
restitution’ (1989) 67 Texas LR 1277 at 1279-80; Terminological and conceptual problems 
bedevil restitution see Kull (n 39 above) ‘Rationalizing restitution’ (1995) 83 California LR 
1191 1192-93. 
 182 
on unjust enrichment.52 This definition seems to limit itself to restitution in the first 
respect. In this case, remedies usually entail the return or restoration of something to 
its rightful owner or status. For instance, if someone assaults another and robs them of 
something in the process, returning the stolen ‘thing’ is the proper scope of restitution 
so conceived.  
In the criminal justice system, restitution seems to be used, at least in domestic 
law, in the second sense, that is, making good or giving an equivalent for any loss, 
damage or injury previously inflicted. In this regard, Dawson suggests that restitution 
is said to entail ‘compensation for loss, especially full or partial paid by a criminal to a 
victim, not awarded in a civil trial for tort, but ordered as part of a criminal sentence or 
a condition for probation’.53 It is clear that in this sense ‘restitution’ seems to mean the 
same thing as, or overlaps considerably with, ‘compensation’.54 It is suggested that it is 
perhaps due to similar instances of lack of clarity and obfuscation in the area of 
remedies that many consider it a problem area not only in national law55 but also in 
international law generally.56 However, it is not thought that these reasons should 
prevent the ICC in adopting a clear policy and principles on reparations as required by 
Article 75 of the Statute.  
As used in this thesis, it is suggested that the ICC adopts a definition of 
restitution that encompasses the two aspects outlined: restoration of property stolen or 
looted in the course of an act that amounts to an ICC crime and compensation ordered 
as part of a criminal sentence for injury or loss sustained by an individual arising from 
the commission of an ICC crime. While restitution as understood in the first sense has 
                                                
52  Kull (n 39 above) 1191 argues that the proper scope of ‘restitution’ is limited to civil liability 
for unjust enrichment and that it does not extent to the other areas to which it is erroneously 
attributed.  
53  J Dawson ‘Restitution without enrichment’ (1981) 61 Boston Univ LR 563 577; Kull (n 39 
above) 1191. 
54  In the UN's Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, compensation is 
considered one of the categories of reparations, ‘in terms of which every quantifiable harm is 
compensated’; Kull (n 39 above) 1191 (considers that restitution so understood is ‘a form of 
compensation’); Laycock (n 51 above) 1282-83 (referring to the ‘third’ sense in which 
‘restitution’ is used – restoring the value of what the plaintiff or requiring criminal to pay 
victims… is simply compensatory damages’. 
55  See Kull (n 39 above) 1191 lamenting that ‘linguistic problems … bedevil the law of 
restitution’; Laycock (n 51 above) 1277.  
56  Shelton (n 38 above) 1. 
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been the subject of concern of ICL since Nuremberg,57 it is new as used in the sense of 
‘compensation for damage, loss or injury.’ It is suggested that this is thus one of the 
main aspects of reparations on which the ICC’s interpretative efforts should be 
concentrated. Issues to be elaborated include what kind of damage or loss can be 
compensated; what principles underlie such determination; what standards of proof are 
applicable, standards of causation and the like. These are considered at some length in 
the following sections of this chapter. Since the ICC assumes an important place in the 
framework of international criminal law, it is suggested that it should seize the 
opportunity to bring clarity to relevant aspects of remedies in as far as they relate to its 
work and ICL in general.  
 
6.4 Implementing Reparations: Issues, Concerns and Challenges 
6.4.1 Criminal and ‘Civil Liability’ Proceedings: To Separate or Not? 
 
The first issue the ICC has to address is whether reparations concerns will be dealt 
with entirely within the main criminal trial or whether a separate post trial procedure 
will be favoured or whether aspects of reparations will be a dealt with within the trial 
and the rest reserved for a more elaborate post trial procedure. In responding to this 
question, a further concern to be addressed later – how the criminal Court dispensing 
reparations issues will relate to the Victim Trust Fund and how reparations functions 
should be allocated between them – is raised. This is a relevant question in the context 
of burden sharing between institutions with overlapping mandates as it relates to 
victims and the fact that there are numerous victims. 
There is no provision, either in the Statute, the Rules or the ICC’s regulations 
that provides definitively whether reparations should be held separately to the main 
trial. What exists is a permissive rule that opens the possibility for a combined hearing. 
Regulation 56 of the Court’s Regulations provides that ‘the Trial Chamber may hear 
                                                
57  Art 28 of the Nuremberg Charter provided that ‘in addition to any punishment imposed by it, 
the tribunal shall have the right to deprive the convicted person of any stolen property and 
order its delivery to the Control Council for Germany’. The Tokyo Charter did not have a 
similar provision. Arts 23(2) ICTR and art 24 ICTY Statute provide for restitution of property 
or proceeds acquired by criminal conduct. It is notable however that these identical provisions 
are included under ‘penalties’ rather than as a free standing right to restitution for victims. For 
a longer discussion of Nuremberg, Tokyo and the ad hoc tribunals, see chapter two of this 
study. 
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the witnesses and examine the evidence for the purposes of a decision on reparations 
in accordance with Article 75, paragraph 2, at the same time as for the purposes of 
trial.’ Although in its decision of January 200858 the Trial Chamber I interrogated at 
some length the applicability of Regulation 56, it abstained from pronouncing 
definitively on the question under consideration here.  
Although Trial Chamber I did not rule out the possibility that reparations issues 
may be determined conclusively during the trial, it seems to favour separation in as far 
as each process leads to a conclusive end – a conviction or acquittal on the one hand, 
and an award of reparations on the other. Concurring with victims’ submissions on the 
extent of participation in Trial proceedings, TC stated that:  
 ‘the extent of participation by victims during trial will, to a significant degree depend on the 
Chamber's decision as to whether or not evidence concerning reparations will, at least in part, 
be considered during the trial or as a separate procedure after the trial.59  
 
One notes that the formulation used by Trial Chamber I refers to considering ‘evidence 
concerning reparations’ rather than ‘deciding reparations’ for instance, which would be 
a more definitive consideration of reparations including the award itself. To support 
this view, the Trial Chamber considers Regulation 56 as a provision meant to enhance 
the Court’s efficiency, rather than a requirement that it choose to deal with reparations 
at a particular stage of proceedings.60 Trial Chamber I took the view that Regulation 56 
does not, contrary to defence submissions, undermine the presumption of innocence. 
In its view, the application of this provision would allow it increase efficiency by 
expediting proceedings and to avoid unnecessary hardship or unfairness to the 
witnesses by removing, where appropriate, the necessity of giving evidence twice.61 
As discussed in chapter four, it seems that the procedure adopted in many 
jurisdictions where the right to reparations in some form or another exists is such that 
                                                
58  Situation in the DRC in the case of Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Decision on victims’ 
participation No ICC-01/04-01/06 (Jan 18 2008) [Hereinafter DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber 
I Decision]. This Decision is intended to provide the parties and participants with general 
guidelines on all matters related to the participation of victims throughout the proceedings in 
the Dylo case. 
59  DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber I Decision paras, 40 and 119 (emphasis mine). 
60  Ibid, para 120. 
61  Ibid. TC I seemed to endorse submissions by the Office of Public Counsel for Victims noting at 
para 76 that holding a joint (trial-reparations) hearing would have the objective of expediting 
the proceedings and limiting unnecessary further trauma to the victims. 
 185 
the criminal trial is separated from the civil claim for compensation.62 Proponents of 
this view have argued that combining trial and restitution proceedings would burden 
and further complicate a process with potential prejudice to the accused person.63 To 
the contrary, some have however argued that the successful ‘integration’ between 
criminal and civil law in most continental European systems has shown that fears 
enhanced roles for victims in these proceedings need not have disruptive results.64  
While the continental European approach has its benefits – cost effectiveness, 
efficiency – the fear of overburdening the criminal process, with the possible 
infringement of due process rights of accused persons, is a real one. It is clear that the 
ICC Trial Chamber I seems prepared to address at least some reparations issues during 
trial on account of the two reasons advanced – efficiency and concerns for victims. It 
is posited that in the context of mass atrocities – and the possibility that there may be 
tens, or hundreds of victims who may successfully motivate the requisite links to a 
case before the ICC for purposes of reparations - it may be absolutely necessary that 
the trial, and ‘civil liability’ issues, are separated. The process could be drawn out on 
that account alone. Logistical complications that arise from its location away from the 
actual theatre of crime add to this dilemma. Therefore, it is suggested that if the 
proceedings are not separated, its impact on the defendants’ right to a fair and 
expeditious trial must be considered.65 Even when the Court considers it appropriate to 
take evidence on reparations within the trial, these issues should not delay the 
determination of guilt at the earliest possible time.66 In view of the above factors, one 
                                                
62  This applies generally to Common Law countries. See in relevant parts M Brienen & E Hoegen 
Victims of crime in 22 European criminal justice systems (2000) 285; P Rock Constructing 
victims’ rights (2005) 263-330 discussing compensation and reparation in the UK. 
63  J Dolliver ‘Victims’ rights constitutional amendment: a bad idea whose time should not come’ 
(1987) 34 Wayne LR 87; AM Cellini ‘The proposed victims' rights amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States: Opening the door of the criminal justice system to the victim’ 
(1997) 14 Arizona J. Int'l & Comp. L. 839 856. 
64  AM Cellini (n 64 above) 867 noting that ‘inclusion of victims in the criminal proceedings of 
civil code systems and some surviving instances of the ‘private prosecutor’ concept in common 
law criminal proceedings, reveal that victim participation can be achieved without disruptive 
results or compromise of the goals of the criminal justice system; RS Frase, ‘Comparative 
criminal justice as a guide to American law reform: how do the French do it, how can we find 
out, and why should we care?’ (1990) 78 California LR 539 669; Guinchard & Buisson, 
Procedure Penal (2005) 703-704 discussing partie civile procedure. 
65  Henzelin et al (n 11 above) 343; DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber I Decision para 61. While 
endorsing joint proceeding, the prosecutor has advocated for a cautious approach proposing 
that TC ‘must carefully separate any submissions or material relating exclusively to reparations 
from the evidence relating to guilt or innocence, as submitted by the parties.’ 
66  Henzelin et al (n 11 above) 326; dissenting Opinion of Judge Blattman in  
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can foresee that in the vast majority of cases, especially those that involve many 
victims, the Court will opt for a separate post trial procedure whether conducted by 
itself or entrusted to a panel of experts or the VTF.67 
 
6.4.2 The Court and/or the Fund: Independence or Interdependence? 
 
Although both established by the Statute, the Court and Fund are structurally separate 
entities each with particular reparations mandates.68 The ICC framework thus 
establishes two focal points for reparations – the Court’s binding orders and the VTF.69 
In terms of the Statute, Rules and VTF Regulations, a number of scenarios are possible 
in the relationship between the Court and VTF.70 First, both the Court and VTF seem 
to have the option to make an order for reparations or implement an agenda for victims 
directly without recourse to each other. In this regard, once the Court convicts a 
defendant, it may order reparations against a perpetrator,71 which may be raised from 
forfeited money or property.72 This is perhaps the most straightforward case, which 
completely bypasses the VTF. It is suggested that this will typically be the case where 
the Court takes the view that the defendant can afford to pay. Even where the 
defendant is not indigent, it is not far-fetched to argue that there is certainly a limit to 
the number of victims who may benefit from such an order. Other possibilities through 
the Fund must be explored.  
For its part, Rule 98(5) ICC RPE seems to confer powers on the VTF to 
implement reparations programmes in respect of victims without having to deal with 
the Court. It provides that ‘other resources of the Trust Fund may be used for the 
benefit of victims subject to the provisions of Article 79’. Should the VTF implement 
its own initiatives, the only possible link with the Court is that the Court may have 
deposited some of the money in the Fund pursuant to a forfeiture order.73 As was 
suggested earlier, this route (VTF) offers more flexibility in terms of procedure and 
                                                
67  See infra 6.4.2 and; Henzelin et al (n 11 above) 335.  
68  T Ingadottir (n 25 above) 115. 
69  Taylor (n 3 above) 4; Henzelin et al (n 11 above) 335; Wierda & de Greiff (n 12 above) 2-3. 
70  For a brief outline of possible scenarios, see Wierda & de Greiff ( n 12 above) 4. 
71  See Rule 98(1) ICC RPE which provides that ‘Individual awards for reparations shall be made 
directly against a convicted person.’  
72  See also arts 75(4), 57(3)(e) and 93(1)(k) Rome Statute. 
73  See art 79(2) Rome Statute. 
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broader possibilities regarding the nature of reparations that may be ordered. This may 
include ‘communal reparations’ under the category of rehabilitation.74 
As part of the VTF-initiated reparations measures under Rule 98(5) ICC RPE, 
the Board of Directors of the Fund may ‘decide to provide physical or psychological 
rehabilitation or material support for the benefit of victims and their families.’75 A 
reading of the relevant Regulation suggests that these proceedings need not be linked 
to a particular investigation or a case already under consideration by the ICC, which 
would include ‘victims of the situation’, a category elaborated by PTC I.76 In spite of 
this possibility, one does not imagine that the VTF will go out, say to the DRC (a 
situation before the ICC) ‘trawling’ for victims and their families to rehabilitate and 
provide with material support. It is suggested that for practical purposes, these will 
have to be victims who have had some contact with the Court (Office of the Prosecutor 
or Victims and Witnesses Unit), even though they may not be linked to any particular 
proceedings.77  
It is suggested that the VTF-initiated activity or project for victims may be 
envisaged as ‘interim relief’, in the sense that they are measures undertaken in favour 
of victims who may at a later stage receive reparations that are more substantial.78 
Emphasizing the need for the Court-VTF collaboration - and acknowledging the fact 
that ordering reparations even before investigations are commenced by the Prosecutor 
                                                
74  On definition of ‘rehabilitation’, see J de Hemptinne & F Rindi ‘ICC Pre-Trial Chamber allows 
victims to participate in the investigation stage of proceedings’ J of International Criminal 
Justice 4 (2006) 342-350 332; UN Handbook on Justice for Victims on the Use and Application 
of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power UN Doc. E/CN.15/1998/CRP4/Add.1. 
75  Regulation 50(a) (i) VTF Regulations. 
76  Regulation 50(a) (ii) VTF Regulations. 
77   This would be consistent with the Court’s approach as relates to this category of victims in 
respect of whom the Prosecutor has an obligation to inform when he takes a decision to 
investigate and commence proceedings before the PTC. See Rule 50 (1) ICC RPE; Uganda 
Participation Decision (n 53 above) para 91. In late 2008, the VTF launched a global appeal 
for 10 million euros to finance its projects in Uganda, Central African Republic and the DRC. 
See VTF ‘Donor appeal: rehabilitating and supporting survivors of sexual violence’ 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/vtf/TFV_Donor_Appeal_Eng.pdf> (Accessed on 30 September 
2008). Between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2009, the Fund supported 30 projects - 13 projects in 
the eastern DRC (covering the provinces of North and South Kivu and the District of Ituri in 
Orientale Province) and 17 projects in northern Uganda (covering the Lango, Teso, and Acholi 
subregions and Adjumani District) through which rehabilitation and material support is 
provided to the most vulnerable victims. See Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the Court 
on the activities and projects of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims for the 
period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009’ 29 July 2009, ICC-ASP/8/1, paras 8-12. 
78  See Ingadottir (n 25 above) 131 referring to recommendations contained in the Report on the 
International Criminal Court UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/INF/2, at 8. 
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raises serious concerns – Regulation 50(a)(ii) requires the Fund to inform the Court 
when it decides to take this action.  Regulation 50(a)(ii) specifies issues that may be 
implicated in this action. In general, the Court must satisfy itself within specified time 
frames that measures proposed by the Fund in respect of victims do not predetermine 
issues of jurisdiction79 or admissibility;80 violate the presumption of innocence;81 or be 
prejudicial to the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial.82 It is suggested that 
in view of the fact that reparations orders – when made against an accused - must be 
preceded by a guilty verdict, these factors must also inform decisions relating to 
interim measures of reparations, whether initiated by the Court or the VTF. 
The third set of circumstances in the Court-Fund relationship relates to when 
the Fund acts as a ‘trustee’ or ‘safe deposit’ of a reparations award made by the Court 
against a convicted person but which is impossible or impracticable to immediately 
implement to benefit a victim(s).83 It is evident that in this case, the Fund will have 
little role in the process, other than to distribute the award at an opportune time in 
terms of the Court’s reparations order. However, this presupposes that the order is 
specific in nature, in terms of not only the form of reparations but also the 
beneficiaries.84 
The fourth possibility affords the VTF an opportunity not only to participate in 
fashioning the reparations order, but also in implementing it. In terms of Rule 98(3) 
ICC RPE, the Court may order that an award for reparations against a convicted person 
be made through the Trust Fund where the number of the victims and the scope, forms 
and modalities of reparations makes a collective award more appropriate. It is posited 
that the role of the VTF in fashioning collective reparations awards may be its defining 
role if well implemented. This is in view of the limitations imposed on the Court as a 
judicial body. It is suggested that the Fund may enjoy greater flexibilities in terms of 
procedure and permissive standards of proof that may allow it to process large 
numbers of victims who need not be linked to a case before the Court in order to 
obtain reparations. 
                                                
79  Art 19 Rome Statute. 
80  Arts 17 and 18 Rome Statute. 
81  Art 66 Rome Statute. 
82  Regulation 50(a) (i) and (iii) VTF Regulations. The Fund may only proceed if the Court does 
not express itself within 45 days. 
83  Rule 98(2) ICC RPE. 
84  Wierda & de Greiff (n 12 above) 4. 
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It is suggested that this fourth scenario raises at least three possibilities. The 
first and unlikely option is for the Court, while making the award destined to go to 
many victims through the Fund, to fashion specific orders with identified victims and 
leave the VTF the sole role of giving effect to that order. The second and perhaps most 
likely option is for the Court to draw on expertise assembled by the VTF by consulting 
when designing the order.85 
It is suggested that in view of reasons cited elsewhere, including that the 
lengthy and cumbersome reparations proceedings may detract the Court from its trial 
functions, (apart from posing real dangers for fair trial guarantees and efficiency of the 
Court), it may be necessary for the Court to rely entirely on a third option. This option 
would apportion to the Court only the role of developing ‘principles’ or general 
guidelines and reserve the discretion for the VTF to design a fitting approach to the 
nature of claims, number of victims and other relevant factors. The Court then would 
assume only a supervisory role.86 Such an approach was successfully adopted in 
Holocaust-related restitution programmes discussed further below.87 
It is suggested further that this is perhaps the best approach for the Court to 
adopt, save in straightforward cases where reparations awards are easy to make against 
convicted defendants who are financially able. Even in this case, the VTF may be best 
suited to operationalise a reparations award in favour of several victims. The 
experience of the Inter-American Court discussed in chapter three,88 and the specific 
case studies discussed below support this assertion. 
 
6.4.3 Links Between Two Rights: Participation and Reparations 
 
It is suggested that one question is of pertinence here - whether participation is a 
prerequisite for obtaining reparations. It would appear that in view of the two focal 
points for reparations – the Court and the Trust Fund - the answer to this question 
depends on whether one is speaking to the ICC or the VTF. Either way, it is difficult to 
                                                
85  Wierda & de Greiff, 4. 
86  Wierda & de Greiff, 4. 
87  Section 6.6.1 this study. 
88  In Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname (Reparations, 1993. Aloeboetoe Case, which involved 
numerous victims for a particular tribe, the Court for the first time ordered, among others, the 
establishment of a fund to manage compensation claims in favour of members of that tribe. 
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imagine a successful reparations programme without some form of participation from 
victims – lodging claims forms, giving evidence to support claims, participating in 
outreach programmes, appeals etc.  
Participation as it relates to the right to reparations is not used in the same 
sense as participation under Article 68(3) discussed in the previous chapter – it is 
suggested that it must be considered as participation in proceedings other than Article 
68(3) proceedings. Otherwise, it would produce undesirable results. If the fairly strict 
triple test under Article 68(3) of the Statute is applied as general criteria for 
participation in all proceedings, including reparations proceedings, then it must be 
applied less restrictively to reparations proceedings. The implication is that any victim 
who has a ‘plausible’ claim on the papers filed should be allowed to make 
representation in support of their claim at an appropriate time. In any case, in terms of 
the triple test, once one meets the requirement of ‘victim’, it is opined that it is no 
longer necessary to inquire whether ‘participation’ would prejudice a defendant, who 
would already have been convicted (in case reparations are considered as part of a post 
trial procedure). The case is clearly different if reparations, or part of reparations 
issues, are dealt with in the trial, in which case the Court has to be careful to weigh 
other factors such as the presumption of innocence and other rights of accused 
persons.89 The third factor – that ‘personal interests are affected’ is of little importance 
either way. The Court seems to take the view so far that whenever a victim has reason 
to claim reparations, it must be considered that their personal interests are affected.90 
As to the fundamental question whether the right to reparations is predicated on 
the right to participate under Article 68, in the sense that only victims who are granted 
the right to participate in proceedings can eventually claim reparations later on, the 
answer is a resounding no. No links based on right to participate are apparent in 
Articles 68, 75 and 79 in this regard. The basic requirement – and the obvious link – is 
                                                
89  See section 6.4.1 above. 
90  DRC Situation Participation Decision July 2006, para 63. The Court noted with respect to 
participation at the investigation stage that ‘The personal interests of victims are affected in 
general at the investigation stage, since the participation of victims at this stage can serve to 
clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators and to solicit reparations’. See also Decision of the 
Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 
concerning the "Directions and Decisions of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 February 2007, 1CC-
01/04-01/06-925. Separate Opinion of Judge Song, para 10 noting that victims have at least 
two interest - to obtain reparations and to receive justice. 
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that one has to be a victim (as defined under Rule 85) to participate based on Article 
68 criteria as well as to benefit from reparations under Articles 75 and 79 of the 
Statute. Further, as seen already, it is possible for victims to obtain reparations from 
projects initiated by the Trust Fund, which are unlinked to the Court process.91 While 
the right to reparations is not dependent on participation, it is already noted that the 
extent and forms victim participation will take at the trial is dependent on whether 
reparations hearings will be held as part of the trial.92 
 
6.4.4 Assessing Reparations: Some Specific Issues 
6.4.4.1 The Concept of Harm: Damage, Loss, or Injury 
 
The right of victims to obtain reparations is premised on their ability to prove some 
form of harm.93 Neither the Statute nor Rules 85 defines these terms. Neither do they 
set the ‘minimum threshold of harm’, if at all, for a victim to obtain reparations. 
Article 75 (1) requires the Court to ‘determine the scope and extent of any damage, 
loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and […] state the principles on which it is 
acting.’ Presumably, pursuant to this mandate, the Court has referred, without 
clarification, to the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy (Basic 
Principles).94 The Court noted that in terms of Principle 8 of the Basic Principles, a 
victim may suffer, either individually or collectively, from harm in a variety of 
different ways such as physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or 
substantial impairment of his or her fundamental rights.95 Without saying more, the 
ICC Appeals Chamber stated that Principle 8 provides appropriate guidance.96 It is 
opined that the normative status of the Basic Principles notwithstanding, principle 8 
does not begin to address the range of issues implicated in the concept of harm. The 
                                                
91  See Rule 98(5) ICC RPE; Regulation 50 VTF Regulations; section 6.4.2. 
92  Situation in the DRC in the case of Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Decision on victims’ 
participation No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (Jan 18 2008) [Hereinafter DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial 
Chamber I Decision], para 40. 
93  Rule 85 ICC RPE defines victims as ‘natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’. See art 75 Rome Statute. 
94  Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law. 
95  DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber I Decision, para 92. 
96  Ibid. 
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matter should not be regarded as either settled or uncontroversial.97 The Court will 
have to return to this question at some stage. An attempt is made here to highlight 
some issues relevant to the concept.   
For a start, the ICC has placed victims into two categories – ‘victims of 
situation’ and ‘victims of a case’.98 However, it is suggested that this categorization is 
only for administrative purposes, and serves only to distinguish between victims 
granted permission by the Court to participate in proceedings including trial at a 
particular time (in terms of Article 68) and those who do not. The distinction does not 
mean that victims who participate have any greater claim to reparations than those who 
do not. In any case, as argued already, the right to reparations is not tied to 
participation in proceedings.99  
However, this distinction does not shed any light on the determination of harm 
- what damage, loss or injury is compensable and what principles should underlie this 
determination. As relates to the kind of harm that is compensable, Henzelin et al 
observe that the use of the terms ‘damage, loss or injury’ is intended to cover various 
types of physical damage, as well as personal injury, financial and other losses.100 This 
seems to be in keeping with the practice of the human rights tribunals discussed in 
chapter 3.101 One can assume that one aspect of reparations in respect of which the 
Court may have wide discretion because of the ‘silences’ in the relevant instruments is 
the concept of harm. The elaboration of the kinds of compensable damage, loss or 
injury falls entirely on the Court. It is suggested that context – nature of crimes, kinds 
                                                
97  See dissenting opinion of Justice Rene Blattman in DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber I 
Decision para 4-5 cautioning against regarding the Basic Principles as ‘a strongly persuasive or 
decisive authority which the Chamber should be using in its legal determination of victims and 
in particular the definition of victims and participation.’ See Donat-Cattin n 4 above) 969 
(noting that Principle 8 definition was considered and included as a footnote in the Draft 
Statute but was eventually left out). 
98  See Situation in the DRC in the case of Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Decision on 
victims’ participation DRC Situation Participation Decision July 2006, PTC I, paras 65-6. 
99  If this view were taken, it would produce undesirable results. Faced with the clamour from 
tens, possibly hundreds of victims vying to participate in proceedings, the Court would lose the 
ability to run a speedy and efficient trial to the detriment of defendants. See Rule 98(5) ICC 
RPE; Regulation 50 VTF Regulations. 
100  Henzelin et al (n 11 above) 324. 
101  Some relevant cases decided the Inter-American Court include Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname 
(Reparations, 1993) para 46; Velásquez Rodríguez Case, (Merits, 1988) Series C No. 4, para. 
189; Godínez Cruz Case, (1989) Series C No. 5, para.199; Castillo Páez (Reparations) para 49; 
Velásquez  Rodríguez (Compensatory Damages) paras 27, 30  & 54. 
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of victims, availability of resources are some of the factors that will affect the eventual 
position to be taken by the Court.  
As relates to gross human rights violations, human rights tribunals, as 
discussed in chapter three, have adopted a ‘liberal’ approach. For the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court), which, of all human rights tribunals 
has developed the most relevant jurisprudence in this regard, fair compensation for 
injury as used in Article 63(1) of the Convention includes material and moral damages, 
but excludes ‘punitive damages’. It rightly takes the view that the latter concept does 
not exist in international law.102 Material (pecuniary) damages, as used in its case law, 
cover a range of issues: loss of income, medical expenses, costs incurred in searching 
for the victim (where the state engages in a cover-up or fails to investigate), and other 
expenses of a pecuniary character resulting from the violation.103 Moral damages, 
which in the Inter-American Court’s view may result from ‘the psychological impact’ 
suffered by the victim or survivors due to the violations,104 or as in the case of 
Aloeboetoe, the assault on the dignity and self worth of victims, family and tribal 
members,105 have been ordered as part of the package of reparative measures.  
The experience of the United Nations Compensation Commission, which 
adopted language similar to Article 75 of the Rome Statute – ‘damage, loss or injury’ 
seems to support this view.106 The UNCC had a wide range of ‘particulars’ for 
compensation dictated by circumstances.107 The fact that UNCC operated under the 
state responsibility framework may limit its relevance to the ICC.108 
Secondly, it is noticeable that neither the Statute nor Rules prescribe a 
minimum threshold of harm that is compensable. One may take the view that ICC 
crimes are the most serious, and that any harm arising from there occasioned to victims 
                                                
102  Velásquez Rodríguez (Reparations) para 39. 
103  JM Pasqualucci The Practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(2003) 255; Trujillo Oroza v Bolivia (Reparations, 2002) para 74 (a). 
104  Velásquez Rodríguez, para 50. 
105  In Aloeboetoe (Reparations) moral damages were based on the death of loved ones, denial of 
information about victims and their inability to obtain and bury their bodies.  
106  See UN SC Res 687 (1991); Hemptinne et all (n 74 above) 324. 
107  The United Nations Compensation Commission established to process claims against Iraq took 
the view that ‘damage, loss or injury’ covered a wide range of various types of ‘harm’ 
including departure costs, illegal detention, torture and witnessing of traumatic events, personal 
injury and death, personal property, bank accounts and securities, loss of income, real property, 
and various types of business losses and public service expenditures, including evacuation 
costs incurred by Governments. 
108  See section 6.6.4 below. 
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must be repaired. However, this position may be untenable in view of various factors. 
Victims of these crimes are affected in different ways. Secondly, in view of the large 
number of victims, the undesirable yet necessary reality is that many victims will be 
left out. It makes sense for the Court to establish a ‘minimum threshold’ of 
compensable harm for individuals. It may be necessary that this threshold be applied 
through fairly strict criteria to achieve this necessary end.109 Communal reparations can 
then be applied to the benefit of a greater pool of victims on the basis of less restrictive 
criteria. However, communal reparations may be criticized on grounds that they ignore 
particular ways in which individual victims are affected by crime. If a reparations 
order is to be made against an accused, it is already noted that this is dependent on a 
guilty verdict. But what indications relating to compensable harm can be gleaned, if at 
all, from the sentence imposed? Writing with respect to sentencing generally in 
international criminal law, Danner notes that ‘sentencing…overtly or unconsciously 
encodes judgments about harm and culpability … [it] provides signals about norms 
underlying the criminal law it serves’110  
The question one may ask here is: does a long custodial sentence, as opposed to 
a short one, presuppose a greater or ‘larger’ responsibility for harm caused to victims 
affected by relevant crimes? It is tempting to take this view, but one has to consider 
that in terms of the principle of proportionality proposed below, quantum of 
reparations should as far as possible relate to the actual harm suffered. In national 
jurisdictions where restitution proceedings are part of a post trial procedure usually 
linked to sentencing, short custodial sentences may indicate the commitment of the 
convict to pay restitution to the victim or family. The length of sentence alone cannot 
therefore be a definitive marker of actual harm.111  
One is not entirely sure whether any guidance on how to decide on harm from 
the sentence imposed on the perpetrator can be sought from the jurisprudence of 
international criminal tribunals, which since Nuremberg, have failed to meaningfully 
                                                
109  See Henzelin et al (n 11 above) 325-26. 
110  AM Danner ‘Constructing a hierarchy of crimes in international criminal law sentencing’ 
(2001) 87 Virginia LR 415 417 (emphasis mine). 
111  See Randy Barnet ‘Restitution: a new paradigm of criminal justice’ (1977) Vol 86 Issue 4 
Ethics at 279-301 at 284 notes that there is never a simple rational connection between a term 
of imprisonment and and harm caused to the victim; Heikkila, 27. 
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address victims’ concerns relating to reparations.112 Danner does not discuss whether 
actual harm to victims has had any bearing on the perceived ‘hierarchy’ of crimes on 
the basis of sentences. The closest the sentencing principles of the ad hoc tribunals 
come to considering victims is on the question of ‘gravity of crimes’.113 However, 
while the nature of crimes - and their gravity in terms of persons killed or affected - 
has informed sentences, these factors have mostly been referred to en passant. It is 
opined that the experience of the tribunals and their sentencing practice offers little 
help in determining either ‘kinds’ of reparable damage, loss or injury. The Rome 
Statute, in keeping with these previous international criminal tribunals provides but a 
skeletal framework on sentencing.114 It suggested however that in view of the victims’ 
right to reparations, the ICC should reorient sentencing jurisprudence to reflect the 
new restorative justice paradigm.  The substantive basis for such action exists in the 
Statute.115 
 
6.4.4.2 Assessing Harm: Proposed Principles 
 
It is suggested that at least the following principles should inform the determination of 
harm and the award of reparations to victims or categories of victims. Firstly, it is 
opined that non- discrimination as a norm of customary international law must inform 
all reparations activities and projects undertaken either by the Court or VTF. While the 
Statute and the Rules do not contain a prohibition on discrimination, the VTF 
Regulations are underpinned by this criterion. The Fund is obliged not to accept 
earmarked donations from non-state entities whose application as prescribed by the 
                                                
112  See Chapter two of this study. Commenting on offender’s mental state and impact on victims 
as determinants of punishment meted out, Heikkila, 26 argues that for [international crimes] 
which infer numerous victims, offenders mental state has been afforded greater significance 
since it is impossible to fashion punishment that would fit the suffering of victims.  
113  On sentencing principles, see art 23 ICTR Statute; Art 24 ICTY Statute; Danner (n 110 above) 
428. 
114  Arts 77 and 78 Rome Statute; Danner, (n 110 above) 442-43 comparing the ad hoc tribunal and 
ICC.  
115  Art 76 (1) provides that ‘n the event of a conviction, the Trial Chamber shall consider the 
appropriate sentence to be imposed and shall take into account the evidence presented and 
submissions made during the trial that are relevant to the sentence.’ It is suggested that 
‘appropriate sentence’ should be informed by any obligations held in respect of victims right to 
reparations.  
 196 
donor would result in discrimination on listed grounds.116 Although this provision 
relates to ‘contributions’, it is suggested that non-discrimination equally applies to how 
funds are allocated to particular groups as well as awards to specific victims. One 
clearly sees that in all cases, the Regulations intend that victims should as much as 
possible be treated fairly. A reading of relevant regulations suggests that non-
discrimination aims at fair treatment rather than equality between victims. This 
interpretation of ‘non-discrimination’ finds support in the endorsement in the VTF 
Regulations of preferential treatment for certain ‘kinds’ of victims – those with special 
status in international law.117  
The second principle proposed – proportionality – should be fairly 
straightforward in its application. Proportionality, a general principle of international 
law, has been applied by the ad hoc tribunals in the area of sentencing118 and is 
endorsed by national practice largely based on retributive theories of punishment.119 
What is suggested with regard to reparations is that reparations awarded to victims 
should be proportional to harm suffered. In view of a number of factors foreseen here 
– limited resources, difficulties in establishing damage, loss or injury with exactitude – 
it is suggested that proportionality, should not, while desirable, be understood to 
always infer restitutio in integrum. For the reasons cited, including the vast number of 
victims in a particular category, it is not entirely presumptuous for one to conclude that 
in most cases, reparations will be symbolic. The case studies discussed shortly – 
Holocaust reparations, the South African TRC and Rwanda’s post genocide 
experiences support this view. It is suggested that while proportionality best applies in 
                                                
116  Regulation 27(b) VTF Regulations mentions race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or other origin, property, birth or other status. 
117  Art 27(b) has a proviso to the effect that: ‘provided that contributions aimed at assisting those 
enjoying specific protection under international law should not be considered to be 
discriminatory’. 
118  See V Morris and MP Scharf An insider’s guide to the International criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (1995) 21 noting that the general principle of proportionality is the main, if 
not the only principle of determining the standard for appropriate penalty for crimes under 
international law.  See also Danner, 447 referring to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
who consistently invoke retribution as a purpose of sentencing. See for instance trial chamber 
decision in Prosecutor v Kambanda Case No ICTR 97-23-S reprinted in 37 ILM 1411 at 1424 
noting that ‘a sentence must reflect the predominant standard of proportionality between the 
gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender’. 
119  See Danner (n 110 above) 449-51; also C Kelk et al ‘Sentencing Practice and Discretion’ in 
Phil Fennell et al. (eds) Criminal Justice in Europe (1995) 319 at 323 cited in Danner, 450 
referring to this as greater movement’; D Dolinko ‘The future of punishment’ (1999) 46 UCLA 
LR 1719 at 1720. 
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circumstances described, it will be imperative for the Court (or VTF) to consider in 
this ‘scheme of proportionality’ the ‘burdens’ imposed by a reparations order on the 
perpetrator. 
Thirdly, although this does not pass as a ‘principle’, the Court or VTF has to 
consider the question of alternative avenues of recourse for victims. It is clear that 
recourse to the ICC by victims seeking reparations does not prejudice their rights 
under national or international law.120 It is perfectly possible that victims who approach 
the ICC may have already received, or may receive at a later stage, some form or other 
of reparations nationally or in an international tribunal. In assessing harm and thus 
reparations at the ICC, it is suggested that prior reparations measures received by a 
victim have to be considered in the scheme of awards. Whether the ICC is constrained 
or not in terms of resources, it is advisable that as a matter of principle, double 
reparations be avoided. 
 
6.4.4.3 Causation, Standard of Proof and Related Issues 
 
Once harm is determined, the focus turns on establishing causation. This standard - the 
relationship that must exist between the harm suffered and the criminal conduct of the 
accused that forms the basis of the charges provided for – is not specified either in the 
Statute or in the Rules.121 However, as noted in the previous chapter, both Pre-Trial 
Chambers I and II have stated that for a victim to be eligible to participate in particular 
proceedings, one the victim must establish a causal link between the harm a victim 
applicant has suffered and the crimes that the accused has been charged with.122 This 
link serves as motivation for the applicant’s claim that his/her interests are affected – if 
the link is established, they can claim reparations at a later stage. 
                                                
120  Art 75(6) Rome Statute. 
121  Hemptinne et al (n 74 above) 325. 
122  See Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings Submitted by VPRS 1 to 
VPRS 6 in the Case the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-172, page 6 
and 7; Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, 
a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the 
investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, pages 9-10; 
Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 
at the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/06-462, page 5; and Decision on victims' 
applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and 
a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-01/05-252, paragraph 12 noting that the Judge will consider 
whether harm alleged ‘appears to have arisen 'as a result ' of the event constituting a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
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One can see that the issue of the causal link has concerned the Court as one of 
the criteria on the basis of which victims are granted rights to participate in 
proceedings related to a particular situation or case. However, it is clear that the 
Court’s preoccupation with this aspect signals its importance in the apportionment of 
responsibility and eventual claim for reparations.123 
The actual standard aside, there are fundamental problems in establishing with 
exactitude causation with a view to apportioning ‘civil’ responsibility for harm 
suffered. It is suggested that the problems are in large part likely to be founded in the 
form of responsibility the ICC embodies – individual responsibility rather than state 
responsibility – and dynamics related to perpetrators – the fact that ICC will try only 
persons who bear the largest responsibility124 and that in case of joint perpetration, only 
some may actually be before Court.  
The following scenario may illustrate some of these difficulties. A bomb 
destroys a church during an armed conflict.125 Five senior people in the army and 
government are indicted, but only two are hauled to the Court for trial. Two of the 
officers are indicted and charged for, among others, war crimes relating to this attack. 
If the ICC dealt with state responsibility, it may suffice to convict the officials and 
hold the state responsible to pay reparations to victims, having established their links 
to the state in terms of international rules of attribution.126 However, state 
responsibility does not apply, so one must grapple with the difficult issues of causation 
in this scenario.  
Issues of command responsibility will loom large. Depending on seniority, the 
indicted individuals are unlikely to have participated in the crimes themselves, in the 
sense of ‘pulling the trigger’. Yet, unless they can be linked concretely to this crime 
and convicted, they cannot be expected to pay any form of reparations. If for 
                                                
123  DRC Jan 18 2008 Appeals Chamber Decision, para 99 established the required standard of 
causation for one to be allowed to participate as ‘prima facie, credible grounds for suggesting 
that the applicant has suffered harm as a result of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of 
the Court.’ AC motivated this standard noting that it would be untenable for the Chamber to 
engage in a substantive assessment of the credibility or the reliability of a victim's application 
before the commencement of the trial. 
124  Art 1 Rome Statute. 
125  Rule 85 (2) ICC RPE provides that victims may include organizations or institutions that have 
sustained direct harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or 
science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and 
objects for humanitarian purposes. 
126  See ILM Articles on State Responsibility and chapter three of this thesis. 
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argument’s sake the bomb were to trigger a landslide in the neighbouring village 
resulting in deaths and further destruction, issues of causation become even more 
complicated. However, even when the alleged perpetrators are convicted, issues of 
indigence may still dog reparations efforts. What level of ‘civil’ responsibility should 
be apportioned to them in view of the fact that the other perpetrators are not in Court, 
and may never be brought to Court? Yet claimants must demonstrate that damage, loss 
or injury suffered is a result of, or is closely related to, the acts of the convicted 
person.127  
In case of indigent perpetrators, the Court may be constrained to order 
reparations to be made through the Trust Fund (as discussed above) but in view of 
limited funds, prioritization becomes the next concern.128 Would the Court rather make 
an order for funds to reconstruct a church, rather than construct a village clinic or pay 
hospital expenses for specific victims or school fees for surviving children? All said, 
there are conceptual problems associated with holding the two officers before the 
Court in the example ‘civilly liable’ for what are essentially state-instigated crimes – 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and more so, aggression.  
This section is not meant to discuss in detail issues related to causation. It is 
merely an illustration of the complex issues in respect of which the Court has to 
develop guidelines, which in view of the variety of cases, it is suggested, must embody 
both a general and case-by-case approach. The question is whether the standard 
alluded to above, that of ‘prima facie, credible grounds for suggesting’, applicable as 
part of eligibility criteria for grant of the right to participate in proceedings generally, 
will be the same as that required to obtain actual reparations. The Court’s decisions 
have been less revealing in this regard. What seems clear from these decisions is that 
the claimant has to establish a nexus between harm suffered and crimes charged.  
Once the Court has pronounced itself on this, it will become clear whether the 
applicable standard of causation is one of directness, proximate cause, foreseeability or 
                                                
127  Henzelin et al (n 11 above) 328; see participation criteria (art 68(3) Rome Statute) discussed in 
the last chapter, which support this interpretation. 
128  Lack of funds is the main problem faced by the Victim Trust Fund, and may ultimately 
determine whether the VTF will contribute meaningfully to the work of the ICC in providing 
justice to victims. Since it began its functions, the operational costs of the fund far exceed its 
income. The result has been that the Fund does not have sufficient staff to enable to perform at 
optimal level. For the financial report of the VTF as at July 2009, see Assembly of States 
Parties (n 77 above) pars 28-32.  
 200 
some other standard. The lack of uniformity in this regard is such that general 
international law offers no clue as to the eventual direction the Court will take on the 
question.129 The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice as well as that of 
international human rights tribunals is irrelevant in this regard for the simple reason 
that their focus is on state responsibility under which causation issues do not arise. As 
noted in chapter three, in case of conduct of private persons, it suffices to link these 
individuals to the state under the rules of attribution, or by the failure by the state to 
fulfil some obligation under international law in order to establish the relevant state’s 
responsibility to pay reparations.130 
 
6.5 Design and Implementation of Mass Reparations Mechanisms 
 
The ICC is confronted with mass atrocities. In whatever case that comes before the 
Court, there will be tens, hundreds or thousands of victims eligible to claim 
reparations. Yet, the Court can only deal with a few of these in its trial processes. To 
deal with this reality, it will have to use effective means possible under the 
instruments, which may only lie in approaches that respond appropriately to the nature 
or crimes and large number of victims they generate. The design of reparations 
mechanism(s) must consider this fact. In this part, historical mass reparations 
mechanisms are explored with a view to providing lessons in design as well as 
principles that may be applied by the ICC.  
As a preliminary observation, it appears that while in general victims’ claims 
(to compensation schemes) are often couched and pursued as individual entitlements, 
models have been adopted allowing for mass tort claims under special legislation. To 
the extent that claims for reparations under the ICC may be made by numerous victims 
relating to the same set of facts or circumstances, domestic systems proffer some 
lessons as shown on how to deal with mass claims. It emerges that one common 
approach in these circumstances has been resort to the ‘fund model’, which offers a 
                                                
129  For a discussion on the practice of international claims commissions see various in RB Lillich 
(ed) The United Nations Compensation Commission (1995); N Wuhler, ‘Causation and 
Directness of Loss as Elements of Compensability before the United Nations Compensation 
Commission’, in RB Lillich (ed) The United Nations Compensation Commission (1995); V 
Heiskanen, The United Nations Compensation Commission, 296 Recueil des cours de 
L’Academie de La Haye 259, 334–339 (2003) cited in Hemptinne et all (n 74 above) 325. 
130  See Chapter three and ILM Articles on State Responsibility. 
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no-fault liability approach to mass tort litigation.131 This has been a favoured 
alternative to mass tort litigation because it is a less complicated, non-adversarial way 
of compensating identified victims.132  
An important aspect of mass reparations mechanisms – the fund model – is 
exclusivity. Victims who choose to participate waive their right to sue in the Courts or 
pursue other recourse against the same parties. To the contrary, ICC victims do not 
relinquish potential claims available to them in domestic and international law merely 
by obtaining some form of remedy from the ICC or the VTF.133  
Another approach which may be of greater relevance to the nature of crimes 
dealt with by the ICC has been deployed in more specific circumstances, as 
transitional justice mechanisms to address the question of accountability for mass 
atrocities. While Truth and Reconciliation Commissions fit generally in the 
complementarity framework, they may also serve as reference points for the ICC, in 
particular with respect to victims. The South African TRC, celebrated by 
commentators as a possible model for post conflict societies grappling with 
accountability issues, may inform how the ICC deals with some reparations issues.134 It 
also emerges from the discussion that follows that some international mechanisms 
such as claims commission carry useful lessons for the ICC in fashioning a mechanism 
to process reparations. 
 
6.5.1 Holocaust Reparations Programmes 
 
No movement has been as successful as that associated with the Holocaust in pursuing 
reparations claims against various entities.135 The Holocaust gave rise to a range of 
                                                
131  See generally LS Mullenix & KB Stewart (2002) ‘The September 11th victim compensation 
fund: fund approaches to resolving mass tort litigation’ Connecticut Insurance Law J 121-152 
who outline the September 11th Compensation Fund as well as other similar mass tort models 
in recent US history. 
132  Ibid. 
133  Art 75(6) Rome Statute. 
134  Aldana-Pindell, ‘In vindication of justiciable victims’ right to truth and justice for state-
sponsored crimes’ rights in the criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes’ 
35 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l Law 1399-1501. 
135  See MJ Bazyler ‘The Holocaust restitution movement in comparative perspective’ 2002 20 
Berkeley J Intl Law; Redress ‘Reparations for victims of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes: systems in place and systems in the making’ Report of proceedings (2007) 7. 
See also R Howard-Hassman ‘Getting to reparations: Japanese Americans and African 
 202 
approaches and mechanisms aimed at restitution to victims or their families. The 
restitution claims resulted in a number of significant settlements including the Swiss 
Banks settlement;136 Austrian Banks settlement137 and the German Banks Settlement.138  
For its historical importance and richness in potential lessons for latter-day 
reparations programmes, the Swiss banks settlement is discussed at length here. The 
matter began with class actions brought in several US federal Courts under the Alien 
Torts Claims Act (ATCA) against a number of Swiss banks and other entities. The 
claimants alleged that these financial institutions collaborated with and aided the Nazi 
Regime by knowingly retaining and concealing assets of Holocaust victims, and by 
accepting and laundering illegally obtained Nazi loot and profits of slave labour.139 All 
the cases were consolidated before the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York (New York District Court).140 In the course of the litigation, the 
Swiss banks opted to settle out of Court. A settlement of USD 1.25 billion141 (Global 
Settlement) agreed upon was to be distributed to four categories of claims: forced 
labour claims; looted property claims; deposited assets claims and insurance policies 
claims.142 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Americans’ (2004-5) 83:2 Social Forces 823-840 who comparatively examines two other 
social movements and discusses why the former was far much more successful and J 
Greenberg ‘Reparations: politically inconceivable’ 29 (2006-7) T. Jefferson LR 157 discussing 
the African American reparations claims in context. 
136  Swiss Banks Settlement: In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York at <http://www.swissbankclaims.com/> ion to 3,858 
former refugees. See generally Bazyler, (n 135 above); P van der Auwereart ‘Holocaust 
reparation claims fifty years after’ 2002 71 Nordic J Intl L 557. 
137  On the Austrian banks settlements, see M Bazyler, ‘Nuremberg in America: Litigating the 
holocaust in United States Courts’ (2000) 1 Univ Richmond LR 239 (which explains the 
general history of recent Holocaust litigation). 
138  In December 1999, the U.S and German governments announced a $5.2 billion settlement to 
compensate Nazi-era slave and forced laborers. Over 200,000 survivors have received awards 
between 2001 and 2004 in the US and Eastern Europe. The $5.2 billion fund included 
approximately $4 billion for non-Jewish survivors. See Bazyler (n 136 above) 239. 
139  On the five law suits, see Auwereat (n 136 above) 567-570. 
140  See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. CV-96-4849, 2000 US Dist. LEXIS 20817 
(E.D.N.Y); and generally Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation at 
<http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Overview.aspx> (Accessed on 13 April 2008). 
141  See the Class Action Settlement Agreement of 1999, para 5.1 Accessible at <http://www.crt-
ii.org/Court_docs/Settleme.pdf> [as amended in 2000 to provide for an Insurance Claims 
Process for claims concerning WWII-era insurance policies issued to Victims or Targets of 
Nazi Persecution by certain Swiss insurance companies released under the Global Settlement.]. 
142  Bazyler (n 136 above) 16; Auwereart (n 136 above) 572-2. 
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6.5.1.1 Structures and Mandates 
 
Several institutions were central to the implementation of the Swiss banks settlement - 
the New York District Court; the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons (‘ICEP 
or Volker Committee); the Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland (Bergier 
Commission); the Joint Distribution Committee;143 and the Claims Resolution 
Tribunal. The Volker Committee144 and Bergier Commission established by the Swiss 
Parliament were established independently around the time settlement negotiations 
were ongoing between claimants and Swiss institutions to explore Switzerland’s role 
during the Holocaust era. Their findings – on the dormant accounts of victims of Nazi 
persecution by the Volker Committee145 and those on wartime dealings in gold 
between Germany and Swiss institutions and on Switzerland’s treatment of refugees of 
Nazi persecution in Switzerland146 - became instructive to the settlement and 
distribution recommendations. 
The Claims Resolution Tribunal (CRT) was established by the Volker 
Commission as an international tribunal in Switzerland in furtherance of the goals set 
in the ICEP’s memorandum as part of the comprehensive claims resolution process 
arising from its investigation.147 The independence of the CRT from the class action in 
New York ended in 1998 when an arrangement was reached for the two processes to 
be merged as part of the Global Settlement of USD 1.25 billion.148 Of this, USD 800 
million was earmarked by the New York District Court for the main restitution class – 
the Deposited Assets Class rendered by the CRT. The District Court, assumed a 
                                                
143  Responsible for distribution of awards to victims in the US, Former Soviet Union and Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
144  Established by Memorandum of Understanding between the Swiss Bankers Association, the 
World Jewish Restitution Organization and the World Jewish Congress on May 2, 1996. 
Memorandum rprinted in Volker Report Apendix A, A-1. On Volker Committee generally see 
Michael Bradfield ‘The role of the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons’ 1998 14 
American Univ Intl Rev 231. 
145  See Volker Committee Report Report on dormant accounts of victims in Swiss banks available 
at <http://www.crt-ii.org/icep_report.phtm>  (accessed on 10 Jan 2008).  
146  Final Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War 
(Final Bergier Report) 
<http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Documents/DOC_15_Bergier_Refugee.pdf> (accessed on 
10 Jan 2008). 
147  RP Alford ‘The Claims Resolution Tribunal and Holocaust Claims Against Swiss banks’ 
(2002) 20 Berkeley Intl LJ 250 at 259; 
148  Ibid, 260. 
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supervisory role over CRT activities. The CTR’s guidelines and criteria to resolve the 
claims, as well as individual awards, were subject to the Court’s approval.149 
For a mass restitution tribunal, the CRT adopted a unique approach, opting to 
resolve claims by ‘a judicial case-by-case manner rather than through an 
administrative procedure using predetermined criteria.’150 As shown in subsequent 
examples in this chapter, mass restitution programmes generally adopt an 
administrative procedure in most cases ending in undifferentiated awards.151 It is 
argued that this approach may have been informed by the fact that in most cases, the 
quantum of the claims could be established with ease where dormant accounts existed, 
or where evidence of the amounts deposited was available. Further, it is opined that the 
approach adopted is not informed only by the availability of evidence to establish a 
claim with a measure of exactitude. The nature of claims and the availability of funds 
in reparation programmes for thousands of claimants are additional factors that may 
dictate approaches chosen. In cases of mass atrocities for instance, victims sustain 
different injuries or damage and are affected in different ways. A case by case 
approach in such instance may be unworkable considering the obvious need for variety 
of experts and the necessity for extensive administrative structures that many countries 
emerging from conflict may not be able to marshal. Limited funds committed to such 
programmes, or lack of it may force, as was the case of the South African TRC’s 
reparations programme, for relevant entities to shun a case by case approach that infers 
restitutio in integrum.152 
                                                
149  Deposited Assets Class was implemented in phase two of CRT (CRT II). Stage one (CRT I) 
operated as an independent arbitral tribunal under the Volker Commission. See Auwereart, at 
574; Rules of the Claims Resolution Tribunal (CRT Rules) arts 8 and 16; the Final Order and 
Judgment of the [District] Court approving the Settlement Agreement, dated July 26, 2000 (as 
corrected on August 2, 2000); Press release ‘ICEP Claims Process Underway in $ 1.25 Billion 
Swiss Bank Settlement’ April 17 2001 available at 
<http://www.swissbankclaims.com/pdfs_eng/pressreleasefinal.pdf >. See also Alford (n 146 
above0 260 and 265. 
150  RP Alford & Peter HF Bekker ‘International Courts and tribunals’ (1999) 33 International Law 
537 at 548 quoted in Alford (n 146 above) 260. 
151  See the exception of the UN Compensation Commission where certain types of claims were 
adjudicated on a case -by -case basis. See Alford & Bekker (n 150 above) 548. 
152  See section on TRC. Although in a different context, Wierda & de Greiff (n 12 above) 5 give 
the example of Peruvian reparations program to argue that restitutio in integrum is not always a 
desirable principle to apply. In that case, lump-sum settlements were paid out to victims. Had 
this principle, applied by the Inter-American Court in its practice been adopted, the 
unaffordable amount of USD 150, 000 would have been payable to victims. 
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In what became typical of later mass claims processes, the CRT adopted 
flexible rules of procedure and a low threshold of proof.153 For a claimant to prove 
entitlement s/he had to satisfy the CRT on a ‘standard of plausibility’ which required 
that ‘each claimant must demonstrate that it is plausible, in light of all the 
circumstances that s/he is entitled to the claimed account.’154 The Sole Arbitrators or 
Claims Panels were required to ‘bear in mind the difficulties of proving a claim after 
the destruction of the Second World War and Holocaust and long time that [had] 
lapsed since the opening of [the] dormant accounts.’155 According to Alford, this low 
standard of ‘plausibility’ proved difficult to apply in some cases, in particular those 
relating to competing claimants.156 
 
6.5.1.2 Principles, Trends and Lessons 
 
Restitution measures associated with the holocaust have become relevant for national 
and international reparations processes. First, holocaust restitution programmes 
illustrate how inappropriate a judicial forum operating under normal rules and 
procedures is for processing mass claims. Although as noted at the beginning some of 
the holocaust claims were commenced by judicial action, these claims processes 
generally avoided the Courtroom. In these cases, targeted organizations have moved 
swiftly to settle through negotiations.157 Litigation or the threat of it, where this option 
exists, while unsuited for actual processing of claims can be crucial as a ‘trigger’ of 
action from persons targeted by reparations claims.158 It is clear the banks targeted by 
these claims moved to negotiate and settle the claims out of Court for fear of, among 
others, harmful publicity.159 .  
                                                
153  On the procedure and practice of the CRT see Alford (n 147 above) 260-. 
154  Art 17 (1) CRT Rules. See also art 22 CRT Rules on the criteria for making awards which 
required fairly speculative links to the account claimed taking into consideration factors as 
similar, or substantially similar names, street address of account holder and the like. 
155  Rules of the Claims Resolution Tribunal (CRT Rules) art 17(2); Alford (n 146 above) 262. 
156  Ibid 267. 
157  The Swiss Bank Settlements were attributed to pressure from victims’ groups. 
158  Later settlements seemed to follow the same pattern. See Bazyler, (n 136 above) 17. 
159  Bazyler (n 136 above) 17 citing political pressure, in particular from Sen. D'Amato's banking 
committee and the threat of sanctions against relevant banks as one main reason to settle. See 
also Auwereart (n 136 above) 569; generally HE P Moser ‘Restitution negotiations-the role of 
diplomacy’ (2002) 20 Berkeley Intl LJ on the important role of diplomatic pressure in the 
settlements.  
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While the matter was eventually settled through negotiation, this did not 
entirely exclude the District Court in New York, which exercised a supervisory role 
then and throughout the distribution process, as discussed. This offers a second 
valuable indication of the role Courts can play in mass claims programmes such as 
this. It has been argued that the ICC is unlikely to deal extensively with reparations 
concerns within the trial and may have to appoint a panel of experts – either 
independently or through the Trust Fund - to deal with these questions.160  
Thirdly, holocaust restitution programmes demonstrate the crucial role played 
by organizations and groups within in survivor communities not only in rallying 
support for political action, but also in the implementation of restitution programmes 
themselves. If reparations programmes in the ICC are to succeed, there is need to work 
with states, intergovernmental organisations, civil society in general, in particular, 
victim groups. The ICC Rules permit such possibility. The ICC may order that an 
award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund to an intergovernmental, 
international or national organization approved by the Trust Fund.161 In this regard, 
the holocaust programmes once again are illustrative of the need for an effective 
network of organizations, not only in lobbying and raising funds but also in the 
disbursement of awards and implementation of broader goals of reparations such as 
rehabilitation. 
Fourthly, these programmes have contributed to the evolution of procedure 
related to mass claims processes. While for the most part case - by - case 
determination of claims was undertaken in most of the programmes, the identification 
of special beneficiary categories and the award of both individualized and collective 
awards may be their most important procedural innovation.162 In view of claims 
lodged, the programme had to respond appropriately to fashion fitting measures to 
address the varied broad categories of claimants. These options are pertinent to the 
ICC, which confronts mass atrocities that affect victims differently. There will be 
cases where individual reparations are more fitting and others – in view of limited 
                                                
160  See section 6.5.2 above. Rule 97(2) ICC RPE permits the Court to appoint appropriate experts 
to assist it in determining the scope, extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect 
of victims and to suggest various options concerning the appropriate types and modalities 
of reparations. See Henzelin et al (n 11 above), at 337-38. 
161  Rule 98(4) ICC RPE. 
162  Redress (n 135 above) 7. 
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resources and the need to address the effects of crimes at the broader societal level – 
where collective reparations will be more appropriate.  
Another important contribution in terms of mechanisms and procedure relates 
to not only the flexible use of administrative and judicial mechanisms but also of 
flexible evidentiary standards and engagement of civil society groups and 
governments.163 Fewer possibilities for adapting rules – substantive and procedural - to 
new situations exist for the ICC and VTF than those that availed those charged with 
implementing Holocaust reparations mechanisms. The latter could amend with ease 
even rules pertaining to the most fundamental institutional issues.164 The ICC is a 
criminal Court established by treaty, with attendant institutional strictures and 
limitations. However, what the ICC will do in this regard – achieving procedural 
flexibility – may depend on the extent to which reparations proceedings are tied to the 
trial. As noted already, the less ‘judicial’ VTF, or independent experts appointed by 
the Court are perhaps the best avenues to deal in detailed fashion with reparations 
claims.  
The need to have an efficient, well organized secretariat to carry out 
complicated administrative work is glaringly illustrated by these programmes, which 
dealt with fifty year-old restitution matters of varying degrees of complexity. Further, 
as is the case for holocaust restitution claims, the fact that crimes in respect of which 
reparations claims will be made in the ICC require thorough investigations speaks to 
the need for specialized entities, but also extensive groundwork investigations. In the 
case of the Swiss Banks Claims, the centrality of the Volker and Bergier investigative 
reports to establishment of claims challenges the possibility that a Court such as the 
ICC may be suited for broad based reparations programmes. As the South African 
TRC case demonstrates, the success of reparations programmes in cases of mass 
atrocities where a broad range of issues must be established, including the identity of 
                                                
163  Ibid. 
164  For instance, after encountering difficulties that slowed distribution of assets among claimants, 
the Claims Redistribution Tribunal (CRT) eliminated the concept of ‘applicable law’ in an 
earlier version of its rules with a view to achieving ‘the result that is most fair and equitable 
under the circumstances’, which offered greater discretion. See Alford (n 147 above) 266 and 
269.  
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victims, nature of crimes, injury/loss/damage sustained, often hinges on investigative 
processes.165  
Because of the difficulties involved in quantification of damage and payments, 
varied modes of assessments were used – restitution in integrum, sometimes lump-sum 
payments and long-term benefit (pension funds), common trust funds among others. In 
case of dissimilarly placed survivors and in case of difficulty of ascertaining exact 
loss, strict legality was not adhered to. In these circumstances, restitution in integrum 
is impossible to effect. With respect to the looted property for instance, it was 
determined that neither case-by-case adjudication nor a pro rata distribution was 
acceptable due to at least three factors: the large size of the class of claimants; the 
difficulty for claimants to prove that property was indeed stolen from them and the 
impossibility of determining whether specific property was transacted through a Swiss 
entity as required by the Class Settlement Agreement.166 The distribution Plan 
therefore favoured a cy-près remedy consisting in an approximate assessment of 
loss.167  
For the first cy-près remedy, the Special Master in charge of this class decided 
to adopt measures beneficial to the entire group. He created a Victim Lists Foundation 
to compile and publicize a list of all victim targets of Nazi persecution as defined in 
the Settlement168 which he believed would ‘honour the memory of the victims, tangibly 
benefit all their heirs and serve as a powerful testimony to the horrors of the 
Holocaust.’169 The second cy-près remedy consisted in the establishment of various 
forms of humanitarian assistance programmes for the elderly and neediest survivors of 
the Holocaust.170 
More broadly, the Holocaust experience is said to have influenced a range of 
mass claims processes deployed in the post-Holocaust era to address a multiplicity of 
                                                
165  See TRC and Community based Organisations. 
166  Class Settlement Agreement (n 136 above); Auwereart (n 136 above) 575. 
167  In common law jurisdictions the cy-près doctrine a legal doctrine of Courts of equity. The term 
can be translated (from French to English) as "as near as possible" or "as near as may be. See 
Black’s Law Dictionary p. 349 (5th ed. 1979). 
168  See s 1 Class Settlement Agreement. 
169  See Special Master’s Proposed Distribution Plan for Allocation Plan and Distribution of 
Settlement Proceeds, adopted by the Court on November 22 2000 and upheld by the United 
States Courts of Appeal for the Second Circuit on July 21 2001 (hereinafter Distribution Plan), 
Vol I at 115; Auwereart (n 135 above) 575. 
170  This included Jews in America and Russia as well as Jehovah Witness, homosexuals, disabled 
and Roma. See Auwereart (n 136 above) 575-576; Distribution Plan Vol I at 118.  
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situations and objectives. For instance, some objectives have been judicial in character 
involving the evaluation of liability, while other objectives have been more political in 
nature, including fact-finding functions.171 Some of these processes of relevance to this 
study are discussed below. 
 
6.5.2 South African TRC Model 
 
Many aspects of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission have 
generated much academic comment.172 Here, the focus is on those aspects that relate 
directly to the rights of victims of crimes under apartheid. Not much is made of the 
fact that apartheid was declared a crime against humanity173 as confirmed by the Rome 
Statute.174 It is opined that the relevance of the status of apartheid as such and its 
endorsement by the Rome Statute is that it affords national initiatives established to 
deal with such breaches and to redress related victims significance within the Rome 
Statute and its framework on victims’ rights.175 
To start with, one can take a preliminary view – by a cursory reference to the 
restorative justice framework outlined in chapter one of this thesis – that the South 
African approach to redress gross violations associated with apartheid was strongly 
                                                
171  Redress (n 134 above) 7 mentioning some of these developments. See also generally John 
Torpey ‘Reparations in the twenty-first century’ (2000-2003) Third World Legal Studies 43 on 
the influence of the Holocaust reparation programs on the politics of later initiatives. 
172  P Hayner ‘Fifteen truth commissions from 1974-1994: a comparative study’ (1994) 16 Hum 
Rghts. Q; Tama Koss ‘South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: a model for the 
future’ 14 Florida J of International Law (2001) 517; A Boraine ‘Truth and  Reconciliation in 
South Africa: the third way’ in RI Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (eds) (2000) 141; J Klaaren 
‘A second bite at the amnesty cherry: constitutional and policy issues around legislation for a 
second amnesty’ (2002) 117 South African Law J 572 593; C Jenkins ‘A truth and 
reconciliation commission for East Timor: lessons from South Africa?’ 7 J on Conflict and 
Security (2002) 234; J Dugard ‘Reconciliation and justice: the South African experience (1998 
8 Transnational Law and Contemp. Probs) 277; J Sarkin ‘Trials and tribulations of the South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (1996) 12 South African J on Human Rights 
617.  
173  International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid Crime 
of Apartheid (30 November 1973), reprinted in (1974), 13 ILM; G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. 
GAOR (No. 50), U.N. Doc.A/9233/Add.1 (1973). 
174  Arts 7(1)j and 7(2)h Rome Statute. 
175  Chapter 1 of the TRC Act limited the list of breaches of concern to the TRC to gross human 
rights violations namely killings, torture, severe ill treatment, abduction and related acts - 
attempts, incitement, conspiracy, instigation, command or procurement to commit the listed 
(main) acts. See Vol Six TRC Report, at 98. 
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restorative in character.176 Restorative justice approaches including reparations were 
central to the process entrusted to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (TRC Act).177 
The general tenor of the TRC’s objectives was ‘to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions 
of the past.’178 This core objective was to be pursued by the TRC ‘establishing as 
complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations 
of human rights’ committed during the period commencing 1 March 1960 to the ‘cut-
off date’.179 The TRC had the power to grant amnesty180 ‘to persons who make full 
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political 
objective’,181. It was also required to establish and make known ‘the fate or 
whereabouts of victims’ and of ‘restoring the human and civil dignity of such victims’ 
by enabling them to relate their accounts of the violations and by recommending 
‘reparation measures’ in respect of such violations.182  
 
                                                
176  See chapter one of this thesis. However, see S Wilson ‘The myth of restorative justice: Truth, 
reconciliation and the ethics of amnesty’ (2001) 17 South African J of Human Rights 531 who 
argues that restorative justice ‘should be seen as a political myth to which some commissioners 
[of the South Africa TRC] mistakenly appealed while grasping for a moral justification for 
amnesty’…and that ‘restorative justice, as conceived by the TRC – failed to take full account 
of the value of retribution and the meanings of forgiveness and reconciliation’. See also S 
Garkawe ‘The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: a suitable model to 
enhance the role and rights of the victims of gross violations of human rights?’ (2003) 27 
Melbourne Univ LR, 344 suggesting that the TRC did not formulate RJ as a model of justice. 
177  The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995; See summary in the 
Preamble of the Act the general discussion under this section. 
178  Section 3 TRC Act. 
179  Described in the epilogue to the Constitution as a date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 
December 1993. 
180  Although we do not delve into this here, the grant of amnesty had implications for victims 
rights, in the sense that it had the effect of extinguishing the rights of individual victims from 
seeking redress outside the TRC process in the South African legal framework. Azanian 
Peoples Org v The President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SALR 637 (CC). A 
distinct feature of the TRC’s mandate which raises serious questions of South Africa’s 
responsibility under international law is that its inquiry did not extent to acts which constituted 
international crimes, for reasons that they were not crimes under South African Law at the 
time. Although the TRC acknowledged that Apartheid was an international crime, its approach, 
and recommendations did not reflect this principled position. See J Dugard, ‘Is the Truth and 
Reconciliation Process Compatible with International Law? An unanswered Question’ (1997) 
13 (2) South African J Human Rights 260. 
181  S 3(1) (b) TRC Act. 
182  S 3(1) (c) TRC Act. 
 211 
6.5.2.1 Structures and Mandates 
 
The TRC Act established three committees, each with a set of duties that contributed 
to the global objective of the TRC. These were the Committee on Human Rights 
Violations,183 Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation (RRC)184 and the 
Committee on Amnesty.185 The TRC could, as it did, recommend prosecutions where a 
grant of amnesty had been refused.186 The broad mandate of the Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) was to ‘affirm, acknowledge and consider the impact 
and consequences of gross violations of human rights of victims, and to make relevant 
recommendations.187 Under the TRC Act, one of the objectives of the TRC was to 
provide for the taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the 
rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity, of victims of 
violations of human rights.188  
More specifically, the TRC Act required the TRC to make recommendations to 
the President with regard to policy and measures to be taken to grant reparation to 
victims, including urgent interim reparations or with respect to ‘other measures aimed 
at rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of victims.’189 This provision 
was buttressed by Section 25(b)(i) of the TRC Act, which granted the RRC 
discretionary powers to ‘make recommendations which may include urgent interim 
measures as contemplated in Section 4(f)(ii), as to appropriate measures of reparation 
to victims.’ In its final report, the TRC made such recommendations, referred to 
below. The TRC Act created ‘a President’s Fund’ from which all money payable to 
victims would be disbursed.190  
 
                                                
183  S 3(3)(a) Chapter 3 of the TRC Act. 
184  S 3(30(c); Chapter 5 of the TRC Act. See L Atkins & WP Pagan ‘Conflict resolution and 
Democratic Transformation: Confronting a shameful past- Prescribing a human future’ 119 
South African Law J (2002) 174-191 at 194. 
185  S 3(3)(b); Chapter 4 of the TRC Act. 
186  D Ntsebeza ‘The Legacy of the TRC’ in Charles Villa-Vicencio and E Doxtader (eds.) The 
Provocations of Amnesty: Memory, Justice and Impunity (2003) 237 Doxtader at 23. See also 
George Bizos ‘Why prosecutions are necessary’ in Charles Villa-Vicencio and Doxtader, E 
(eds.) The Provocations of Amnesty: Memory, Justice and Impunity (2003) 5. 
187  See Final Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (1998) Vol Six [Vol Six TRC Report], 
S TWO, Chapter Two at 98. 
188  Preamble to the TRC Act. 
189  S 4(f) TRC Act. 
190  S 42 TRC Act. 
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6.5.2.2 Principles, Trends and Approaches 
 
The TRC experience offers valuable lessons for the ICC. First, like the Holocaust 
reparations programmes, it illustrates the need for special entities – committees, task 
forces or experts tasked with specific functions relating to reparations, which 
implicates a range of issues.191 At the grand structural level, the Commission itself was 
divided into the three committees introduced above, with the RRC tasked specifically 
with considering reparations. The Commission was empowered to establish 
subcommittees to perform specific duties and functions assigned by the 
Commission.192  
Additionally, the Act created an Investigation Unit193 charged with among 
others, the duty to conduct any investigation or hold any necessary hearing,194 to gather 
information and receive evidence and to establish the identity of victims and the nature 
and extent of harm suffered.195 To collect and record statements of violations from 
victims, the TRC at one point used special ‘statement takers’ and later governmental 
and community-based organizations in this task.196 The ability to establish specialized 
entities such as these afforded the Commission sufficient flexibility in its functions. In 
the discussion on Holocaust restitution programmes, doubt was expressed regarding 
the Court’s ability to process mass reparations claims. The same argument advanced 
there – that the Court should use the facility available to it (appoint experts and/or 
delegate to the Fund) as the best approach to the issue –applies here. 
In the context of this multiplicity of bodies, there is need for coordination and 
sharing of information between various committees, subcommittees and other 
commission structures. The Act also provided for the possibility of referral of relevant 
issues to the RRC by the other Committees of the Commission197 and from the RRC to 
                                                
191  For a critical discussion of various entities in the TRC seen P Pigou ‘False promises and 
wasted opportunities? Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ in Deborah 
Posel and Graeme Simpson (eds) Commissioning the past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (2002) 37. 
192  Ss 5(b) TRC Act. 
193  S 3(3)(3)d TRC Act. 
194  S 5 (d) TRC Act. 
195  S 4(b) TRC Act. 
196  S Garkawe (n 175 above) 367. 
197  S 15(1) TRC Act with respect to the Committee on Human Rights violations; S 22 TRC Act 
with respect to the Amnesty Committee both of which were required to furnish the RRC with 
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the Committee on Human Rights Violations.198 All these required an effective 
administrative unit to co-ordinate the work of various units. In the case of the ICC, 
administrative functions, coordination and supervision functions have to be 
streamlined. Henzelin et al have suggested that should the ICC appoint experts, it 
should retain overall control - with enough powers ceded to the relevant experts to 
develop effective reparations mechanisms.199  
While the TRC was not fully a judicial body and could operate flexibly, there 
was still need to establish a special investigation unit with the functions described 
above. This quasi-judicial character is not true of the ICC, which is a criminal tribunal 
with limits on what it can do. Yet, it is required in terms of its reparations mandate 
‘either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, to determine 
the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and to 
state the principles on which it is acting.’200 Evidently, such a task may require 
resources usually not available to a Court, especially one that operates more or less 
along adversarial lines. Additionally, this may be a lengthy process, which may offend 
against the requirement of an expeditious trial of accused. In earlier discussion, it was 
noted that defendants in the Katanga case advanced this argument with some approval 
from the Court in the context of debates relating to whether reparations issues should 
be dealt with at the trial stage.201 The views relating to how the ICC should proceed 
have already been expressed.202 Suffice it to say that, the complicated process of 
identifying victims and perpetrators, and quantifying loss and damage, will need 
investigation and processing mechanisms free of the strictures of Courts.  
The ICC may find some useful reference in the TRC experience in the 
interpretation of Article 75 of the Rome Statute on ‘principles relating to reparations 
to, or in respect of, victims’. On the forms of reparations, the TRC regarded 
‘reparations’ as encompassing a range of measures. On the types of reparations, the 
TRC elaborated a wide range of measures showing a great deal of innovation and 
                                                                                                                                        
the names of individuals they encountered during their work whom they considered to have 
been a victim of a gross human rights violation. 
198  S 26(2) b TRC Act for a finding whther a particular violation alleged met the criterion of ‘gross 
violation’. 
199  Henzelin et al (n 11 above), 337. 
200  Art 75 Rome Statute. 
201  See DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber I Decision,   
202  Section 6.5.2 above. 
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variety of reparations to fit the circumstances - variety of violations, number of 
victims, and availability of resources among others. The TRC Act defined reparation 
to include ‘any form of compensation, ex gratia payment, restitution, rehabilitation or 
recognition.’203 Commenting on the Interim Constitution of 1993 under which the TRC 
Act operated, the Constitutional Court endorsed the TRC and a broad conception of 
reparation.204 The Court gave some examples of reparations: bursaries and scholarships 
for the youth; occupational training and rehabilitation; surgical intervention and 
medical assistance; housing subsidies, and tombstones and memorials.205  
The following five modes of reparation were eventually recommended by the 
TRC: interim reparation in monetary terms,206 individual reparation grants both in 
monetary terms;207 and in the form of symbolic reparation208 including a range of legal 
and administrative measures,209 Community rehabilitation programmes;210 and 
institutional reform.211  
For the ICC, in view of the large number of victims, the ICC will have to 
explore the possibilities available in deploying communal reparations. However, the 
fact that ICC deals with individual responsibility – and not state responsibility - raises 
                                                
203  S 1 TRC Act. 
204  Justice Mohammed stated in AZAPO v President of South Africa CC at para 45 that: ‘The 
election made by the makers of the Constitution was to permit Parliament to favour ‘the 
reconstruction of society’ involving in the process a wider concept of ‘reparation’ which would 
allow the state to take into account the competing claims on its resources, but at the same time, 
to have regard to the ‘untold sufferings’ of individuals and families whose fundamental human 
rights had been invaded during the conflict of the past.’ (emphasis added). 
205  AZAPO, ibid. See also See Final TRC Report, Volume Five, Chapter Five, para 44. 
206  Ibid, para 25. This was conceived by the Commission as assistance for people in urgent need, 
to provide them with access to appropriate services and facilities. The TRC recommended that 
limited financial resources be made available to facilitate this access. 
207  Ibid, paras 26 and paras 40-45. The Commission envisaged an individual financial grant 
scheme through which each victim would receive a financial grant, according to various 
criteria, paid over a period of six years. Citing lack of resources, the government eventually 
paid out a one time lump-sum of R 6000, down from the R 23,000 recommended. The 
insufficiency of individual grants has been central critiques of the TRC process. 
208  Ibid, para 27-28. According to the TRC, symbolic reparation would encompass ‘measures to 
facilitate the communal process of remembering and commemorating the pain and victories of 
the past’ and would include including designation of a national day of remembrance and 
reconciliation, erection of memorials and monuments, and the development of museums. 
209  These included measures to assist individuals to obtain death certificates, expedite outstanding 
legal matters and expunge criminal records. See Ibid, para 29. 
210  This involved the establishment of community-based services and activities by various 
ministries aimed at promoting the healing and recovery of individuals and affected 
communities. Ibid, para s30-31. 
211  Ibid, para 32. These proposals include legal, administrative and institutional measures designed 
to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses. 
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conceptual as well as practical concerns. A state, with its deeper purse, is best suited 
and able to institute measures requiring expenditure towards construction of 
monuments, museums, health facilities and the like. Unless the accused at the ICC are 
heads of states or government – this is not the case at the moment – one cannot expect 
the government to take on such a responsibility in respect of which the ICC lacks 
powers to order. Since an order against an accused is dependent on a guilty verdict,212 
and since a reparations order can only be made against an individual with respect to 
specific victims, the only other avenue – unless the defendant is rich enough – is to 
operationalise communal reparations through the ICC’s Trust Fund. But, this confronts 
yet another obstacle – lack of funds. The trust fund, as stated, relies on voluntary 
contributions. It is unlikely that meaningful programmes will be instituted in all the 
four countries in respect of which the ICC is seized of ‘situations’ at the moment. 
The TRC outlined a number of principles relating to reparations said to be 
drawn from internationally acceptable approaches, which the Commission couched as 
‘reparations policy’. The specific modes of reparations outlined above were to be 
considered and implemented within this policy. These principles are:1) redress, 
constituting the right to fair and adequate compensation; 2) restitution, which means 
the right to the re-establishment, as far as possible, of the situation that existed prior to 
the violation; 3) rehabilitation, which entails the right to receive medical and 
psychological care and fulfilment of significant personal and community needs; 4) 
restoration of dignity, entailing the right of the individual/community to a sense of 
worth and; 5) guarantees of non-repetition, which covers  a wide range issues and the 
strategies for the creation of legislative and administrative measures that contribute to 
the maintenance of a stable society and the prevention of the re-occurrence of human 
rights violations. 213  
As discussed, the Rome Statute contains provisions on restitution, 
rehabilitation and compensation but not on guarantees of non-repetition. In the 
discussion on the ICC reparations framework, it was noted that states unsupportive of 
reparations in the ICC took the view that the establishment of the Court constituted 
implicit recognition of victims’ rights through its retributive and deterrent functions 
                                                
212  DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber I Decision, paras 51, 61 and 76. 
213  Final TRC Report (n 205 above) para 37; Also Final TRC Report Volume Six, Section Two, 
Chapter Two. 
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and that guarantees of non-repetition was assured in case of convictions.214 It is opined 
that this view only partially comprehends what guarantees to non-repetition means. It 
seems to suggest that non-repetition is achieved merely through the incapacitation of a 
particular perpetrator. It was noted above that guarantees of non-repetition is a much 
broader idea which infers not only incapacitating a particular perpetrator but also 
institutional and legal reform, and promoting mechanisms to prevent and monitor 
future social conflict.215 Once again, the fact that the ICC deals with individual 
responsibility rather than state responsibility raises practical problems for the ICC in 
giving effect to this form of reparation. Yet, this may be the one of the most effective 
measure for post conflict societies more broadly. The ICC cannot make an order 
against an individual concerning legal reform. In this regard, the ICC may have to 
work through relevant national organisations – beyond its particular mandate – to 
promote a legal reform agenda in countries it has dealings with. 
However, it is possible that the ICC can partly contribute to the achievement of 
guarantees of non-repetition through the implementation, within the limits of 
resources, of broad communal reparations in relevant communities, rather than 
individualised measures. Uplifting economically relevant victims groups and their 
communities may be the best way of addressing at least some of victims’ concerns. 
More often than not, individuals are victimised in conflicts that are rooted in economic 
marginalisation, and other forms of exclusion. It makes more sense in these cases to 
deploy mechanisms that target communities more rather than exclusively individual 
victims. The work of other intergovernmental, international and national organisations 
in this regard can be crucial.  
At a practical level, the TRC experience provides more lessons. In general, the 
RRC, and the TRC in general adopted flexible procedures and low standards of proof. 
All that was needed was for one to prove that one was a victim of a gross violation. 
For these reasons, the TRC and RRC in particular provided for wide and unrestricted 
                                                
214  Muttukumaru (n 25 above) 264.  
215  Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, GA Res., UNGAOR, 60th Sess., UN Doc. A/Res/60/147 (16 December 
2005) paras. 19-23. See also, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni: 
The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. UNESCOR, 56th Sess. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, 
(January 18, 2000) which provides a comprehensive outline of reparations. 
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participatory rights unlike in the case of the ICC where the potentially prohibitive 
Article 68 criteria – operates to limit the number of eligible victims who can 
participate directly in proceedings. Even in the TRC’s amnesty committee – which for 
the reason that the rights of suspected perpetrators were at issue adopted a fairly 
adversarial procedure – once the committee had identified a victim, they would 
without restrictions or preconditions refer to the RRC for action.216  
In line with the TRC’s open policy on reparations,217 the ability to obtain 
remedies was not pegged on participation in TRC proceedings such as those relating to 
amnesty. Even non-participating victims who made application for reparations 
received reparations.218 It is not expected that the ICC will limit beneficiaries of 
reparations to victims who participate, even when the orders are made against the 
defendant. The facility for legal representation provides a viable avenue for large 
numbers of victims to participate and to motivate a case for reparations during the trial 
or in a post trial procedure as the case may be. 
In terms of awards, the RRC recommended a lump-sum award spread over 6 
years. In so doing, it dispensed with potentially complex and time-consuming 
processes of quantifying loss, injury and damages. The ICC could choose this 
approach, but it is not without problems. It ignores the fact that victims are not 
similarly placed in not only injuries or losses sustained but also economically and that 
responses to each must vary. Why treat similarly, differently placed victims? The fact 
that the South African government eventually cut the final award recommended for 
each victim by the TRC demonstrates the limits of individualized reparations 
especially where victims are many. 
Equally, one can take the view that the TRC process – with its wide 
participation and the RRC’s reparations policy - seems better suited to deal with 
broader issues of reconciliation than a traditional criminal Court. The broad 
participation by victims and the public, the amnesty and reparations among others 
contributed to the general view that TRC approach was restorative in character. One 
can argue that the TRC inferred a relatively more accessible process not tethered to the 
procedural and formalistic requirements of an essentially adversarial process such as 
                                                
216  S 22 TRC Act. 
217  Art 26 TRC Act and Final TRC Report, Chapter Five, part Five. 
218  Ibid. 
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the ICC. In the end, there are limits to what the ICC can do both in facilitating access 
and in achieving goals beyond prosecution of perpetrators. That is why the reparations 
function should be ceded to the fund with only a limited supervisory role reserved for 
the Court. Since the Rules allow the Court to collaborate with intergovernmental, non-
governmental, international and national organizations and others,219 the Court should, 
stimulate and work with these ‘partner’ organizations at the national level in matters 
relating to victims once the ICC becomes seized of a matter. 
 
6.5.3 Rwanda and Gacaca Reparations Model 
6.5.3.1 Structures and Mandates 
 
After the genocide 1994, Rwanda faced a huge challenge of justice – millions of 
devastated survivors and tens of thousands of alleged perpetrators in its collapsing 
penitentiary facilities. In spite of the government’s firm desire to prosecute all alleged 
perpetrators without exception, represented in its rejection of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,220 there was no enabling law for the punishment of 
genocide and crimes against humanity.221 In the face of a collapsed judiciary and the 
absence of enabling legislation to try genocide and crimes against humanity, difficult 
problems bedevilled efforts to prosecute perpetrators and to bring justice to victims.222 
A new law was passed on August 30 1996 to enable national Courts to try individuals 
accused of participation in the two crimes.223 The law defined four categories of 
offenders, beginning with category I, consisting of the most serious ones whose 
                                                
219  Rule 18(e) relating to the Witnesses and Victims Unit; and Rule 98(4) on making of reparations 
order by the Court. 
220  J Sarkin ‘Promoting justice, truth and reconciliation in transitional societies: evaluating 
Rwanda’s approach in the new millennium of using community based Gacaca tribunals to deal 
with the past’ (2000) 2 International LF 112-121 117; E Daly, 367. 
221  Rwanda rejected calls to institute a Truth and Reconciliation Commission opting for 
Nuremberg style trials under difficult circumstances. 
222  CM Carrol ‘An assessment of the role and effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda and the Rwandan national criminal justice system in dealing with the mass 
atrocities of 1994’ (2003) 18 Boston Univ International LJ 163-200 164. 
223  The Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of 
Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed since October 1 1990, Organic Law 
No.8/96. 
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responsibility overlapped considerably with ICTR-type cases, to less serious crimes 
against property in category IV. 224  
No sooner had it come into operation than the government became sceptical of 
the conventional Courts’ ability to deal with the complicated question of post conflict 
justice in Rwanda in view of the problems cited.225 It became imperative for new 
institutions to be created to deal with massive numbers of perpetrators and victims. 
The answer seemed to lie in Gacaca, an ancient conflict resolution mechanism that 
was formally adopted and constituted to try offenders in their communities by their 
peers. A law was promulgated in 2001 giving legal sanction to these traditional or 
‘village’ Courts.226 Gacaca tribunals have jurisdiction over intentional and 
unintentional homicides, crimes against property and assault,227 but excludes category I 
crimes in terms of the Organic Law of 1996. 
The concept of Gacaca inferred a broad based participatory process presided 
over by elders – inyangamgayo – and open to public participation by whoever could 
lend assistance to the process.  Gacaca was firmly rooted in restorative justice as 
understood today in many national jurisdictions. Rather than mete out retributive 
justice, these Courts were intended to reconcile the wrongdoer with those affected by 
their acts. Together with institutionalized apology, open participation by victims, 
perpetrators and the entire community enhanced the ability of the tribunals to reconcile 
victims with perpetrators and the entire community. 
The vesting of powers in such rudimentary Courts, generally unequipped to try 
serious international crimes especially in the face of serious deprivations of due 
process rights raises serious questions beyond this study.228 The lack of legal 
                                                
224  For a discussion of the Organic Law No 8/96 and the categorization of crimes, see generally Idi 
Gaparayi ‘Justice and Social reconstruction in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda: an 
evaluation of the possible role of Gacaca tribunals’ 1 (2000) African HRLJ 78-106; E Bradley 
‘In search for justice: a truth and reconciliation commission for Rwanda’ (1998) 7 J of 
International Law and Practice 129-190 135; M Morris ‘Rwandan justice and the International 
Criminal Court’ 1998 ILSA J of International & Contemp. Law 351-361 at 351 (citing political 
problems and factionalisation for the problems encountered in the implementation of the 
Organic Law). 
225  E Daly ‘Between Punitive and reconstructive justice: the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda’ (2001) 34 
New York Univ J of International L and Politics 355. 
226  Legal Notice No 8 of 2001.  
227  E Daly (n 226 above) 371. 
228  For commentaries on this see J Sarkin ‘Tension between justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: 
politics, human rights, due process and the role of Gacaca in dealing with the genocide’ 45, 
2(2001) J of African Law 143-172 146; generally I Gaparayi (n 225 above). 
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representation and fair trial guarantees in Gacaca procedure has been one of the main 
points of attack on these tribunals, sometimes derided as ‘mob justice’ and a disguised 
avenue for revenge.229 Others have been more lenient in their criticism. For instance, 
Human Rights Watch has noted the flaws in the Gacaca system but acknowledged that 
it may be the only hope for dealing with the large number of suspects at the time held 
in overflowing Rwandan jails and centers of detention.230 
 
6.5.3.2 Principles, Trends and Lessons  
 
Like the South African TRC, Gacaca’s main mandate was to promote reconciliation. 
Zorbas has observed in this regard that Gacaca’s ‘overarching goal was to promote 
healing and reconciliation by providing a platform for victims to express themselves, 
encouraging acknowledgements and apologies, and facilitating the coming together of 
both victims and perpetrators.’231 
In terms of the Organic Law, reparations were ordered against persons found 
guilty of property offence - destruction, stealing, burning. This did not extend to those 
who had to serve prison terms, in particular, those charged with the most serious 
crimes. The nature of reparations measures ordered – rebuilding of houses, minimal 
monetary recompense and community service to construct communal facilities - 
accommodated the indigence of the accused in practical ways. Commentators take 
issue with how the indigence of defendants at the ICC affects the possibility of 
meaningful restitution orders. While Rwanda offers interesting and innovative 
approaches to restitution, it is unlikely, because of the fact that the ICC is removed 
from the theatre of conflicts that could make such orders, that a defendant will be 
ordered to reconstruct a house that was destroyed. 
Lack of fair trial guarantees, while perhaps justifiable under the circumstances 
of post-1994 Rwanda, somewhat eroded the gains and legitimacy of the Gacaca as a 
viable alternative to formal justice. The fact that Gacaca is in direct contact with 
                                                
229   Amnesty International Report, Rwanda, Unfair Trials: Justice Denied -AFR 47/08/97, (8  April 
1997) Para. 1. 
230   See ‘Justice in Rwanda’ BBC News Tuesday, 18 June 2002, accessible at  
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa> (accessed on 13 May 2004). 
231  E Zorbas ‘Reconciliation in post genocide Rwanda’ 1 (2004-05) African J of Legal Studies 29-
52 at 36. 
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communities – as opposed to tribunals such as the ICC – lends legitimacy to the 
process.232  The remote location of ‘theatres of crime’ from the ICC’s seat in The 
Hague limits its contact with conflict communities. This is not mitigated by the fact 
that the ICC may from time to time hold sessions away from its permanent seat.233 
Even when it relocates, the formal rules limit who may appear or participate 
meaningfully in the process.  
 
6.5.4 UN Compensation Commission: The Case of Iraq-Kuwait 
 
Unlike international criminal tribunals, such as the ICC, UN Claims Commissions are 
established within the framework of state responsibility and usually provide 
compensation only to injured states, not individuals. The UN Compensation 
Commission (UNCC) established after the Gulf War had the mandate to enforce Iraq’s 
international responsibility to pay reparations to individuals and corporations in 
respect of obligations arising from the unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.234 
As such, the UNCC broke new ground in the law of state responsibility by requiring a 
state to provide direct compensation to both individual victims and corporate 
entities.235 The procedure afforded individual victims a primary role in the process of 
compensation, in contrast to the established practice, which made the state the focal 
point for similar claims.236 The UNCC, which concluded its work in 2005 was created 
                                                
232  D Hafner & E King ‘Beyond traditional notions of transitional justice: how trials, truth 
commissions and other tools of accountability can and should work together’ 30 (2007) British 
Columbia & Contemp LR. 91- 110 at 103; E Daly (n 226 above)  374 (noting that a majority of 
Rwandans support Gacaca). 
233  Art 3(3) Rome Statute provides that the Court may seat elsewhere whenever it considers 
desirable. 
234  On the UN Claims Commission, see RB Lillich (ed) The United Nations Compensation 
Commission (1995); N Wuhler, ‘Causation and Directness of Loss as Elements of 
Compensability before the United Nations Compensation Commission’, in RB Lillich (ed) The 
United Nations Compensation Commission (1995); V. Heiskanen, The United Nations 
Compensation Commission, 296 Recueil des cours de L’Academie de La Haye 259, 334–339 
(2003). 
235  MC Bassiouni ‘International recognition of victims rights’ (2006) 6:2 Human Rights LR 6 
(2006), 203-279 at 240. Individual victims and corporations presented their claims through 
their respective governments or international organisations on behalf of those individual 
victims who are not in a position to have their claims filed by a government. 
236  See S Rosenne ‘Reflections on the position of the individual in inter-state litigation in the 
International Court of Justice’ in P Sanders (ed) International arbitration Liber amicorum for 
Martin Domke (1967) 240-251 241 who has wondered why the individual in the context of 
cases where states articulate claims on behalf of nationals before the ICJ, although the 
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by Security Council resolution under Chapter VII – another first in international law.237 
The resolution established a Compensation Fund and the UNCC to administer and 
process compensation claims, of which 1.5 million were concluded by 2005.238 
Conceived as a ‘claims resolution facility’ rather than a tribunal or Court, the UNCC 
has dealt with property compensation issues arising from unlawful activities and 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law violations – including 
murder, torture and illegal detention.239  
The experience of the UNCC is instructive in respect of potential models of 
processing mass claims for victims. First, it demonstrates, just as is the case for the 
mass claims processes discussed above, that a successful, well-run reparations process 
must be free from the fetters of litigation.240 A flexible procedure with low thresholds 
of proof may be necessary to enable processing of thousands – probably millions of 
claims. Secondly, the importance of specialized expertise and evaluation in processing 
mass claims –which the judges such as those of the ICC lack – is equally demonstrated 
here. While, there is room for the ICC to use experts in the evaluation of loss, damage 
and injury to, and in respect of, victims in processing reparations applications, it has 
already been argued that there is a limit to what can be done within the main trial in 
view of a number of countervailing interests - fair trial guarantees and efficiency. In 
the end, it is suggested that the focus for reparations should be on the Trust Fund, and 
or a separate post trial procedure managed by experts.   
Thirdly, the UNCC sounds a caution, in the context of the ICC, to the ‘dangers’ 
of an open process that is likely to attract enormous claims, in view of limited 
resources – time and money. While the ICC is undertaking a vital step towards 
meeting its mandate by sending out forms and inviting victims to identify themselves, 
it risks raising expectations of millions of victims only to disappoint by failing to 
provide reparations. It is advisable for the Court to properly manage expectations of 
                                                                                                                                        
individual is the object of proceedings, he is not ‘granted any opportunity to make known to the 
Court, in his own way, his own views on the questions of fact and questions of law involved’. 
237  See SC Res. 692, 20 May 1991, S/RES/692 (1991; MCBassiouni (n 236 above) 240. 
238  See SC Res. 692, 20 May 1991, S/RES/692 (1991); Bassiouni (n 236 above) 240. See also JR 
Crook, ‘Current Development: the United Nations Compensation Commission - A New 
Structure to Enforce State Responsibility’, (1993) 87 American JIL 144. 
239  Bassiouni (n 236 above) 240. 
240  The UNCC was not conceived as a Court or tribunal, but as a compensation facility. Bassiouni 
(n 236 above) 240; Crook (n 238 above) 145. 
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victims and not to ‘fish’ for victims in the absence of sufficient funds.241 Fifthly, the 
fact that the UNCC was able to process more than 1.5 million claims totalling in 
excess of USD 50 billion demonstrates the success a well endowed fund can achieve – 
and the limits of the VTF based on voluntary contributions. 242. 
Fourthly, the UNCC may proffer limited lessons for the ICC reparations 
framework on assessment of damage, loss and injury as appears in Article 75 of the 
Rome Statute. Conceptually, a comparison between the two, in particular attempts to 
draw ‘hand-in-glove’ solutions would be problematic in view of the fact that the ICC 
and UNCC, as noted already operate within different frameworks of responsibility – 
individual and state responsibility respectively. Curiously, UN Res 671 that created 
UNCC uses similar language to that used in Article 75 Rome Statute – ‘damage, loss 
or injury’. Noting this similarity, Hemptinne et al rightly highlight the fact that UNCC 
was charged with establishing responsibility on the basis of general international law 
(which in their view may have resulted in a broader scope of liability), while the ICC 
deals with responsibility arising largely in international humanitarian law.243 They note 
that the Court must consider this.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that unlike the UNCC, the definition of victim in Rule 
85 ICC RPE is limited to natural persons. It is argued that this is a vital factor that 
must inform the considerations relating to the nature and forms of reparations – and 
perhaps scope of liability before the ICC. 
 
6.5.5 United States’ Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) 
 
The ATCA is considered here - not because it is a reparations model (in the sense of a 
mass reparations programme) but rather, as an important institution that offers victims 
                                                
241  A Di Giovanni ‘The Prospect of ICC Reparations in the Case Concerning Northern Uganda: 
On a Collision Course with Incoherence?’ (2006) 2 J of International Law & International 
Relations 25 noting at 27 that with respect to publicizing reparations that ‘… the Court would 
risk sending the message to the victim population that they will indeed be compensated, in 
some form or other, for wrongs committed against them. These are expectations which might 
be more easily created than dispelled.’ 
242  Bassiouni (n 236 above) 241 records that more than USD 20 billion of this has been availed to 
states and international organisations for distribution to successful claimants. The 
Compensation Fund drew funds collected from 25% of oil proceeds managed through the UN 
Oil for Food Programme. 
243  Hemptinne et al (n 92 above) 353. 
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of ICC-type crimes from around the world to obtain reparations against individual or 
corporate perpetrators in United States federal Courts. As noted already, the ATCA 
has links to most of the Holocaust reparations programmes in the sense that 
proceedings that eventually led to out of Court settlements between victims and 
various entities were commenced under the ATCA, and were, as in the case of the 
Swiss Banks Settlement discussed in detail above, supervised by the same Court.  
In the post Holocaust era, the United States has been a forum of choice for 
many victims of gross human rights violations from many parts of the world because 
of the ATCA. The purpose of the abridged discussion244 here is to draw important 
lessons arising from litigation under this law as it relates to the design of reparations 
mechanisms as well as principles that it proffers. It is considered that the ATCA is 
worth discussing at two levels. It has so far been the only national law under which 
victims of gross human rights violations have successfully claimed for reparations. 
Equally, it is relevant in demonstrating the limits of such statutory judicial process as a 
mechanism of addressing mass atrocities.  
The ATCA provides an avenue for victims of certain human rights abuses, 
including those committed outside the United States, but where the perpetrator has 
territorial ties to the US – usually where he now lives in or, in the case of corporations, 
is based in the United States, to obtain damages in US federal Courts.245 The ATCA, 
adopted in 1789 as part of the original Judiciary Act, grants Federal Courts jurisdiction 
over cases involving violations of the ‘law of nations’, which has proved an important 
                                                
244  The ATCA has evoked considerable academic commentary. On this subject generally, see JL 
Garwood-Cutler ‘Enforcing ICL Violations with Civil Remedies’ in Bassiouni, MC Vol III 
(Enforcement) 343-390. See also AR Amar, ‘The two-tiered structure of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 (1990) 138 Univ. of Pennsylvania LR 1499; J Jarvis ‘A new paradigm for the Alien Tort 
Statute under extraterritoriality and the universality principle’ (2003) 30 Pepperdine LR 671; 
ST Kim, ‘Adjudicating violations of international law: defining the scope of jurisdiction under 
the Alien Tort Statute - Trajano v Marcos’ (1994) 27 Cornell Int'l LJ 387. 
245  Corporations that may be called to account include those that did business, paid taxes or 
complied with the laws of a foreign country in which it is alleged that an atrocity occurred. 
However, none of the cases brought against corporate entities have been successful yet, 
although the Court in Karadzic and Unocal-Burma case (Doe v Unocal), Corp., 395 F.3d 932 
(9th Cir. 2002) have made statements to the effect that ‘any private person’ (unlinked to 
governments) can be held to account under the ATCA. See RG Steinhardt ‘The Alien Tort 
Claims Act: Theoretical and historical foundations of the Alien Tort Claims Act and its 
discontents: a reality check’ (2003) 16 St. Thomas LR 585 at 602-05. See also AF Enslen 
‘Filartiga’s offspring: the Second Circuit significantly expands the scope of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act with its decision in Kadic v Karadzic’ (1996) 48(2) Alabama LR 695. 
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criterion strictly enforced by the Courts. 246 Although on the face of it the ATCA does 
not provide for a cause of action required for one to obtain redress, US Courts have 
taken a progressive approach on this point. Since the landmark judgment in the 
celebrated case Filartiga v Pena Irala247 that revived the 200-year-old statute, they 
have consistently held that the Act provides for both jurisdiction and a cause of action 
for acts that violate international law.248  
The somewhat ambiguous position after Filartiga as to what acts the ATCA 
deals with, this most important criterion of a twin test applied by federal Courts under 
ATCA has been clarified. In a recent case Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court 
took the view that ATCA provides only a limited ability for individuals to bring 
private causes of action based on international law.249 ATCA applies only to claims 
involving violations of international norms that are specific, universal, and 
obligatory.250 The Court stated categorically that the ATCA does not apply to claims of 
arbitrary arrest and detention at issue in the case. While the Court did not elaborate 
further, the additional categories that may meet this test, it is opined that genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are easy inclusions in the list of acts against ‘the 
law of nations’. Accordingly, a victim of any of these crimes can – if able to furnish 
the second requirement regarding jurisdiction – obtain a civil remedy before relevant 
US Courts.  
The requirement that the relevant US Court must have personal jurisdiction 
over defendants is equally important. For the individual defendant, there must be some 
physical presence in the U.S. With regard to corporate entities, this rule enacts that the 
                                                
246  S 28 U.S.C. §1350, Judiciary Act 1789 provides that ‘U.S. district Courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.’ 
247  630 F.2d at 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
248  Since the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Filartiga case in 1980, U.S. 
Courts have consistently held that the ATCA permits victims, or their relatives, to seek 
damages for acts committed outside the US and that violate international law. Over $10 million 
were awarded to the family of a Paraguayan human rights activist who had been subjected to 
torture by a Paraguayan police inspector in Paraguay, but who had subsequently immigrated to 
the US. 
249  Sosa v Alvarez Machain 542 US 692 (2004) 732; A Farelly ‘Foreign policy in the Courts – 
ATCA and the in re South African Apartheid Litigation: What Sosa makes Courts do’ (2005) 
30 Seton Hall Legis J 437 439. 
250  See Filartiga (n 250 above); J Jarvis ‘A new paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute under 
extraterritoriality and the universality principle’ (2003) 30 Pepperdine LR 671 672.  
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corporation must either be based, or have certain other contacts in the US. The onus of 
establishing the link in both cases falls upon the victim.251  
To date, various perpetrators have been sued successfully under the ATCA. 
This suggests that the ATCA is indeed a useful tool for establishing accountability that 
can, as it has albeit in a limited number of cases, enable deserving parties to obtain a 
measure of justice,252 even though sometimes this may only be symbolic given the poor 
record of enforcement of ATCA judgments.253  
While the ATCA can be a useful tool for victims, and indeed has been, in 
delivering judgments against powerful foreign defendants in cases where such is 
impossible in their home countries, it has been influenced by questions of politics and 
US relations with other governments. While this is not reflected overtly in US Courts’ 
rulings, together with the twin test described, courts have deployed the customary 
principle of sovereign immunity254 and the ‘political question’ doctrine effectively to 
refuse jurisdiction in cases that have foreign policy implications.255 This stance appears 
to have been influenced by fears that ATCA suits would compromise US relations 
with other states.256 President Bush expressed related fears in 1991257 regarding the 
                                                
251  AA Reed ‘The two-tiered structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1990) 138 Univ. of 
Pennsylvania LR 1499; generally J Jarvis (n 251 above). 
252  As the result of increasing international concern with human rights issues, however, litigants 
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include for instance Abebe-Jira v Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir.1996) (alleging torture of 
Ethiopian prisoners); Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.1995) (alleging torture, rape, and 
other abuses against Karadzic, a military leader committed during the Balkan war); In re Estate 
of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.1994) (alleging torture and other abuses by former 
President of Philippines); Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir.1984) 
(alleging violations against Libya based on armed attack upon civilian bus in Israel); Xuncax v 
Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162 (D.Mass.1995) (alleging abuses by Guatemalan military forces). 
For a discussion of these and other ATCA cases, see generally Garwood-Cutler (n 246 above). 
See also L Londis ‘The corporate face of the Alien Torts Act: how an old statute mandates a 
new understanding of global interdependence’ (2005) 57 Maine LR 141. 
253  See Garwood-Cutler (n 245 above) 383 noting that apart from a small payout in a the case 
brought against Marcos (Philippines)  from the sale of seized assets in Hawaii, no plaintiffs 
have been able to enforce any portion of the amounts awarded. 
254   See Garwood-Cutler (n 245 above) 367; generally Farelly ‘Foreign policy in the Courts – 
ATCA and the in re South African Apartheid Litigation: What Sosa makes Courts do’ (2005) 
30 Seton hall Legis. J 437 439. 
255  US Courts have refused to adjudicate certain ATCA cases on the grounds that that they only 
disclosed a nonjusticiable political problem and therefore lie ‘beyond judicial cognizance’. See 
Garwood-Cutler (n 246 above) 366-367. 
256  B Fein, ‘Ruinous Spanner in Foreign Policy? The Washington Post 3rd Oct 1995 at A14 quoted 
in Garwood-Cutler (n 246 above) 373 echoing President Bush’s statements four years earlier 
when signing the TVPA. 
257  Bush stated that ‘[t]here is … a danger that US Courts may become embroiled in difficult and 
sensitive disputes in other countries, and possibly ill-founded or politically motivated suits, 
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Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which, like the ATCA permits aliens to sue in 
US Courts for torture258 committed abroad, but unlike the ATCA extends this 
possibility to US citizens.259 
 
6.5.5.1 Available But Inappropriate: The Limits of Litigation 
 
The ATCA discussion illustrates a number of things. First, it illustrates the lack of 
appropriate avenues through which victims of serious violations and ICC type crimes 
in most countries around the world. Victims who have brought claims under the 
ATCA are drawn to the US federal Courts for a range of reasons, including the fact 
that a real possibility of obtaining remedies exists.  
Secondly, as shown in the discussion, the application by US Courts of a 
number of devices – sovereign immunity, political question doctrine – to refuse 
jurisdiction in ‘sensitive’ cases illustrates in part the limits of litigation to pursue 
reparations claims in foreign Courts, even though this may be the only avenue. One 
must underscore here however that as an international Court, these considerations are 
unlikely to inform the ICC’s actions on the question of remedies. It is suggested that 
while some form of these considerations may inform prosecutorial policy at the ICC – 
whether to indict certain individuals – once this happens, reparations claims will be 
determined on the basis of Article 75 criteria.  
Thirdly, it was indicated that in some successful cases under the ATCA, 
favourable judgments obtained have been largely symbolic. Victims have been unable 
to enforce judgments obtained.260 This shows that favourable judgments alone may not 
helpful to victims, although even judgements may be regarded as a victory for victims 
insofar as their pain and suffering is acknowledged, illegality of impugned conduct 
                                                                                                                                        
which have nothing to do with the United States and which offer little prospect of successful 
recovery. Such potential abuse of this statute undoubtedly would give rise to serious frictions in 
the international relations…’ Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 
28 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 465, Public Papers of the Presidents, Mar 12 1992 cited in 
Garwood-Cutler 366. See Fein (n 257 above) A14 quoted in Garwood-Cutler (n 246 above) 
373. 
258   The TVPA meets US obligations under article 14 of the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment GA Res 39/46, 39 UN GAOR Supp. 
No 51, at 197, UN Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) reprinted in 23 ILM 1027 (1984). 
259   Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L No 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); 1992 
USCCAN (106 Stat.) 1991. 
260  Garwood-Cutler (n 246 above) 343 citing the ‘Marcos exception’. 
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condemned and guilty entities identified. The ability of persons against whom 
judgments are obtained to pay is but one of relevant factors.  
Fourthly, related to the third, the success of Holocaust claims that were 
initiated but not completed under the federal legislative framework (ATCA) once 
again illustrate the limits of Courts as an avenue for obtaining reparations, especially 
where high stakes political issues are concerned. In this regard, it is noteworthy that all 
Holocaust-related cases brought before the Swiss banks claims were unsuccessful 
before US Courts. Claims subsequent to the Swiss claims, were all concluded by 
negotiated agreements, with strong ‘encouragement’ of parties involved by the US 
government. 261 
Lastly, perhaps of greater relevance to the ICC’s victims’ framework is that 
even where reparations have been obtained by some involvement of Courts, such as 
the Swiss banks Holocaust claims, a separate, usually non-judicial mechanism has 
been established to handle actual processing and distribution of awards to actual 
claimants. The Court is thus reduced to a supervisory role of appointing claims 
administrators, certifying agreements and confirming awards. It is suggested that this 
is a powerful illustration of the unsuitability of an institution that operates on strict 
judicial rules and procedure in matters such as these and must inform the ICC 
approach to this question. Further, it is posited that accordingly, this strengthens the 
case for a greater role for the Victims Trust Fund in the Court-Fund dichotomy on the 
question of reparations in the ICC.  
                                                
261  See Bazyler (n 136 above) 16; Garwood-Cutler (n 246) 345. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The retributive model of justice applied by international tribunals has tended to focus 
on the interests of two parties – the international community (as represented by the 
prosecutor) and perpetrators. For this reason, this model does not address the specific 
concerns of victims of international crimes, which go beyond mere participation as 
witnesses when called by either party. A review of the practice of the international 
criminal tribunals since the Nuremberg through to the recent ad hoc tribunals – ICTR, 
ICTY and SCSL – amply demonstrate the fringe position occupied by victims and the 
failure by these tribunals to address their specific concerns.  
The Rome Statute provides for the rights of victims to participate in 
proceedings in their capacity as victims and the right to reparations. The study 
proposes that in order to give full effect to the new victims’ rights regime in the Rome 
Statute, a restorative justice approach – which, as argued has a basis in the texts – has 
to be adopted by the Court. The thesis argues that the new victim rights regime in the 
ICC, in particular the right to participation and to reparations as read together with 
other relevant provisions in the Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(ICC RPE), provide a normative framework for a restorative justice paradigm. This 
framework is a mechanism through which victims of international crimes can be 
entrenched as a party – albeit a party sui generis – with specific interests to be 
protected. However, it further argues that in implementation, the scope of these rights 
will depend on various factors including the role of the Court. It was further argued 
that in view of the novelty of these victims’ rights in international criminal law (ICL), 
the Court has to rely, in its interpretation, on sources beyond ICL, in which victims 
have held but a fringe position. To test the assumptions made above, the study 
attempted to respond to a number of key questions while conducting a systematic 
analysis and review of relevant texts and jurisprudence. 
The following key questions were posed at the beginning: Does the new 
victims’ rights regime presuppose a restorative justice paradigm? If so, what is the 
scope of this concept in view of both normative and institutional limitations since the 
ICC is primarily a criminal court? In view of the well recognised defence right to fair 
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trial and the prosecutor’s law enforcement functions, how should the rights of victims, 
in particular the right to participate be read? In view of the interests of these two 
parties that are traditionally protected in the criminal process, does the new victims’ 
rights regime proffer a real change for victims, or will it in effect end up as merely 
superficial recognition? What is the role of the Court in developing content of victims’ 
rights and giving effect to them amid these competing interests? In view of the novelty 
of the ICC victims’ rights regime, what is the relevance of jurisprudence on related 
matters from national, human rights and other international bodies? 
This final chapter summarises and integrates the main findings in relation to 
the two rights of victims of international crimes discussed – participation and 
reparation. 
 
The normative framework and sources of law 
 
The study departed from the position that ICL based on a retributive paradigm 
of justice has previously marginalised victims of crime and has largely relegated them 
to the role of witness. In providing for the right to participate in proceedings and the 
right to reparations, the Rome Statute has normatively changed this. However, since 
the framework of justice within which the relevant provisions are to be interpreted and 
given effect is important, the ICC has to adopt an appropriate model of justice. 
As argued in chapter one, the inclusion of the new victims’ rights regime in the 
Rome Statute read together with several other concepts in the ICC framework 
contemplates, and indeed requires the adoption of restorative justice paradigm in order 
to give full effect to victims’ rights to participation and reparation. A restorative justice 
paradigm offers the best way of understanding how the provisions of the Rome Statute 
fit together. But, what is restorative justice? To what extent do institutional 
arrangements (the ICC being a criminal court) place constraints on the elaboration of a 
restorative justice approach? 
Typically, restorative justice, which is generally used in contradistinction to 
‘retributive justice’, is associated with principles and values that underpin appropriate 
reaction to the commission of a crime such as making amends, reconciliation, 
guarantees against repetition of crime(s), participation and restoration but also with 
various ‘methods’ or ‘practices’ such as mediation, group conferencing and circles, 
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especially at the national level. Although restorative justice principles are rooted in 
international law, in particular the law of state responsibility, the potential links 
between restorative justice and human rights violations has not been well explored. 
The term ‘restorative justice’ has been somewhat stigmatized in ICL. Although judges 
and commentators today make fleeting reference to it, or sometimes choosing 
formulations such as ‘victim-oriented’, ‘victim-centred’ justice, restorative justice has 
remained ill defined and vague. Discourse around the role of victims in the process of 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals has tended to inaccurately equate 
‘restorative justice’ to reparations or compensation.  
Various provisions in the Rome Statute relating to victims, the rights of 
defendants and the role of states parties as discussed in chapters 5 and 6 embody the 
principles or restorative justice. These principles require the balancing of the interests 
of victims, offenders and the public, facilitation of access to justice for victims and 
defendants as well as participation and full restoration of victims of crime. In view of 
the normative and institutional constraints imposed on the ICC as a criminal court, the 
concept of restorative justice that includes the listed ‘practices’ and ‘methods’ 
sometimes associated with it is not fitting for the ICC framework. The conception of 
restorative justice adopted here – as limited to certain principles and values – is 
informed by institutional constraints applicable to the formal criminal justice system in 
general and the ICC in particular. 
In proposing a restorative justice approach by the ICC, it has been 
demonstrated in chapter one that the Rome Statute contemplates such an approach. In 
this regard, it was argued that restorative justice provides the best basis of 
understanding how all the provisions coherently fit together. First, the objects and 
overall mandate of the ICC consists not only in prosecuting perpetrators but also in 
providing justice for victims.1 Secondly, the victims’ participatory and reparative 
regime itself and related mechanisms institutionalise this new, more just approach in 
ICL. Thirdly, various other mechanisms in the texts such as ‘interests of justice’, and 
‘fairness’ are supplementary frameworks of analysis which also advance this approach. 
It has been argued that the participation of victims in the process of the ICC renders 
                                                
1  Situation in the DRC in the case of Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Decision on victims’ 
participation No ICC-01/04-01/06 (Jan 18 2008) [Hereinafter DRC Jan 18 2008 Trial Chamber 
I Decision]. 
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the process more fair and complete. Further, although not given much emphasis in ICL 
until now, reparation as an obligation in general international law is not only of similar 
normative standing as that requiring punishment of perpetrators, but is also about 
fairness – the idea that harm suffered by victims should, to the extent possible, and by 
all appropriate means be repaired to the fullest extent possible. 
Fourthly, the Rome Statute requires that the application and interpretation of 
law pursuant to Article 21 – the interpretative clause –, ‘must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights.’2 A proper reading of Article 21 of the Rome 
Statute, in its requirement that interpretation of the Statute must conform to recognised 
human rights, provides an entry point for the Court to apply restorative justice 
principles that have been embraced by international human rights tribunals, which 
jurisprudence is relevant to the elaboration of victims’ rights in the Rome Statute itself. 
It appears that while various Chambers of the ICC have so far referred to human rights 
and cited human rights jurisprudence in their interpretation of specific aspects of 
victims’ right to participate and to reparations, the ‘cherry-pick approach,’ so far 
adopted is problematic. While this approach is presumably informed by considerations 
of relevance of human rights jurisprudence to the issues under consideration, it is 
unsystematic and not always rationalised. This thesis suggests that for coherence, the 
Court should deploy restorative justice paradigm within Article 21 as an interpretative 
framework. 
 
The right to participate in proceedings 
 
In terms of Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, victims have a general right to 
participate at all stages of the proceedings from the initiation of proceedings and 
investigations to the conclusion of appeals. The decisions rendered by various 
chambers of the ICC so far reiterate this. However, a further reading of the Statute and 
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE) disclosed that this is not an automatic 
right for every victim to participate in every proceeding and that various factors are 
relevant in understanding the scope of the right to participate. These are; whether 
proceedings relate to a ‘situation’ or a ‘case’; the fact that there is criteria for 
                                                
2  Art 21 (3) Rome Statute 
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participation; the role of the Court (Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber or Appeals 
Chamber); the role of legal representation among others. In various circumstances, the 
Statute and ICC RPE provide a right to participate as either mandatory or facultative. 
Thus victims have: an absolute right to attend trial proceedings; a discretionary right to 
participate in specific circumstances – put questions to the accused, witness or experts; 
the possibility to make representations before the Court even in Pre-Trial procedure; 
the right to be heard before decisions on reparation; and the right to intervene in 
appeals concerning reparation orders. Before looking at these circumstances in turn, it 
is important to clarify some general elements relate to the right to participate. 
On the question whether victims are established victims as a third party to 
proceedings – in addition to the prosecutor and defence – chapter one concluded that 
the Statute bestows on victims a presumptive status of party, not an automatic, full 
party status as is the case for the Prosecutor and defence. To the extent that victims’ 
role in particular proceedings is subject to judicial determination and that because their 
participation is not in the strictest sense essential to the conduct of a criminal trial, 
victims are but a ‘potential’ and ‘not genuine’.3 However, whether an essential party or 
not, the Statute affords victims the right to participate at every stage and to assert 
certain rights as such, albeit subject to judicial approval.  
Commentators acknowledge that the possibility of a trial without victims does 
not mean that they do not have a right to participate or interests to protect in the 
process. Further, it was noted that their potential contribution to the accomplishment of 
the Court’s main objective – truth searching – renders them indispensable. The chapter 
concluded that victims are a party sui generis and that full prosecutorial functions rest 
with the prosecutor. 
While the discursive principles embodied in restorative justice would require 
an open process in which the majority of victims participate directly to resolve 
particular conflict, it emerged that participation by victims at the ICC will be largely 
through legal representatives. The large number of victims, the fairly complex 
procedures, the rights of defendants to a speedy trial and the need for an efficient 
                                                
3  Donat-Cattin ‘article 68’ in Triffterer 873; Roy S Lee ‘XI’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The International 
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2001) 
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process makes it necessary for the Court to ‘bundle’ victims together for purposes of 
participation subject to special interests and any conflict of interests between victims. 
The factors enumerated above render the criteria established under Article 
68(3) of the Rome Statute for the participation of victims crucial. Article 68(3) is 
crucial, not only to ensure the efficiency of the Court process, the achievement of the 
law enforcement function and protection of fair trial guarantees, but also in ensuring 
that the rights of victims to participate do not fall victim to those aims. Article 68(3) 
requires that the right of a victim to participate in any proceeding be subjected to three 
tests: 1) that the personal interests of the victims are affected; 2) that it is appropriate, 
as determined by the Court for a victim(s) to participate in particular proceedings; and 
3) the manner of their participation is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. The application of these criteria in essence 
determines the scope of victims’ right to participate in particular phases of the 
proceedings. 
On reviewing existing jurisprudence, the test of appropriateness, was 
determined to be whether the participation of victims raises the appearance of integrity 
of the process (for instance the investigation or trial) and whether such participation is 
inconsistent with basic considerations of efficiency and security, in particular that of 
victims themselves.4 The study takes the view therefore that there is a presumption in 
favour of broad participation of victims at all stages. The view taken by the Court with 
respect to the investigation stage applies to the rest of the proceedings. To the Court, 
the extent of a victim’s participation and not their participation per se is the core 
consideration in determining the adverse impact on the investigation, or by extension 
the trial or appeal proceedings.5  
With respect to the requirement that a victim’s interests have to be affected in 
order for him or her to participate in proceedings, it is noted that this requirement will 
be perhaps the most challenging to apply and may determine how effective victim 
participation in the ICC general will be. While the interests of victims at issue may 
differ with the stage of proceedings, in general, the interest(s) that a victim(s) seek to 
                                                
4  DRC Situation Participation Decision, para 57 
5  DRC Situation Participation decision, para 58 
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protect must be one that is capable of judicial recognition. 6 However, there is no 
clarity yet on the meaning of ‘interests’. The Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC has so far 
identified two examples of interests that may determine admission of victims to 
participate – obtaining reparations and punishment of perpetrators.7  
On analysis of the ICC’s jurisprudence, the study suggests in chapter five that 
the decision of the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga Case, in particular the dissenting 
opinion by Justice Song in that case represents the best approach of assessing when 
victims’ interests are affected. The Appeals Chamber endorsed the victims’ view that 
their interests in participating in proceedings are diverse, and include obtaining 
reparations, expressing their views and concerns, verifying facts, protecting their 
dignity during the hearings and securing recognition as victims.8 The study agrees with 
the Appeals Chamber’s view that victims have multiple interests to protect, but that 
these must be linked to evidence brought to substantiate specific charges against the 
accused.9  
Other than reparations, Judge Song’s view that victims participate with an 
interest ‘to receive justice’ is accurate.10 This formulation aggregates the diverse 
interests victims may seek to protect within the ICC proceedings and could furnish the 
Court with a flexible test to deploy in determining when the interests of victims are 
affected. The Appeals Chamber endorsed PTC I’s view that victims have multiple 
interests to protect, but that these must be linked to evidence brought to substantiate 
specific charges against the accused.11 While this requirement of causal connection 
between crimes charged in a particular case and harm suffered by a victim(s) in respect 
of which claims are made – is necessary to protect defendants’ rights to a speedy trial 
and for the Court to operate an efficient process – it may reduce considerably the 
number of victims who may participate in particular proceedings. 
                                                
6  See E Haslam ‘Victim participation at the International Criminal Court: A triumph of hope 
over experience?’ in D MacGoldrick, P Row & E Donnely (eds) The Permanent International 
Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues’315-334 326’ 
7  See initial opinion of PTC I in DRC Situation Participation Decision, para 63  
8  Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 
and a/0105/06 concerning the "Directions and Decisions of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 
February 2007, 1CC-01/04-01/06-925, para 39 
9  Ibid, para 97 
10  Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 
and a/0105/06 concerning the "Directions and Decisions of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 
February 2007, 1CC-01/04-01/06-925. Separate Opinion of Judge Song, para 10 
11  Ibid, para 97 
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In view of the fact that cases to be tried at the ICC will arise from situations of 
mass atrocities, there is a danger that hundreds of victims may apply to participate in 
proceedings with the possibility of such proceedings being drawn-out, with injustice 
being occasioned to accused persons. For his or her part, the Prosecutor, considering 
victims as a ‘burden’ may seek to exclude or limit to a minimum the role of victims in 
their capacity as such. It becomes imperative for the Court to apply judiciously its 
control role.  
Thus, the study concludes that the exercise by victims of the right to participate 
is closely related to the power of the Court vis-à-vis those of the prosecutor, in 
particular during the investigations.12 While accepting in principle that victims are 
afforded this right, the attitude of the prosecutor gleaned from decisions so far reflects 
a desire to limit to a minimum the number of victims participating in the process who 
are considered as an encumbrance on prosecutorial powers. It may take time for the 
Prosecutor to be entirely at ease with the fact that the right of victims to participate is 
not necessarily inimical to prosecutorial function and that victims’ role may in the end 
enhance the impact of the Court. Other than qualified legal representatives, the Court 
has to consistently, as it has done so far, assert the fact that victims’ right to participate 
is embedded in the ICC framework. Defendants against whom rights of victims to 
participate have to be balanced have not viewed this development entirely in positive 
light and have raised the possibility of their right to an expeditious trial being 
prejudiced. So far, the Court recognises the necessity to entrench participatory rights 
of victims and to assert their influence and voice in the ICC’s process but is equally 
alive to the challenges this portend. 
Legal representatives of victims will play an important role in the realisation of 
the right to participate at various stages of proceedings. A question was posed at to 
whether requiring legal representation of victims does not negate the essence of the 
right to participate in proceedings. A proper response may require that one determine 
what victims want and what victims aim to achieve by participating in the proceedings 
at the ICC. For want of appropriate tools, the study restricted itself to the last two 
issues. One of Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute criteria alludes to why victims 
                                                
12  See with respect to investigations J de Hemptinne & F Rindi ‘ICC Pre-Trial Chamber allows 
victims to participate in the investigation stage of proceedings’ J of International Criminal 
Justice 4 (2006) 342-350 349 
 237 
participate – to protect their personal interests, which as noted, cover a wide range of 
issues. While the potential cathartic benefits of participating personally in a trial have 
been raised and debated, effective participation and articulation of one’s interests 
required informed representation in view of the complex procedures at the ICC. 
Practically, ‘bundling’ of victims in terms of broad interests for purposes of 
representation is inevitable in the face of numerous victims. The complexity of 
procedures and other practical considerations thus limit direct participation in 
proceedings, in particular at trial where victims can put questions to the accused, 
witnesses and experts. 
 
The right to reparations 
 
In chapter six, the study identified and discussed some of the issues it suggests the ICC 
must address with respect to the right to reparations. These include: firstly, whether the 
trial and reparations (‘civil liability’) issues, can and should be combined in one 
proceeding. Secondly, whether Article 75 (substantive right to reparations) and Article 
79 that creates the victims trust fund (VTF) establish two separate ‘reparations 
frameworks’ within the Court, and, if so, what are the links and how should they be 
implemented to complement each other. Thirdly, what are the reparations principles 
and rules related to actualization of the specific issues such as assessment of damage, 
loss or injury to or in respect of victims? Furthermore, what is the link between the 
right to participate and the right to reparations – is the latter predicated on the former? 
- In view of the fact that: i) at least some reparations issues will be dealt with within 
the trial; ii) reparations proceedings must necessarily involve some participatory role 
for victims whether effected within the trial or in separate proceedings.  
As a start, the objections to the inclusion of reparations in the ICC had to be 
examined. Responding to the concerns that a reparation component in the ICC could 
distract the Court’s attention from its ‘core purpose’ of prosecuting perpetrators, the 
study emphasises that with the inclusion of victims’ rights, the retributive model of 
justice – with its emphasis on punishment – is no longer appropriate if the tripartite 
interests now recognized in the Rome Statute are to be properly protected. The 
objective of giving victims a voice in the Court’s process would not be achieved.  
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Drawing from the experience of national criminal justice systems discussed in 
chapter four, the chapter on reparations acknowledged the practical difficulties 
involved in vesting a criminal court with a reparation function. The right of a 
defendant to a speedy trial and the need to conduct an efficient proceeding poses 
particular challenges. Having reviewed the texts and relevant jurisprudence, the 
conclusion is that the ICC framework is equipped to deal with these concerns. Various 
mechanisms in these regard, including various permissive rules and the creation of the 
VTF closely associated with the Court make it possible to confront difficulties 
associated with the right to reparations in the ICC. 
The Court, in terms of Article 75(2) and VTF in terms of Article 79 are the two 
‘focal points’ of the victims’ reparation function.13 These two ‘centers of reparation’ 
are closely linked operationally. Chapter 6 took the view that while a reading of the 
relevant provisions establishes the possibility of the Court and VTF instituting 
independent reparations schemes, it is imperative that the two collaborate in order to 
give full effect to that function. Despite being structurally separate entities, the texts 
intended interdependence between the Court and the VTF, especially given that the 
latter may be required to participate in fashioning or reparations orders made by the 
Court and to give effect to the Court’s reparation order. Further, the VTF is required to 
consult with the Court when it implements independent reparations projects. 
With respect to reparations linked to the trial, the study examined in chapter six 
the possibility of incorporating reparation proceedings within the main trial taking into 
consideration the rights of defendants to a speedy trial and the presumption of 
innocence. While Regulation 56 of the Court’s Regulations provides for the possibility 
of considering reparations issues during the main trial,14 the experience from national 
tribunals leads one to conclude that it is best if criminal proceedings and reparation 
proceedings are held separately. The fact that a reparation order against an accused is 
dependent on finding of guilt of the accused, it necessarily means that a definitive 
finding on reparation has to come after that. Further, in the context of mass atrocities 
and the possibility that numerous victims may prove the requisite links to a case to 
obtain reparations, holding joint proceedings would complicate and burden the trial. 
                                                
13  L Taylor ‘Thoughts on victims’ reparation and the role of the Office of the Prosecutor’ (2003) 
Available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/taylor.pdf > (accessed on 15 Jan 2008) 
14  Regulation 56 of the Court Regulations 
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However, the chapter endorsed the initial view of the Court that evidence concerning 
reparations could, at least in part – where appropriate, and in the interest of efficiency 
and victims –be considered during the trial.15 
In view of the limits of what the Court can achieve in relation to reparations, 
the large number of victim claimants and the rights of defendants, it is suggested that 
the VTF should be allowed a more prominent role in the processing of reparations. A 
survey of various mass reparation schemes – Holocaust reparations, South African 
TRC, the Rwandan Gacaca model and the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC), as well as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a particular mass tort 
litigation mechanism – offer some useful lessons on a range of reparation related 
questions.  
First, the very existence of these mechanisms is a testament to the limits of a 
criminal Court to deal with reparation issues especially in cases of mass victimisation. 
With the exception of the ATCA, all the mechanisms were meant to operate outside 
the strictures of a courtroom situation. It was noted that even for the ATCA, all the 
successful claims under that Act were settled outside court, with the latter assuming a 
mere supervisory role. For this reason alone, it is suggested that the VTF, rather than 
the Court presents the better option for addressing reparations issues.  
Secondly, as exemplified by the Gacaca in Rwanda and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions, in South African and Sierra Leone, the permissive rules 
and special procedures operated by these mechanisms not only allowed for a greater 
role for victims, but also made it possible for the often complex reparations issues to 
be determined in a less restrictive framework. As is the case for mass reparations 
schemes discussed in chapter six, flexibility in procedure with low thresholds of proof 
may be necessary to enable processing of numerous claims. The VTF, rather than the 
Court is best placed to institute such mechanisms.  
Thirdly, these mechanisms demonstrate that reparation scheme that is 
dependent on the guilt of the perpetrator creates enormous challenges. The ICC 
prosecutes only a handful of perpetrators, most of who are likely to be indigent, yet the 
number of victims will run into hundreds, thousands or more. This limits the scope and 
                                                
15  Situation in the DRC in the case of Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Decision on victims’ 
participation No ICC-01/04-01/06 (Jan 18 2008) 
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impact of Court-based reparations. A liability-free scheme, in which determination of 
beneficiaries is not subject to the challenges mentioned is best suited for a multiplicity 
of victims and could allow for the adoption of interim measures in favour of victims 
before the criminal trial is concluded. Despite all the problems likely to be raised by a 
liability-free scheme (where only the injury to the victim matters), the VTF is the best 
forum to deal with reparations. However, as was observed in chapter six, while the 
sources of funds for the VTF may be wider, reliance on voluntary contributions is a 
problem. 
Fourthly, in determining the quantum of reparations, chapter six examined 
practice at international and national levels and identified proportionality as a key 
principle to be applied by the Court and VTF in this regard. In view of several factors 
identified: numerous victims; limited resources; possible indigence of perpetrators; and 
difficulties in establishing with exactitude the damage, loss or injury suffered by a 
particular victim, it is suggested that while desirable, proportionality should not be 
understood to always infer restitutio in integrum, which requires specific ‘itemisation’ 
of every aspect of harm suffered. The case studies examined reveal that in reality, 
individual awards in mass reparations schemes are only likely to be symbolic. These 
cases further showed that innovative ways of bundling victims – collective or 
communal reparations – have to be a necessary component of reparations schemes at 
the ICC. However, while it may be easier to group victims together for purposes of 
exercising their right to participation, bundling victims who have suffered in specific 
ways for purposes of implementing collective forms of reparations would rightly 
attract the critique of not only being arbitrary (insofar as it departs from the 
proportionality principle) and of ignoring particular concerns individual victims.  
In terms of which victims should benefit, the VTF offers flexibility (unlike the 
Court-based individualised reparations). This is however subject to availability of 
funds and clearance from the Court to the effect that defence rights are unlikely to be 
affected by the institution of any independent reparations or support projects. It would 
be in line with the VTF’s mandate should it choose to focus on a particular class of 
victims; for instance children or women who have suffered the brunt of sexual crimes. 
However, the VTF depends on voluntary contributions, rather than the Court’s budget 
will limit what it can do in this regard. The Court, and in particular the VTF is caught 
between two groups of victims. The first is a huge group of victims (hundreds of 
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thousands of victims of a situation who are not yet linked, and may never get a chance 
to participate in any case). The second is a smaller group of victims (victims of a case 
who have a chance to make a case for reparations before conclusion of the trial by 
virtue of participating in proceedings). There is a chance that victims in the latter 
group may unfairly receive preferential treatment, which the Court and the Fund have 
to consider. 
For the above reasons, those who look to the VTF or the Court in general as a 
panacea to all victims’ problems are likely to be disappointed. While one must urge 
member states to increase contributions to the VTF and for the Fund and the Court to 
seek ways, as suggested in this study, of implementing reparations, situation countries 
– those states under investigation by the ICC and from which victims are drawn – 
cannot abandon their primary responsibility of providing appropriate remedies for 
victims. Mere referral of a situation to the ICC should not be the last act undertaken by 
the state in response to mass atrocities. Just like the ICC can only prosecute those who 
bear the greatest responsibility, it cannot be expected to bear the burden of providing 
reparations and other appropriate remedies to all victims. Even when the ICC orders 
reparations in respect of victims or the VTF institutes projects, the site of 
implementation – where relevant mechanisms should be established – is at the national 
level. It is discouraging for victims that in all the four situation countries – Uganda, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and the Sudan – no 
domestic reparations schemes have been instituted. 
The Rome Statute promises a lot for victims of international crimes. As argued, 
the Court has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the rights guaranteed – to 
participate at all stages of the proceedings, and to reparations – are given effect. In 
view of the limits of retributive justice, the paradigm of justice to be adopted by the 
Court is crucial. The thesis motivated and argued for a restorative justice model of 
justice as one that best accommodates the tripartite interests of law enforcement, 
defendants and victims rights. It suggested that apart from giving a voice to victims, as 
an interpretative framework, restorative justice constitutes the best way of 
understanding how the provisions in the Rome Statute – at least the key ones that go to 
the objectives of the Court – fit together.  
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